585. h 32

THE HISTORY OF GREECE.

VOL. III.

A C T III

C K E C E'

H I S I O K K

THE

HISTORY

OF

GREECE.

By WILLIAM MITFORD, Esq.

THE THIRD VOLUME.

LONDON:

PRINTED FOR T. CADELL, JUN. AND W. DAVIES

(SUCCESSORS TO MR. CADELL)

IN THE STRAND.

M DCC XCVII.

BRITISH MUSEUM

C. B. E. C. F.

HISTORY

CONTENTS

OF THE

THIRD VOLUME.

CHAPTER XXI.

History of ATHENS from the Concluſion of the PELOPONNESIAN WAR and the Eſtabliſhment of the SUPREME COUNCIL of THIRTY, commonly called The THIRTY TYRANTS, to the Reſtoration of the DEMOCRACY by THRASYBULUS.

SECT. I. *Recapitulatory ſynopſis of the Peloponneſian War. Deficiency of the Greeks in Political Science. Condition of ſlaves meliorated by the Peloponneſian War. Character of the Athenian Democracy: Judicature; revenue; ſycophancy; theatrical ſatire; law of treaſon* - - 1

SECT. II. *Firſt meaſures of the Supreme Council of Thirty at Athens: Views of the Thirty: Critias; Theramenes; Violences of the Thirty: Death of Theramenes* - - - - - 24

SECT. III. *Farther violences of the Thirty: Meaſures of Thraſybulus againſt the Thirty: Peiræus occupied by the Athenian refugees under Thraſybulus: Death of Critias: the Thirty depoſed and a Supreme Council of Ten elected: Interference of Lacedæmon: the Athenian Democracy reſtored* - 37

CHAPTER XXII.

Illuſtrations, from the Orators and Philoſophers, of the CIVIL HISTORY of ATHENS and the Condition of the Athenian People, between the Ages of Pericles and Demoſthenes; with a ſummary View of the Riſe of PHILOSOPHY and LITERATURE in GREECE.

SECT. I. *Short political quiet at Athens. Tranſcription of Solon's Laws. Violence of party-ſtrife renewed: Sycophancy revived: Riſe of the Rhetoricians. Proſecutions,*

Proſecutions, of the ſon of Alcibiades; of the nephews of Nicias; of a citizen ſuppoſed to have appropriated property forfeited to the commonwealth; of thoſe who proſecuted the aſſaſſins of Phrynichus; of a citizen for grubbing the ſtump of a ſacred olive-tree - - - 52

SECT. II. *Proſecution of Andocides for impiety: Petition of Andocides for a decree of protection* - - - - 68

SECT. III. *Virtuous age of Greece romantic: Deficiency of Grecian Morality. Summary view of the origin and progreſs of Grecian Philoſophy. Religious perſecution. Sophiſts; Socrates* - - - 83

CHAPTER XXIII.

Tranſactions of the GREEKS in ASIA and THRACE, from the Concluſion of the PELOPONNESIAN WAR, in which Perſia was the Ally of Lacedæmon, to the Renewal of WAR between LACEDÆMON and PERSIA.

SECT. I. *Increaſed connection of Grecian affairs with Perſian. Succeſſion of Artaxerxes Mnemon to the Perſian throne. Weakneſs of the Perſian government. Grecian forces raiſed by Cyrus, brother of the king: Clearchus, Proxenus, Xenophon* - - - - 100

SECT. II. *March of Cyrus to Babylonia: Battle of Cunaxa* - 107

SECT. III. *Return of the Greeks: Treaty with the king: March through Meſopotamia and Media: Circumvention of the Generals* - - 126

SECT. IV. *Return of the Greeks. Election of new Generals; Grecian Military Law: Paſſage of Mount Taurus; March through Armenia: Arrival at Trapezus* - - - - - 140

SECT. V. *Return of the Greeks. Tranſactions at Trapezus, Ceraſus, (beneficial effect of Grecian Superſtition) Cotyora, (ſpirit of Grecian Military Diſcipline) Sinopë, Heracleia, Port-Calpë: Authority of Lacedæmonian officers: Arrival at Chryſopolis* - - - - - 164

SECT. VI. *Return of the Greeks. Tranſactions at Byzantium: Deſpotiſm of Lacedæmonian commanders: Summary of the affairs of Thrace: Service of the army with the Thracian prince Seuthes: Paſſage to Aſia, and march to join the Lacedæmonian forces* - - - - 190

CHAPTER

CONTENTS.

CHAPTER XXIV.

History of LACEDÆMON from the Reſtoration of the ATHENIAN Democracy, and Affairs of the GREEKS in ASIA from the Renewal of War between LACEDÆMON and PERSIA, till the Recall of AGESILAUS from ASIA, in Conſequence of renewed War within GREECE.

SECT. I. *War reſolved by Lacedæmon againſt Perſia: Thimbron commander-in-chief: Joined by the Cyreian Greek forces. Liberality of the Perſian government. Dercyllidas commander-in chief: Truce with the ſatrap of Lydia, and war with the ſatrap of Bithynia. Mania ſatrapeſs of Æolia: Succeſſes of Dercyllidas in Æolia. Winter operations in Bithynia. Protection given to the Cherſoneſe. Proſperity of the Grecian Colonies. Ill-judged orders from Lacedæmon. Danger of the Grecian Colonies. Treaty concluded between Dercyllidas and Tiſſaphernes, for the complete emancipation of the Aſian Greeks from Perſian dominion* - - - - - 207

SECT. II. *War of Lacedæmon and Elis. Death of Agis, king of Lacedæmon, and ſucceſſion of Ageſilaus. Sedition in Lacedæmon* - 221

SECT. III. *War renewed with Perſia. Inſult of the Thebans to Ageſilaus. Firſt campain of Ageſilaus in Aſia. Preparations for the ſecond campain. Battle of the Pactolus. Death of Tiſſaphernes. Weakneſs of the Perſian government* - - - - - - - 231

SECT. IV. *Miſſion of Timocrates into Greece from the ſatrap of Lydia: Bribery of the democratical leaders in the Grecian republics: Enmity excited againſt Lacedæmon: War between Phocis and Locris leading to war between Lacedæmon and Thebes: Athens gained to the Theban alliance: Invaſion of Bœotia: Death of Lyſander: Proſecution and flight of Pauſanias king of Lacedæmon* - - - - - 243

SECT. V. *Plan of Ageſilaus for diſmembering the Perſian empire: Alliance of the prince of Paphlagonia with Lacedæmon: Winter campain in Bithynia: Conference between Ageſilaus and Pharnabazus* - - 249

CONTENTS.

CHAPTER XXV.

Affairs of GREECE, and Tranſactions of the GREEKS in ASIA, from the Eſtabliſhment of the GENERAL CONFEDERACY againſt LACEDÆMON, to the TREATY between LACEDÆMON and PERSIA, and the Reëſtabliſhment of the LACEDÆMONIAN POWER in GREECE, through the GENERAL PEACE dictated in the KING of PERSIA's Name, commonly called the PEACE of ANTALCIDAS.

SECT. I. *Confederacy in Greece againſt Lacedæmon: Recall of Ageſilaus from Aſia: Propoſed invaſion of Laconia: Battle of Corinth: March of Ageſilaus to Greece. Summary view of the hiſtory of Cyprus: Evagoras prince of Salamis: Combination in Aſia againſt Lacedæmon: Fleet under Conon: Defeat of the Lacedæmonian fleet near Cnidus. Victory of Ageſilaus near Coroneia. Succeſſes of Pharnabazus and Conon, and downfall of the Lacedæmonian dominion in Aſia* - - - 256.

SECT. II. *Sedition of Corinth. Singular union of Corinth with Argos. Succeſſes of the Lacedæmonian general Praxitas, near Corinth* - 271.

SECT. III. *Invaſion of Laconia by Pharnabazus and Conon. Reſtoration of the long walls of Athens. Seafight in the Corinthian gulph* - 279.

SECT. IV. *Improvement of the Grecian art of war by the Athenian general Iphicrates. Affairs of Phlius. Succeſſes of Iphicrates in Peloponneſus. Antalcidas ambaſſador from Lacedæmon, and Conon from Athens, to the ſatrap of Lydia. Expeditions of Ageſilaus into Argolis and Corinthia. Slaughter of a Lacedæmonian mora. Farther ſucceſſes of Iphicrates* - 282.

SECT. V. *Unſteddineſs of the Perſian government: War renewed by Lacedæmon againſt Perſia: Thimbron commander-in-chief. Expedition into Acarnania under Ageſilaus; into Argolis under Ageſipolis* - - 293.

SECT. VI. *Affairs of Rhodes. Diphridas commander-in-chief of the Lacedæmonians in Aſia; ſucceeded by Teleutias. An Athenian fleet ſent to Aſia under Thraſybulus: Aſiatic and Thracian dominion recovered to Athens. Death of Thraſybulus and Conon. Anaxibius commander-in-chief of the Lacedæmonians in Aſia, Iphicrates of the Athenians: Defeat and death of Anaxibius* - - - - - 299.

SECT.

CONTENTS.

SECT. VII. *Freebooting war of the Æginetans againſt Attica: Siege of Ægina. Teleutias commander on the Grecian coaſt: Antalcidas commander in Aſia, and again ambaſſador from Lacedæmon to the ſatrap of Lydia. Able conduct of Antalcidas, in military command and in negotiation. Treaty concluded between Lacedæmon and Perſia, and Peace dictated to Greece by the Lacedæmonian government, in the king of Perſia's name, commonly called the Peace of Antalcidas* - - - - 307

CHAPTER XXVI.

Affairs of GREECE, from the PEACE of ANTALCIDAS till the Depreſſion of the LACEDÆMONIAN POWER and the Elevation of THEBES to Supremacy among the GRECIAN REPUBLICS, by the Battle of LEUCTRA.

SECT. I. *Deſpotiſm of Lacedæmon: Puniſhment of Mantineia: Reſtoration of Phliaſian exiles* - - - - - 319

SECT. II. *Uncommon tranquility in Greece. New political phenomenon in Greece: Inconvenience of the Grecian political ſyſtem: Growing power of Olynthus: War reſolved againſt Olynthus by the Congreſs of the Lacedæmonian Confederacy* - - - - - 323

SECT. III. *Iniquitous conduct of Lacedæmon toward Thebes. Complete ſubjection of Thebes to Lacedæmon. Trial of Iſmenias, polemarc of Thebes. Teleutias commander-in-chief againſt Olynthus. Defeat and death of Teleutias* - - - - - 328

SECT. IV. *Ageſipolis commander-in-chief againſt Olynthus. Rebellion in Phlius againſt Lacedæmon: Ageſilaus commander againſt Phlius: Delphion demagogue of Phlius: Surrender of Phlius. Death of Ageſipolis: Polybiades commander-in-chief againſt Olynthus: Reduction of Olynthus* - 336

SECT. V. *Apparent confirmation and real inſtability of the Lacedæmonian authority in Greece. Conſpiracy and revolution in Thebes* - 342

SECT. VI. *Motives, at Lacedæmon, for lenient conduct toward Thebes. Command in war againſt Thebes, declined by Ageſilaus, committed to Cleombrotus. Uncommon ſtorm. Change in Athenian politics, adverſe to Thebes* 349

SECT. VII. *Motives of the Theban leaders for perſevering in oppoſition to Lacedæmon: Pelopidas, Epameinondas. Corruption of the Lacedæmonian general*

ral Sphodrias: Weak conceſſion of Ageſilaus: Renewal of connection between Athens and Thebes. Ageſilaus commander againſt Thebes. State of the ſmaller republics of Greece. The Thebaïd ravaged: Winter campain. Second invaſion of the Thebaïd under Ageſilaus: Sedition at Theſpiæ - 354

SECT. VIII. *Diſtreſs and exertions of Thebes: Naval aſſiſtance obtained from Athens; Timotheus commander. Preſſure upon Lacedæmon and ſucceſſes of Thebes. Accommodation and breach again between Lacedæmon and Athens: Siege of Corcyra by the Lacedæmonians: Succeſſes of the Athenians under Iphicrates* - - - - - 361

SECT. IX. *Tyranny of Thebes in ſucceſs: Diſſatisfaction of Athens: General Peace negotiated by Athens: Refuſal of Thebes to accede to the terms of the treaty* - - - - - 374

SECT. X. *Independency of the Bœotian towns, aſſerted by the Lacedæmonians, reſiſted by the Thebans: Battle of Leuctra* - - 379

CHAPTER XXVII.

Affairs of GREECE, from the Elevation of THEBES, by the Battle of LEUCTRA, to the Failure of the Attempt to extend the THEBAN SUPREMACY over GREECE, through Support from PERSIA.

SECT. I. *Reception of news of the Battle of Leuctra, at Lacedæmon, at Athens. Jaſon of Pheræ in Theſſaly; Polydamas of Pharſalus: Jaſon elected tagus of Theſſaly: Power and great views of Jaſon: Mediation of Jaſon between the Lacedæmonians and Thebans: Magnificent preparation of Jaſon for the Pythian feſtival: Death and ſucceſſors of Jaſon: Fall of the Theſſalian power* - - - - - 386

SECT. II. *Partiality, among the Peloponneſians, for the Lacedæmonian ſupremacy. Congreſs at Athens: Ceſſation of jealouſy of Perſia: Oppoſition of Elis to the propoſal for the univerſal independency of Grecian cities. Irritating conduct of the democratical party in Mantineia toward Lacedæmon. Evils reſulting from the ſeparate independency of cities. Liberal project of the Tegeans for a union of the Arcadian cities illiberally executed: Violent interference of the Mantineians: Arbitrary aſſumption of authority by the Lacedæmonians: Union of Arcadia accompliſhed, and Megalopolis founded* 396

SECT.

SECT. III. *Invaſion of Arcadia under Ageſilaus: Superior conduct of the Theban leaders: Invaſion of Laconia by the army of the Theban confederacy, under Epameinondas: Reſolution of the Athenians to ſupport Lacedæmon. Retreat of Epameinondas from Peloponneſus: Reſtoration of the Meſſenians: Diſtreſs of Sparta* - - - - - - - 406

SECT. IV. *Bad arrangement of military command by the popular aſſembly of Athens: Second invaſion of Peloponneſus by the Thebans under Epameinondas. Lycomedes of Mantineia: Alienation of Arcadia from the Theban intereſt: Military merit of the Arcadians. Quarrel of Arcadia with Elis. Congreſs at Delphi, aſſembled at the inſtance of a miniſter of the ſatrap of Bithynia. The Tearleſs Battle, won by Archidamus ſon of Ageſilaus. Expedition of the Thebans into Theſſaly, under Pelopidas. Embaſſies from the principal Grecian republics to the Perſian court. Able and ſucceſsful conduct of Pelopidas, ambaſſador from Thebes: Congreſs at Thebes: Attempt of Thebes to acquire the ſupremacy of Greece, through the ſupport of Perſia, defeated* 416

CHAPTER XXVIII.

Affairs of GREECE, from the Failure of the Attempt to eſtabliſh the SUPREMACY of THEBES over the GRECIAN REPUBLICS, through the Support of PERSIA; till the Depreſſion together of the ARISTOCRATICAL and DEMOCRATICAL Intereſts, and the Diſſolution of the antient Syſtem of GRECIAN CONFEDERACY, through the Event of the Battle of MANTINEIA.

SECT. I. *Difficult circumſtances of the Theban adminiſtration. Affairs of Achaia: Advantageous conſtitution of Achaia, and advantageous character of its people: Interference of Thebes: Generous policy of Epameinondas: Impolitic illiberality of the Theban Confederacy. Miſeries, virtues, and injoyments of the people of the ſmaller republics, exemplified in the hiſtory of Phlius* - - - - - 429

SECT. II. *Affairs of Sicyon: Euphron tyrant of Sicyon: Liberal deſpotiſm of Æneas, general of Arcadia: Principles of Grecian Law of Nations and of Theban Civil Juriſprudence, illuſtrated: Public honors to the memory of Euphron* - - - - - 439

SECT.

CONTENTS.

SECT. III. *Affairs of Athens: Athenian exiles: Progreſs of change in Grecian politics adverſe to Theban ſupremacy: Alliance of Arcadia with Athens: Inſecurity of perſon in Greece: Alienation of Corinth from Athens: New preſſure upon Lacedæmon: Magnanimity of Lacedæmon: Uprightneſs of Corinth: Partial Peace: Injuſtice of Argos* - - - 447

SECT. IV. *Conſiderations on which the conduct of Lacedæmon was founded: Diſpoſition of Athens: Narrow views of Grecian politicians: Advantage of the meaſures of Ageſilaus: Progreſs of diſſention among the Peloponneſian confederates of Thebes: War of Arcadia and Elis. Danger of Thebes from ſedition; cruelty of the Thebans. War of Thebes in Theſſaly; death of Pelopidas. Project of Epameinondas to make Thebes a maritime power* 454

SECT. V. *Invaſion of Eleia by the Arcadians, of Arcadia by the Lacedæmonians: Arcadian Eparites, or Select Militia: Liberality in Grecian law of war. Interference of the Arcadians in the preſidency of the Olympian feſtival; battle of Olympia* - - - - 463

SECT. VI. *Sacrilegious robbery of the Olympian treaſury, by the democratical adminiſtration of Arcadia: Oppoſition of Mantineia to the ſacrilege: Support ſolicited from Thebes by the perpetrators: Remonſtrance againſt interference from Thebes by the Arcadian ſoverein aſſembly: Congreſs at Tegea: Violence of the Theban commiſſioner; ſupported by Epameinondas: Reünion of Arcadia, Achaia, and Elis, in alliance with Lacedæmon* - 469

SECT. VII. *Principles of Grecian politics. Fourth expedition of the Thebans, under Epameinondas, into Peloponneſus; ſecond invaſion of Laconia; battle of Mantineia* - - - - 477

SECT. VIII. *General Pacification; Lacedæmon excluded: Troubles in Arcadia; Interference of Athens: Views of Ageſilaus. Affairs of the Eaſt: War of Evagoras with Perſia: Rebellion of the Perſian maritime provinces. Expedition of Ageſilaus to Egypt: Death of Ageſilaus: Diſtraction together of the Ariſtocratical and Democratical intereſts in Greece, and Diſſolution of the antient ſyſtem of Grecian Confederacy* - - 491

SECT. IX. *Illuſtration of the ſtate of Greece: Seditions, in Argos, Phialeia, Corinth, Megara, Sicyon, Phlius, Theſſaly: Proſperity, of Megara, Cos, Sicyon, Rhodes, the Aſiatic cities: Circumſtances promoting the cultivation of Science, Arts, and Commerce: Proſperity of Athens: Memorials of Xenophon* - - - - - 504

THE

THE HISTORY OF GREECE.

CHAPTER XXI.

History of ATHENS from the Concluſion of the PELOPONNESIAN WAR and the Eſtabliſhment of the SUPREME COUNCIL of THIRTY, commonly called The THIRTY TYRANTS, to the Reſtoration of the DEMOCRACY by THRASYBULUS.

SECTION I.

Recapitulatory ſynopſis of the Peloponneſian War. Deficiency of the Greeks in Political Science. Condition of Slaves meliorated by the Peloponneſian War. Character of the Athenian Democracy: Judicature; revenue; ſycophancy; theatrical ſatire; law of treaſon.

IN the long and complicated war which it has been the buſineſs of the preceding chapters to relate, the reader would in vain look for campaigns upon the extenſive ſcale of Hannibal's in Italy, Cæſar's in various parts of the antient world, or many in modern Europe. It was not a war between two great ſtates, but between two confederacies of ſmall ſtates, with intermingled territories. The objects of attack and defence

were thus numerous and ſcattered. At the ſame time the Lacedæmonian confederacy, ſtrong in diſciplined numbers, was deficient in pecuniary reſources; while the very purpoſe of Athens, defenſive war, reſtrained her operations to a correſpondency with thoſe of her enemies. Hence, in the account of Thucydides, digeſted ſcrupulouſly according to the order of events, the Peloponneſian war may appear, to ſuperficial obſervation, an unconnected ſeries of action, in which the enterprizes had often no very near relation to each other, or to the firſt and great object of the contending parties. In the foregoing narrative, it has always been in view to guard the reader againſt a miſtake, into which ſome writers on the ſubject have fallen; yet, to enable him to follow, with greater facility, the clue of Grecian politics, through ſucceeding times, it may be advantageous here briefly to retrace the principal features of that multifarious ſeries of events [1].

The Peloponneſian war was truly a civil war: it was leſs a conteſt between Lacedæmon and Athens than between the oligarchal and democratical intereſts throughout the Grecian commonwealths; in every one of which was a party friendly to the public enemy; with whom it had a community of intereſt, not, as may happen in modern Europe, accidental, unprincipled, and paſſing, but fundamental and permanent; ſo that, with the ſucceſs of that public enemy, not only the political welfare of the party, but the private welfare of its members, was intimately, and, for the

[1] Barthelemi, in the Grecian hiſtory which he has interwoven in his Voyage du jeune Anacharſis, after a conciſe account of the firſt campain of the Peloponneſian war, proceeds thus: 'Les campagnes qui la ſuivirent n'offrent de même qu'une 'continuité d'actions particuliéres, de courſes rapides, d'entrepriſes qui ſemblent etrangéres à 'l'objet qu'on ſe propoſoit de part & d'autre. 'Comment des peuples ſi guerriers & ſi voiſins, 'animés par une ancienne jalouſie, & des haines 'recentes, ne ſongeoient ils qu'à ſe ſurprendre à 's'éviter, à partager leurs forces, &, par une 'foule de diverſions, ſans éclat ou ſans danger, 'à multiplier et prolonger les malheurs de la 'guerre? C'eſt parceque cette guerre ne devoit 'pas ſe conduire ſur le même plan que les autres.' This ſolution of the difficulty can ſcarcely but excite a ſmile; and the more detailed explanation which the learned author proceeds to attempt, will not be found very ſatisfactory. It is however the merit of Barthelemi's work, a rich mine of information concerning the intereſting people he deſcribes, that makes it important to expoſe his deficiencies and errors. Tho he paſſed much of his time in the houſe of a miniſter, the late Duke of Choiſeuil, he ſeems to have been no politician. Certainly he had no clear inſight into the complicated politics of Greece. His fellowcountryman Rollin, tho an academician, had juſter views of Grecian hiſtory. If Rollin had avoided to interrupt and perplex his narrative with anecdotes, biography, and preaching, which might have been better thrown into an appendix, his book, inſtead of being eſteemed fit only for boys, might have maintained its reputation as the beſt epitome of Grecian hiſtory that has yet appeared.

moſt

moſt part, inſeparably implicated. The apprehenſion excited, among the oligarchal ſtates, by the growing preponderance of the Athenian democracy, rendered terrible by its ſpirit of conqueſt, its ſpirit of tyranny, and its particular diſpoſition to overthrow and oppreſs the oligarchal intereſt, was the real ſource of the war[z]. The purpoſe of the Peloponneſians therefore, tho in offenſive meaſures, was, not to conquer Athens, but only to reduce her to a ſtate of inability to conquer them. For this end it was held ſufficient, and it was deemed alſo indiſpenſably neceſſary, to deprive her of that dominion over other Grecian ſtates, which, by affording a ſuperior revenue, inabled her to maintain the moſt formidable navy to that time known in the world, and to carry hoſtilities to diſtant countries, by land as well as by ſea. The invaſion of Attica, for two ſucceſſive years, had this for its principal object; the ſiege of Platæa, and the unavailing attempt at naval exertion, equally followed with the ſame view. Meanwhile it was the purpoſe of Pericles to ſtrengthen Athens, if poſſible, by alliance, but not by conqueſt. It ſufficed to let her enemies weary and impoveriſh themſelves with fruitleſs attack, and the conſequences would be equal to victory: her power would be at leaſt confirmed, and probably extended. And in theſe views he was favored by the circumſtances of the Athenian dominion, and by the warfare of the age. For the Athenian dominion conſiſted moſtly of ilands and tranſmarine territories, ſecure through the ſuperiority of the Athenian fleet; and tho a country could leſs eaſily be defended, againſt a ſuperior invading force, with antient than with modern weapons, yet towns derived a ſecurity from fortifications, which, againſt the modern art of attack, no art of defence can give.

Sect. 5. ch. 13. of this Hiſt.

But what the Peloponneſian arms alone could not accompliſh, the peſtilence, coöperating with them, in ſome degree effected. The ſeverity of the preſſure upon Athens at home, incouraged the oligarchal, and checked the democratical intereſt in her forein dependencies. In ſome of them inſued what, in modern phraſe, we ſhould call a change of adminiſtration;

[z] The alarm lately ſpred over Europe by a ſimilar ſpirit, carried indeed to a greater extravagance, in the French democracy, may poſſibly be ſuppoſed to have furniſhed this idea; but it was derived purely from the Grecian cotemporary hiſtorians; and indeed the paſſage was written before the ſpirit of conqueſt and tyranny among the French had given the lie direct to their pretenſion of peaceful and equitable principles.

and inſtantly as the oligarchal became the prevailing party, revolt was ripe: with the firſt favoring opportunity the Athenian connection was renounced, and the Lacedæmonian adopted. Thus the operations of the war became diſtracted and complex, while the principal object remained ſimple and the ſame. The command of the ſea nevertheleſs inabled the Athenians to vindicate their tranſmarine dominion; the extraordinary affair of Pylus put pledges into their hands which inſured Attica againſt farther invaſion; and thus, near five years after the death of Pericles, the purpoſe of that great ſtateſman was accompliſhed in the acquiſition of means for making an honorable and advantageous peace. But unfortunately, in the want of his ſuperintending wiſdom, the popular will, bandied from orator to orator, and often ſubjected to the unworthieſt, owned no principle but of ambition and avarice, inflamed by ſucceſs; till, Braſidas obtaining the direction of the enemy's arms, and Cleon of their own, defeat reſtored among the Athenians the moderation which ſucceſs had baniſhed, and peace was made.

Such was the firſt ſeries of action of the Peloponneſian war. The antient enmity of Lacedæmon and Argos, in concurrence with the riſing ambition of Alcibiades, produced a ſecond; abundantly complicated, tho within a narrow field. But ſtill, reduced to its elements, it was a conteſt between oligarchy and democracy.

The circumſtances of Sicily led to a third ſeries. Here a new principle was the ſpring; and, here firſt, conqueſt upon a great ſcale came into view. Democracy here was oppoſed to democracy. But unlike thoſe little democratical ſtates, which could only ſupport themſelves under the protecting power of Athens, Syracuſe was ſo powerful as to aſſert its own dominion over almoſt all the other Grecian cities of Sicily. Such a democracy was perhaps even more obnoxious to the domineering temper of the Athenian people, than the moſt abſolute oligarchy or monarchy. Thus the jealouſy and the ambition of the Athenian people were led readily to ſecond the ambition of Alcibiades. But on the removal of the able projector, the magnificence of the project ſhrunk, and with the overthrow of the Athenian forces in Sicily, the principle upon which the Sicilian war was begun, totally loſt its energy.

From the Sicilian war then reſulted a fourth and concluding ſeries of action; abundantly complicated in its circumſtances, but in principle brought

brought back to the original ſpring, the oppoſition of intereſt of the democratical and oligarchal parties throughout Greece. The prominent points of that ſeries were, the revolt of the Athenian dependencies; war transferred to the Aſiatic coaſt; the connection of Lacedæmon with Perſia; ſedition in Athens itſelf, with the ſhort triumph of the oligarchal party there, more hoſtile to their fellowcountrymen of the oppoſite intereſt than to the common enemy; and thence that weakneſs and inſtability in all the powers of government, which ſuperinduced the defeat of Aigoſpotami, and the capture of the city.

Able in war, ſkilful, perhaps to the utmoſt extent of human ability, in political intrigue and political negotiation, in leading fellowcitizens, in bargaining with ſtrangers, the Greeks were unfortunately deficient in the more important ſcience of framing that great machine which we call a Government; harmonizing the various ranks of men of which a nation muſt conſiſt; providing, at the ſame time, ſecurity for property, and equal juſtice for thoſe who have no property; eſtabliſhing, for the well-diſpoſed of every rank, an intereſt in the preſervation of the conſtitution, and, for the unprincipled and turbulent, ſtrong coercion to ſecure it againſt diſturbance; reconciling the protection of private rights with the maintenance of public force, and making a general private intereſt in the ſupport of the exiſting order of things the baſis of patriotiſm, and the ſource of general concord and public-ſpirit. In the preceding chapters we have traced the riſe and downfal of the moſt celebrated democracy that has appeared in the world: we have ſeen the wonderful force of that form of government as a ſpring, which inabled ſo ſmall a community to become ſuch a formidable power, to acquire ſuch extenſive dominion, and to exhibit, within ſo ſhort a period, ſo many exalted characters. But we have ſeen too its utter unfitneſs both to give ſecurity under equal law to its own people, and to reſt in peace among neighboring ſtates; its diſpoſition to exerciſe the moſt oppreſſive tyranny againſt the moſt illuſtrious of its own citizens, and the moſt imperious and cruel deſpotiſm over thoſe who were ſo unfortunate as to fall under its ſovereinty in the condition of ſubjects; and we have ſeen that, tho it might have reſiſted the combination, which its injurious and alarming conduct excited, of the moſt powerful military confederacy with the wealthieſt empire to that time known, yet the higheſt ſpirit in the peo-

ple,

ple, with very uncommon abilities in the leaders, was unable to avert the ruin which ſuch a government hath an eternal tendency to bring upon itſelf.

The benefit of inſtruction, and the amuſement of intereſting inveſtigation, ſhould reward the painful contemplation of the crimes, follies, and miſeries of mankind, which it is the office of hiſtory to relate. Any gratification ariſing from matter pleaſing in itſelf, muſt be placed to the account of incidental gain; but, when occaſionally we find, in the courſe of events, good beaming upon men, or evil alleviated, the ſatisfaction will be greater in proportion as the ſurrounding ſcene is dark and the relief unexpected. We have had occaſion to obſerve that misfortune could ſcarcely befal a Grecian ſtate, ſo imperfectly were the Grecian governments harmonized, but benefit, or at leaſt the proſpect of benefit, would reſult to ſome conſiderable portion of its members. We ſhall be more gratified to find that, with the various miſeries which a war of twenty-ſeven years diffuſed among thoſe called citizens of the Greek nation, it brought a very general alleviation of evil to, that more numerous portion of mankind, the Grecian ſlaves. When all neighboring republics were friendly, the ſlave looked around in vain for refuge from the cruelty of an inhuman maſter; but if they were hoſtile, it behoved equally the wealthy deſpot of many ſlaves, and the poor tyrant of one, to beware how he ſet the wretch upon comparing the riſk of deſertion with the hope of a better ſervice. The Grecian republics indeed were not all intirely without laws for the protection of that unfortunate portion of the human race: at Athens particularly, the wiſe and humane inſtitutions of Solon provided for them a lot that other ſlaves might envy. Yet even at Athens they might be very cruelly treated; and even there the war produced regulations to ſoften their condition. What the antient hiſtorians have left unnoticed (for ſlaves came little within their regard) we learn from the celebrated comic poet of the day. In the comedy yet extant called The Clouds, we find an old country-gentleman of Attica ludicrouſly execrating the war, becauſe he was no longer permitted to beat his ſlaves.

Ariſtoph. Nub. v. 7.

Thus incidentally only we get information of the condition of thoſe who formed the largeſt part of the population of the boaſted free republics of Greece. Of the lot of their maſters, the citizens, or however of thoſe of

Athens,

Athens, in ſo many reſpects the firſt of the republics, our information is large; and coming from cotemporary writers, of various ſituations in life, various views and purſuits, and of various and oppoſite political intereſts, it is, in great proportion, amply authenticated. From this it will be advantageous and even neceſſary to endeavour to ſelect and throw together here what may be wanting to elucidate the views, and account for the actions of thoſe to whom, on the ſurrender of the city to the Lacedæmonian arms, the ſupreme power was committed. Without ſuch preparation, the conduct of men among the firſt of Greece in birth, talents, and education, might appear monſtrous and irrational, and the ſtory, however well atteſted, altogether too ſtrange for belief.

We have already had occaſion to obſerve, that Solon introduced or left, in the Athenian conſtitution, a defect which had the moſt direct and irreſiſtible tendency to its deſtruction. Carefully providing for the reſponſibility of miniſters, he committed abſolute ſovereinty immediately to the multitude, who could be reſponſible to none. The ſame power delegated to repreſentatives who, at ſtated periods, ſhould be reſponſible to the multitude, would not have been ſo haſtily ruinous. He intended indeed that the councils of the Areiopagus and of the Four-Hundred (afterward Five-Hundred) ſhould balance the authority of the popular aſſembly; and they might have been effectual balances to a body repreſentative of the people; but againſt ſoverein power committed immediately to the people at large, no balance could avail: intereſted demagogues inciting, reſtraint was ſoon overborne, and ſo the Athenian government became, what, in the very age, we find it was called, and the people ſeem to have been even pleaſed to hear it called, A TYRANNY IN THE HANDS OF THE PEOPLE[3]. Sect. 4. ch. 5. of this Hiſt.

We want information how Solon compoſed his courts of juſtice; but there ſeems reaſon to believe that, among the changes introduced by Cleiſthenes and Ephialtes, not only his venerable tribunal of the Areiopagus, but the whole judicature of Athens ſuffered. The inſtitution of wages for ſerving in the ten ordinary courts is attributed to Pericles. It was a mode of bribing the people. Three oboles, nearly fourpence ſterling, were Ariſtot. Polit. l. 2. c. 12.

[3] Τυραννίδα ἔχετε τὴν ἀρχήν. Thucyd. l. 2. c. 63, & l. 3. c. 37.

the

the daily pay of a dicaſt, whoſe office reſembled that of our juryman. The rich and the induſtrious avoided; the poor, the idle, the profligate thenceforward ſought the office: it became their reſource for a livelihood [a]. To extend gratification then among that ſoverein order, the juries were made immoderately numerous. Five hundred was the ordinary number of each. In the ten courts, unleſs the demands of military ſervice interfered, no leſs than ſix thouſand citizens are ſaid to have been employed, except on holidays, daily throughout the year; and, for a cauſe of extraordinary importance, the whole ſix thouſand were ſometimes aſſembled to compoſe the ſingle tribunal called Heliæa. But the holidays themſelves, which interrupted the buſineſs of the courts, afforded alſo a pretence and a mode for bribing the people. They were truly ſeaſons of feſtival; in which the numerous carcaſes of animals killed in ſacrifice were diſtributed to the multitude. Demagogues therefore would omit no opportunity for ingratiating themſelves at ſo eaſy a rate as by the propoſal of a new feſtival; and thus the Athenian holidays were multiplied till they were twice the number of thoſe of any other Grecian city. Still however they were far from equalling thoſe of the Roman church in modern Europe, making, all together, no more than a ſixth part of the year.

Ariſtoph. Veſp.

Andoc. de myſt. p. 9.

Xen. reſp. Athen. c. 2. ſ. 9. & c. 3. ſ. 2 & 8.

In the deficiency therefore of ſubſiſtence provided under the name of Sacrifice, a lawſuit, or, ſtill more, a criminal proſecution, became the delight of the Athenian people. Beſide the certain pay, which was ſmall, there was the hope of bribes, which might be large; while pride was gratified by the importance which accrued to the meaneſt man who could call himſelf an Athenian citizen. Fine and confiſcation, ordinary puniſhments of the Athenian law, conveyed the property of the wealthy to the treaſury, to be thence diſtributed in various ways, theatrical exhibitions, proceſſions, and feaſts, for the gratification of the people, or wages on pretence of paying their ſervices. Suits and proſecutions therefore, incouraged by the intereſt of the ſoverein, became innumerable; and life and property were rendered inſecure beyond what anything ſeen in the moſt profligate of modern European governments would give to imagine under any government poſſi-

[a] 'I ſold ſauſages,' ſays Agoracritus, in The Knights of Ariſtophanes, 'but I got the beſt 'part of my livelih od by judging cauſes.' V. 1239 & 1255. 'And if the archon ſhould 'not order the court to ſit,' ſays a boy in The Waſps, 'how are we to have victuals?' 'Alas,' anſwers his father, 'I fear we muſt go ſupper-'leſs.' V. 309.

ble.

ble. The glorious ſecurity provided by the Engliſh law, which requires the deciſion of a grand jury upon the accuſation, before any man can be ſubjected even to trial, was unknown at Athens. It appears as if liberty was held there (ſo was the ſpirit of Solon's ſyſtem perverted) to conſiſt, not in the ſecurity of every one againſt injury from others, but in the power of every one to injure others. Any man might conſtitute himſelf accuſer againſt any, and the king-archon was bound by his office to bring the accuſed to trial. When the cauſe came before the jury, no right of challenge, the ſecond ſecurity of Engliſhmen, gave the accuſed Athenian means of guarding againſt partiality in his judges. The effect of partiality in ſome, it was indeed propoſed to obviate by multitude, ſuch that the majority ſhould not be likely to concur in it: but the diſadvantages of ſuch a reſource perhaps exceeded its benefits. In no conference among themſelves could the informed and the wary, of ſo numerous a court, correct the prejudices and misjudgement of the ignorant, careleſs, or impaſſioned, or obviate the effects of miſuſed eloquence; nor was it poſſible to make ſo large a portion of the ſoverein people reſponſible for the moſt irregular or flagitious deciſion. Puniſhment could not take place, and among the multitude ſhame was loſt. Under this conſtitution of judicature, the moſt victorious and deſerving general, the ableſt and moſt upright magiſtrate, or the moſt inoffenſive private citizen, might be brought to trial for his life at the pleaſure of the moſt profligate of mankind. Even the allegation of a ſpecific crime, a crime defined by law, was unneceſſary. Conſtructive treaſon, any imputed diſaffection to the ſovereinty of the people, ſufficed; and, as paſſion and prejudice, or the powers of oratory, or ſolicitation and bribery, moved, condemnation or acquittal were pronounced.

Xen reſp. Ath. c. 3. ſ. 12.

Lyſ. or. pro Polyſtr. p. 664. & or. con. Ergocl. p. 820.

We have, from Ariſtophanes, a ludicrous picture, not perhaps greatly inflated, of the importance which the political and judicial ſyſtem of Athens gave to every individual citizen; of the court paid in conſequence to thoſe, moſtly men beyond the age of military ſervice, who gave their time to the tribunals in the office of dicaſt; and of the uſual pride and profligacy of ſuch as could hold any leading influence there. 'We are as 'great as kings,' ſays an old dicaſt. 'The principal men of the common-'wealth watch our riſing in the morning. Preſently one of thoſe who 'have imbeziled public money approaches me, bows humbly, and begs

Veſp. v. 546 —569.

'favor: If ever you yourſelf, he ſays, in any office, or but in the manage-
'ment of a military meſs, robbed your comrades, pity me! He ſtood
'trembling before me as if I was a god.' Allowing for ſomething of cari-
cature, ſtill this is a picture from the life, of democratical probity, modeſty,
and magnanimity; and what has been ſaid of the Athenian judicature
altogether may inable the reader to form ſome judgement of the legal ſecu-
rity provided for life, liberty, and property at Athens.

It may be held as an unfailing political maxim, that where the property of individuals is inſecure, the PUBLIC REVENUE will be ill-adminiſtered. Perhaps Solon, little foreſeeing that his commonwealth would want, did not deſire that it ſhould have, a great revenue. A ſoverein people indeed would not eaſily be perſuaded to pay taxes; but ſome proviſion for public expences would be neceſſary. Attica fortunately poſſeſſed, in the ſilver-mines of Laureium, an advantage unknown in any other part of proper Greece. Thoſe mines were public property; but individuals were allowed to work them for their private benefit, paying only into the public treaſury a twenty-fourth of the ore obtained. This was the great ſource of the regular public revenue of Athens. The ſacred olive-trees, tho the income from them could be but ſmall, were however looked to as a ſecond branch. Theſe, ſcattered among the lands of individuals in various parts of Attica, were conſecrated, together with the ground immediately around them (perhaps originally by the policy of the government, for their ſecurity) to the goddeſs protectreſs of Athens; the fruit was ſold by auction, under the direction of the court of Areiopagus, and the price was paid into the treaſury. A third branch of the Athenian revenue conſiſted in the rents of public lands and houſes, moſtly acquired from individuals by forfeiture.

Xen. de vectig.

Lyſ. or. de oleâ ſacrâ, p.

But among the little ſtates of Greece, the firſt purpoſe of a public revenue was generally leſs to ſupply public than private needs; leſs to ſupport civil and military eſtabliſhments, than to provide a maintenance for citizens without property, without induſtry, and perhaps without objects for induſtry. Solon however was anxious to promote induſtry among his people. He deſired rather that they ſhould earn their livelihood by labor than be maintained in idleneſs; and, not, with the credulous inexperience and deficient foreſight of ſome modern political ſpeculators, ſuppoſing democracy

cracy naturally economical, he propoſed to check its wildneſs and extravagance by committing to his court of Areiopagus a controling power over all iſſues from the treaſury. But the revolutions under Peiſiſtratus, and ſtill much more that under Cleiſthenes, deranged his wiſe inſtitutions: the paſſions of the multitude and the intereſt of demagogues met; and, before the Perſian invaſion, we find the whole revenue from the ſilver-mines diſtributed among the people. This extravagance was remedied, as we have ſeen, by the extraordinary addreſs of Themiſtocles; who, with the advantage of favoring circumſtances, perſuaded the Many to reſign that revenue for public purpoſes, and hence acquired the means to make Athens the greateſt maritime power to that time ſeen in the world.

Sect. 2. ch. 8. of this Hiſt.

We are uninformed by what able ſtateſman, or in what public exigency, the Athenians were perſuaded to ſubmit to a tax, in the manner of the modern cuſtoms, of a fiftieth of the value upon all goods imported, and upon ſome exports. Early in the Peloponneſian war we find it familiar; as well as a ſmall toll, or a kind of exciſe duty, on goods ſold in the markets. The two, forming together a very ſlight burthen, were the only regular and general taxes at any time paid by the Athenian people [5].

Andoc. de myſt. p. 65.

The deficiency of a public revenue, ariſing from ſources ſo ſcanty, was in ſome degree ſupplied by an impoſition, in the manner of a poll-tax, on the metics, thoſe numerous free reſidents in Attica who were not Athenian citizens. This however ſeems to have been not in its amount oppreſſive, any more than in its principle unreaſonable. It was the conſideration for the better protection, or the hope of better protection (ſo deficient were the Grecian governments) which Athens had at leaſt ſometimes afforded, than the cities whence the metics or their forefathers had migrated. Thoſe ſtrangers, ſo injoying many municipal rights in Attica, were not Greeks only, from various cities, but Lydians, Phrygians, Syrians, and other barbarians. Many were traders or manufacturers: they ſeem indeed to

Xen. de vectigal. c. 2. ſ. 3.

5 The articles of the Athenian revenue are thus enumerated by Ariſtophanes—Ἑκαλοσὰς, φρύλαντα, μέταλλ', ἀγορὰς, λιμένας, μισθοὺς καὶ δημιόπρατα. Veſp. v. 657. The amount he reckons two thouſand talents, about five hundred thouſand pounds ſterling. The Ἑκαλοσαὶ, hundredths, appear to have been the ſame tax which Andocides calls fiftieths. Perhaps it may have been doubled after the concluſion of the Peloponneſian war, to ſupply the deficiency of the public revenue ariſing from loſs of dominion. For the other articles the curious reader may conſult the ſcholiaſt on Ariſtophanes, and Xenophon on the Athenian republic, c. 1. ſ. 16—19.

have compoſed the great body of traders and manufacturers of Athens; and through the ſuperior population of that city, the extent of its dominion, and the protection for maritime communication which naval empire afforded to its ſubjects, they could carry on their buſineſs there upon a greater ſcale, and with more certain profit, than in any other ſituation in Greece.

But tho the regular taxes, which the Athenian people would conſent to pay, for the ſupport of that government of which they held in their own hands the immediate ſovereinty, were ſo light, yet, irregular and partial taxes, in their principle inimical to equal freedom, and every way worthy of the moſt deſpotic government, were as the materials of ſtorm in a lowering ſky, threatening always all, but falling chiefly on the higher ranks of citizens. It ſeems likely to have been when the poorer Many were perſuaded to make the patriotic ſurrender of their dividends from the ſilvermines for building a fleet, that the wealthier Few undertook at their own charge to equip the ſhips when built. There was an apparent fairneſs and liberality on both ſides in ſuch a compromiſe. But as the balances of Solon's government were ſucceſſively overthrown, and the popular will became the inſtrument of arbitrary power in the hands of the demagogue of the day, the practice, grown into law, for individuals to equip the fleet, degenerated into a ſource of grievous oppreſſion. Regulated by no certain principle, the wealthier, or thoſe reputed the wealthier citizens, were annually appointed by arbitrary nomination (in the Peloponneſian war to the number of four hundred) to be reſponſible from their private fortunes, ſome ſingly, ſome in partnerſhip with others, for the equipment of a ſhip of war. Intrigue, and popular favor or popular diſpleaſure, decided on whom the burthen ſhould be light, and whom it ſhould oppreſs. Yet whether from a natural ſenſe of juſtice, or ſome remaining prejudice in favor of the old Athenian conſtitution, the perſon who equipped the trireme was generally allowed to command it, or to name the commander.

Xen. Ath. reſp. c. 3. ſ. 4.

Another irregular tax, not unknown where ſingle deſpots have ruled, with the improper name of free-gift, was frequently exacted by the deſpotic democracy of Athens. This, a tax alſo upon the higher ranks only, and perfectly arbitrary, could not fail to become partial and oppreſſive in extreme. Among taxes partaking of the nature of free-gifts, may alſo be

be reckoned the requiſition for the rich to exhibit, at their own expence, theatrical entertainments, and other coſtly ſhows, for the amuſement of the people; taxes ſeverely felt by the higher ranks, tho contributing nothing to the public revenue or the public force.

But Athens, in acquiring extenſive dominion, acquired means to make others pay the principal expence of that force which was to maintain her dominion; and a democracy, leaſt of all governments, would ſcruple any means of profit. The comic poet, one of the moſt informed and clear-ſighted politicians, and however reprehenſible in ſome points, very far from having been altogether the worſt citizen of his age, has painted the popular temper of the day in a ſpeech ſo breathing the pureſt ſpirit of democracy, that, tho already noticed, it may not be ſuperfluous to repeat it here. 'A 'thouſand cities,' it is obſerved by one of the characters in his comedy called The Waſps, 'pay tribute to Athens. Now if each was ordered to 'furniſh ſubſiſtence for only twenty Athenians, twenty thouſand of us 'might live in all eaſe and luxury, in a manner worthy of the dignity of 'the commonwealth and of the trophy of Marathon.' The mixture of ariſtocracy yet remaining in the Athenian conſtitution, prevented any actual attempt to carry a meaſure ſo congenial to what may perhaps not improperly be called the natural politics of the multitude. But in the empire which Athens exerciſed over ſo many tranſmarine cities, a vaſt field for peculation was open; new and greater objects then incited contending factions; and immoderate temptation occurred for thoſe in authority, and thoſe who ſought authority, to put forward meaſures ultimately the moſt adverſe to the public good, if they tended in the moment to gratify the Many. The principal powers of the court of Areiopagus, and eſpecially its ſalutary controul over the treaſury, were thus aboliſhed; and when the commanding abilities of Pericles no longer checked popular extravagance, there followed the groſſeſt dilapidation of the public money, the moſt tyrannical oppreſſion of the allies, and the moſt profligate exerciſe of the pureſt deſpotiſm over the moſt reſpectable citizens. Fine and confiſcation were looked to leſs for the purpoſe of juſtice than of revenue. The temptation to peculate, the inſecurity of innocence, and the hope for crime to eſcape puniſhment, became ſuch, that, amid the general depravity of Grecian governments, Athenian peculation grew proverbial, and it was at

Sect. 2. c. 16. of this Hiſt.

Veſp. v. 705.

Xen. anab. l. 4. c. 6. ſ. 12.

Xen. reſp. Ath. & Sympos.

at the ſame time made a queſtion, whether it was advantageous for an individual to have property, and whether it was advantageous for the commonwealth to have a revenue. If we might believe Ariſtophanes, who almoſt alone, among the poets of the day, dared direct his ſatire on the public ſtage to reſtrain the folly and correct the profligacy of the tyrant multitude, of two thouſand talents, eſteemed the annual amount of the Athenian revenue, except one-tenth, diſtributed among the people for ſerving the office of dicaſt, the whole was conſumed in peculation. We ſhall of courſe impute exaggeration to this round aſſertion, put into the mouth of a comic character; yet, from the concurring teſtimonies of Xenophon and Lyſias (whoſe concurring teſtimonies afford the ſtrongeſt proof, becauſe they were of oppoſite parties) it ſeems not to have been very extravagant. Repeated capital puniſhments, with confiſcation of all property, did not prevent the frequency of an alluring crime, where probity gave no ſecurity. Deſpotic governments, whether the power be in the hands of one or of a multitude, will have a near reſemblance of character. The frequent uſe of the bowſtring, in Turkey at this day, does not prevent the groſſeſt peculation. We find indeed many marks of kindred between the Turkiſh deſpotiſm and the Athenian democracy. It appears to have been a point of policy in the latter, as in the former, to connive at peculation in its ſervants, to approve tacitly their oppreſſion of its ſubjects; to wait patiently till the private fortune, thus iniquitouſly collected, became ſufficiently conſiderable to be a public object, and then to bring the criminal, hitherto the apparent favorite, to judgement, and, condemning him to death or baniſhment, to inrich the treaſury with his ſpoil. We ſhall have occaſion to ſee, in the ſequel, that this was a frequent and rather a favorite mode of collecting revenue at Athens.

Ariſtoph. Veſp. v. 667 & ſeq.

Xen. reſp. Ath. c. 3. ſ. 3.

A treatiſe remains to us from Xenophon expreſſly on the improvement of the Athenian revenue. The title, with the author's name, cannot fail to excite the modern politician's curioſity; who will however probably find himſelf at the ſame time informed, diſappointed, and ſurprized by the contents of the work. Xenophon abandoned Solon's hope of making the Athenian people ſupport themſelves by ſober induſtry: were the thing ever practicable, he thought the ſeaſon for it paſſed. His object therefore was to provide a revenue, leſs for public ſervice than for maintaining the whole

Athenian

Athenian people, as the Lacedæmonians lived, in eaſe and idleneſs. He could deviſe no other remedy for domeſtic evils, ariſing from the neceſſary inquietude of ſoverein beggars; no other means to ſoften that ſpirit of tyranny in the Athenian people, under which ſo many ſubject Grecian ſtates had ſuffered the ſevereſt and moſt contumelious oppreſſion, the conſequences of which had at length brought Athens herſelf to the brink of annihilation [6]. Taxes therefore, to be paid by Athenian citizens, come ſcarcely within his view. The Attic ſilvermines are his great object. The public income from theſe he would improve by a meaſure which, at this day, would not find univerſal approbation. The immoderate proportion of ſlaves already in the population of Attica, the property of individuals, he would increaſe by purchaſing a number on the public account, to work the mines for public benefit. He then conſiders the taxes, the cuſtoms and market-tolls, and the capitation paid by the metics. This branch of the revenue he would improve by the more liberal policy of giving new privileges and increaſed ſecurity to free foreiners ſettling in Attica.

The modern reader, leſs verſed in Grecian politics, will then ſcarcely obſerve without wonder, that while Xenophon is anxious to increaſe the number of forein reſidents and ſlaves, the increaſe of Athenian citizens, the only ſecure and effective ſtrength of a ſtate, appears totally out of his conſideration. But from all the remaining writers of the age we may gather, that the ſpirit of every Grecian government, whether oligarchy or democracy, was generally adverſe to the increaſe of citizens. For every citizen having an intereſt in a certain public capital, increaſe of citizens was increaſe of partners, which would diminiſh every old proprietor's ſhare. If the Athenian commonwealth had had only two or three thouſand citizens, the lands of Attica, cultivated by ſlaves, with the added produce of the ſilvermines, might have made all wealthy. But wealth ſo ill protected, would have invited the rapacity of neighboring people. The combined conſideration, therefore, of the means of ſubſiſtence and gratification, with the means of defence, would decide the degree of population to be deſired.

6 Zeunius of Leipzig, who has publiſhed a collection of Xenophon's ſmaller works, ſuppoſes the Treatiſe on the Revenue to have been written during the war which Athens, in conjunction with Lacedæmon, carried on againſt the Thebans, when Epaminondas was their general. Note, c. 4. ſ. 40. It appears clearly to have been written during a war, and not in any probability ſo early as the Peloponneſian war, but by no means preciſely in what war.

in

in a Grecian republic. But unleſs danger was preſſing, the general diſpoſition was always averſe to an increaſe. The rich diſliked it, as our pariſhes commonly diſlike any increaſe of their reſpective inhabitants, becauſe there was a poor-law at Athens. The poor objected to it, becauſe it would diminiſh their chance of ſubſiſtence from ſacrifices, from treats to their ward, from pay for attendance on the tribunals, from that public allowance which was often given, not to thoſe who beſt deſerved or moſt needed it, but to thoſe who could beſt make intereſt for it. Altogether, the ideä of a common intereſt in a common ſtock, a fundamental principle of every Grecian republic, not only made the averſion to any increaſe of citizens popular, but gave the ableſt politicians (all conſidering ſlaves indiſpenſable) to imagine the neceſſity of limiting the number of citizens, and to a very ſcanty proportion.

Plat. de rep.

A very remarkable project, which ſeems to have been original with Xenophon, next occurs; the eſtabliſhment of a bank, by ſubſcription[1], open for all the Athenian people. The intereſt of money, it appears, was enormous at Athens; an unavoidable conſequence of the wretched inſecurity of perſon and property. Throughout modern Europe, land is, of all property, eſteemed the ſafeſt ſource of income; but in Greece it was held that the ſureſt return was from money lent at intereſt. For in the multiplied diviſion of Greece into ſmall republics with very narrow territories, the produce of land was continually liable to be carried off or deſtroyed by an invading enemy: but a monied fortune, according to Xenophon's obſervation, was ſafe within the city-walls. In proportion then to the intereſt of money, and the inſecurity of all things, the profits of trade will always be high, and thus numbers would be induced to borrow even at a high intereſt. Xenophon therefore propoſed, by lending from the public ſtock, and incouraging commercial adventure by juſt regulations, to raiſe a great revenue, and, by the ſame means, inſtead of oppreſſing to inrich individuals. As a corollary then to his project, when the amount of the ſubſcription, or its profits, ſhould allow, he propoſed to improve the ports of Athens, to form wharfs and docks, to erect halls, exchanges, warehouſes, markethouſes, and inns, for all which tolls or rents ſhould be

Xen. de rectigal. ſ. 9, 10.

De rectigal. ſ. 12, 13.

[1] The word Ἀφορμὴ appears to mean preciſely a *ſubſcription*. It occurs in the 6th, 9th, and 12th ſections. The Greek index added to the Opuſcula Xenophontis of Zeunius may alſo be conſulted for it.

paid,

paid, and to build ſhips to be let to merchants. Thus, while numbers of individuals were incouraged and inabled to employ themſelves for their private benefit, the whole Athenian people would become one great banking company, from whoſe profits every member, it was expected, would derive at leaſt an eaſy livelihood.

Such was Xenophon's project for improving, not ſo much the revenue of the Athenian ſtate, as the condition of the Athenian people, and of all who were in any degree dependent upon them. By taking away from all the incitements of abſolute want, by giving to all a ſtrong intereſt in the preſervation of peace without and good government within, he hoped to make the lower ranks quiet and orderly, and the higher ſecure, and at the ſame time to obviate that oppreſſion of allies and ſubjects, the evils of which had often reverted upon Athens herſelf. The ſcheme, whatſoever difficulties or diſappointments might have occurred in the execution, appears worthy of Xenophon; but unfortunately, paſſing his life in exile, his exertions for the good of his country were confined to ſpeculation.

The groſs vices of the government and judicature gave birth to that evil which, with the name of SYCOPHANCY, ſo peculiarly infeſted Athens. The term originally ſignified information of the clandeſtine exportation of figs. Apparently to gratify the idle populace of the city, at the expence of the landowners, ſome demagogue had procured a law forbidding the exportation of that plentiful production of the Attic ſoil. The abſurdity of the prohibition, however, making the information particularly invidious, the term Sycophant grew into uſe as a general appellation for all vexatious informers. Such was the incouragement which the Athenian government and judicature afforded for theſe, that ſycophancy became a profeſſion, furniſhing a livelihood for many. The ſycophant courted the lower people, and was the terror and ſcourge of the rich. Intimation to a wealthy man that he would be denounced, as able to equip a trireme, or provide a dramatic entertainment, or give a ſupper to his ward, often ſufficed to obtain money for preventing ſo ſerious an evil. But the ſycophant's great engine of profit was accuſation, whether true or falſe; tho falſe accuſation, we are told, was often preferred, as generally more lucrative[8]. Thoſe various public

Ariſtoph. Equit. v. 908 & 919.

Lyſ. or. pro Polyſtr. p. 158 vel 663, & Δῆμ. καταλυσ. p. 171 vel 762.

[8] Τούτων γὰρ (τῶν συκοφάντων) ἔργον ἐστὶ καὶ τοὺς γὰρ ἂν μάλιστα χρηματίζειν. Lyſ. Δῆμ. καταλυσ. μηδὲν ἁμαρτηκότας εἰς ἀτιμίαν καθιστάναι, ἐκ τούτων ἀποδ. p. 171. vel 762.

functions which the wealthy were not allowed to decline, magiſtracies, equipment of ſhips of war, and preſidencies of choral feſtivals, made opportunities endleſs. On the expiration of office, the euthynë, a ſcrutiny before the council, muſt be undergone. Accuſation was then in a manner invited; and if any, however unfounded, was preferred, perſon and property were attached, and remained ſo till judgement was given. The ſycophant was neceſſarily an Athenian citizen; for no other could denounce; but the evidence of ſtrangers and ſlaves was admitted, and often preferred; becauſe they might be examined by torture, which was ſometimes carried to ſuch inhuman ſeverity that the ſufferers died under it. But however little the accuſation could be ſupported, it would always occaſion trouble and expence; and any neglect of the faſtidious multitude would involve danger. Bribes were neceſſary to procure diſpatch from the officers who directed the buſineſs of the courts: an Athenian jury would be ſolicited for favor, or it would pronounce condemnation; and not by the accuſation of Xenophon only, but by the confeſſion of Lyſias, the great advocate for democracy, we are aſſured that, at Athens, equally protection for iniquity might, and juſtice muſt, be bought.

Xen. Athen. reſp. c. 3. ſ. 4.

Lyſ. or. con. Agorat. p. 135, vel 488.

Xen. Athen. reſp. c. 13. ſ. 2. Xen. & Plat. apol. Socr. & Ariſtoph. Veſp. Lyſ. con. Philocr. p. 181, vel 818 & al.

A reſource which, in this wretched inſecurity for innocence under the Athenian government, Socrates recommended and Xenophon approved, may ſhow the extent of the evil. Criton, an Athenian of rank, complained to Socrates (Xenophon ſays he was preſent at the converſation) of the ſeverity of their lot in Athens, who, as he expreſſes himſelf, deſired to concern themſelves only with their own affairs. 'I have a proſecution 'inſtituted againſt me,' he ſaid, 'by perſons whom I never injured, but 'who think I would rather pay ſome money than have much trouble.' 'Do not you keep dogs,' ſaid Socrates, 'to guard your ſheep againſt 'wolves?' 'Yes,' anſwered Criton. 'And could you not engage the 'friendſhip of ſome able man in low circumſtances, who, in return for 'benefits conferred, would make it his buſineſs in the ſame manner to 'guard you againſt ſycophants?' A friend was fortunately found, able and faithful. As an advocate however, he could ſerve his benefactor little; becauſe, in the Athenian courts, the accuſed was generally required to plead in perſon. His buſineſs was, like that of the ſheepdog, to give ſecurity to the fold by attacking the wolf. When Criton was threatened

Xen. Mem. Socr. l. 2. c. 9.

with

with proſecution, he threatened the accuſers; and as their profligacy offered opportunities which Criton's probity denied, in fear of the conſequences, they not only ſtopped their proceedings againſt Criton, but paid his advocate for ſimilar forbearance toward themſelves.

Where ſuch was the beſt reſource that Socrates or Xenophon could deviſe, we may conceive how precarious was the condition of men of property in Athens. Under oligarchy, as we find one of the moſt zealous partizans of democracy confeſſing, to be eſteemed a good citizen, it ſufficed not to covet other men's goods; but, under democracy, no man was maſter of his own: property, perſon, everything, muſt be devoted, not to the ſervice only, but to the pleaſure and fancy of the people. The wealthy were not allowed the choice of leaving Attica, and the conſtitution poſitively denied them the choice of quiet there. To execute the duties of magiſtracy, to equip a ſhip of war, to preſide at a public feaſt, to direct a dramatic entertainment, and to furniſh the whole coſt, were equally required of all ſuppoſed of competent eſtate. Hence indeed ſome ſmall mixture of ariſtocracy remained in the Athenian government. Wealth was the allowed key to office and influence; birth and great connections were not without weight; commands in the army and navy were ſeldom given but to men of birth, education, and conſiderable connections; and even the council and the college of archons, both indeed open to men without property, but not without paſſing the ſcrutiny of the dokimaſia, formed ſome ſmall check upon popular raſhneſs and folly. Hence we find, at intervals, the Athenian affairs ſo ably conducted; and while tumult and deſtruction were preparing within the volcano, the outſide bore an appearance ſo fair and flouriſhing[9].

Lyſ. Δῆμ. καταλυσ. ἀπολ. p. 173. vel 774.

Xen. ſympoſ. c. 4. ſ. 30.

Xen. reſp. Ath. c. 1. ſ. 3.

The ſpirit of tyranny inherent in the Athenian conſtitution, and the diſregard upon principle for property and the convenience and ſatisfaction of individuals, are very ſtrikingly marked in a regulation which we find had the force of law. When an expenſive office, and particularly when the equipment of a trireme was aſſeſſed on any one, he might, for the time, avoid the burthen by indicating a richer man; and, if the ſuperior wealth

Iſocrat.

[9] Under Solon thoſe of competent eſtates only were eligible to office. Afterward magiſtracies were given by lot. Iſocr. Areiop. p. 108, 109. But Xenophon ſays all expenſive offices were ſtill impoſed on the rich—perhaps only choral preſidencies and the command, or the charge of equipment, of ſhips of war.

was denied, offering to exchange eſtates. The perſon ſo challenged had no alternative but to take upon himſelf the office, or accept the exchange. The ſatisfaction, thus, of an Engliſhman in conſidering his houſe and his field more ſecurely his own, under the protection of the law, than a caſtle defended by its garriſon, or a kingdom by its armies, was unknown in Attica. The attachment, therefore, of an Engliſhman to the country where ſuch bleſſings are injoyed, to the conſtitution which gives to injoy them, and to the people who have a common intereſt in defending them, could not there eaſily find place. For men of rank and property, excepting the few who could make the popular will the inſtrument of their own ambition, to be ſatisfied with the Athenian government was impoſſible. It was as dangerous to be rich under the Athenian democracy as under the Turkiſh deſpotiſm; the ſame ſubterfuges were uſed to conceal wealth; the ſame bribery and flattery to preſerve it; with this difference principally, that, in Athens, the flattery was groſſer, in proportion to the low condition of the flattered, and their multitude; which ſo divided the ſhame, that, equally in receiving adulation and committing iniquity, no man bluſhed for himſelf.

Beſide the various modes of vexation and oppreſſion, to which the higher ranks were ſubject in their perſons and properties, another remained by which their characters were affected. Satire againſt the people collectively, ſays Xenophon, the people will not allow; but perſonal ſatire they incourage; well knowing that, while it is permitted to exhibit the wealthy, the noble, the powerful, to popular deriſion and indignation, the meaner will eſcape; or thoſe only will become objects for the poet, who, by aiming at ſome preëminence, ſeparate themſelves from the common cauſe. To what exceſs that licence went, what groſs ribaldry might delight, and what malicious calumny would not diſguſt an Athenian audience, the remaining comedies of Ariſtophanes, who could write equally for the higheſt and loweſt ranks, who could be at the ſame time a conſummate politician and a conſummate buffoon, abundantly teſtify[10]. The calm dignity of a

Xen. reſp. Ath. c. 2. ſ. 18.

Pericles

[10] Ariſtophanes ventured ſatire upon the people collectively; but it required his courage to dare and his abilities to ſucceed in ſuch an attempt. With regard to his ribaldry, we may obſerve that ſomething very like it ſeems to have ſuited the taſte of readers of higher rank than the bulk of the Athe-

Pericles could bear this unmoved: the intriguing ambition of an Alcibiades, exciting poet againſt poet, and mob againſt mob, might even profit from it: but the wealthy and noble of more common and quiet characters, would often ſeverely feel the apprehenſion, if it went no farther, of being expoſed in effigy, by their proper names, to vulgar ſcorn upon the public ſtage, while, in witty dialogue, the moſt malignant turn was given to every the moſt innocent or even meritorious action of their lives. Nor were character and public eſtimation only indangered; for that turn in the public mind might be prepared in the theater, and thoſe prejudices againſt individuals excited, which afterward, in the agora or the tribunals, might produce decrees of confiſcation, baniſhment, or capital condemnation.

In the dialogue remaining to us from Xenophon, intitled The Banquet, an eminent man, reduced by the war from wealth to indigence, is repreſented poſitively declaring that he felt his condition improved by the total loſs of his property; 'inaſmuch,' he ſays, 'as cheerfulneſs and con-'fidence are preferable to conſtant apprehenſion, freedom to ſlavery, being 'waited upon to waiting upon others, being held an aſſured good ſubject 'to being an object of public ſuſpicion. For,' he continues, 'while I lived 'a rich man in this city, I had reaſon to fear the attacks of houſe-'breakers, which with my wealth might indanger my perſon. I was 'then under the neceſſity of courting the ſycophants, knowing it was in 'their power to do me miſchief which I could little return. Nevertheleſs 'I was continually receiving orders, from the people, to undertake ſome 'expence for the commonwealth, and I was not allowed to go any-'where out of Attica. But now I have loſt all my forein property, and 'nothing accrues from my Attic eſtate, and all my goods are ſold, I 'ſleep anywhere fearleſs; I am conſidered as faithful to the government; 'I am never threatened with proſecutions, but I have it in my power to 'make others fear; as a free man, I may ſtay in the country or go out of 'it, as I pleaſe; the rich riſe from their ſeats for me as I approach, and 'make way for me as I walk; I am now like a tyrant, whereas I was before 'an abſolute ſlave; and whereas before I paid tribute to the people, 'now a tribute from the public maintains me.'

Athenian audiences, in the age of Chaucer, in our own country. In calumny, as abundant remaining teſtimony evinces, his cotemporaries far exceeded him; and indeed in every point, blackguard as his jokes often are, yet among the Athenian comedians he may be conſidered as a very gentlemanly poet.

Under

Under the circumſtances which have been ſtated, it will be evident that an irritation inceſſantly working in the minds of the Few againſt the Many would be unavoidable, and in equally unavoidable conſequence the Many would be tormented with an unceaſing jealouſy of the Few; in its foundation ſometimes reaſonable, but generally in its manner illiberal, and often in its meaſure exceſſive. In fact, the balances of Solon's conſtitution were no ſooner overthrown, and ſoverein power become abſolute in the hands of thoſe without property, or rather in the hands of any demagogue who could, for the moment, lead them, than the intereſt of all who had property placed them neceſſarily in the ſituation of conſpirators againſt the exiſting government. Indeed, throughout Greece, the noble and wealthy, ſerved by their ſlaves, not only as domeſtics, but as huſbandmen and manufacturers, had little connection with the poorer Many, but to command them in the oligarchal ſtates, and, in the democratical, to fear, flatter, ſolicit, and either deceive or be commanded by them. No common intereſt, or ſcarcely any, united the two deſcriptions of men; ſo that, for maintaining civil order and holding the ſtate together, flattery and bribes alone could perſuade the multitude, and the only alternative was violence. Hence that impoſſibility of laſting harmony, and that readineſs for extreme diſcord which the Grecian republics ſo ſtrikingly exhibit. What we are familiar with always appears obvious and eaſy; and hence, having ever before our eyes the equal freedom, ſecurity, and eaſe of all ranks among ourſelves, we obſerve with wonder that the abilities and extenſive experience of Xenophon could imagine no remedy for the evils of the Athenian conſtitution, or none in the practicability of which he had any hope, but in the ſubjection of the Many to arbitrary command, either under the Few or under One; and the genius of Plato, in earneſt reſearch after better political principles, could even in viſion propoſe a benefit only to a very ſmall portion of mankind [11].

Xen. Athen. reſp. c. 1. ſ. 1—9. c. 2. ſ. 19, 20. c. 3. ſ. 9, 10, 11. et Cyropæd. Plat. de rep.

[11] Ἐν δυσμίᾳ γὰρ πόλει τὸ βέλτιστον ἴσον εἶναι τῷ δήμῳ, ἀλλὰ τὸ κάκιστον ἐν ἑκάστῃ ἐστὶ πόλει ἴσον τῷ δήμῳ· οἱ γὰρ ὅμοιοι τοῖς ὁμοίοις ἴσοι εἰσί. Xen. Athen. reſp. c. 3. ſ. 10. Xenophon eſteemed the evils of the Athenian conſtitution irremediable, becauſe neceſſarily flowing from the ſovereinty of the people, and to be checked only by putting ſuch a curb on that ſovereinty as, in the nature of things, would lead to its complete overthrow. He ſeems to have ſuppoſed it impoſſible ſo to conſtitute a balanced government as to give it permanency: the people at large, he thought, muſt either command abſolutely or obey implicitly. And, for any experience that hiſtory to this day furniſhes, perhaps he was right: perhaps a balanced government cannot be at once conſtituted: it muſt grow.

Where

Where the conſtitution is ſuch that all ranks have a clear intereſt in its preſervation, where every man's houſe is his caſtle, where the property of the rich and the perſons and honeſt earnings of the poor are equally protected by law, and the hope of riſing to a higher ſtation is denied to none, there the law of treaſon may be mild. But no mild law, no common precaution, could give ſecurity to a conſtitution like the Athenian. The law of treaſon, accordingly, at Athens, was conceived in the higheſt ſpirit of deſpotiſm; it was atrocious. Before the council-hall ſtood a column, on which was thus ingraved: 'Whoever ſhall overthrow the democracy, or 'hold any magiſtracy in Athens when the democracy ſhall be overthrown, 'may be lawfully killed by any one: the perſon killing him ſhall be held 'holy before the gods and meritorious among men; and ſhall be rewarded 'with the whole property of the perſon killed.' The ſame principle of committing public juſtice to the diſcretion of individuals was puſhed yet farther in the following oath, which was required of every Athenian: 'I will kill with my own hand, if I am able, whoever ſhall overthrow the 'democracy; and if any hold office under any other government, I will 'eſteem holy before the gods whoever ſhall kill him. Whoever may loſe 'his life in killing or attempting to kill ſuch perſon, I will befriend 'his children and their offspring, as I would Harmodius and Ariſtogeiton. 'Whatever oath may be taken, adverſe to the democratical authority, I 'abjure and hold as nothing.' Prayers and imprecations were added, for bleſſings on all who maintained this oath, and utter deſtruction to thoſe and the race of thoſe who ſhould break it.

Andocid. de myſt. p. 46.

It is obſerved by Ariſtotle that democracy and tyranny are of all governments moſt adverſe to each other, as, according to Heſiod's proverb, two of a trade never agree; for, he adds, abſolute DEMOCRACY IS TYRANNY[12].

[12] Ἐναντίαι δ' ἀλλήλαις πολιτεῖαι Δῆμος μὲν Τυραννίδι, κατὰ Ἡσίοδον, Ὡς κεραμεῦς κεραμεῖ κεραμεὺς· καὶ γὰρ ἡ Δημοκρατία ἡ τελευταία Τυραννὶς ἐστί. Ariſtot. Polit. l. 5. c. 10.

SECTION

SECTION II.

First meaſures of the Supreme Council of Thirty at Athens: Views of the Thirty: Critias; Theramenes; Violences of the Thirty: Death of Theramenes.

SUCH was the ſtate of the Athenian government nearly, from the death of Pericles, till it ſubmitted to the victorious arms of the Peloponneſians. The fate then of a fallen city, deprived of command beyond its own narrow territory, and allowed to exiſt only under the controul of a forein power, it might ſeem would ſcarcely invite much of our farther attention. But Athens, after all her loſſes and with all her failings, has peculiar claim upon the curioſity and reſpect of men. In her fallen ſtate ſhe retained the germ of the ſublimeſt philoſophy, of all ſcience, and of every liberal art: Socrates, Xenophon, and Plato ſtill lived within her walls; Alcibiades, Thraſybulus, and Conon, tho in exile, adorned the liſt of her citizens; and ſhe could ſtill be the prolific mother and able preceptreſs of artiſts, poets, warriors, orators, ſtateſmen and ſages, who made their age the moſt brilliant in the annals of mankind, and through whom, when her political importance ceaſed, Athens continued, and may be ſaid in ſome degree ſtill to continue, to hold an empire among all the civilized nations of the earth[13]. Nor was her political importance yet ſo far beyond recovery, but that ſhe became again a principal channel of Grecian hiſtory's multifarious ſtream.

After the view we have taken of the Athenian conſtitution, we ſhall not wonder if men of rank and property deſired at any rate a change; nor can we impute it to any peculiar depravity, if they bore ſome antipathy toward the body of the lower people, from whom they ſuffered ſuch oppreſſion. Even the moſt moderate might look, not without ſome indignation, upon that imperious 'crowd of fullers, ſhoomakers, carpenters, braziers, dealers 'of all kinds,' I uſe the cotemporary philoſopher's words, 'the great object of 'whoſe lives was to buy cheap and ſell dear,' whoſe deſpotic will neverthe-

Xen. Mem. Socr. l. 3. c. 7. ſ. 6.

[13] Tully's eulogies of Athens are well known:—Illas omnium doctrinarum inventrices Athenas. Cic. de Orat. l. 1. ſ. 4.—Unde humanitas, doctrina, religio, fruges, jura, leges, ortæ atque in omnes terras diſtributæ putantur, Cic. or. pro L. Flacco, ſ. 26. and that of Velleius Paterculus, Adeò ut corpora gentis illius ſeparata ſint in alias civitates; ingenia vero ſolis Athenienſium muris clauſa exiſtimes. Vell. Pat. l. 1. c. 18.

leſs

leſs diſpenſed public and private law, directed the adminiſtration of the commonwealth, ſent out fleets and armies, diſpoſed of the lives and fortunes of individuals at home, and decided by a vote the fate of whole cities abroad, 'while ſome of them, not worth a drachma,' they are again Xenophon's words, 'were ready to ſell their country with all in it, that they might have 'a drachma.' Accordingly, when Athens was inveſted by the Peloponneſian forces, and no proſpect of ſucceſsful reſiſtance remained, many of thoſe of higher rank ſaw, or thought they ſaw, means of mending their condition in the approaching wreck of the ſtate. Through this oppoſition of intereſts among the Athenians, the Lacedæmonians propoſed to hold Attica in ſubjection, without the expence of garriſons; and thus they were induced to grant terms; to leave the town with walls and a citadel; to reſtore the whole territory; and even out of the captive fleet to allow twelve ſhips of war to the vanquiſhed. The Athenian people had never treated a conquered city ſo mildly. But the Lacedæmonians depended upon the ariſtocratical party among the Athenians themſelves, as a faithful garriſon, bound, by the moſt preſſing intereſts, to hold all in ſubordination to Lacedæmon [14].

On the ſurrender of the city, then, that vicious government which has been deſcribed, being diſſolved, the ſupreme power of the Athenian ſtate was committed to a Council, compoſed of Thirty Athenians, choſen by the conquerors out of the ariſtocratical party, and all of them formerly members of the Council of Four-hundred, eſtabliſhed by Peiſander. The firſt meaſures of this council were moderate and wiſe. Veſted with full powers to new-model the whole fabric of the antient conſtitution at their pleaſure, provided only nothing was done adverſe to the ſuperintending authority of Lacedæmon, they avoided all great and haſty changes which their ſituation did not indiſpenſably require. Farther than what fell neceſſarily, with the abolition of the popular ſovereinty and the commiſſion of the ſupreme power to the Thirty, the laws remained in force: all the antient magiſtracies, care being taken to fill them with friends of the Thirty, were retained: the civil adminiſtration therefore, under the Thirty inſtead of the Five-hundred, B. C. 404. Ol. 94. 1. Xen. Hel. l. 2. c. 3. ſ. 8.

[14] The aſſertions of Lyſias, in his orations againſt Eratoſthenes and Agoratus, that the Lacedæmonians would have granted better terms, and that Theramenes prevented it, ſcarcely need the teſtimony of Xenophon, to refute them. They are obviouſly meer calumnies; not propoſed to the reaſon, but to the thoughtleſſneſs and paſſion of the multitude to which they were addreſſed.

proceeded in the accuſtomed courſe. A new ſupreme court of judicature only was eſtabliſhed, with the title of the Council.

Matters being ſo far arranged, orders were given for immediately apprehending all who, under the democracy, had exerciſed the abominable trade of ſycophancy. The evils of that practice were ſo groſs, ſo extenſively dreaded, and, under popular ſovereinty, ſo irremediable, that, when every one proſecuted by the Thirty was condemned by the obſequious council, and executed, none, ſays the cotemporary hiſtorian, not obnoxious to the charge, were diſſatisfied with this arbitrary juſtice.

The wrongs, however, of the higher orders being ſo far avenged, the hope was generally entertained that animoſity would ſtop, and that the Thirty, proceeding with proper diſpatch in their great buſineſs of legiſlation, would let the people know under what form of government, and ſubject to what laws, they were to live and might be ſafe. With this hope wellmeaning men in general were eaſy: indeed hope was rather high among them; for, tho ſucceſſive demagogues had wretchedly degraded the antient Athenian conſtitution, yet, if there exiſted in Greece a good foundation for a good government, it ſeems to have been in the laws, cuſtoms and habits of Athens, derived from the inſtitutions of Theſeus and Solon. That excellent principle of the Engliſh conſtitution, the only one on which a free government can be firmly founded, that the aggregate of private good ſhould make public good, and its corollary, that the rights of individuals, once eſtabliſhed by law, ſhould be ever held ſacred, ſeems to have been a principle of Theſeus's kingdom and Solon's republic. But a different principle obtained very generally among the Grecian Commonwealths, an ideal public good, diſtinct from and often oppoſite to private good. It was carried into practice with beſt effect by Lycurgus, and can only be carried into practice with any good effect, where, as in Lacedæmon, a communion of intereſt was eſtabliſhed for everything, and private property ſcarcely exiſted. The brilliant ſucceſs of his ſingular ſyſtem gave reputation to this principle, and party leaders readily adopted it everywhere; for the good of their party was that to which alone they would allow the title of public good, and to this it was very convenient for them that every private intereſt ſhould yield. The peaceable then and the quiet, who deſired, not political power, but eaſe and ſecurity under civil order, were the only certain ſufferers. The great defect

of

of the conſtitutions of Theſeus and Solon, was the want of another principle, ſpred extenſively over modern Europe through the feudal ſyſtem, tho not an original part of that ſyſtem, the principle of repreſentation. The advantage of this is not meerly that a great nation can do that conveniently by its repreſentatives, which even a ſmall one cannot by its aſſembled numbers, but, farther, that reſponſibility may be attached to every conſtituted power; by which alone, whatever the name or form of the government may be, reäl deſpotiſm can be obviated. In the want of this, the Grecian legiſlators were utterly at a loſs to give ſecure liberty to the body of the people, without giving them deſpotic power. It may be held for certain that thoſe are either not wiſe or not honeſt men, who pretend that political and legiſlative ſcience are eaſy and obvious. The writings of the ableſt of the Greeks, ſhowing how deficient they were in it, abundantly ſhow how difficult it is; and the hiſtory of all nations will demonſtrate by what ſlow ſteps and what accidental circumſtances any perfection in government has been attained. The works of Plato and Xenophon ſhould be red, to form a juſt ideä of the imperfection of the ſcience in their time, and of their ſmall ability to improve it; and then it may in ſome degree be conceived what were the difficulties under which, even had they had the pureſt intentions, the ſincereſt deſire of public good, the Thirty muſt at any rate have had to incounter, in reforming the conſtitution of Athens. Xen. reſp. Ath.

But in addition to the difficulties always and everywhere exiſting, the peculiar circumſtances of Athens at the time, obviating perhaps ſome conſiderable inconveniences, gave riſe to many others. The controling power of Lacedæmon would be neceſſarily invidious to thoſe for whom they were to legiſlate; and yet much conſideration for that controling power would be, in their ſituation, unavoidable. Of the changes then which Athens had ſuffered by the event of the war, ſome would be favorable to them, but ſome far otherwiſe. Private diſtreſſes among all ranks were numerous and great. The loſs of property in the forein territories of the commonwealth, had reduced ſeveral from affluence to want: the abolition of means, formerly ready, to make intereſt of money at home, annihilated income for many: the advantages of command were no more for the higher ranks, nor the reward of ſervice for the lower, nor the various profits of the equipment of fleets and armies for any: public revenue no longer flowed from numerous tributary ſtates: neither Xen. Mem. Socr. l. 2. c. 8. ſ. 1. c. 7. ſ. 2.

ther the public treaſury, nor the wealth of individuals, could, as formerly, provide gratifications for the people: the citizens of numerous ſubject republics were no longer amenable to Athenian tribunals; multitudes, accuſtomed to fight and to judge, and to feaſt at ſacrifices, and to be amuſed, but not to work, were without income, without employment, and without victuals; the court and the flattery, and the pay and the bribes, to which the Athenian people were accuſtomed, had all ceaſed together.

Such were the circumſtances in which the council of Thirty entered, with abſolute authority, upon the adminiſtration of the affairs of Athens. Whether by appointment of the Lacedæmonians, or by election of the council itſelf, Critias preſided; a man, by every advantage of birth, fortune, connections, education and talents, pointed out for the arduous ſituation. His paternal great-grandfather was brother of the great lawgiver Solon; and, what ſhould have been a more ſolid advantage, he had been himſelf a diligent hearer of Socrates. But the Athenian democracy, denying eaſe and ſecurity, not only incited ambition and avarice, but it incited the pride of nobility and wealth. Xenophon deſcribes Critias, whom he knew well as his fellow-diſciple, vain of his illuſtrious birth and large inheritance, elated with the early poſſeſſion of power and influence, and with the court and adulation inſuing, and then ſoured by a baniſhment which he had ſuffered from a decree of the people. Thenceforward Critias conceived a vehement averſion to the popular cauſe, and his pride and ambition became ſtimulated by indignation and revenge.

Plat. Charmid. p. 154, t. 2.

Xen. Mem. Soer. l. 1. c. 2. ſ. 12—25.

But among the members of this council, the man moſt diſtinguiſhed in high office and in party meaſures, was Theramenes ſon of Agnon, whom we have already ſeen a leader in one revolution which aboliſhed, and in another which reſtored the ſovereinty of the popular aſſembly. He ingaged now in this third revolution, under the patronage of Lacedæmon, with a diſpoſition and views widely differing from thoſe of Critias. His family, tho noble, had been popular. His father, Agnon, founder of Amphipolis, had been a diſtinguiſhed favorite of the people; and however Theramenes himſelf might, with all reaſonable men, diſlike the ſovereinty of the multitude, yet poſſeſſing an inherited family intereſt among the people, and talents to cultivate it, he loved popularity. In reforming the government, therefore, it was not his purpoſe to oppreſs the people. He ſeems rather to have propoſed

propoſed to reſtore, under ſanction of the ſtronger means now poſſeſſed by the Thirty, that mixed government, which, upon the overthrow of the Four-hundred, he had framed but could not ſupport, and which we find ſo highly commended, but ſo little explained, by Thucydides. Chap. 19. ſ. 7. of this Hiſt.

The ſcheme of Critias, not altogether new in Greece, was however ſuch as had not been executed, nor perhaps attempted, upon ſo extenſive a ſcale. The habit of having all laborious offices performed by ſlaves, gave to conceive that the exiſtence of the lower orders of freemen might be diſpenſed with, and made that poſſible and even obvious in Greece, which, in modern Europe, could neither be executed, nor ſcarcely imagined. Critias would allow no mixture of popular folly and inſolence in power: he would remove as far as poſſible the danger of having the democratical law of treaſon reſtored, and put in execution againſt himſelf. He would abandon all hope of the glory of preſiding over a powerful independent ſtate, to have eaſe and affluence in a ſubordinate command. He propoſed therefore, under the protecting authority of Lacedæmon, to be lord of Athens; he would make the city and its whole territory the private property of himſelf and a few aſſociates, allowing no more of the Athenian people to remain within the country, than, with Lacedæmonian aſſiſtance, might be held in complete ſubſerviency.

With theſe extravagant and nefarious views, which it could not be prudent immediately to declare, Critias, in the outſet, courted Theramenes, and there was, for a ſhort time, the appearance of perfect harmony between them. Soon however differences aroſe, but ſtill Critias maintained a ſhow of deference for his collegue. Meanwhile among the reſt of the Thirty he made his party ſecure. No eminence of character there moved his envy; no ſuperior talents excited his apprehenſion; no firmneſs of principle thwarted his purpoſes. Concert then being eſtabliſhed among them, the abilities and yet more the popularity of Theramenes became ſuſpicious to all. For ſecurity againſt their effects, it was reſolved to ſolicit an armed force from Lacedæmon. Theramenes, not yet aware that he was himſelf the object, in vain remonſtrated; the reſolution paſſed, and Æſchines and Ariſtoteles, two of the Thirty, were deputed to Sparta, authorized to ingage for pay from the Athenian treaſury for the troops deſired. A force for holding Athens in obedience, and to be paid for doing ſo, was not likely Xen. Hel. l. 2. c. 3. ſ. 11. ſ. 12.

to

to be denied. A body of Lacedæmonians was ſent; and Callibius, their commander, with the title of Harmoſt, regulator, which the Lacedæmonians affected for thoſe to whom they committed reälly the command, as governors, of Grecian cities, took his reſidence in the citadel of Athens, with his troops as its garriſon.

Confident now of means to overbear oppoſition, Critias no longer kept meaſures with any, whether of the democratical or oligarchal intereſt, whom he ſuſpected of inclination, with power, to thwart his deſigns: but he began to conſider ſome of the oligarchal party, whom it was in the general policy of Lacedæmon to raiſe to power, as more dangerous opponents than any in the democratical intereſt, now ſufficiently depreſſed. From the firſt arrival of the Lacedæmonians, he was ſedulous in attention to the harmoſt; and by the ſhow of much deference, obtained the effectual command of him. Under pretence, and perhaps in the belief, that the intereſt of Lacedæmon required, Callibius iſſued orders, as Critias inſtigated, and the Lacedæmonian ſoldiers were employed to apprehend whom the Thirty denounced. Proſecution was no longer confined to ſycophants and men notoriouſly turbulent or infamous, but extended to characters the moſt irreproachable. Some forms of legal proceſs were obſerved, and thoſe of the old conſtitution were moſtly retained; but whomſoever the Thirty accuſed, the obſequious council never failed to condemn, and deliver to the executioner.

Xen. Hel. l. 2. c. 3. ſ. 12.

Such proceedings excited aſtoniſhment with alarm among all ranks. What could be the motive, and where the end of them, and what the form of government at length to be eſtabliſhed, were the anxious ſubjects of general wonder and inquiry. Theramenes himſelf, ſurprized as diſſatisfied, while Critias yet maintained a decent exterior toward him, remonſtrated among his collegues on the impolicy of their meaſures: 'Without 'ſome party among the people,' he ſaid, 'no oligarchy could ſtand; and 'alarm and offence were now extended to all parties.' The admonition was taken, but not as Theramenes intended. Nothing the Thirty ſo much ſtill feared as the popularity of Theramenes himſelf. To obviate its efficacy, they haſtened the publication of a catalogue of three thouſand citizens of their own ſelection, who ſhould partake of the ſoverein power in common aſſembly, and be competent for magiſtracy[15]. All other Athenians

Xen. ibid.

[15] Thus I think the phraſe μεθέξοιλας τῶν πραγμάτων may beſt be interpreted.

were

were reduced to the condition of ſubjects, not to the Three-thouſand only, but the Thirty, whoſe ſovereinty over them was declared abſolute. Xen. Hel. l. 2. c. 3. ſ. 20.

Theramenes again remonſtrated: 'Their faith was pledged, he ſaid, by ſ. 13. 'their former declarations, that all thoſe and only thoſe ſhould ſhare in the 'government, whoſe education might give the neceſſary knowlege, and whoſe 'property would afford means to allot leiſure to its functions. Pay for 'attending the general aſſembly or the courts of juſtice, it had been agreed, 'ſhould no longer be allowed. But three thouſand men, as if there were 'ſome virtue in the number, had been arbitrarily choſen, without any 'attention to the propoſed qualifications; and all other Athenians were as 'arbitrarily deprived of the rights of citizens. The imprudence was equal 'to the injuſtice of the meaſure; violence only could ſupport it; and the 'force of thoſe who were to command was inferior to that of thoſe who 'were to be held in ſubſerviency.' This admonition alſo was taken, but, like the former, very differently from the monitor's intention. A review of arms was ordered; of the Three-thouſand in one place; of the other citizens in another. The avenues to the latter were occupied by the confidential adherents of the Thirty, ſupported by the Lacedæmonian troops. The arms of the citizens, not of the catalogue, were taken from them as they paſſed, and being carried to the temple of Minerva in the citadel, were committed to the care of the Lacedæmonian garriſon.

Effectual oppoſition being thus obviated, the Thirty proceeded with a ſhameleſſneſs in crime, for which, after all we have ſeen of crime in Grecian hiſtory, could he be ſuſpected of partiality for the democratical cauſe, we ſhould with difficulty believe the expreſs teſtimony even of Xenophon. The credit of his account however, ſtrong as his authority is, does not reſt on his ſingle authority. We find it ſupported by two other cotemporary writers; one his decided adverſary in politics, the other no way his friend, Lyſias and Plato. From their united evidence we learn that the moſt abominable policy guided the meaſures now purſued. Revenge and avarice had their full ſway: many ſuffered death for private enmities; many meerly for their wealth. Every eminent man was either to be deſtroyed or gained: but as means were wanting to attach a ſufficient number by favors, the infernal expedient was practiſed of forcing men to a community of intereſt through a participation in crime. Driven by terror to execute tyrannical ſ. 15. Lyſ. con. Agorat. p. 133 vel 470.

tyrannical orders, they became involved in the ſame guilt, and obnoxious to the ſame reſentment, and thus theirs and that of the Thirty became a common cauſe [16].

Xen. Hel. l. 2. c. 3. ſ. 18. Lyſ. pro fil. Eucrat. p 149, vel 602.

Amid numerous enormities, the death of three men, the moſt eminent of the commonwealth, and all notoriouſly attached to the oligarchal intereſt, particularly excited general wonder and alarm. Of Niceratus, ſon of the rich and worthy Nicias, who periſhed at Syracuſe, it was ſaid that he inherited the ariſtocratical ſpirit; neither father nor ſon, by any one action or word, having ever favored democracy. The able advice and powerful eloquence of Antiphon had ſerved ſo many individuals, while the free expenditure of his private fortune in public ſervice during the war had acquired him ſuch reputation for public ſpirit, that he was in favor with all parties, tho his whole political conduct had been directed to promote ariſtocracy. Leon of Salamis, amid the turbulence and crimes of his age and country, had been eminent for his blameleſs life. The monſter Critias propoſed to involve his maſter Socrates in the odium of the execution of ſo excellent a man. A meſſage from the Thirty required the attendance of Socrates, with four others. Critias himſelf gave the order for them to go to Salamis, to apprehend Leon, and bring him to Athens. This order, knowing its purpoſe, and holding it contrary to law, Socrates diſobeyed. The other four, leſs ſcrupulous or leſs courageous, performed it. To be apprehended and to be condemned were nearly the ſame thing; and Leon, Niceratus, and Antiphon, were all delivered to the executioner.

Xen. ut ſup.

Plat. apol. Socr. p. 32. t. 4.

Numerous as the executions of men of property had been, the confiſcation inſuing did not ſuffice to ſupply the deficiencies of the public revenue, ſo curtailed by the event of the war, and to furniſh the rewards claimed by the forward adherents of the Thirty. Money was wanting to pay the Lacedæmonian troops in the citadel. The metics were thought the beſt reſource. They had much wealth among them; and the oppreſſion, which had been ſucceſsfully dared againſt the firſt of the Athenians, might be exerciſed, it was hoped, againſt aliens with leſs noiſe, and no hazard. Some ſymptoms of diſaffection toward the ruling powers were made the

Xen. Hel. l. 2. c. 3. ſ. 25.

[16] Οἷα δὴ καὶ ἄλλοις ἐκπίνειν πολλοῖς πολλὰ προστάττειν, βουλόμενοι ὡς πλείστων ἀνάπλεων αἷμα. Plat. apol. Socr. p 32. t. 1.

pretence,

pretence, and it was reſolved to accuſe eight of the richeſt, to whom, as a blind, were added two in indigent circumſtances.

The orator Lyſias, from whom we have the detail, was of the order of metics, and among the ſufferers. His father, Cephalus, was a Syracuſan, whom faction in his own city had driven to migrate, with a large fortune, to Attica, when the able adminiſtration of Pericles, in aid of what remained of Solon's laws, made Attica the moſt deſirable reſidence in Greece. He had injoyed the friendſhip of Pericles and of Socrates; and his houſe in Peiræus is the ſuppoſed ſcene of thoſe dialogues, ſo celebrated under the title of Plato's Republic. Lyſias had gone a boy to Italy, with the hiſtorian Herodotus, when, under the patronage of Pericles, the colony of Thurium was ſettled on the ruins of Sybaris. There he had lived above thirty years, when, by the defeat in Sicily, the Athenian intereſt in thoſe parts was overthrown, and Thurium was no longer a ſafe reſidence for men of property, who would not accept, or could not obtain, Lacedæmonian protection. Lyſias, collecting whatever he could carry, returned to Athens; where, in partnerſhip with Polemarchus his brother, a manufactory of ſhields, in which above a hundred ſlaves were employed, ſtill gave him affluence. Lyſ. con. Eratoſth.

He was, as he relates, entertaining ſome ſtrangers at ſupper, when ſome of the Thirty entered, commanded the gueſts to withdraw, and himſelf to remain their priſoner. Committing him then to the care of Peiſon, one of their number, they proceeded to take account of his effects, of which the ſlaves were a principal part. Meanwhile Lyſias, apprehending his life to be in danger, tampered with his keeper, and, for a bribe of a talent, obtained a promiſe of ſafety; but, to pay the money, being obliged to open a cheſt, in which were more than three talents, above ſeven hundred pounds ſterling in ſilver, with Cyzicenes and Darics, the gold coins then moſt current in Greece [17], to the amount of near five hundred pounds more, Peiſon ſeized the whole. Remonſtrance was vain, but the admonition was ſalutary to Lyſias. From a houſe to which he had been conducted as a place of ſecurity, while the Thirty were ſtill occupied in pillage, he found means

[17] The Cyzicene, named from the city of Cyzicus in the Propontis, was in value about a pound ſterling; the Daric, a Perſian coin, about fifteen ſhillings.

to eſcape, and haſtening to Peiræus, proceeded thence by ſea to Megara. His brother, Polemarchus, leſs provident or leſs fortunate, being carried to the common priſon, was, without trial, in purſuance of a ſimple order from the Thirty, executed in the Athenian manner, by a draught of hemlock. All the property of both was confiſcated. Melobius, one of the Thirty, with his own hands tore from the wife of Polemarchus the golden ear-rings ſhe wore. The body was not denied to his friends for burial; it would have been bootleſs impiety; but clothes for it, ſolicited from his large wardrobe, and an apartment in one of three houſes which the family had poſſeſſed, for the preparation of the funeral, were refuſed.

Such are the circumſtances related by Lyſias himſelf. We ſhall receive the account with caution, as from an orator, famed for the talent of giving falſehood the air of truth, and, on this occaſion, not meerly pleading a cauſe, but the cauſe of his own revenge, and avowing his purpoſe to inflame the multitude who were to judge it [18]. The teſtimony of Xenophon however ſeems to ſhow that the whole detail might be nearly true [19]. Had not the conduct of ſome of the Thirty been marked with peculiar atrocity in this tranſaction, had there not been ſomething in it particularly ſhocking to the general feelings and prejudices of the Athenian people, Theramenes would ſcarcely have taken up the proceedings againſt metics, rather than thoſe againſt citizens, for the ground of increaſed vehemence in oppoſition to his collegues. He now arraigned their conduct in a manner that gave them ſerious alarm. It was evident that their ſafety and his were become incompatible, and they reſolved that he ſhould himſelf be the next proſecuted.

Dionyſ. Hal. vit. Lyſ. p. 196. t. 6. or. Gr. Reiſk.

Xen. Hel. l. 2. c. 3. ſ. 16.

The council of Judicature, tho thus far obſequious to the views of the Thirty, was not yet duly prepared to be the inſtrument of their purpoſe againſt Theramenes. Nevertheleſs they determined to make it their in-

[18] Ὀργίσθητε μὲν, ὥσπερ ὃτ ἐφεύγετε. Which may be expreſſed faithfully, tho paraphraſtically, thus: Let the anger and indignation which you felt, when injuriouſly driven into baniſhment, now revive in your minds.

[19] Demoſthenes (or. in Androt. & or. con. Timocr.) has ſaid that, under the tyranny of the Thirty, no man was taken from his houſe. On this the learned Markland, in a note on the oration of Lyſias againſt Eratoſthenes, obſerves, 'that Lyſias is rather to be believed of what 'himſelf experienced; unleſs ſome diſtinction 'can be found.' The diſtinction ſeems obvious: Demoſthenes probably meant to ſpeak only of citizens; Lyſias was not then a citizen. The matter is of conſequence only that the faith of hiſtory be not unduly made queſtionable: more than enough will always remain uncertain.

ſtrument

ſtrument for his deſtruction. Some of the members they could command: they endeavoured to perſuade ſome, to alarm others. Matters were arranged with thoſe in whom they could beſt confide: the council was ſummoned: a body of men with concealed arms ſurrounded the hall: the Thirty attended, and Theramenes was in his place among them; when Critias, riſing, in a ſet ſpeech accuſed him of meditated treaſon againſt the exiſting government. Stating no facts amounting to treaſon by any known law, he argued rather as a conſpirator to his accomplices, than a public accuſer before a court of juſtice; contending, not on the ground of public law, but of convenience only to the party, that the accuſed ſhould be capitally condemned. Xen. Hel. l. 2. c. 3. ſ. 17.

Theramenes, eloquent, and practiſed in thoſe difficult and dangerous ſituations, which require, with a firm mind, the readieſt exertion of great powers, ably adapted his defence to the exiſting circumſtances. To have aſſerted, as before a juſt judicature, the right and the duty of a public man in his place in council, to declare and ſupport by argument his opinion on public matters (which almoſt alone had been imputed to him) he knew would be at leaſt uſeleſs, and perhaps injurious. He therefore addreſſed himſelf rather to the fears and feelings, than to the conſcience and juſtice of his judges; and he ſo demonſtrated the expediency of the meaſures which he had always recommended, and not only the iniquity, but the danger of thoſe purſued by Critias, that he diſpoſed a majority of the council in his favor. ſ. 18, 19.

The moment was critical: Critias was aware that his own ruin could now ſcarcely fail to follow the miſcarriage of his purpoſe againſt Theramenes. After ſhort communication with the Thirty, he went out and directed his armed attendants to ſhow themſelves. Returning then, he addreſſed the council thus: 'I eſteem it a duty of my ſtation' (he was preſident of the Thirty) 'to prevent thoſe acting under me in the adminiſtration from being deceived and miſled. I ſhall therefore take upon 'myſelf to do what the preſent emergency requires. The crowd, at your 'doors, have declared they will not reſt under the acquittal of one, whoſe 'known purpoſe is the overthrow of the oligarchy. In the new code 'it is inacted, that the citizens of the catalogue ſhall be liable to capital 'puniſhment, only from the judgement of the council; but over all others 'the authority of the Thirty is abſolute. I therefore, confident of your ſ. 20.

'unanimous approbation, ſtrike the name of Theramenes from the cata-
'logue, and we, the Thirty, condemn him to death.'

To Athenians, familiar, under their democracy, with the moſt anomalous and tyrannical meaſures of government, theſe proceedings were not aſtoniſhing and ſhocking, as they would be among thoſe accuſtomed to the better political order of modern Europe, and eſpecially of England. No oppoſition was made to them, either among the Thirty or by the council. Theramenes ſaw that his deſtruction was reſolved, and inſtantly had recourſe to what alone ſeemed to afford a chance for ſafety. He ſprang to the altar (for, among the Greeks, every council-hall had its altar) and thence claimed the protection of a law ſo lately made, which Critias was propoſing ſo groſſly to violate. 'As for this altar,' he ſaid, 'I know its ſacred-
'neſs will not protect me; but I will at leaſt ſhow that the impiety of thoſe
'men is equal to their injuſtice. Yet I cannot but wonder that you, coun-
'cillors, men of rank and high worth, will not aſſert your own cauſe:
'for the name of any of you may be eraſed from the catalogue with as little
'ceremony as mine.'

Xen. Hel. l. 2. c. 3. ſ. 21.

The herald of the Thirty had been diſpatched to command the attendance of thoſe high officers of juſtice called the Eleven, who were already gained to the views of Critias. They entered the council-hall with their uſual attendants, while Theramenes was ſtill ſpeaking from the altar. Critias immediately told them that Theramenes had been condemned to death according to law: and commanded them to do what in conſequence became their duty. In vain Theramenes alledged illegality and impiety. The council, awed by thoſe around the hall, now known to be armed, was paſſive, while Satyrus, a man of ability, verſed in high office and leading ſituations, but whom Xenophon deſcribes as the moſt profligate as well as the moſt daring of the Eleven, ſet the example for laying hands on Theramenes, dragged him from the altar, and hurried him away to the priſon. Daringly, or perhaps incautiouſly, as the neareſt way, he paſſed through the agora. Theramenes, with exerted voice, endeavoured to excite the people in his favor. Exaſperated by this, 'If you ſpeak again,' ſaid Satyrus, 'I
'will make you groan.' 'And had I ſaid nothing,' replied Theramenes,
'ſhould I eſcape groaning?' The people, however, prepared to fear, and not to reſiſt, made no ſtir. In the priſon, the deadly potion being brought,

Lyſ. or. con. Nicom. p. 847 & 850.

Xen. Hel. l. 2. c. 3. ſ. 22.

Theramenes

Theramenes drank it with a ſerene countenance, and then, tinkling the cup (the Grecian cuſtom at banquets, in paſſing the cup to another) as a remaining drop fell, 'This libation,' he ſaid, 'is for the worthy Cri-'tias.' 'Such particulars,' ſays the cotemporary hiſtorian, 'are, I am 'aware, of little worth in themſelves, yet what they prove of Theramenes 'I think deſerving admiration, that neither readineſs nor pleaſantry forſook 'him, even with immediate death impending.'

M. T. Cic. Tuſc. l. 1. ſ. 40.

Xen. ut ſup.

SECTION III.

Farther violences of the THIRTY: *Meaſures of* THRASYBULUS *againſt the* THIRTY: *Peiræus occupied by the Athenian refugees under Thraſybulus: Death of* CRITIAS: *The* THIRTY *depoſed and a Supreme Council of* TEN *elected: Interference of* LACEDÆMON: *The Athenian* DEMOCRACY *reſtored.*

THE concurrent teſtimony of cotemporary writers of different parties, aſſures us that, under the democracy, after it became abſolute, the principal road to the honors of the Athenian ſtate was through bribery to the people; in various ways adminiſtered. An officer ſoliciting a command, would to little purpoſe relate the length and variety of his ſervice, or the wounds he had received in it, if his competitor had been more magnificent in theatrical exhibitions. An orator defending his client under criminal proſecution, conſidered the expences of that client for the people's amuſement, of more importance to enumerate than any military or naval merits; or if he was conducting a criminal proſecution, he would not omit to detail the theatrical exhibitions with which his own family had entertained the people, in the hope, by ſo recommending himſelf, the more efficaciouſly to urge the condemnation of his enemy. Under every view then of the circumſtances of the times, it will appear evident that bribery, high bribery, would be abſolutely neceſſary to the Thirty, for keeping the Three-thouſand of their catalogue firm to their party. To mark, on all occaſions, the moſt pointed partiality for them, to give them the moſt decided preëminence, and, on the other hand, to take the ſtrongeſt precautions againſt-

Xen. Mem. Socr. l. 1. c. 4. init.

Lyſ. ἀπολογ. δωροδοκ. p. 161 vel 697.

againſt thoſe not of the catalogue, was indiſpenſable. The neceſſity then of bribing high would carry with it the neceſſity of increaſed violences and new crimes. The death of Theramenes had been a preparatory ſtep. That able leader being removed, meaſures the moſt violent and injurious againſt the multitude, already deprived of arms, were no longer ſcrupled. Lands and country-houſes were ſeized for the benefit of the Thirty and their adherents, and ſhortly an order was iſſued for all not of the catalogue to quit Athens. The greater part took refuge in Peiræus; but the jealouſy of the oppreſſors did not allow them long to remain there. Fortunately the ruling party in the neighboring city of Megara, being democratical, was friendly to their cauſe; and ſome revolution, of which no ſatisfactory account remains, had ſo altered things in the larger and more powerful city of Thebes, long the moſt virulent enemy of democracy and of Athens, that there alſo a diſpoſition favorable to them prevailed. Thebes, accordingly, and Megara became crowded with Athenian fugitives[20].

Xen. Hel. l. 2. c. 4. ſ. 1. Lyſ. or. 25. Δῆμ. καθ. ἀπολογ. p. 173 vel 776.

Among thoſe whom the tyranny of the Thirty had early driven to ſeek ſafety in baniſhment, was Thraſybulus ſon of Lycus, already known for ſo many important ſervices to his country. Thraſybulus, reſiding in Bœotia,

Xen. Hel. l. 2. c. 4. ſ. 2.

[20] If, in purſuing the courſe of Athenian affairs, the reader carries in his recollection the progreſs of the French revolution, he cannot fail to be ſtruck with the many points of reſemblance between the proceedings of the Thirty in Athens, with its council of judicature, and of the Committee of Public Welfare, in Paris, with its Revolutionary Tribunal; and the conſideration is not unimportant to Grecian hiſtory, inaſmuch as it reſtores evident probability to the accounts of enormities which, however well atteſted, the deſuetude of modern times, in the order of things eſtabliſhed in even the worſt of European governments, had rendered, till new example aroſe, almoſt incredible. And here the ſimilitude between what in France is called democracy, and what in Greece was eſteemed an oligarchy, will become ſtriking. Their character, as it ſtands marked by their conduct, has hardly a difference; and thus it may appear that, with allowance for that latitude of expreſſion which poetry may claim, Pope is right where he has ſaid,

For forms of government let fools conteſt;
Whate'er is beſt adminiſter'd is beſt.

The phraſe, indeed, without a comment, is hazardous, yet it may be creditably explained thus: 'The form of a government, meerly as it gives 'a claim to this or that title, democracy, ariſto-'cracy, monarchy, ſignifies little. That is really 'the beſt government which is ſo conſtituted, in 'whatever form, as moſt to inſure a juſt admi-'niſtration.' But this cannot be abſolute monarchy; for there all muſt depend upon the accidental character of the reigning prince; it cannot be democracy; for there the popular paſſion, which intereſted demagogues may in the moment excite, or the exertions, not even of the moſt numerous, but of the moſt turbulent and leaſt ſcrupulous party, will decide everything: it cannot be oligarchy, or what is vulgarly called ariſtocracy; for there a part of the people has an intereſt ſeparate from the reſt. It can only be a government ſo mixed and balanced, that it may have ſtrength to reſtrain popular folly and popular injuſtice, without being ſtrong enough to ſupport its own injuſtice or folly.

was rather watching for movements within Athens favorable to his views, than hoping to ſee a multitude driven to join him in exile, ſuch as might form a force ſufficient to aſſail the tyrants from without. Quickly he decided his plan. It was toward midwinter, and ſcarcely ſix months after the eſtabliſhment of the Thirty, when with only about ſeventy heavy-armed, he ſeized Phylē, an Attic fortreſs near the Bœotian border.

Such an enterprize might bear, on firſt view, the appearance of imprudent haſte and raſh adventure. It gave little alarm to the Thirty, who truſted that they could eaſily prevent the plunder and waſte of the neighboring lands, which alone they thought threatened, by marching immediately againſt the little garriſon. Phylē was ſcarcely more than twelve miles from Athens. Reaching it therefore early in the day, they directly led their forces to aſſault, but with the ill ſucceſs which, in that age, ſo commonly attended the attack of walls. In their haſte, for ſo ſmall a diſtance, and againſt an enemy ſuppoſed little able to reſiſt them, they had omitted to bring tents and camp equipage. Nevertheleſs the weather being, for the ſeaſon, fine, they reſolved to remain before the place and immediately begin a contravallation. That ſame night a heavy fall of ſnow ſo diſtreſſed them, that next morning they withdrew haſtily to Athens; and with ſo little conduct, that much of their baggage was taken by the activity of the purſuing enemy. Xen. Hel. l. 2. c. 4. ſ. 3.

Had Thraſybulus aſſembled a numerous body for his outſet, it might have excited an alarm ruinous to his purpoſe; and unleſs he could immediately have ſtruck ſome great blow, ſubſiſtence would probably have failed him. But the ſeaſon favored enterprize with a ſmall force. It was not eaſy to keep the field with a large one againſt him; and in midwinter the Lacedæmonians would not, for a light cauſe, ſend troops from Peloponneſus. The Thirty, even after their miſcarriage againſt Phylē, ſeem to have apprehended nothing from its garriſon beyond excurſion for plunder. To obviate this they ſent the greater part of their Lacedæmonian troops, with a body of their own horſe, to a ſtation near the place. But the credit of ſucceſs having inabled Thraſybulus to increaſe his forces, he marched with ſeven hundred heavy-armed, ſurpriſed the camp of the Thirty at daybreak, killed a hundred and twenty of their heavy-armed, and put the reſt to flight.

This

This unexpected ſtroke produced an effect on the minds of men far overproportioned to its reäl importance. The partizans of the Thirty were ſo alarmed, that the tyrants themſelves doubted if they could be ſafe, even in Athens, till aſſiſtance might be obtained from Lacedæmon. Their reſources then in beginning diſtreſs were congenial to their meaſures for the eſtabliſhment of power. Should they, by any train of misfortunes, be reduced to quit Athens, Eleuſis would be the moſt deſirable refuge. It was, next to the capital, the largeſt town of Attica, favorably ſituated for receiving ſuccour from Peloponneſus, and fortified; but many of the inhabitants were diſaffected. This inconvenience therefore they reſolved to obviate; and the cavalry, whom they conſidered as the moſt truſtworthy of their troops, were the inſtruments choſen for the occaſion. For the equeſtrian order, compoſed of the wealthieſt families of the commonwealth, having been common ſufferers from the oppreſſion of popular tyranny, rejoiced in the proſpect of an improvement of their condition by an alteration of the conſtitution. Thus prediſpoſed to the Thirty, it had been the policy of thoſe inſidious tyrants to court the equeſtrian order, and they had ſucceeded in holding the largeſt part of it attached to their cauſe.

Xen. Hel. l. 2. c. 4. ſ. 5.

Ariſtoph. Equit.

At the head of the cavalry therefore, Critias went to Eleuſis. All the Eleuſinian people, of age to bear arms, were ſummoned, under pretence of a muſter, for aſcertaining their ſtrength as a garriſon for their town. Every man, as his name was inrolled, received orders to paſs through the gate leading to the ſhore. There the Athenian cavalry were poſted, with ſome of the Thirty attending. Theſe indicated the ſuſpected, and the ſervants of the cavalry (for a Grecian trooper was always attended by one or more ſervants afoot) ſeized and bound them. The cavalry then returned to Athens, and delivered their priſoners into the cuſtody of the Eleven.

Thoſe unfortunate men, together with ſome who, for the ſame crime of ſuſpected diſaffection, had been brought from Salamis, were ſufficiently at the mercy of Critias and his aſſociates. But an infernal policy dictated farther ceremony. To ſtrengthen the tie between himſelf and his choſen Three-thouſand, Critias would make theſe his accomplices in every crime, and ſharers in the conſequent enmity and abhorrence of men. On the follow-

following day therefore the Three-thouſand of the catalogue, together with the cavalry, were aſſembled in that ſplendid edifice, raiſed for far other purpoſes by the taſte and magnificence of Pericles, the Odeïon or muſic-theater: and, leſt all ſhould not be ſufficiently zealous in the cauſe, or ſufficiently obſequious to the Thirty, the Lacedæmonian garriſon attended. Critias, according to the cotemporary hiſtorian, addreſſed the Athenians in theſe extraordinary terms: 'In the government which we have been eſta-'bliſhing, your intereſt has been conſidered equally with our own. Shar-'ing therefore its advantages, you will not refuſe to ſhare with us its 'dangers. Your common voice muſt ratify an order for the execution 'of the priſoners yeſterday brought hither; that your ſecurity and your 'peril may reſt on the ſame foundation with ours.' Suffrages were given by ballot, as under the democracy; but openly, that it might be ſeen if any were untrue to the cauſe; and the priſoners from Eleuſis and Salamis, together about three hundred, were all condemned to death by one vote. And among the Athenians, ſays the cotemporary hiſtorian, there were ſome ſo intent upon the acquiſition of wealth and power as to be even gratified with theſe proceedings.

It was not long after this maſſacre, ſo ineffectual was the horrid policy of Critias to ſecure his command over Attica, that Thraſybulus, with about a thouſand heavy-armed, marching by night, entered Peiræus, and took poſſeſſion of it without oppoſition. The Thirty led their whole force to attack him there. Peiræus, ſince the fortifications were deſtroyed by the Lacedæmonians, being open, and the extent great, Thraſybulus moved to the adjoining ſuburb of Munychia, which afforded more advantageous ground. The Thirty did not delay their aſſault. Next to victory, death in battle was certainly the moſt deſirable lot for Critias; and he was fortunate enough, beyond his deſert, to obtain it. Hippomachus, another of the Thirty, fell, and only about ſeventy of their followers; but the reſt fled, and the victory of Thraſybulus was complete. His troops carried off the arms of the dead; but their clothes, a common object of plunder among the Greeks, were, in pious reſpect for deceaſed fellowcitizens, left untouched. Xen. Hel. l. 2. c. 4. ſ. 7. ſ. 8. ſ. 12.

When the purſuit ceaſed, a truce for burial of the ſlain, was, in the uſual form, ſolicited by the defeated and granted by the conquerors. Opportunity to communicate being thus open, numbers from both ſides aſſembled in con-

Xen. Hel. l. 2. c. 4. ſ. 13.

verſation. Among thoſe from Peiræus was Cleocritus, herald of the myſteries, a man reſpected for his birth, connections, and abilities, as well as for the ſacred office which he bore, and, what was particularly advantageous on the preſent occaſion, indowed by nature with a voice ſingularly capable of prevailing over the murmur of talking numbers. Having procured ſilence, he addreſſed the throng in a conciliatory ſpeech, in which, profeſſing for himſelf and his party every diſpoſition to friendly union with the Three-thouſand, he imputed to the Thirty alone the evils ſuffered on both ſides. 'The Thirty,' he ſaid, 'only to gratify an inordinate thirſt of wealth and 'power, had deſtroyed as many Athenian citizens in eight months as all the 'Peloponneſians in ten years; and, when no obſtacle exiſted to prevent their 'eſtabliſhing a good government in peace, they had forced on this moſt 'ſhameful, cruel, wicked, and to gods and men hateful civil war. For himſelf 'and thoſe with whom he acted, he proteſted that the death of thoſe miſled 'men, whoſe obſequies were about to be performed, was a ſubject of ſincere 'grief not leſs than to their own party.'

ſ. 14. This ſpeech, gaining anxious attention from the Many, alarmed the chiefs of thoſe from the city, and they ſedulouſly hurried away their people. Next day the Thirty, for that remained their title, met, and, with faded hopes, conſulted concerning their affairs, while the Three-thouſand were in altercation, in various parts of the town; thoſe who had been forward in the late violences, urging oppoſition to the utmoſt againſt Thraſybulus and his adherents, while thoſe who thought themſelves leſs perſonally obnoxious inſiſted on the neceſſity of an accommodation; unreſervedly declaring they would no longer obey the Thirty, to their own deſtruction and that of the commonwealth. The reſult of the contention was a reſolution, paſſed in the form of a decree, by which the Thirty were depoſed, and a council of Ten was appointed in their room, one from every ward, for the expreſs purpoſe of negotiating an accommodation with thoſe in Peiræus. Neither was reſiſtance attempted by the fallen tyrants, nor violence uſed againſt them. Two of their number, Eratoſthenes and Pheidon, were elected of the Ten; the others, weak as cruel, and neglected as worthleſs, retired to Eleuſis.

ſ. 15.

Lyſ. con. Eratoſth. p. 125, vel 422.

Id. p. 125, vel 419.

Lyſ. ibid. Their general oppoſition to Critias had recommended Eratoſthenes and Pheidon to the choice of the Three-thouſand, and a diſpoſition adverſe to the

the Thirty was alſo the ſuppoſed merit of their new collegues. But no ſooner were the Ten veſted with the ſupreme authority than they betrayed the truſt. Appointed for the expreſs purpoſe of negotiation with Thraſybulus, they reſolved not to do what would preſently reduce them to the general level of Athenian citizens. To this determination they were perhaps inſtigated, but at leaſt they were warmly ſupported in it, by Lyſimachus, general of the cavalry, a moſt vehement enemy of democracy. The cavalry were almoſt univerſally diſpoſed to the ſentiments of their chief, and a large proportion of the Three-thouſand being found ſtill well inclined to the cauſe, the reſolution was taken to oppoſe Thraſybulus, to maintain oligarchy, and, in reliance on ſupport from Lacedæmon, to exert themſelves for the preſent in defenſive meaſures. The Three-thouſand being however far from unanimous, the cavalry took on themſelves the principal care, both of preſerving peace within the city, and giving ſecurity againſt the enemy without. The whole body conſtantly ſlept in the Odeïon, with their horſes at hand bridled, and their ſpears by them, that they might act inſtantly, as emergencies might require, either as cavalry or infantry; for beſide unceaſing apprehenſion of ſedition within the city, attack from Peiræus was hourly expected. Xen. Hel. l. 2. c. 3. ſ. 15.

Meanwhile citizens, metics, and former inhabitants of Athens of all denominations, who had fled from the tyranny of the Thirty, allured by the fame of the ſucceſſes of Thraſybulus, flocked to join him. The greater part, diſarmed, as we have already ſeen, by the policy of Critias, brought only their perſonal ability and zeal in the cauſe: but all were ſedulous in providing themſelves to the beſt of their ſkill and means; ſome making ſhields of wood, ſome of wicker; and, whether meerly for uniformity and diſtinction, or that no viſible weakneſs of the material might incourage the enemy, they whitened all. Fellowſhip in adverſity, and unity of object under one able leader, promoted concord among them. About the tenth day from their firſt occupying Peiræus, in general aſſembly they ſolemnly pledged themſelves to fidelity in the common cauſe, and then came to a liberal reſolution, that the rights of citizenſhip ſhould be common to all, even foreiners having right of hoſpitality, who ſhould faithfully do the duty of ſoldiers, in the war in which they were ingaged for the recovery of their country. They were now ſtrong in heavy-armed; their light-armed were ſtill more ſ. 16.

numerous, and they had about ſeventy horſe. They commanded the country, ſo that they were at no loſs for proviſions, and it was reſolved, with general approbation, to puſh the ſiege of the city.

Xen. Hel. l. 2. c. 4. ſ. 18.

Tho the tranſient reign and haſty downfal of the Thirty might, on a firſt glance, give to ſuppoſe that their projects were as unaccountably raſh and imprudent as groſsly nefarious, yet they were, in reälity, not ſo lightly founded. Critias had propoſed, not to eſtabliſh an independent dominion, but only to be lord of Attica, under the ſovereinty of Lacedæmon; and he confided in the Three-thouſand heavy-armed of his catalogue, together with the greateſt part of the Athenian cavalry, who were warm in his cauſe, only as force ſufficient in emergencies, till ſupport from Lacedæmon might be obtained. Attica, divided among three or four thouſand families, would afford every man a maintenance. Every Athenian thus, like every Lacedæmonian, would be a gentleman, all the offices performed among the modern Europëan nations by the lower claſſes of freemen, being ſupplied by ſlaves. An extraordinary concurrence of bold and well-concerted enterprize, with favoring incidents, had ſhaken this ſyſtem almoſt in the outſet; but, tho Critias himſelf fell, and the people under him were ready for a revolution, yet his ſucceſſors in power, who had been his opponents in council, found his plan ſo far inviting, that they adopted it almoſt intirely; while his opponents in arms, almoſt graſping the object of their wiſhes, were ſtill very far from any clear proſpect of obtaining permanent poſſeſſion of it.

Thraſybulus had indeed ſo choſen his ſeaſon, ſo avoided to excite alarm, was ſo rapid in his enterprizes, and ſo favored by contingencies, that the revolution was on the point of taking place, before his opponents began to think any addition to their own ſtrength wanting. At length, nearly at the ſame time, from the Thirty in Eleuſis, and from the Ten, in the name of the Three-thouſand, in Athens, miniſters reached Lacedæmon. With a government ill-formed for extenſive dominion, Lacedæmon itſelf was at this time divided by faction. But the ſupport of oligarchy was neceſſary to the exiſtence of Lacedæmonian influence in any forein ſtate: and all the ſtanding principles of Spartan policy would urge it. The powerful intereſt of Lyſander therefore, whoſe credit was deeply concerned in the maintenance of the Lacedæmonian authority in Athens, ſufficed to obtain

ſ. 19.

for

for him the appointment of commander in chief in Attica, with the title of harmoſt, and for Libys, his brother, the command of a ſquadron to coöperate with him. He deſired no Lacedæmonian land-force, but he procured a loan from the treaſury to the Athenian ſtate, of a hundred talents, for paying troops, which he could eaſily hire among the other ſtates of Peloponneſus. He paſſed immediately to Eleuſis, where he was ſoon joined by his mercenaries, and he prepared to blockade Peiræus by land and ſea. Xen. Hel. l. 2. c. 4. ſ. 19. Lyſ. Iſocrat.

Theſe were circumſtances to which the Ten, from their firſt appointment, had looked forward; and the hopes of their party now became high again, while inevitable ruin ſeemed to threaten Thraſybulus and his followers. Certainly no exertion of prudence and bravery on their part, could inable their ſcanty number and deficient reſources to withſtand the power of Lacedæmon. But the ſtate of parties in Lacedæmon itſelf, not likely to be totally unknown to Thraſybulus, had probably been among the incouragements to his enterprize; and indeed it ſeems more than poſſible that he had communication there, and reaſonable dependence upon intrigue favorable to his views. Xenophon has apparently not ſaid all that he knew or thought upon the ſubject; certainly he has not explained all that appears myſterious in it; and tho he generally writes freely, yet this is not the only occaſion upon which he appears to have avoided declaring what might involve the ſafety or the character of perſons living when he wrote. The facts however, which at the time were of public notoriety, are not dubious now. Pauſanias, the reigning king of the Euryſtheneid family, was of the party that envied or feared the power and influence of Lyſander. Xen. ibid. ſ. 20. But the ephoralty was the hinge on which the politics of Lacedæmon turned. Whatever party could obtain a majority of the five ephors, commanded the adminiſtration for the year. The expectation that Lyſander would make Attica, according to Xenophon's expreſſion, his own, gave much uneaſineſs. An exertion was therefore made by the king's party; and three of the ephors going with them, a decree of the general aſſembly was procured, which, without taking from Lyſander the particular command ſo lately conferred upon him, put the ſupreme direction of the buſineſs into the king's hands. It was reſolved that the affair was important enough to require that the allies ſhould be ſummoned. In a general aſſembly it

it was then decreed, that a Lacedæmonian army ſhould march, that Pauſanias ſhould command, and that two of the ephors ſhould attend him as his council.

In purſuance of theſe reſolutions, taken in the abſence of Lyſander, the contingent of forces was required from all the allies. The Bœotians and Corinthians, already jealous of Lacedæmon, found pretences to diſobey: but all the other allies ſent their proportions of troops, and Pauſanias led a very powerful army into Attica. Lyſander, with due ſubmiſſion to legal authority, joined him, and they incamped together in the plain of Halipedon, before Peiræus. A meſſage was immediately ſent to Thraſybulus, requiring his followers to diſperſe. To this obedience was refuſed, and then Pauſanias led his troops to an aſſault upon the place. He had however no intention that it ſhould ſucceed, and of courſe it was ineffectual. Next day he examined the ground about the port, with the pretended purpoſe of forming a contravallation. His eſcort, conſiſting of Lacedæmonian infantry, and Athenian cavalry being moleſted by the enemy's light-armed, he ordered the cavalry to charge. The irregulars fled, and the cavalry, killing ſome, purſued as far as the theater in Peiræus, where they were met and checked by the targeteers and heavy-armed. The Lacedæmonians following to ſupport them, were ſo annoyed by the miſſile weapons of the targeteers, that they were compelled to retreat with loſs, and two polemarcs were among the killed. Thraſybulus then led on the whole of his heavy-armed, and Pauſanias not without difficulty reached a hill, at the diſtance of half a mile, where he could defend himſelf while he ſent for ſupport. Having collected his forces, and formed his phalanx in very deep order, he drove back the enemy, with ſome ſlaughter, raiſed his trophy, and withdrew to his camp.

Xen. Hel. l. 2. c. 4. ſ. 21. ſ. 20, ſ. 22. ſ. 23. ſ. 24. ſ. 25.

This action, critical as it had been, very exactly anſwered the end of Pauſanias. He was anxious to eſtabliſh the opinion of his ſerious deſire to reduce the democratical Athenians by arms, while he carried his reäl purpoſes by ſecret negotiation. Quitting therefore his ſituation before Peiræus, he incamped under the walls of Athens, taking his own quarters in the celebrated Academia. He had probably, not leſs than Lyſander, his view to a commanding influence in Attica. He was connected by hereditary hoſpitality with the family of Nicias, of which the chief, Niceratus,

Lyſ. pro fil. Eucr. p. 604.

the

the unfortunate ſon of that unfortunate general, had periſhed, as we have ſeen, under the Thirty. Pauſanias having communicated with the ſurvivors of that family, directed them to come to him, numerouſly attended by their party, to give weight to a declaration of their wiſh for an accommodation with their fellowcountrymen in Peiræus. At the ſame time he invited Thraſybulus to ſend commiſſioners to treat with him, and intimated the terms which thoſe commiſſioners ſhould propoſe. He was readily obeyed by both; and with the advice and concurrent authority of the two ephors his council, he gave paſſports for the commiſſioners from Peiræus, and for Cephiſophon and Melitus[21] as repreſentatives of the moderate in Athens, to proceed to Lacedæmon. Xen. Hel. l. 2. c. 4. ſ. 26.

The Ten and their aſſociates were alarmed at theſe miſſions. Their general aſſembly was ſummoned, and they procured a decree for ſending miniſters to Lacedæmon, on the part alſo of the exiſting government of Athens. By theſe they urged, 'That as they had voluntarily placed their 'city and themſelves under the protection, and to be diſpoſed of at the 'pleaſure, of the Lacedæmonians, nothing leſs ought to be required of 'thoſe who now held Munychia and Peiræus than an unconditional ſur- ſ. 28. 'render.' All the parties however were temperately heard by the ephors and the Spartan aſſembly, which decreed, That fifteen commiſſioners ſhould be appointed, in conjunction with the king Pauſanias, to ſettle, with the ſtricteſt impartiality and equity, the differences exiſting among the Athenian people. ſ. 27.

This reſolution, generous, we ſhould wiſh to conſider it, tho evidently in no ſmall degree a party meaſure, appears however to have been faithfully and liberally executed. All Athenians of all parties, the Thirty, and ſome few who had acted in the moſt invidious offices under them only excepted, were reſtored to their rights as Athenian citizens[22], an oath only being required of them, to keep the peace and be true to a univerſal ſ. 29. amneſty. Humanity perhaps and prudence demanded the exception, as not leſs neceſſary to the ſafety of the excepted than to the general quiet.

[21] Perhaps father of the accuſer of Socrates, who was Melitus ſon of Melitus.

[22] Even the Thirty, the Eleven, and the Ten were not to be denied thoſe rights, provided they would abide a judicial ſcrutiny of their conduct —ὃς ἂν ἐθέλοι ἐνθύνας διδόναι τῆς ἀρχῆς ἧς ἦρξεν. Andoc. de myſt. p. 42.

Eleuſis

Eleuſis was given them for their reſidence, and to be at the ſame time the refuge of all who, with them, might fear to live under the reſtored commonwealth. Matters being ſo far ſettled, Pauſanias led away the whole of the Peloponneſian forces, leaving the Athenians at perfect liberty with regard to their future civil government.

Xen. Hel. l. 2. c. 4. ſ. 29. & Lyſ. c. Agorat. p. 137 vel 499.

The retreat of the Lacedæmonian army was the ſignal for Thraſybulus and his followers to march to Athens. In ſolemn proceſſion, like the Roman triumph, they aſcended into the citadel, and in their arms offered a thankſgiving ſacrifice to Minerva. A general aſſembly was then held to give the ſanction of the popular will to the meaſures which the circumſtances might require. Phormiſius, tho one of the army from Peiræus, propoſed that landowners only ſhould have votes in the general aſſembly and be competent for magiſtracy. The more prudent Thraſybulus ſaw that, tho the evils of the old government were great, this was not the proper remedy; nor would the times have borne it. More than five thouſand citizens would ſo have been deprived of the privileges to which, under the old conſtitution, they were intitled; and would of conſequence have ſunk into a condition of little more ſecurity for perſon and property than ſlaves. For ſo it was, in the want of any juſt idea of balanced government among the Greeks, that portion of the people which held the ſoverein power was deſpotic, and the reſt were their ſubjects, more depreſſed than the ſubjects of any ſingle deſpot can eaſily be. In addreſſing the aſſembly therefore, after ſome expoſtulation to the oligarchal party, he ſtrongly recommended, to the democratical, peaceable behaviour, and the ſtricteſt obſervance of the oath of amneſty juſt taken. Stating then the inexpediency of riſking new troubles, by attempting, at ſuch a ſeaſon, any innovation, he recommended the complete reſtoration of the conſtitution as it ſtood before the appointment of the Thirty. The aſſembly decreed as he adviſed: all the magiſtracies were filled in regular form, and the government reſumed its antient courſe[23].

Lyſ. or. de non abolend. rep. & Dion. Hal. vit. Lyſ.

Xen. ut ſup.

Thus, by a ſeries of conduct, as wiſe and moderate in civil buſineſs as able and daring in military, the latter a common merit among the Greeks, but the former very uncommon, Thraſybulus injoyed the ſatisfaction while he lived, and through ſucceeding ages has had the glory, of being the reſtorer of the Athenian commonwealth, the ſecond founder of Athens. Attica

however

however was not yet united under one government: it was divided between a democratical republic, of which Athens, and an oligarchal, of which Eleuſis, was the capital; an arrangement ſuiting the policy of Lacedæmon, as it facilitated the means of holding all in ſubjection. Theſe means, nevertheleſs, were neglected. As the Lacedæmonians wrote no books, and foreiners had little acceſs to their city, we are very deficiently informed of their domeſtic affairs. They ſeem however to have been at this time ſo warm in faction, the party of Pauſanias overbearing, but hardly overbearing, that of Lyſander, that they had little leiſure for interfering in the affairs of neighboring ſtates. Meanwhile the people of Athens were alarmed with information that thoſe in Eleuſis were ingaging mercenary troops. The vehemence of jealouſy, natural to thoſe who had ſo lately been ſuffering the evils of exile, and who expected no alternative but death or expatriation from the ſucceſs of the ſuppoſed deſign, inſtantly poſſeſſed the public mind. The ſervice of all able to bear arms was ſtrictly required, and the whole ſtrength of the city marched. The leaders in Eleuſis, whoſe purpoſe ſeems to have been but ſuſpected, truſting themſelves to a conference, were maſſacred; but fortunately, ſo moderate was the popular fury, or ſuch the influence of the chiefs to reſtrain it, perjury and bloodſhed went no farther. Propoſals of peace and complete amneſty were offered and accepted, and the refugees, moſtly of the nobleſt and wealthieſt families of Attica, were reſtored to the rights of Athenian citizens. The multitude, who had the power in their hands, as the cotemporary hiſtorian, not their partial friend, obſerves, remained faithful to their oaths, 'and the government,' he continues, 'is ſtill carried on 'with harmony between them.' Thus, at length, the Athenian commonwealth was completely reſtored, and all Attica reünited as its territory.

B. C. 402. Ol. 94 3/3. Xen. Hel. l. 2. c. 4. ſ. 30.

In the accounts remaining of theſe viciſſitudes in the affairs of Athens, no mention occurs of Alcibiades: after his ineffectual interference to prevent the defeat of Aigoſpotami, he is not even named by the cotemporary hiſtorian. His fate, nevertheleſs, as it may beſt be gathered from the imperfect accounts of later writers, is altogether too intereſting not to require notice.

Alcibiades ſeems to have poſſeſſed, in the Thracian Cherſoneſe, a large eſtate, even a princely command, and extenſive influence; the eſtate appa-

rently inherited from his anceſtors; for avarice, and that low diſhoneſty which has the accumulation of wealth for its object, were not among his vices. When he was a ſecond time driven from the command of his country's forces to ſeek ſafety in exile, his property, in the expectation of a great booty for the treaſury, was ſtrictly inquired after, and private intereſt, as we have ſeen, made ſuch inquiries at Athens very ſevere. But tho, in iſſues from the treaſury and collections from the tributary ſtates, the public money which had come into his hands very greatly exceeded what had ever fallen within the power of any former Athenian general, it was found that he had not uſed the opportunity for private profit.

Lyſ. or. pro Ariſtoph. p. 654.

In exile therefore, and after the overthrow of his country, with the conſideration which his property and power brought, Alcibiades injoyed the conſideration ariſing from great abilities and magnanimous diſintereſtedneſs, diſplayed in great commands. But as it often happens, in human affairs, that circumſtances apparently moſt advantageous and deſirable lead to miſfortune, ſo the very credit of Alcibiades was the occaſion that, tho in exile, the overthrow of his country involved his ruin. Athens was thought not in ſecure obedience to the Thirty or to Lacedæmon while Alcibiades lived; and, the authority or influence of that ſoverein ſtate pervading all the Grecian ſettlements, it was difficult to find a reſidence where he could be ſafe. Perhaps indeed his diſpoſition too little allowed him to reſt in quiet ſecurity. Finding himſelf threatened in his reſidence in the Cherſoneſe, he paſſed over into Bithynia. He had ſome confidence in the friendſhip as well as in the tried honor of the ſatrap of that country, Pharnabazus. Little contented however with ſafety there, he conceived projects, not ſimply for reſtoring himſelf to his country, but for reſtoring his country to its former preëminence in Greece. His hopes were excited, and his views directed, by the well-known ſucceſs of Themiſtocles at the Perſian court; and, under the protection and with the recommendation of Pharnabazus, he propoſed to go to Suſa. Arrangements ſeem to have been in ſome forwardneſs for his purpoſe, when, in his reſidence in Bithynia, he was attacked by an armed multitude, whoſe provocation or whoſe inſtigators are not certainly known. Pharnabazus, the Lacedæmónians, and his own paſſions have all been accuſed; but the many well-atteſted proofs of the ſatrap's integrity, magnanimity, and honor,

ſeemingly

ſeemingly ſhould exculpate him. The aſſailants, an armed multitude againſt a few domeſtics, feared to enter the houſe, but they ſet fire to it. Alcibiades then ſallying ſword in hand, none dared await his aſſault; but, from a diſtance, he was overwhelmed by a ſhower of darts and arrows. Nearly thus, according to all remaining accounts, fell that extraordinary man, before he had reached his fortieth year.

CHAPTER XXII.

Illuſtrations, from the Orators and Philoſophers, of the CIVIL HISTORY of ATHENS, and the Condition of the Athenian People, between the Ages of Pericles and Demoſthenes; with a ſummary View of the Riſe of PHILOSOPHY and LITERATURE in GREECE.

SECTION I.

Short political quiet at Athens. Tranſcription of Solon's Laws. Violence of party-ſtrife renewed: Sycophancy revived: Riſe of the Rhetoricians. Proſecutions; of the ſon of Alcibiades; of the nephews of Nicias; of a citizen ſuppoſed to have appropriated property forfeited to the commonwealth; of thoſe who proſecuted the aſſaſſins of Phrynichus; of a citizen for grubbing the ſtump of a ſacred olive-tree.

ON the concluſion of the Peloponneſian war, there followed a ſuſpenſion rather of the uſual turbulence throughout Greece, than what, in modern Europe, would be eſteemed a political calm; Attica only remaining, as we have ſeen, for ſome time, violently agitated. The ſtate of the reſt of the country, under the undiſputed ſupremacy of Lacedæmon, tho not particularly deſcribed by any antient author, we ſhall gather from circumſtances hereafter occurring to notice. Of the ſtate of Athens, after the reſtoration of democracy, which Xenophon's ſhort eulogy might give a modern reader to ſuppoſe all concord, tranquility, and happineſs, we have from the cotemporary orators and philoſophers large information. Hence indeed we derive almoſt all that we learn of Athenian hiſtory, and no uninſtructive part of it, till Athens became again implicated in troubles which anew involved all Greece, and ended only with the overthrow of Grecian independency.

It

It is a ſtrong teſtimony to the merit of Solon's laws, that, in all revolutions of the Athenian government, they never ceaſed to be highly reſpected. The legiſlative and executive powers, never well defined in any antient government, might receive changes, the judicial might paſs to new tribunals; but no innovating demagogue dared make a direct attack upon Solon's legal ſyſtem. Nevertheleſs there exiſted, for ſome ages, only one complete copy of his laws, which was kept with great care in the citadel, where all might have acceſs to it, and tranſcribe any parts that were particularly wanted. It ſeems to have been, amid the violent internal troubles preceding the concluſion of the Peloponneſian war, a meaſure of the better-minded men for reſtoring the moſt valuable part of the old conſtitution, and providing new ſecurity for civil order, to procure a decree for a ſecond copy of the whole code for public uſe. The important buſineſs of making or ſuperintending the tranſcription, was committed to Nicomachus, a man of rank, connected with the oligarchal party; and it was expected that the work ſhould be completed in four months. But new troubles within, the preſſure of an enemy without, and at length the capture of the city, interfered. Meanwhile Nicomachus, and thoſe connected with him, found themſelves poſſeſſed of power which they were unwilling to reſign. Litigants and others, who wanted copies of any particular laws, could have them only through Nicomachus. The tranſcription of parts, for private purpoſes, unavoidably interrupted that of the whole for public uſe; and thus, independently of the political troubles, aroſe a pretence for delay, which would require reaſonable allowance, while the extent of reaſonable allowance, under theſe circumſtances, could ſcarcely by any meaſure be eſtimated; and thus ſix years paſſed before the complete copy was delivered for public uſe.

Lyſ. con. Nicom. p. 836.

id. p. 839.

Meanwhile, amid the diſorders of conqueſt and revolutions, both temptation and opportunity occurred to do irreparable injury to the code itſelf, or at leaſt to its reputation. Forgeries were imputed to Nicomachus; and, if Lyſias, ſpeaking as an advocate, might be believed, in the violence of contending factions, during the ſiege of the city by Lyſander, Cleophon, a popular leader, was condemned and executed, in purſuance of a feigned law, interpolated for the purpoſe. Nicomachus was much connected with Satyrus, whom we have ſeen diſtinguiſhing himſelf, among the Eleven, as a zealous

id. p. 849.

Ch. 21. ſ. 1. of this Hiſt.

zealous miniſter of the violences of the Thirty Tyrants. Nicomachus and Satyrus had together been among the leaders of the oligarchal party in oppoſition to Cleophon. They afterward together joined the party of Critias; and thus, when, by the death of Theramenes, oppoſition to that party was quelled, the code of Solon was at its mercy.

Nevertheleſs, if we put together all that remains on the ſubject, it appears not likely that the code was very eſſentially injured. Lyſias, as an advocate by profeſſion, muſt himſelf have had a general knowlege of the laws, and he could not want opportunity for learning the opinions of the beſt informed about them; yet when, in conducting the proſecution afterward inſtituted againſt Nicomachus, it was moſt his object to point out what had been deſtroyed or interpolated, he ſeems to have been unable even to name anything very material, except that forgery which he affirms to have occaſioned the condemnation of Cleophon. All other alterations, made, as he ſays, principally under the Thirty, appear to have had no farther purpoſe than to authorize increaſed expence in public ſacrifices. A public ſacrifice being always a feaſt for the lower people, the purpoſe and the effect of the forgery were no more than to inable the Thirty to feed the Three-thouſand of their catalogue at the public expence.

When therefore, on the expulſion of the Thirty, the democracy was reſtored, the ineſtimable advantage was experienced of poſſeſſing a ſyſtem of law, which the people had been accuſtomed to revere, and the Athenian ſtate became reſettled at once on the code of Solon, as on a baſis in whoſe firmneſs all had confidence. But, on the contrary, intolerable inconvenience had been experienced from the variety of laws added ſince his time; for many had been made only to anſwer the momentary purpoſes of faction; ſome oppreſſive in their tenor; ſome contradictory to others; inſomuch that, in the end, the moſt cautious man could ſcarcely direct his conduct ſo as not to become obnoxious to legal puniſhment. Fortunately, the laws of Solon, together with a few unrepealed ſtatutes of Draco, were ſufficient, in the moment, for the purpoſes of civil life. It was therefore decreed, that all later laws ſhould be ſuſpended, till they had undergone a reviſion, and that thoſe only which might be advantageouſly graſted on the old ſyſtem, ſhould be reïnacted.

Andoc. de myſt. p. 39 & 52.

Thraſy-

Thraſybulus, and thoſe who with him guided the popular will, certainly deſerve high honor for that political calm, ſhort as it was, which Athens now injoyed. Not the public meaſures only, but the public temper was marked with a wiſe moderation and a magnanimous liberality. Sycophancy was diſcouraged; party was nearly aboliſhed; ſeveral of thoſe who had acted with the Thirty, who had ſerved under them in the cavalry, their guard and principal ſupport, were admitted into the council, and allowed to aſpire to the higheſt offices, civil and military. Harmony and internal quiet prevailed, ſuch as, perhaps ſince the death of Pericles, had been unknown in Athens.

Lyſ. δοκιμαζ. ἀπολογ. p. 575. Lyſ. ut ſup. & con. Poliuch. p. 609 & Xen. Hel. l. 2. c. 4. ſ. 30.

While ſobriety and moderation, the fruit of ſevere ſuffering, thus pervaded the public mind, a vain attempt was made by the patriotic leaders, without the hazard of great changes, to put legal reſtraint upon democratical deſpotiſm. A law was propoſed and inacted, declaring that no decree, whether of the council or even of the general aſſembly, ſhould be valid in oppoſition to the law, as it ſtood then eſtabliſhed. But the reſtraint of law, in an unbalanced democracy, was a phantom, which party-leaders eaſily taught their favoring majority in the ſoverein aſſembly to deſpiſe. The conſtitution, therefore, remaining unaltered, the former temper of the government ſoon returned, and all its inherent evils again broke out. Party-ſpirit reſumed its violence, tyranny again marked the meaſures of the aſſembly and the judgements of the tribunals, and even the amneſty, that ſolemn ingagement to which the whole people had ſworn, as the very foundation of order and quiet in the reſtored commonwealth, was, not openly indeed, but under various ſubterfuges, violated. If the intereſt of a party required the excluſion of ſome eminent man from the college of archons or from the council, nice diſtinctions were taken to prove the caſes of ſuch men exceptions to the general pardon, and to contend that the approbation of the council in the dokimaſia ſhould be withheld. Succeſs in ſuch an argument before the council, which went no farther than to excluſion from office, incouraged accuſation on ſimilar grounds in the ordinary courts, or before the aſſembled people, which might produce confiſcation and baniſhment, or even death. Needy and profligate men caught at the opportunity, and ſycophancy revived, with all its public evils and all its private horrors.

Lyſ. ut ſup.

Lyſ. pro. Mantith. & id. con. Evand. & con. Philon.

In

In a popular government, the art of public ſpeaking cannot fail to be important, and in Athens it was more extenſively ſo, as no man, who poſſeſſed anything, could, by the moſt upright conduct, be ſecure againſt proſecution, and as moreover it was expected of the proſecuted, tho friends or council might aſſiſt, that they ſhould nevertheleſs alſo ſpeak for themſelves. The importance of eloquence, in a court of juſtice, will alſo bear ſome proportion to the numbers which compoſe it. Eloquence will often operate powerfully upon an Engliſh jury of only twelve men; tho the judge will check deception, inform ignorance, and correct miſinformation; and the jury, in conference before they decide, diſcuſſing their own opinions, the recollection of the informed and wary may obviate the faſcination of oratory upon the ignorant, the paſſionate, and the giddy. But in the Athenian courts, conſiſting of from five hundred to ſix thouſand jurors, no conference could take place; no ſalutary influence of the wiſer few could eaſily affect the maſs; the deciſion muſt generally be that of ignorance and paſſion, operated upon, as might happen, by the powers of contending ſpeakers. 'Exaſperated by eloquence,' ſays Xenophon, 'they 'often condemn the innocent; moved to pity, or even to favor, by elo-'quence, they acquit and even honor the guilty.'

Xen. Apol. Socr. ſ. 4.

In this ſtate of things, at Athens, it was unfortunate to want eloquence. A wealthy man, unable to ſpeak for himſelf in public, was doubly an object for the ſycophants. Hence the profeſſion of the rhetorician, who compoſed orations to be ſpoken by others, aroſe and gained high credit. Eminent men, of ſuperior abilities, attached themſelves to it, whoſe compoſitions, as valuable models of an important art, were collected and tranſmitted to poſterity; and much of the works of two of the moſt eminent, Lyſias, whoſe name has already occurred to notice, and Iſocrates, who ſoon after acquired celebrity, fortunately remain to us. In the Grecian annals of the cotemporary Athenian hiſtorian, we find, after the reſtoration of the democracy, a void in Athenian hiſtory. Thoſe factious intrigues, thoſe ſtrifes in the tribunals and in the agora, which alone offered themſelves, were apparently, in his ideä, either too familiar to his cotemporaries, or too hazardous for hiſtorical narrative. He has therefore referred his notice of them to thoſe valuable diſſertations which remain to us from him. Theſe, with the works of the orators and rhetoricians, who often paſſed under

the

the common title of orators, inable us in ſome degree to fill the void; not indeed with a ſeries of connected events, but with facts which afford much illuſtration of the character of the Athenian conſtitution, and of the condition of the people under it.

Among the early objects of reviving ſycophancy, we find Alcibiades, ſon of the extraordinary man of that name, who has already ingaged ſo much of our attention, by Deinomache, daughter of Megacles, the nobleſt and wealthieſt heireſs of her time in Athens, to whom he was married in early youth. The younger Alcibiades, from deficiency, whether of talents, or activity, or opportunity, made no figure, in public life, proportionate to his father's fame. He is chiefly known to us through two orations, compoſed by the two celebrated rhetoricians juſt mentioned, in different cauſes, one in his accuſation, the other in his defence; which however ſhow that he was eminent enough to excite the attacks, not only of ſycophancy but of faction.

The Athenian people had decreed a military expedition, on what occaſion does not appear, and the generals were impowered (ſuch was the tyrannical authority with which the deſpotic multitude not unfrequently intruſted its favorites) to name the citizens who ſhould ſerve upon it. Party-intereſt or party-reſentment, or poſſibly ſome view to favor with the lower people only, prompting, ſeveral men of rank and property were called upon to ſerve as common foot-ſoldiers. Moſt of them, dreading the conſequences of a deſpot's reſentment, obeyed the injurious mandate; but young Alcibiades dared to refuſe. Mounting his horſe, he joined the cavalry, and ſaid, there he was in his poſt; there he was ready for the duty which the conſtitution and the laws required of him. Lyſ. con. Alcib. Lyſ. ibid. Xen. Hel. l. 1. c. 1. ſ. 24.

The oration compoſed by Lyſias, for the proſecution, will not impreſs the moſt favorable ideä of the rhetorician himſelf, or of the proſecutor for whom he wrote, or of the court to which the ſpeech was addreſſed, or of the general adminiſtration of law at Athens, after the boaſted reſtoration of the commonwealth. Private revenge is a motive of the accuſer, directly and repeatedly avowed; and not only the moſt illiberal perſonal abuſe of the accuſed, but all that faction had ever, truly or falſely, imputed to his father, was urged to influence the tumultuary tribunal. The loſt defence is not wanting to evince, that the accuſation, which we muſt ſuppoſe ſo

able a pleader well knew how to adapt moſt advantageouſly to the capacity and temper of the court, was weakly founded and malicious. The teſtimony, that ſuch a compoſition affords, is in more than one view valuable. We might queſtion the evidence of Xenophon to the inſecurity of individuals at Athens, and the tyranny exerciſed over all poſſeſſing, or reputed to poſſeſs property; he was a ſufferer from popular ſovereinty; but the concurring teſtimony of Lyſias, a ſufferer from oligarchy, and thence a vehement advocate for popular power, completes the proof.

In the oration againſt Alcibiades, we find three penal laws quoted: one againſt cowardice in battle; another againſt omiſſion of ſervice with the infantry; and a third againſt preſuming to act with the cavalry, without the previous approbation of the council in the ſcrutiny called dokimaſia. By a violent conſtruction, the accuſer endeavoured to perſuade the court that Alcibiades was obnoxious to the firſt of theſe laws; tho not only his ſervice with the cavalry was admitted, but no battle had taken place. 'But this is a caſe,' ſays the accuſer, 'that has not occurred be-'fore ſince the reſtoration of the democracy. It behoves you therefore 'to act, not meerly as judges, but in ſome degree as legiſlators, not con-'fining yourſelves to a ſtrict conſtruction of the law as it ſtands, but rather 'deciding how the law ſhould ever hereafter be underſtood. Alcibiades, 'regularly ſummoned for the infantry, having ſought ſhelter in the leſs 'dangerous ſervice of the cavalry, it is a duty you owe to juſtice and to 'your country to preſume his cowardice, as if a battle had actually been 'fought and he had fled; and ſentence ought to be pronounced accord-'ingly.' The ſtrong contraſt of the principle, here inculcated, to that of the Engliſh juriſprudence, which requires the ſtricteſt conſtruction of penal laws, cannot fail to ſtrike the Engliſh reader; nor can he have examined Grecian hiſtory, in the genuine portraits given by cotemporary writers, without obſerving that it is in the character of democracy, far more than even of the moſt abſolute monarchy, to be careleſs of the ſafety of individuals, where but a ſhadow of the intereſt of the ſoverein interferes; and, in a democracy, the prevailing faction is the abſolute ſoverein. The accuſer's own argument ſhows that Alcibiades could, by no fair conſtruction, be deemed to have incurred the penalty of the firſt law. The caſe ſeems not to have been within the meaning even of the ſecond; intended

apparently

apparently to apply only to thoſe who owed no military ſervice but in the infantry. Upon the third a queſtion ariſes, which we have not means to decide; but we may ſafely pronounce that either the caſe of Alcibiades was not within it, or the law was a dictate of the pureſt tyranny. For if, in any ſuſpenſion of the dokimaſia, thoſe who had every requiſite for the cavalry-ſervice were legally compellable to ſerve in the infantry, what muſt have been the ſituation of leading men, in a party to which the general of the day, and a majority of the council were inimical? Any one or all of them might be baniſhed, at the nomination of the general, in the ſituation of common foot-ſoldiers, to any part of the world to which the Athenian multitude might be perſuaded to decree an expedition.

Alcibiades had the good fortune to eſcape condemnation; for, in his behalf, the general himſelf came forward with his nine collegues, declaring that, tho Alcibiades had been regularly ſummoned to ſerve in the infantry, yet he had had their leave to act with the cavalry. But apparently the Athenian law did not, like the Engliſh, forbid a ſecond proſecution for the ſame imputed crime. The accuſer purſued his purpoſe, and a fragment of a ſecond oration compoſed for him by Lyſias remains to us, in which the moſt ſtriking feature is the impudence with which the generals are called upon, with threats, to retract, and acknowlege as falſe, the evidence which they had given on oath to the court in the face of the people.

Young Alcibiades, it has been ſaid, inherited his father's fine perſon and his profligacy, without his talents. For the blemiſhes of his character, however, we ſhall not implicitly believe an avowed enemy, or a venal rhetorician, paid for giving a ſpecious form to calumny. It is creditable for both father and ſon, that a rhetorician of far fairer reputation than Lyſias, a real patriot and a ſcrupulouſly honeſt man, has been the eulogiſt of one and advocate of the other. A proſecution was inſtituted againſt the younger Alcibiades, to recover damages for a violence, pretended to have been, many years before, committed by his father, in forcibly taking from a perſon named Tiſias, a pair of horſes, which won for him the prize in the chariot-race at Olympia. Iſocrates compoſed the ſpeech, yet extant, which the younger Alcibiades ſpoke in his own defence. It is moſtly apology for ſome parts, and panegyric of the reſt, of the public conduct of his father.

What deſerves our notice here is an animadverſion upon the ſycophants. 'You are now informed,' ſays Alcibiades to the court, 'by the teſtimony 'of many acquainted with the tranſaction, and among others by the am-'baſſadors themſelves of Argos, that the horſes were not taken by violence 'from Tiſias, but fairly bought, by my father, of the Argian commonwealth. 'Attacks however, like the preſent, are not new to me; and in all of them 'the inſidious policy of the ſycophants has been the ſame. Inſtituting an 'action on pretence of ſome private wrong, they conſtantly implicate in 'their plea ſome charge of public miſdemeanor. They employ more time 'in calumniating my father, than in proving what they have ſworn to as 'the foundation of their ſuit againſt me; and, as if in contempt of 'every principle of law and juſtice, for crimes committed, as they 'affirm, by him againſt you, they demand reparation from me to them-'ſelves.'

Thoſe unverſed in the Athenian pleadings may poſſibly not immediately ſee the force or the exact drift of the concluding obſervation. The multitude ordinarily compoſing an Athenian court of juſtice was ſo great, that the pleaders always addreſſed it as under the impulſe of the ſame intereſts, and ſubject to the ſame feelings as the general aſſembly, and equally without reſponſibility. Impartiality was never ſuppoſed; the paſſions were always applied to; and it never failed to be contended, whether plaintiff or defendant could moſt perſuade the jurors, that their intereſt was implicated with his, and that, by deciding in his favor, they would be gainers[1].

[1] The orators abundantly ſhow the juſtice of Xenophon's aſſertion, Ἐν τι τοῖς δικαστηρίοις ὀυ τῶν δικαίου ἀνίοις μίλει μᾶλλον ἢ τοῦ αυτοῖς συμφέροντος. Athen. reſp. c. 1. ſ. 13. See particularly the oration of Lyſias for the eſtate of Ariſtophanes, p. 157, or 656—660.

The extravagant uſe made of public accuſation, as the tool of private malice, profiting from the extravagance of democratical jealouſy, has not eſcaped the animadverſion of the comic poet of the day. 'Run and tell Cleon,' ſays the chorus in The Waſps, (v. 407.) 'that here is a diſ-'affected man, bent upon the commonwealth's 'ruin. He aſſerts that litigation and proſecutions 'ſhould be diſcouraged! Is not this abomina-'ble? Is it not manifeſt tyranny?' An opponent of the faction of Cleon obſerves upon this: '(v. 486.) Everything, with you, is tyranny and 'conſpiracy. Even in the market everything is 'tyranny. If any one buys haddock in prefe-'rence to ſprats, the ſpratſeller ſays he is laying 'out for the tyranny. If any one wants to have 'leeks thrown into the bargain, as ſauce for 'mackarel, "What," ſays the herbwoman, "are "you looking for the tyranny? Do you think "Athens will find you ſauce for tribute?" A joke follows to the ſame purpoſe from Xanthias, the ſlave, too indelicate for tranſlation.

With

With the ſon of Alcibiades, we find under the perſecution of revived ſycophancy the nephews of his collegue in command and adverſary in politics, the rich, benevolent, unfortunate Nicias. The family was unfortunate. Niceratus the ſon, and Eucrates the brother, of Nicias, had ſuffered death under the tyranny of the Thirty. What crime, under the reſtored democracy, was imputed to his nephews, the ſons of Eucrates, for which they were threatened with confiſcation of their property, the remaining fragment of their defence, written by Lyſias, does not inform us. A decree had already been given againſt them, which is complained of as a direct violation of the amneſty. The ſervices of their family to the commonwealth are urged in their favor; and occaſion is taken, from the ſufferings of Eucrates and Niceratus under the odious tyranny of the Thirty, to affirm, what we however learn, on the beſt authority, to have been falſe, that the whole family had always been attached to the democratical intereſt. With more truth perhaps, the orator inſiſts that, as the three brothers, objects of the proſecution, were all ſupporting the burthenſome command of triremes, and liable to every other expenſive office, as well as to calls, unlimited, for occaſional contributions to the treaſury, their property was more valuable to the commonwealth in their own hands than if actually confiſcated. Such are the principal heads of the defence: of the final event of the proſecution we are no otherwiſe informed than by a report, little likely to have been ſtrictly true, that, with one exception only, all the pleadings of Lyſias were ſucceſsful.

Lyſ. p. 606.

Xen. Hel. l. 2. c. 3. ſ. 18.

An oration, written by Lyſias, for a defendant againſt a proſecution inſtituted by the treaſury, exhibits a far deeper ſcandal to the laws and conſtitution of Athens. Nicophemus and Ariſtophanes, father and ſon, ſerved their country in high ſituations; whether really well or ill we know not; but they were introduced to the public favor which raiſed them, by Conon, whom we ſhall find one of the moſt illuſtrious characters in Athenian hiſtory. On ſome turn in the popular mind, ſome change in the adminiſtration, ſome machination of faction, unreported by antient writers, they were impriſoned, ſecretly made away with, and not even their bodies, as was uſual in all common executions, reſtored to their friends for burial. This atrocious act, more ſtrongly impreſſed with the pureſt character of deſpotiſm than any recorded even of the Thirty, whoever were the perpe-

trators,

trators, and however ſtimulated, received the fulleſt and moſt deliberate approbation and ſupport of democratical authority. Confiſcation of property followed the murder, as if the ſufferers had been lawfully executed, in purſuance of the moſt regular conviction; and the amount diſappointing the expectation of the greedy Many, whether animoſity, or the deſire of plunder only ſtill incited, a proſecution was inſtituted againſt the brother of the widow of Ariſtophanes, as the neareſt relation, to compel payment to the treaſury of the ſuppoſed deficiency, on pretence that it muſt have been imbeziled by the family.

Theſe facts indeed we have only from the defendant himſelf. But to authenticate them it ſeems ſufficient, that a defendant in ſuch circumſtances could dare, or that an advocate ſuch as Lyſias could adviſe him, to ſtate them before the Athenian people. The whole oration is in a ſtile of humble ſupplication for juſtice, little to be expected, unleſs the paſſions of the deſpotic throng could be intereſted. 'A patient hearing,' ſays the accuſed, 'ſuch as you have granted to my proſecutors, is what I moſt earneſtly 'ſolicit.---Accuſations of the moſt atrocious crimes, have, it is well known, 'ſometimes been ſupported only by ſuch groſs falſehood, ſo immediately 'detected, that the witneſſes have carried out of court with them the 'deteſtation of all preſent. At other times the moſt iniquitous proſecution 'hath ſucceeded, and detection has followed, not till reparation to the in-'jured was no longer poſſible[2].'---The profeſſion of apprehenſion that a part of the numerous court would be influenced by intereſted motives, is however not ſcrupled: 'I know,' ſays the accuſed again, 'how difficult 'it will be effectually to refute the received opinion of the great riches of 'Nicophemus. The preſent ſcarcity of money in the city and the wants 'of the treaſury, which the forfeiture has been calculated upon to ſupply, 'will operate againſt me.'

If the poſſeſſion of abſolute power ſpoils individuals, it much more certainly ſpoils a multitude. An expreſſion follows, in the oration we are conſidering, ſingularly marking the perſuaſion of the ſpeaker, and of the able rhetorician who wrote for him, that, in addreſſing the Many of Athens, he was addreſſing a body impregnated with all the illiberal jea-

[2] The ſame thing is ſaid by Andocides, in his defence of himſelf, p. 2, or. 3 & 4.

louſy,

ſouſy, all the haughtineſs, and all the ſelfiſhneſs of tyranny. To illuſtrate a point he wanted to eſtabliſh, he introduced the ſuppoſition 'that the 'eſtate of Timotheus, ſon of Conon,' the greateſt, moſt irreproachable, and moſt popular character then in Athens, 'was to be confiſcated: but,' he adds, 'the gods forbid that it ſhould be ſo, UNLESS SOME SIGNAL BE-'NEFIT TO THE COMMONWEALTH MIGHT FOLLOW.' He feared to have offended by the ſuppoſition of an injurious indignity to the people's favorite; he feared to have offended by the ſuppoſition that the people's preſent intereſt ought not to be the firſt conſideration upon all occaſions: he dared not deprecate the groſſeſt injuſtice to the moſt reſpectable individual, if benefit to the multitude might follow; and he thought it a neceſſary tribute of compliment to the Athenian multitude, to expreſs, what the better nature of men the moſt uneducated, accuſtomed to injoy real freedom, but not to abuſe power, would revolt at as an inſult, his opinion of their graſping ſelfiſhneſs, and his doubt of their liberality and juſtice.

A detail follows, of the public merits of the accuſed and his family; totally alien to the merits of the cauſe, but ſtrongly marking the condition of men of property, and explaining the remark of Xenophon, ſo ſtrange on firſt view to the modern reader, that it was a queſtion whether, under the Athenian government, it was better to have property or to be deſtitute. 'There are ſome,' he proceeds to ſay, 'who ſpend their eſtates in public 'ſervice or public gratifications, that they may receive twofold through your 'favor. But my father neither ſolicited gainful, nor avoided expenſive 'offices. He took the preſidency ſucceſſively of all the choral exhibitions. 'He was ſeven times trierarc[3], and he paid many and large free-gifts to the 'treaſury. He kept horſes for public ſervice; his equeſtrian rank indeed 'required it; but whether of a ſuperior kind and in ſuperior condition, their 'victories at the Iſthmian and Nemean games may tell; where my father 'was crowned and the fame of Athens was proclaimed[4]. He was beſides

[3] The exact value of this phraſe ſeems not aſcertained: whether he fitted out ſeven different triremes, or only ſupported the expence of the ſame command renewed ſeven times.

[4] A merit was imputed to theſe victories, beyond what appears eaſy either to account for or to conceive. We learn from Plato, that an Athenian who won in the chariot or horſe-race at Olympia, was often rewarded for it with a maintenance in the prytaneium, (Plat. Apol. Socr. p. 36. D.) and it ſeems to have been common, among the Grecian republics, to give an honorary penſion to thoſe of their citizens who gained a victory in any of the games, at Olympia, Delphi, the Iſthmus, or Nemea.

'liberal.

'liberal to his fellowcitizens individually. Some he affiſted in giving mar-
'riage-portions to their daughters and ſiſters; ſome he redeemed from
'captivity; for ſome he furniſhed the expence of burial. He died in the
'office of trierarc, leaving ſcarcely two talents and a half to his family;
'and from ſo ſlender a fortune I now ſupport the ſame burthenſome honor.
'All that we have poſſeſſed has thus, you ſee, always been yours; what now
'remains to us is yours, and if we could acquire more, it would ſtill be yours.
'Fairly weighing then what has been proved to you by undeniable evidence,
'it will be found that, juſtice apart, the public intereſt ſhould lead you to
'decide in our favor; ſince the ſmall relic of our fortune will be unqueſ-
'tionably more profitable to the commonwealth in our poſſeſſion than if
'conveyed to the treaſury. Have mercy on us then, and, for the Olym-
'pian gods' ſake, let truth and juſtice bear out this great accuſation. By
'pronouncing in our favor you will act at the ſame time uprightly, and for
'yourſelves beneficially.'

Ch. 19. ſ. 7. of this Hiſt.

It will be remembered that the aſſaſſination of Phrynichus, an able commander, but an unprincipled politician, was a leading ſtep to the overthrow of the oligarchy of the Four-Hundred, and the reſtoration of democracy under Theramenes and Alcibiades; and it may deſerve notice how the principle of that aſſaſſination, the ground of ſome ſtrong meaſures of government immediately following, was avowed and gloried in, after the overthrow of the tyranny of the Thirty, and the reſtoration of democracy under Thraſybulus. Two of thoſe concerned in the murder had been ſhortly apprehended by the friends of Phrynichus, and public juſtice did not refuſe their confinement in priſon. But inſtantly the oppoſite party was vehement in clamor againſt this perſecution, as they called it, of thoſe who had deſerved well in the popular cauſe: and they prevailed ſo far, that the priſoners, one a Megarian the other an Ætolian, not only were releaſed, but preſented with the privileges of Athenian citizens, and a grant of lands in Attica, to reward their democratical virtue. Their proſecutors, Ariſtarchus and Alexicles, Athenians, and of the higheſt rank, were proſecuted as friends of a traitor and enemies of the people. They had certainly been active in the oligarchal party; but the proſecution of aſſaſſins was the crime that ſuperinduced their ruin. They were condemned and executed, and even their bones were forbidden burial within the Attic territory.

Lycurg. or. con. Leocrat. p. 164 vel 217.

Lyſ. or. con. Agorat. p. 136, 27, vel 492. & de oleâ ſacrâ, p. 108, 33, vel 163.

This

If this violence of democratical deſpotiſm might ever demand excuſe, it would be when the public mind, heated by recent injuries, was ſtill agitated by the ferment of faction. But, after the reſtoration of democracy by Thraſybulus, and the wiſe meaſures then taken for promoting concord, which actually produced at leaſt a comparative quiet, it might ſeem not unreaſonable to expect, if ever it could be reaſonably expected under democracy, that maxims more conſiſtent with a wiſe policy, as well as with a juſt morality, might have gained ground. But on the contrary we find, that to have been an accomplice in the aſſaſſination of Phrynichus was ſtill conſidered as meritorious; ſo meritorious, that it might even cover the guilt of other murders, the criminality of which had no other palliative. We find a man under capital proſecution abſolutely pleading it, as the merit which ſhould ſave him; and the accuſer ſo completely concurring with him in principle, that, far from denying the aſſaſſination to have been meritorious, he uſed his utmoſt endeavours to prove that the accuſed had no participation in it. Nor was this a paſſing doctrine, riſing and falling in credit with circumſtances of the times: the remaining works of ſucceeding orators fully evince its permanency, as a democratical principle.

Lyſ. con. Agorat. p. 136, 15, vel 491.

Lycurg. or. con. Leocrat. p. 164, vel 217.

Among circumſtances marking the condition of individuals under the Athenian democracy, the proſecution of a man for removing the decayed ſtump of an olive-tree from his own ground, will deſerve notice. Landed property in Attica, as we have obſerved in treating of the Athenian revenue, was very commonly incumbered with olive-trees belonging to the commonwealth. For their ſecurity, which perhaps was, in early times, of public importance, policy had procured them the reputation of being ſacred to Minerva, and they were placed under the guardian care of the court of Areiopagus. Either to injure the tree, or to till or feed the ſoil immediately around, was highly penal. The fruit, gathered under the council's direction, was ſold for public benefit, and the produce carried to the treaſury. Theſe trees however, thus protected from domeſtic injury, were liable to ſuffer from foreign enemies, who either did not know, or would little regard, their ſacred character; and in the ſeveral invaſions of Attica by the Lacedæmonians, many eſtates, with whoſe cultivation the ſacred olives had formerly

Lyſ. or. de oleâ ſacrâ, p. 110, vel 283.

p. 282.

merly very inconveniently interfered, were, through the calamities of war, delivered from the incumbrance.

Lyſ. or. de oleâ ſacra, p. 108, 39, vel 264.

The Megarian who has already been mentioned as an accomplice in the aſſaſſination of Phrynichus, and whoſe name was Apollodorus, had been rewarded for that deed, ſo meritorious in the eſtimation of the friends of democracy, with a part of the eſtate of the oligarchal leader Peiſander, which had been forfeited when he fled from Athens, on the diſſolution of the government of the Four-Hundred. This public preſent the aſſaſſin had had the precaution or the good fortune to ſell, before the eſtabliſhment of the government of the Thirty gave prevalence to other political principles, according to which his merit would be very differently eſtimated, and his eſtate, had he ſtill held it, would probably have been taken from him. The land being offered for ſale again by the purchaſer, was bought by the wealthy and prudent proprietor of an adjoining eſtate, who managed ſo as to live quietly under the Thirty, without ingaging ſo far in their meaſures as to be involved in their diſgrace. Under the reſtored democracy, therefore, intitled to the benefit of the amneſty, if for anything he wanted it, and having never been deficient either in freegifts to the treaſury, or in any of thoſe expenſive offices, whether of public ſervice or public amuſement, which the wealthy were required to undertake, he hoped, as he ſays for himſelf, that, avoiding to trouble others, he might avoid being troubled.

p. 263.

Ch. 19. ſ. 7. of this Hiſt.

Lyſ. de ol. ſacr. p. 110, 24, vel 283.

p. 111, 6, vel 285.

Ejuſd. or. init.

Notwithſtanding all theſe advantages and all theſe attentions, on the revival of ſycophancy the ingenuity of its profeſſors found a pretence to attack him. On his antient eſtate were many ſacred olive-trees, as well as many his own property; on the adjoining new purchaſe, not one of either ſort remained. A proſecution for deſtroying a ſacred olive-tree on that lately purchaſed land, formerly part of Peiſander's eſtate, was inſtituted againſt him in the Areiopagus. His defence, written by Lyſias, impreſſes no favorable idea on modern, at leaſt on Engliſh readers, even of that celebrated court. Frivolous and vexatious proſecution, it appears, was not deterred by its reſpectable character: ſycophants could, even there, find incouragement. In the action in queſtion, the accuſation firſt ſtated that a fruit-bearing olive-tree had been deſtroyed. But evidence to this point having been vainly ſought among the contractors for the commonwealth's fruit, the charge was altered, and it was ſtated that a decayed trunk

Ejuſd. p. 281.

p. 269.

trunk only had been removed. This however, ſuch ſacredneſs did the ſuperſtition of that philoſophical age impute to the ſapleſs wood, was, in the acknowlegement of the accuſed himſelf, an enormous offence, the legal puniſhment for which was no leſs than baniſhment for life. The temptation to commit the crime, as the accuſed juſtly obſerves, bore no proportion to the penalty impoſed, nor the hope of eſcape to the probability of detection. Neither houſe nor vineyard was near, to make the deſtruc- Ejuſd. p. 290.
tion of a tree particularly deſirable; but a high road paſſed hard by, and the act was of a kind not to be eaſily done but in preſence of witneſſes, either paſſengers or aſſiſtants. 'Heretofore,' ſays the accuſed, 'I might have taken offence at being called fearfully cautious: 'yet I think my conduct has never been marked with ſuch imprudent 'boldneſs as to authorize the ſuppoſition that I would put myſelf ſo in the 'power of my ſlaves, as unavoidably I muſt by the act of which I am 'accuſed. Slaves, it is univerſally known, are always inimical to their 'maſters. After, therefore, giving them opportunity for ſuch accuſation againſt 'me, I could no longer command mine, but they would command me.' This does not offer the pleaſanteſt picture of the ſtate either of ſlaves or of maſters at Athens. Nor is the ideä altogether improved by what follows, tho the maſter in queſtion muſt have had confidence in his ſlaves, ſince he freely offered them for examination by torture. To re- p. 287.
concile ſuch inhumanity with ſuch confidence appears difficult: yet the ſlaves ſeem to have borne a better character for attachment than their maſter would have impreſſed; and a high opinion ſeems to have been entertained of their fortitude, ſince the proſecutor, without any claim to finer feeling, refuſed their teſtimony, as ſubject to influence.

This proſecution, it appears, reſted on the ſingle evidence of the proſecutor. All his propoſed witneſſes failed; while many, farmers who had rented the land, and others acquainted with it, ſwore poſitively that, ſince the accuſed had purchaſed the eſtate, no ſuch ſtump as that ſtated in the indictment, had exiſted. Two motives for the proſecution are aſſigned p. 291.
by the accuſed; the hope of extorting money; and the inſtigation of powerful men with political views. It was not inſtituted till ſome years after the pretended commiſſion of the crime, and it ſeems to have been

unſupported even by any probability; yet it appears that the accuſed was under no ſmall apprehenſion that even the venerable court of Areiopagus might be influenced to give an unjuſt deciſion againſt him.

SECTION II.

Proſecution of Andocides for impiety: Petition of Andocides for a decree of protection.

IT has been a favorite tenet among political writers, that republican government is fit only for ſmall ſtates. But ſmall ſtates are liable to ſuffer, more than large ones, from one evil inſeparable from republican government, the conteſt of parties; for in proportion to the narrowneſs of its bounds and the ſcantineſs of its population, the ſpirit of party will pervade a ſtate with more untempered and more laſting violence. This was experienced in all the little Italian commonwealths of modern times; it has been ſeen in Geneva, and unfortunately is ſtill ſeen there: all the Grecian republics felt it ſeverely. But modern ſpeculators in polities might have had opportunity, which the Greeks wanted, to obſerve, in the example of Britain, that extenſive territory, with a numerous population, giving means for the violence of the ſpirit to be tempered, and the malignity ſoftened, by diffuſion, affords the faireſt field, for an able legiſlator, to obviate the worſt effects of what always muſt exiſt in free governments, while mankind have paſſions.

Among the numerous proſecutions of this period, known by the remaining works of the Athenian orators, that of Andocides on a charge of impiety, for the variety and importance of the information it affords, will deſerve particular notice. Two orations pronounced in that remarkable trial, and a third in conſequence of it, remain to us; one, in accuſation, compoſed by Lyſias; the others, in defence, by the accuſed himſelf.

Andoc. de myſt. p. 14 vel 53, & 18 vel 72, 73.

Andocides was born of one of the moſt illuſtrious families of Athens. His anceſtors had filled the firſt offices of the commonwealth, military and civil.

civil. His great-great-grandfather, Leogoras, was a leader of the party in oppoſition to the Peiſiſtratids, and commanded the exiled people in a ſucceſsful battle againſt the tyrants. His grandfather, Andocides, commanded a fleet, with reputation, in the Corinthian war which preceded the Peloponneſian [5]. His father, Leogoras, was firſt commiſſioner in a treaty for peace with Lacedæmon. Andocides himſelf was a youth, familiar through his birth and connections with men of higheſt rank in the republic, when he became implicated in that accuſation of profaning the myſteries and mutilating the Mercuries, which firſt drove Alcibiades from his country.

Thucyd. l. vi. c. 51 & ſeq. Plut. vit. or. Andoc. de myſt. p. 14, vel 53.

That extraordinary affair, ſo ſtrange, it might be ſaid childiſh, in itſelf, ſo important in its conſequences, remains involved in deep obſcurity, tho the uſe made of it by Lyſias, in accuſation, brought from Andocides, in his defence, what he has given as an explanation of it. Defective however as the account is, it affords much illuſtration of the Athenian government; and, for the ſake of this, we revert, for a moment, to that period of the hiſtory.

In the vehemence of popular alarm, excited by the party in oppoſition to Alcibiades, when witneſſes to the profanation were ſought, or pretended to be ſought, on all ſides, the firſt brought forward, was a ſervant of Alcibiades himſelf, named Andromachus. On his evidence one man only was executed; but ſeveral others, aware that when the tyrant was inraged, no certain meaſure of juſtice was to be expected,

p. 2 vel 6.

[5] Were Plutarch and the ſcholiaſt of Thucydides to be believed, Andocides the orator was himſelf the commander. It is far from my deſire that either ſhould have leſs credit than he deſerves; yet I perfectly agree with Brook-Taylor in the opinion of their error on this occaſion, tho I would not give quite ſuch harſh language. 'Ad hæc tamen,' ſays Taylor, 'non 'animos advertebant σχ. Thucyd. neque mendax ille Plutarchus, qui vitas oratorum, dolis 'et erroribus conſutas, olim conſcribillavit.' Annot. ad Lyſ. or. con. Andoc. p. 107 vel 244.

Concerning the anceſtors of Andocides we find a difference in our extant copies of the orations of Andocides. In the firſt oration, Leogoras, opponent of the Peiſiſtratids, is mentioned as his great-grandfather; in the ſecond, as his father's great-grandfather. The difference is of no great hiſtorical importance, but the latter account ſeems beſt to agree with other reported circumſtances of the family, and beſt to accommodate chronology. I ſhould therefore ſuppoſe the pedigree, which, in the Greek manner of ſtating it, exactly reſembled the Welſh, to have run thus; 1. Leogoras, opponent of the Peiſiſtratids; 2. Leogoras of Leogoras; 3. Andocides of Leogoras, naval commander in the Corinthian war; 4. Leogoras of Andocides, commiſſioner for negotiating peace; 5. Andocides of Leogoras, the orator.

fied,

fled, and were, in their abſence, all condemned to death. Large rewards were held out to invite farther indication. No other witneſſes however offered; but it was underſtood that a metic, named Teucer, who had fled to Megara, could indicate much, and would return and declare all he knew, if he might be taken under the protection of the council of Five-Hundred. That council ingaging for his ſafety, he came and denounced twenty-eight perſons, among whom were Plato, the ſcholar, and Melitus, probably father of the accuſer, of Socrates. Theſe, with ſome others, fled. Of thoſe indicated, all taken were executed. We can only wonder that informers were ſo ſlow and ſcarce, when we learn that Andromachus, a ſervant, in reward of his forward zeal, received no leſs than ten thouſand drachmas, about four hundred pounds ſterling, and Teucer, a foreiner, who, as he bargained for perſonal ſafety, was leſs an object of popular generoſity, one thouſand drachmas, about forty pounds, for their information.

Andoc. de myſt. p. 7.

p. 8, vel 18.

The democratical intereſt, it appears, was now divided. Alcibiades had riſen upon the democratical intereſt; and while he remained in Athens, none, leaning on the ſame intereſt, could enter into competition with him. But his abſence, and the alarm ſo ſucceſsfully excited, gave opportunities; inſomuch that Peiſander, afterward founder of the oligarchy of the Four-Hundred, now ſtood forward as one of the greateſt favorites of the people. He was appointed, together with Charicles, as confidential commiſſioner of the people, to inveſtigate this very myſterious and very alarming buſineſs. After ſhort inquiry, they declared their opinion that it was a deep-laid plot to overthrow the democracy, and that the conſpirators were numerous. On the publication of this declaration, in the diſtraction of party-intereſts, alarm ſo pervaded the lower people, uncertain whom they might truſt, that the ſignal for the meeting of the council ſerved as a ſignal for all to fly from the agora: it was completely deſerted; every man doubting his neighbour, and fearing that he might himſelf be the next to be apprehended. In the midſt of this popular terror, another informing adventurer came forward. A man named Diocleides, being brought before the council, depoſed that he knew the mutilators of the Mercuries to be no leſs than three hundred: forty-two he indicated by name, and among them he did not ſcruple to accuſe Mantitheus and Aphepſion, two of the councillors

p. 19.

p. 22.

cillors preſent. A propoſition was immediately made by Peiſander, the demagogue of the day, which could be tolerated only in a democracy or a divan, 'that the decree of Scamandrius, which forbad the torture of Athenian citi-'zens, ſhould be ſuſpended, and that Mantitheus and Aphepſion ſhould be put 'upon the wheel; for day ought not to cloſe, he ſaid, before every name 'was known.' Not the wild multitude, but the council, taken indeed by lot from the multitude, but men all firſt approved in the dokimaſia, applauded this meaſure of pure tyranny. Mantitheus and Aphepſion betook themſelves to the altar of the council-hall; and, by force of ſupplication, with difficulty obtained indulgence, ſo far as to avoid the torture, and to be allowed to give ſecurity for ſtanding trial. But a government ſo tyrannical, overwhelming principle, urges and almoſt forces men to diſhonorable actions. Mantitheus and Aphepſion were no ſooner at liberty, than they mounted their horſes and fled to the enemy, then ſtationed at Decelcia; leaving their bondſmen legally liable to that puniſhment which, in caſe only of their conviction, ſhould have fallen on themſelves.

Whether put forward to anſwer any party purpoſe, or meerly the ſelf-ariſing fancy of the multitude, Diocleides, the accuſer, became, or appeared to become, the popular favorite, and extravagantly the favorite. He was conducted by the people in a carriage to the prytaneium, crowned as the ſavior of the commonwealth, and entertained with a ſupper at the public expence. Meanwhile forty perſons whom he accuſed were impriſoned. Andocides, Leogoras, father of Andocides, three couſin-germans, and ſeven more diſtant relations, among whom was Eucrates, brother of Nicias, were of the number. 'We were all bound,' ſaid Andocides, ſpeaking his defence, 'night came on, and the priſon was 'locked; when, as intelligence of our misfortune was communicated, 'many women, the mother of one, the ſiſter of another, the wife 'with the children of a third, came and vented their lamentations about 'the place.' Amid this complicated ſcene of woe, this anxiety within and without the priſon for what was next to happen, his relations impriſoned with him, knowing that he had lived in intimacy with ſome who had been executed, and with ſome who had fled, and apprehending more certain deſtruction from the blind jealouſy of the tyrant multitude,

Andoc. de myſt. p. 23.

p. 24.

p. 25.

multitude, than from anything that could be fairly ſtated againſt them, importuned him to offer himſelf for evidence, and declare all he knew.

Andocides yielded to this perſuaſion, and accordingly was examined before the council. He had his information, as he affirmed, from Euphiletus and Melitus, who had been active in the mutilation of the Mercuries. All thoſe already executed, and ſeveral who had fled, he ſaid, had been juſtly impeached, and he indicated four, ſtill in Athens, as accomplices. What however was the purpoſe of ſo apparently ſtrange a wildneſs as the mutilation of the ſtatues, or what the temptation to it, is not in the leaſt indicated by anything remaining from him. Tho he pretends to account for the odd circumſtance, that the Mercury before his father's door, alone of all in Athens, remained uninjured, yet even thus he throws no light on the object of the perſons concerned. His confirmation of the evidence before given againſt thoſe executed and thoſe who had fled, together with the indication of four additional criminals, tho theſe all eſcaped the officers of juſtice, at once calmed the minds of the people, before mad with fear and ſuſpicion. This, extraordinary as it appears, is ſo ſupported by Thucydides, that the fact ſeems not reaſonably queſtionable. Perhaps the multitude wanted the teſtimony of an Athenian citizen and a man of rank to calm their apprehenſions, tho that of Teucer, a metic, and Andromachus, a freedman, or perhaps ſtill a ſlave, had ſufficed them for condemning many citizens of the firſt conſideration to death. Not that this ſuppoſition will wholly explain the myſtery. There was certainly party intrigue connected with the depoſition of Andocides; for the furious Peiſander was at once appeaſed [6]; and the miſerable tool Diocleides, who had been held up almoſt as an idol to the multitude, was now hurled at once to perdition. Being brought again before the council, and confronted with Andocides, he acknowleged, if we may believe the orator, the falſehood of all the evidence he had before given. This, whether by the ſtanding law of Athens, or by law eſtabliſhed for the occaſion, ſubjected him to capital puniſhment. The council promiſed him pardon, on condition of declaring his inſtigators. Diocleides ſeems to have been ready for any declaration that might ſave his life, and he named many;

Andoc. de myſt. p. 26 & 31.

[6] Ἐξελίγχοντες δὲ τὸ πρᾶγμα ἡ τε βουλὴ καὶ οἱ ζητηταὶ—p. 32. The ζητηταὶ, it will be remembered, were Charicles and Peiſander.

but

but all, getting timely information, eſcaped out of Attica. The people became furious, or thoſe who led the people thought the death of Diocleides neceſſary to their own ſecurity; and, by a paſſionate decree, the unfortunate, but apparently worthleſs man was, without trial, ſent to the executioner. Andocides and his father, and all impriſoned with them, were immediately releaſed, and thoſe fugitives, whoſe impeachment by Teucer was not confirmed by the evidence of Andocides, were recalled.

But tho Andocides was thus delivered from confinement and the fear of death, yet he ſeems to have remained under the ban of the atimy, or excluſion from magiſtracy, and all poſts of honor and command. He choſe therefore to leave Athens; but the conſideration of his family and connections, and his own talents, procured him an honorable and advantageous reception in Sicily, Italy, Peloponneſus, Theſſaly, the Helleſpont, and eſpecially in Cyprus[7]. Conſidering the general diſpoſition of later writers among the antients, who have been implicitly followed by the moderns, to revile Andocides, it is rather remarkable that the only eminent man viſited by him, who denied him favor, was Dionyſius of Syracuſe, certainly among the ableſt, but not the moſt virtuous of his age; and, on the contrary, Evagoras of Salamis in Cyprus, eminent among the worthieſt, was his principal patron[8]. Toward the end of the Peloponneſian war, he returned to Athens; whether expecting favor from the people, as on his trial he aſſerted, in conſequence of a conſiderable ſervice he had found means to do the Athenian fleet, then lying at Samos; or whether, as may perhaps be ſuſpected, he rather depended upon intereſt with the party of the Four-Hundred, then in poſſeſſion of the government. We may however truſt his account ſo far, that, inſtead of finding the expected favor, he ſuffered impriſonment, and narrowly eſcaped capital condemnation, from the party-violence of Peiſander; and this gave him opportunity at leaſt to pretend that he was perſecuted for attachment to the democratical cauſe. On regaining liberty, Cyprus became again his refuge. There he was living in affluence, of which, apparently, he owed much to the friendſhip and generoſity of

Lyſ. con. Andoc. p. 103, vel 201.

Andoc. de myſt. p. 1, vel 2, & Lyſ. con. Andoc. p. 107, vel 248. Plut. vit. Andoc. Andoc. de red. p. 21, vel 80.

p. 82.

Andocid. de myſt. p. 1, vel 2.

[7] This, aſſerted by Andocides (De myſt. p. 18, vel 72, & de reditu, p. 21, vel 80.) ſeems confirmed even by the reproaches of his proſecutor. (Lyſ. con. Andoc. p. 103, vel 200, & 107, vel 248.)

[8] Lyſias ſays (p. 226) that he was impriſoned by Evagoras, and eſcaped by flight. There is much appearance that this was calumny. On the contrary, that he received very great favor from Evagoras appears unqueſtionable.

Evagoras, when the overthrow of the government of the Thirty at Athens produced the general amneſty, which ſeemed to afford opportunity for all Athenian exiles to return ſecurely to their country. However, therefore, the friendſhip of Evagoras, and a conſiderable property in the fine iland of Cyprus might ſoften baniſhment, Athens became again the inviting ſcene for a man of the connections and talents of Andocides; and, at the age of ſomething more than forty, he returned thither [9].

Andoc. de myſt. p. 17, vel 64.

It does not appear that any exception was immediately taken againſt his reſuming every right of an Athenian citizen. On the contrary, if we may believe his own probable account, the very party by which he was diſliked, and afterward perſecuted, put him into the honorable but expenſive, and therefore generally avoided offices, firſt of preſident of the Hephæſteia, games of Vulcan, at Athens, then of architheorus, miniſter repreſentative of the Athenian commonwealth, ſucceſſively at the Iſthmian and Olympian games, and afterward of treaſurer of the ſacred revenue [10]. Meanwhile he was active in public buſineſs; his eloquence procured him attention from the people; his great connections and great talents procured him conſideration with the council. Forward, and perhaps little ſcrupulous in accuſation, he diſturbed the meaſures, checked the hopes, and excited the apprehenſions of the party in oppoſition to that with which he was connected. His arguments before the council procured the rejection of one of them, in the dokimaſia, as of objectionable character, and of courſe excluſion from the cavalry ſervice, and from the higher civil offices. Hence aroſe great alarm, and a reſolution to cruſh him, if their policy, in aid of their collected ſtrength, could effect it [11].

Lyſ. con. Andoc. p. 106, vel 230.

The firſt attempt was of a very extraordinary kind: at leaſt ſo it appears to the modern reader. We have the account indeed only from Andocides himſelf; but this was pronounced before the Athenian people, when he apprehended oppreſſion from a party more powerful than his own; and it

[9] Brook Taylor has fancied, and endeavored to prove, that Lyſias, in ſaying that Andocides was more than forty, meant to reckon the years, not from his birth, but from his age of eighteen, his firſt manhood. The learned and ingenious argument carries, to me, no degree of conviction.

[10] Perhaps the revenue (whence ariſing I know not) from which the expence of the Eleuſinian myſteries, and the ſacrifices, proceſſions, and other appurtenant ceremonies, was defrayed.

[11] From the accuſer himſelf may be gathered the motives to the proſecution. Lyſ. con. Andoc. p. 106, vel 230.

contains

contains ſuch a detail of matters open to the knowlege of numbers, that he ſurely would not ſo have committed himſelf, if the truth of the tale had not been either generally known, or within his power to prove.

It was ſuppoſed, we find, of much efficacy toward obtaining the favor of any deity, to place upon the altar, as a ſupplication-offering, an olive-branch, wrapt in a woollen veil. But it was forbidden to do this, in the temple of Ceres, during the myſteries; whether becauſe individuals ſhould not draw the attention of the goddeſs from rites inſtituted to conciliate her favor to the commonwealth, or under what other ideä, does not appear. Among the powerful enemies of Andocides was Callias, hereditary torch-bearer of the Eleuſinian myſteries; an office whence his family derived the ſurname of Daduchus. He was ſon of Hipponicus, eſteemed the richeſt man of his time in Greece, and deſcended from Callias Daduchus, ſaid to have fought, habited in the ſacred robe of his office, againſt the Perſians at Marathon. 'We were returned,' ſays Andocides, 'from Eleuſis' (apparently he was then treaſurer of the ſacred revenue) 'when the king' (the ſecond archon) 'going in regular form, to report the circumſtances of the 'proceſſion, was directed, by the prytanes, to make his report to the coun-'cil, and require Cephiſius and myſelf to attend in the Eleuſinium; for 'there, according to the ordinance of Solon, the council ſits on the morrow 'of the myſteries. We attended accordingly; and, the council being met, 'Callias, habited in the ſacred robe, aroſe and declared, that a ſupplicatory 'bough was lying on the altar; placed there, as he was informed, by Ando-'cides; and the laws of their anceſtors, which had been ſatisfactorily ex-'plained to the people by his father Hipponicus, devoted the perſon, ſo of-'fending, to death without trial.'

Andoc. de myſt. p. 54.

p. 55.

It is remarkable that the accuſed objected nothing to the principle of a law devoting a citizen to death without trial; the law itſelf, apparently traditionary, and the ſenſe inſiſted upon reſting on the depoſition of an individual in office. Andocides, able and experienced, was aware that it was congenial to democracy to be careleſs of the rights of individuals; and, in his ſituation, he dared not queſtion the right of the ſoverein to ſend anybody at pleaſure to the executioner. His defence was of another kind. He contended, in the firſt place, that the law which ſhould direct the deciſion of the council, was ingraved on a pedeſtal within

p. 58.

the temple; and the puniſhment for the offence in queſtion was there clearly declared to be, not death, but a fine of a thouſand drachmæ, leſs than forty pounds ſterling. He then admitted, which may ſeem not leſs ſtrange to the modern reader, that, whether the profanation was intentional or unintentional, the puniſhment, being piacular, was equally to attach upon it, 'The goddeſſes themſelves,' the accuſer had ſaid, 'de-'ſirous of the puniſhment of Andocides, inſtigated him to the pro-'fanation, of the conſequence of which he was ignorant.' The defence of Andocides, againſt an attack ſo apparently difficult to ward, is truly curious. 'I maintain,' he ſaid, 'that, if what my accuſers affirm is 'true, the goddeſſes have ſhown themſelves propitious to me. For had I 'placed the ſupplicatory offering, and confeſſed it, I ſhould indeed have 'wrought my own deſtruction; but, having kept my counſel, when con-'feſſion alone could convict me, for it is not pretended that there were wit-'neſſes to the fact, the goddeſſes may be ſuppoſed to have intereſted them-'ſelves in my preſervation. Had they deſired my deſtruction, they would 'have prompted me to confeſs the profanation, which I certainly did not 'commit.' In truth, no evidence to fix the fact upon Andocides could be produced, and he was acquitted.

This ſtrange attempt in the council having failed, it was reſolved next to bring Andocides before a popular tribunal; and it would probably now be the more neceſſary to puſh meaſures againſt him, as he and his party would be exaſperated by that attempt, and incouraged by its failure. No act of Andocides, ſince his return to Athens, gave any opportunity. It was determined therefore to take advantage of the indiſcretion or the misfortune of his early youth, and, without regard to the many, now happily healed, wounds, which it might open in the commonwealth, to inſtitute a capital accuſation againſt him, on the pretence that his caſe was an exception to the general amneſty.

Cephiſius, apparently his collegue in the office of treaſurer of the ſacred revenue, was the oſtenſible conductor of the proſecution; Lyſias compoſed the principal ſpeech in accuſation. The acts of criminality ſtated in the inditement were, that Andocides had frequented the temples, ſacrificed on the altars, and acted in civil affairs, as if in the legal injoyment of the perfect rights of an Athenian citizen, when the decree of atimy, or depri-

vation

vation of rights and honors, which had been paſſed againſt him on occaſion of the mutilation of the Mercuries, remained unrepealed; and that, by falſe accuſation, in which his own father was involved, with other near relations, he had occaſioned the execution of innocent citizens. The puniſhment, according to the uſual Athenian form, was ſubjoined, death.

The ſpeech in accuſation, written by Lyſias, remains to us nearly intire. It has been ſtudiouſly adapted, by the ingenious and experienced rhetorician, to the information and the temper of a mob-tribunal. Little ſolicitous to convince reaſon, he has applied to the paſſions, and eſpecially to that of ſuperſtitious fear; a paſſion very prevalent among the Greeks, and beyond all others likely to cloud and diſturb reaſon. His great object has been to perſuade, that the impiety of Andocides, if not expiated by his death, would implicate the court and the whole commonwealth in his guilt; and that the greateſt misfortunes, public and private, might be reaſonably apprehended from the conſequent anger of the gods. Lyſ. con. Andoc. p. 104, vel 207, & 105, vel 217, & 106, vel 231.

The tale told at the outſet of the ſpeech, of a kind not to be omitted, is yet difficult to report[12]. The purport was to impreſs the court with a conviction of the reality, and the immediate impendence, of danger from the divine wrath. 'A horſe,' ſays the orator, 'was tied to the rail of the tem- Lyſ. con. Andoc. init.
'ple of the goddeſſes (Ceres and Proſerpine) with the pretended purpoſe 'that the owner, who had loſt it, might reclaim it; but, in the night, 'it was ſtolen by the man who had brought it thither. This profanation 'eſcaped the law, but did not eſcape divine vengeance; for the ſacri-'legious criminal periſhed by a moſt dreadful death. All food emitted, 'to his ſenſe, ſo offenſive a ſmell, that, unable to eat, he died of hunger. 'The teſtimony of the hierophant to theſe facts has been heard by num-'bers now living.' While we wonder at ſuch a tale, ſeriouſly told, in the age of Xenophon and Plato, in one of the principal courts of juſtice in Athens, we ſhould recollect how lately the laws againſt witchcraft were in force among ourſelves.

The rhetorician then labored to prove that the caſe of Andocides was not within the meaning of the general amneſty. For the quiet of the commonwealth it would have been better that ſuch proof ſhould have been in Lyſ. con. Andoc. p. 234.

[12] The beginning of the oration is wanting; but the tale, tho beginning with a broken ſentence, is completely clear.

no

no caſe attempted. All the reſt of the reaſoning, and moſt of the declamation, are founded upon a groſs falſehood. It is impudently aſſerted, that the profanation of the myſteries, and the mutilation of the Mercuries by Andocides, not only were notorious, but confeſſed by himſelf. The peroration then runs thus: 'Give your attention, and let your imagination 'picture to you what this man has done. Clothed in a ſacerdotal robe, in 'preſence of the uninitiated, he acted the ſacred ceremonies; expoſed what 'ought not to be ſeen, and declared what ought not to be heard. The 'images of the gods, in whom we believe, whom we worſhip, and to 'whom, after careful purification, we ſacrifice and pray, he mutilated. To 'expiate this pollution, the prieſteſſes and prieſts, turning toward the ſetting 'ſun, the dwelling of the infernal gods, devoted with curſes the ſacrile-'gious wretch, and ſhook their purple robes, in the manner preſcribed by 'that law which has been tranſmitted from earlieſt times. Theſe deeds he 'has confeſſed; yet in violation of your decree, which declared him ex-'cluded from temples and ſacred ceremonies, as impure and piacular, he 'has returned to the city, ſacrificed upon the altars, mixed in thoſe holy 'ceremonies which he had profaned, entered even the temple of the god-'deſſes, and waſhed his polluted hands in the ſacred ewer. Whom can it 'become to ſuffer ſuch things? What friend, what kinſman, but eſpe-'cially, what member of a court of judicature will riſk, by the moſt ſecret 'favor to ſuch a man, to bring the divine anger on himſelf? No: by 'avenging the gods, by putting Andocides out of the world, you muſt 'purify the city; and let the pollution of ſacrilege, the poiſon of impiety, the 'offence to whatever is holy, be ſent far from you[13]. It has been among 'the cuſtoms of your anceſtors to devote the impious to death, without the 'formality of trial, by a ſimple decree. You do better to make a more 'ſolemn example of them. But, knowing what becomes you, no 'perſuaſion ought to move you from the pious purpoſe. The criminal will 'ſupplicate and intreat, but pity ſhould be far from you. Not who 'periſh juſtly, but thoſe only who periſh unjuſtly, deſerve commiſe-'ration.'

[13] Thus far the peroration is tranſlated: what immediately follows is abbreviated: the three laſt ſentences again are tranſlated.

The

The ſpeech of Andocides, in his defence, is a maſterly and manly compoſition, containing a clear detail of facts, ſtrongly ſupported by witneſſes, and by appeals to the knowlege of the multitude compoſing the court before which he pleaded; carrying a doubtful appearance, and in ſome points little intelligible to the modern reader, only in what regards the profanation of the myſteries, and the mutilation of the Mercuries; every aſſertion concerning which is nevertheleſs ſtill ſupported by evidence, oral or written. The confeſſion, which his accuſer affirmed him to have made, is ſtrongly and repeatedly denied, together with the facts ſaid to have been confeſſed. The improbable aſſertion, that the accuſed impeached his own father and other kinſmen, he ſo ſhows to have been a groſs falſehood, that we can only wonder how ſuch an attempt of the accuſer could paſs without cenſure from the court[14]. Andoc. de myſt. p. 15 & 17.

After then mentioning the attempt of Callias, which has been already related, to procure his condemnation by the council without trial, he proceeds to a private hiſtory of Callias, curious in itſelf, but foreign to the cauſe, and brought forward only to ſhow that the malice of Callias to Andocides originated in circumſtances highly diſcreditable to the former and honorable to the latter; unleſs it was farther in view to point out an object which might draw, from the accuſed, a part of that public indignation which he found preſſing on him. Too long, too intricate, too much entering into detail of private life to be conveniently reported here, it muſt ſuffice to ſay of it, that it tends ſtrongly to ſhow to what a degree, in ſo ſmall a ſtate as Athens, party intereſt inabled men to ſcorn the laws, and how much more than can eaſily be in extenſive dominion, private intereſts became unavoidably implicated with all public concerns.

This tale is followed by one, relating to a public buſineſs, which muſt not be omitted. The tax of a fiftieth on imports and exports, was commonly farmed by auction, for three years. A ſpreading plane afforded convenient ſhade, under which the bidders commonly aſſembled. A company, with one named Argyrius at its head, had farmed this revenue at thirty talents yearly, between ſix and ſeven thouſand pounds ſterling. When their term expired, they found means, by intereſt and money, to p. 65

[14] The clear detail, in the firſt oration, of matter of ſuch public notoriety, and which one ſhould ſuppoſe matter of record, is of itſelf evidence; and it is corroborated by the mention again made of the ſame matter in the ſecond oration, in which it muſt have been the height of imprudence for the accuſed to bring it forward again, if there was any doubt of its truth.

obviate

obviate competition, and they obtained it for a farther term at the ſame rent. Andocides, knowing it to be underlet, made a regular offer to the council to advance upon the bargain. The auction was, in conſequence, opened again, and cloſed finally with letting the tax to Andocides at thirty-ſix talents, being an advance of fourteen or fifteen hundred pounds ſterling yearly. At this rent Andocides declares it was no diſadvantageous contract. The uſe that he propoſed to make of the mention of this tranſaction, on his trial, was to fix popular odium on his accuſers, and particularly on Callias, as connected with Argyrius, and intereſted in his contract; to ſhow that the motive to his proſecution was not public ſpirit, but private malice; to claim to be himſelf a uſeful and neceſſary man to the popular intereſt; and to endeavour farther to allure popular conſideration, by promiſing, that, if he might, through juſtice done him, be at liberty to act in the popular cauſe, he would prevent ſuch impoſition on the public in future, or bring the delinquents to condign puniſhment.

Andoc. de myſt. p. 67.

In the concluſion of his defence, Andocides endeavoured to draw advantage from the popularity of his family, and the merit of his anceſtors; for, with all the vehemence of democratical jealouſy among the Athenian people, family eminence was ſtill in eſtimation. 'If you deſtroy me,' he ſays, 'my family is extinct: and does the family of Andocides 'and Leogoras deſerve ſo to periſh? and is it not a reproach to 'the commonwealth that their houſe ſhould be occupied, as during 'my exile it was, by Cleophon the lyremaker? that houſe, of which 'none of you, in paſſing, could ſay, that thence either public or pri-'vate evil had come upon him: that houſe, which has furniſhed com-'manders of your forces, who have won many trophies, by land and by 'ſea; magiſtrates who have filled all the higheſt offices of your govern-'ment, through whoſe hands the public treaſure has paſſed, and who 'never turned any to their own profit; a family who never had cauſe to 'complain of the people, nor the people of them; and of whom, from 'the remoteſt antiquity, whence they trace themſelves, never were any be-'fore brought into a ſituation to ſupplicate your mercy.

'If they are now all dead, let not their good deeds be forgotten. Ra-'ther let their perſons be preſent to your imagination, ſoliciting your pro-'tection

'tection for me. For, alas, whom among the living can I bring forward 'to move your commiſeration? My father? no, he is no more. Bro-'thers? I never had any. Children? I have none yet born[15]. Be you 'therefore to me inſtead of a father, of brothers, of children. To you I 'betake myſelf: you I implore. Be advocates to yourſelves in my favor; 'and, while, to ſupply the deficient population of the city, you are admit-'ting Theſſalians and Andrians to its rights, devote not to deſtruction your 'true citizens, whom, certainly more than ſtrangers, it behoves to be good 'citizens, and who want neither the will nor the ability to be ſo.'

It was uſual, in the criminal courts of Athens, to try all expedients for impreſſing the paſſions of the numerous court. Pitiable ſights were offered to the eyes, and pitiable tones to the ears: aged parents, weeping wives, and helpleſs children were brought forward to aſſiſt or to obſtruct juſtice, by the moſt affecting intreaties. Andocides, after having urged, in the beſt way his circumſtances admitted, that degrading ſupplication which the tyrannous temper of the people required, aſſumed a more dignified manner in calling forward a ſupport that, with a court properly compoſed, ſhould have been more efficacious. 'Now,' he ſays, 'let thoſe who have moſt approved 'themſelves friends of the people and worthy of public favor, aſcend the 'bema, and declare their opinion of me. Anytus and Cephalus, come up; 'and thoſe of my fellowwardſmen who are appointed my advocates, Thra-'ſyllus and the reſt.' Theſe were men of the firſt conſideration in Athens.

Plutarch, in his ſhort life of Andocides, omits all information of the event of this trial, nor does he ſay when or how Andocides died. We learn however from a ſecond oration of Andocides himſelf, that the firſt neither completely effected its purpoſe, nor intirely failed. The deciſion was againſt him, but not to the extent that his enemies had propoſed. His life was not affected, for in the ſecond oration we find no prayer for mercy. He laments thoſe unfortunate circumſtances, which, without criminal intentions, had brought on him that reprobation of a majority of his fellow-countrymen, to which he muſt bow. But he was not without hopes of even regaining all the advantages of popular favor. It had been found expedient, in the inſecurity, eſpecially of men in public ſituations, under the deficient

[15] This expreſſion ſurely eſcaped Brooke Taylor, when he was intent upon proving Andocides, at the time of his trial, ſeventy years of age.

protection of the Athenian law, to grant decrees of protection [16] to individuals, to inable or to incourage them to undertake or proceed in public ſervice. Such privilege, under a decree of the people, Andocides himſelf had once injoyed; and it would ſtill have been in force but for a ſpecial repeal of it, which his political enemies had procured. His object now was to obtain a renewal of that decree of protection. The inducement, which he held out, was his knowlege of matters of the utmoſt importance to the public welfare, which he could not ſafely declare, without ſuch ſecurity againſt oppreſſion from his powerful enemies. Under ingagement for ſecrecy, he had already communicated the information to the council, who were fully ſatisfied of the reality of its importance, and deſirous that he ſhould have the protection neceſſary to inable him to ſerve the commonwealth. We learn no farther what the matter to be indicated was, than may be gathered from the following paſſage of the ſpeech: 'What I may 'previouſly declare,' ſays Andocides to the Athenian people, 'you ſhall 'now hear. You know it has been told you, that no corn is to be ex-'pected from Cyprus. Now I can undertake to ſay, that the men who have 'ſo informed you, and who, as far as depended upon them, have provided 'that it ſhould be ſo, are miſtaken. What has been the management, it 'is needleſs for you now to know: but thus much I wiſh you to be in-'formed, that fourteen cornſhips are actually approaching Peiræus, and 'the reſt, already ſailed from Cyprus, may be expected ſoon after them.'

Andoc. de reditu, p. 22, vel 86.

p. 20 vel 76, & 22 vel 84.

It appears that Athens, always in the unfortunate circumſtance of depending upon uncertain ſupply by ſea for its ſubſiſtence, was in want of corn; and that the people, perhaps already oppreſſed by dearth, were uneaſy under the apprehenſion of famine; that Andocides meant to accuſe ſome powerful men, his opponents in politics, of inhancing the public diſtreſs for their private profit, and to claim to himſelf the merit of defeating their purpoſe, by procuring relief for the people. Of the event of this project of the orator we have no information. Plutarch, profeſſing to relate the life of Andocides, mentions no circumſtance of it after the trial for impiety.

What were the real merits or demerits, either of Andocides or of his proſecutors and political opponents, is not very deciſively indicated by any

[16] Ἄδεια.

memorials

memorials remaining of them. But, what is of more importance, we gain, from their united evidence, the moſt undeniable teſtimony to the groſs evils inherent in the Athenian conſtitution; its irremediable unſteddineſs, its groſs tyranny, the immoderate temptation and the endleſs opportunities it afforded for knaviſh adventure in politics. What moreover deſerves notice, we learn from them that a ſtrong diſpoſition to religious perſecution prevailed among the Greeks of their age; inſomuch that, where the ſuppoſed intereſts of religion interfered, all forms of juſtice to individuals were ſet at nought. In ſhort, the remaining works of the Grecian orators bear the moſt unqueſtionable proof, that democracy, with the pretence of an eſtabliſhment propoſing nothing but the equal welfare of the people, is, beyond all others, a conſtitution for profligate adventurers, in various ways, to profit from, at the people's expence.

SECTION III.

Virtuous age of Greece romantic: Deficiency of Grecian Morality. Summary view of the origin and progreſs of Grecian Philoſophy. Religious perſecution. Sophiſts; Socrates.

IT may appear ſuperfluous to repeat, that the buſineſs of hiſtory is neither panegyric nor ſatire, but to eſtimate juſtly and report faithfully the virtues and vices of men, who, individually or collectively, have been ingaged in circumſtances marking them for hiſtorical notice. Yet panegyric hath commonly been ſo mixed with certain portions of Grecian hiſtory, that an honeſt declaration of that truth, which a careful inveſtigation will diſcover, may, on more than one occaſion, with many readers, need apology. Authors under the Roman empire, and many in modern Europe, of reputation to have ingaged almoſt univerſal credit, have ſpoken in rapturous language of the virtuous age of Greece, and eſpecially of Athens, as of ſomething not only well known by fame, but undoubtedly once exiſting. Nevertheleſs none have given any intelligible account of it, any account not full of the groſſeſt

contradictions; and, if we ſearch the earlier writers, thoſe who lived neareſt the ſuppoſed virtuous age, or within it, we find nothing to point out its period, but, on the contrary, ſtrong reaſon at leaſt to doubt if it ever had more than imaginary exiſtence. If indeed we may believe Thucydides and Plato, the neareſt approach to what might beſt deſerve the title of the virtuous age of Athens (may I venture on the authority of Thucydides and Plato to ſay it) was made under what declaimers, who lived many centuries after them, have aſſumed to themſelves to reprobate, as the tyranny of the Peiſiſtratids.

But, in the age with which we are now ingaged, the age of Plato, Xenophon, and philoſophy, morality appears not only to have been not better practiſed, but even to have been not better underſtood than in Homer's time. That might made right, eſpecially in public tranſactions, was a tenet very generally avowed; the incalculable miſchiefs of which were checked only by the ſalutary ſuperſtition, which taught to reſpect the ſanction of oaths, in the fear that the immediate vengeance of the gods would follow the violation of it, as a perſonal affront to themſelves. It appears however, in the remaining works of the great comic poet of the day, that this ſalutary ſuperſtition was in his time faſt wearing away. The light of reaſon, improved by much communication of men among one another, had inabled the more quickſighted to diſcover, that temporal evil, of any kind obvious to common obſervation, fell no more upon falſe-ſwearers than upon the moſt ſcrupulous obſervers of their oaths. The perjured might ſuffer in ſecret, under thoſe alarms of conſcience which Homer's penetration has attributed to them; but experience had ſufficiently taught to conſider Heſiod's denunciations as anile fables[17]. The miſchief thus done by human reaſon, in the deſtruction of one of the greateſt ſafeguards of ſociety, human reaſon could not perhaps at all, but certainly could not readily, repair. It is evident from the writings of Xenophon and

Chap. 2. ſ. 1. of this Hiſt.

Xen. Mem. Socr. l. 4. ſ. 2 & 4.

[17] 'Men hid from the ſight of the gods by 'clouds,' ſays one of the characters in the comedy of The Birds, 'commit perjuries undiſcovered; 'but if the gods could manage an alliance with 'the Birds, then, ſhould a man who had ſworn 'by the crow and by Jupiter, break his oath, the 'crow would fly down ſlily and pluck him an 'eye out.' Ariſtoph. Av. v. 1607. The jokes which follow, about Jupiter dying and Hercules cooking, ſeem, like ſome other jokes of Ariſtophanes, to have had no other object than to bring the gods, or at leaſt the notions of them which the eſtabliſhed religion inculcated, into contempt.

Plato,

Plato, that, in their age, the boundaries of right and wrong, juſtice and injuſtice, honeſty and diſhoneſty, were little determined by any generally-received principle. There were thoſe who contended that, in private as in public affairs, whatever was clearly for a man's advantage, he might reaſonably do; and even ſacrifice was performed and prayer addreſſed to the gods for ſucceſs in wrong. When therefore that cloud of ſuperſtition, which produced a regard for the ſanction of oaths, was diſſipated by the increaſing light of reaſon, an increaſed depravity would of courſe gain among the Grecian people. We learn indeed, from the beſt cotemporary teſtimony, that of Thucydides, that the fact was ſo; and hence occaſion may have been taken by the orators of the next age, who ſeem firſt to have cheriſhed and promulgated the notion, which in any other point of view appears purely romantic, to call the preceding times the VIRTUOUS AGE OF GREECE.

Plat. Alcib. 1. p. 117. t. 1. Protag. p. 357. & de rep l. 2. p. 362. & de Leg l. 10. p. 905. & ſeq.

Yet while thus, not morality only, but, as we have before obſerved, politics, were defective among the Greeks, to a degree to excite wonder, ſcience was in eſteem, and had, in ſome branches, the foundation already laid of all that is now moſt valued in them. Grecian PHILOSOPHY is ſaid to have had its origin from Thales, whom we have ſeen a leading man of Miletus in Ionia, at the time of that rebellion of the Aſian Greeks againſt the Perſian empire, which led to the invaſion of Greece itſelf, and the glory of the Athenians at Marathon. The learning, through which Thales became ſo diſtinguiſhed among his fellowcountrymen, and ſo eminent in the republic of letters through all ages, he is ſaid to have acquired in Egypt. The circumſtances of individuals, in the Grecian commonwealths, were indeed more favorable for the cultivation of ſcience, than a tranſient view of the political ſtate of the country might give to ſuppoſe. Few had large incomes; but numbers lived in leiſure; moſtly maintained by the labor of ſlaves; aſſembled in towns, and all communicating with all. Manners were thus formed; politeneſs was diffuſed; genius was invited to diſplay itſelf; and minds capacious and active, but leſs daring or leſs turbulent, or more ſcrupulouſly honeſt, avoiding the thorny and miry paths of ambition, which required not only courage beyond the powers of the weak, but often compliances beyond the condeſcenſion of the liberal, would naturally turn themſelves to the new modes of employment and of diſtinction, which the introduction of ſcience offered. A lively imagination was among the national characteriſtics of

the

the Greeks; and, from the earlieſt accounts of the nation, we find, that whenever new knowlege beamed, it was received with eager attention.

Thus, from the light acquired by Thales in Egypt, aroſe what has obtained the name of the Ionian ſchool of philoſophy. Thales is ſaid to have been the firſt among the Greeks who calculated an eclipſe of the ſun; and hence perhaps we may beſt conjecture the extent of his ſcience, and the kind of philoſophy that he chiefly cultivated, or whence he principally derived his fame. Soon after him Pythagoras, driven by political troubles from his native Ionian iland, Samos, diffuſed information, nearly ſimilar, derived from the ſame ſource, among the Grecian towns of Italy. We have already had occaſion to advert to the dubiouſneſs of all accounts of Pythagoras, beyond the very little that Herodotus and Ariſtotle have recorded of him. Thales is ſaid, as well as Pythagoras, to have mixed ſome valuable moral precepts with the inſtruction which he communicated on other ſciences. Both however ſeem merely to have followed the example of the gnomic poets, the inſtructors and legiſlators of earlieſt ages, from Muſæus and Orpheus, or thoſe before them, downward to their own time. It does not appear that they attempted to reduce morality to a ſyſtem; and therefore, tho they may have deſerved highly as moral preachers, they ſeem hardly to have had any proper claim to the title of moral philoſophers.

Diog. Laert.

'To do as you would be done by,' ſeems, when once ſtated, ſo obvious a maxim for directing the conduct of men toward one another, and, when diſpaſſionately conſidered, ſo incontrovertibly juſt a foundation for all moral philoſophy, that we may wonder at any delay in its diſcovery, and any heſitation about its reception. Nevertheleſs ſelf-love, perpetually inſtigating the deſire to command others and to profit at their expence, operates ſo powerfully in the contrary direction, that Thales may deſerve great credit for the rule approaching, but far from reaching it, 'Not to do to others, 'what, if done to us, we ſhould reſent [18].' But dry unconnected precepts,

[18] Mr. Gibbon has conſidered the two rules as the ſame, or of equal value: 'The golden rule 'of doing as you would be done by, a rule 'which,' he ſays, 'I read in a moral treatiſe of 'Iſocrates (in Nicocle) four hundred years before 'the publication of the Goſpel: Ἃ πάσχοντες ὑφ' ἑτέρων ὀργίζεσθε ταῦτα τοῖς ἄλλοις μὴ ποιεῖτε. Gibbon's Rom. Hiſt. c. 54. note 36. The difference between them appears however to me very great; one forbidding only evil-doing; the other, commanding univerſal charity. Xenophon, I remember ſomewhere, I believe in the Cyropædeia, commending benevolence to enemies, has approached much nearer to the Chriſtian doctrine.

thwarting

thwarting the paſſions and unalluring to the imagination, did not win attention like phyſical and metaphyſical inquiries. The calculation of an eclipſe of the ſun led the mind to more amuſing ſpeculation, and left the paſſions free. The formation of the world, the nature of matter and of ſpirit, the laws of the heavenly bodies, were therefore ſubjects which, in the intervals of political ſtrife, deeply ingaged the minds of the Aſian Greeks. For the want of convenient materials and method, books were yet ſo rare that few could ſtudy in retirement. Knowlege was communicated in diſcourſe; and the gymnaſia and public porticoes, built for exerciſes of the body, became places of meeting for the culture of the mind.

Xen. Mem. Socr. l. 1. c. 1. ſ. 11.

The love of ſcience is univerſally ſaid to have been firſt communicated, among the Athenians, under the able and benign adminiſtration of the Peiſiſtratids. But ſcience itſelf was then in infancy, and its immediate growth in Athens was checked by the violence of political conteſt, which produced the inſuing revolution, and kept low by the long-ſubſiſting fervor of party-ſpirit. The Perſian invaſions, quickly following, abſorbed all attention, and the great political objects, which afterward ingaged the general mind, left little leiſure for ſpeculative purſuits. It was not till the ſuperior talents of Pericles had quieted the ſtorms of war and faction, that ſcience, which had in the interval received great improvement among the Aſian Greeks, revived at Athens with new vigor. Anaxagoras of Clazomenë, the preceptor and friend of Pericles, bred in all the learning of the Ionian ſchool, is ſaid firſt to have introduced what might properly be called Philoſophy there. To him is attributed the firſt conception of one eternal, almighty, and all-good Being, or, as he is ſaid to have expreſſed himſelf, a perfect mind, independent of body, as the cauſe or creator of all things. The gods received in Greece, of courſe, were low in his eſtimation; the ſun and moon, commonly reputed divinities, he held to be meer material ſubſtances, the ſun a globe of ſtone, the moon an earth, nearly ſimilar to ours. A doctrine ſo repugnant to the ſyſtem on which depended the eſtimation of all the feſtivals, proceſſions, ſacrifices, and oracles, which ſo faſcinated the vulgar mind, was not likely to be propagated without reprehenſion. Even the ſcience which inabled to calculate an eclipſe was offenſive, inaſmuch as it lowered the importance, and interfered with the profits,

Ariſtot. de animâ, l. 1. c. 2. Ariſtot. metaphyſ. l. 1. c. 4.

Plat. apol. Socr. p. 26. t. 1.

Plut. vit. Pericl. Schol. in Nub. Ariſtoph. v. 338.

profits, of prieſts, augurs, interpreters, and ſeers. An accuſation of impiety was therefore inſtituted againſt Anaxagoras; the general voice went with the proſecutors; and all that the power and influence of Pericles could do for his valued friend, was to procure him means of eſcape from Attica.

But while phyſical and metaphyſical ſpeculation ingaged men of leiſure, there was other learning that had more attraction for the ambitious and needy. To men indeed in general, living in an independent, and ſtill more if in an imperial democracy, whatever might beſt inable them to ſway the minds of their fellowcitizens, and, through ſuch influence, raiſe themſelves to commanding, dignified, and profitable public ſituations, would be the moſt intereſting ſcience. He who, knowing more than others, could alſo expreſs himſelf better, would command attention in the public aſſemblies. That general education therefore, which gave the greateſt advantage to talents for public ſpeaking, a knowlege of letters and language, of mathematics, of laws, of hiſtory, of men and manners, whatever might contribute to form what we call taſte, which inables the poſſeſſor, by a kind of ſentiment, without reflection, to give advantage to everything by the manner of ſpeaking and acting, and ſtill more to avoid whatever, either in itſelf or by the manner of putting it forward, can excite diſguſt or contempt, theſe would be in the higheſt requeſt.

Yet there would be able men to whom, in the turbulence of the Grecian democracies, public ſituations would be little inviting: in ſome of the ſmaller ſtates they were beneath a ſoaring ambition; in the larger, amid the competition of numbers, ſucceſs would to many be hopeleſs; ſome men, poſſeſſing high mental faculties, might want ſtrength of body or powers of elocution; and many would be excluded or deterred by unfortunate party-connections. From among all theſe, therefore, ſome, inſtead of putting themſelves forward for public ſituations, ſought the leſs ſplendid, but ſafer advantages, to be derived from communicating to others that ſcience and that taſte, which might inable them to become conſiderable as public men; and thoſe advantages were found to be great. Thoſe who firſt became eminent in this line were foreiners in Athens; for it was in Athens only that eminence in this line was to be acquired: they were Gorgias of Leontium in Sicily, Prodicus of the little iſland of Ceos, and Hippias of Elis.

Plat.

Gorgias

Gorgias was previouſly eminent in his own city and in Greece; having been, as we have formerly obſerved, at the head of an embaſſy from Leontium to Athens. All theſe are ſaid to have acquired very conſiderable riches by their profeſſion. Their ſucceſs therefore invited numbers to follow their example, and Greece, but far more eſpecially Athens, ſhortly abounded with thoſe who, under the name of ſophiſts, profeſſors of wiſdom, undertook to teach every ſcience. The ſcarcity and dearneſs of books gave high value to that learning, which a man with a well-ſtored mind, and a ready and clear elocution, could communicate. None, without eloquence, could undertake to be inſtructors; ſo that the ſophiſts, in giving leſſons of eloquence, were themſelves the example. They frequented all places of public reſort, the agora, the public walks, the gymnaſia, and the porticoes; where they recommended themſelves to notice by an oſtentatious diſplay of their abilities, in diſputation among one-another, or with whoever would converſe with them.

In the competition thus ariſing, men of ſpecious rather than ſolid abilities would often gain the moſt extenſive eſtimation. A certain dignity of character was generally affected, to which decency of manner was indiſpenſably neceſſary; whence aroſe the oppoſition of the ſophiſts to the comic poets; but if the doctrine of a licentious rather than a ſevere morality would recommend them to extenſive favor, their efforts would be more directed to excuſe and give a ſpecious appearance to this, than to inforce the other. Many of them indeed would take either ſide of any queſtion; political or moral; and it was generally their glory to make the worſe appear the better cauſe.

The profeſſion of ſophiſt had not long flouriſhed, and no Athenian had acquired fame in any branch of philoſophy, when the ſingular talents, and ſingular manners and purſuits of Socrates ſon of Sophroniſcus ingaged public attention. The father was a ſtatuary, and is not mentioned as very eminent in his profeſſion; but, as a man, he ſeems to have been reſpected among the moſt eminent of the commonwealth: he lived in particular intimacy with Lyſimachus, ſon of the great Ariſteides. Inheriting a very ſcanty fortune, Socrates had a mind wholly intent upon the acquiſition and communication of knowlege. The ſublime principles of theology, taught by Anaxagoras, made an early impreſſion upon him. They

Plat. Alcib. 1. p. 131. t. 2.

Plat. Laches, p. 180. t. 2.

led him to conſider what ſhould be the duty, owed by man, to ſuch a Being as Anaxagoras deſcribed his Creator; and it ſtruck him that, if the providence of God interfered in the government of this world, the duty of man to man, little conſidered by poets or prieſts as any way connected with religion, and hitherto almoſt totally neglected by philoſophers, muſt be a principal branch of the duty of man to God. It ſtruck him farther, that with the groſs defects which he ſaw in the religion, the morality, and the governments of Greece, tho the favorite inquiries of the philoſophers, concerning the nature of the Deïty, the formation of the world, the laws of the heavenly bodies, might, while they amuſed, perhaps alſo inlarge and improve the minds of a few ſpeculative men, yet the inveſtigation of the ſocial duties was infinitely more important, and might be infinitely more uſeful, to mankind in general. Indowed by nature with a moſt diſcriminating mind, and a ſingularly ready eloquence, he directed his utmoſt attention to that inveſtigation; and when, by reflection, aſſiſted and proved by converſation among the ſophiſts and other able men, he had decided an opinion, he communicated it, not in the way of precept, but by propoſing a queſtion, and, in the courſe of interrogatory argument, leading his hearers to the juſt concluſion.

Mem. Socr. l. 1. c. 1. ſ. 10.

We are informed by his diſciple Xenophon, how he paſſed his time. He was always in public. Early in the morning he went to the walks and the gymnaſia: when the agora filled, he was there; and, in the afternoon, wherever he could find moſt company. Generally he was the principal ſpeaker. The livelineſs of his manner made his converſation amuſing as well as inſtructive, and he denied its advantages to nobody. But he was nevertheleſs a moſt patient hearer; and preferred being the hearer whenever others were preſent, able and diſpoſed to give valuable information to the company. He did not commonly refuſe invitations, frequently received, to private entertainments; but he would undertake no private inſtruction, nor could any ſolicitation induce him to relieve his poverty, by accepting, like the ſophiſts and rhetoricians, a reward for what he gave in public.

Plat. apol. Socr. p. 31. Xen.

In the variety of his communication on ſocial duties, he could not eaſily, and perhaps he did not deſire intirely, to avoid either religious or political ſubjects; hazardous, both of them, under the jealous tyranny of democracy. It remains a queſtion how far he was ſubject to ſuperſtition; but his honeſty

is

is ſo authenticated, that it ſeems fairer to impute to him ſome weakneſs in credulity, than any intention to deceive. If we may believe his own account, reported by his two principal diſciples, he believed himſelf divinely impelled to the employment to which he devoted his life, inquiring and teaching the duty of man to man. A divine ſpirit, in his ideä, conſtantly attended him, whoſe voice, diſtinctly heard, never expreſſly commanded what he was indiſpoſed to do, but frequently forbad what he had intended. To unveil the nature of Deïty was not among his pretenſions. He only inſiſted on the perfect goodneſs and perfect wiſdom of the Supreme God, the creätor of all things, and the conſtant ſuperintendence of his providence over the affairs of men. As included in theſe, he held that everything done, ſaid, or meerly willed by men, was known to the Deïty, and that it was impoſſible he could be pleaſed with evil. The unity of God, tho implied in many of his reported diſcourſes, he would not in direct terms aſſert; rather carefully avoiding to diſpute the exiſtence of the multifarious gods acknowleged in Greece; but he ſtrongly denied the weakneſſes, vices, and crimes commonly imputed to them. So far however from propoſing to innovate in forms of worſhip and religious ceremonies, ſo various in the different Grecian ſtates, and ſources of more doubt and contention than any other circumſtances of the heathen religion, he held that men could not in theſe matters do wrong, if they followed the laws of their own country and the inſtitutions of their forefathers. He was therefore regular in ſacrifice, both upon the public altars and in his family. He ſeems to have been perſuaded that the Deïty, by various ſigns, revealed the future to men; in oracles, dreams, and all the various ways uſually acknowleged by thoſe converſant in the reputed ſcience of augury. 'Where 'the wiſdom of men cannot avail,' he ſaid, 'we ſhould endeavour to gain 'information from the gods, who will not refuſe intelligible ſigns to thoſe to 'whom they are propitious.' Accordingly he conſulted oracles himſelf, and he recommended the ſame practice to others, in every doubt on important concerns.

Plat. apol Socr. p. 28 & 31, t. 1. Xen. Mem. Socr. l. 1. c. 1. ſ. 3.

l. 1. c. 1. ſ. 19.

ſ. 2.

Plat. Euthyph. & de rep.

Xen. Mem. Socr. l. 1. c. 3. ſ. 1.

l. 1. c. 1. ſ. 7, 8, 9.

Xen. anab.

The circumſtances of the Athenian government, in his time, could not invite a man of Socrates's diſpoſition to offer himſelf for political ſituations. He thought he might be infinitely more uſeful to his country in the ſingular line, it might indeed be called a public line, which he had choſen

Plat. apol. Socr. p. 23. & 36.

for himſelf. Not only he would not ſolicit office, but he would take no part in political conteſt. In the ſeveral revolutions which occurred, he was perfectly paſſive. But he would refuſe nothing, on the contrary he would be active in everything, that he thought decidedly the duty of a citizen. When called upon to ſerve among the heavy-armed, he was exemplary in the duties of a private ſoldier; and as ſuch he fought at Potidæa, Amphipolis, and Delium. We find him mentioned in civil office; at one time preſident (epiſtates) of the general aſſembly, and at another a member of the council of Five-Hundred. In each ſituation he diſtinguiſhed himſelf by his unbending uprightneſs. When preſident, he reſiſted the violence of the aſſembled people, who voted a decree, in ſubſtance or in manner, contrary to the conſtitution. Neither threats nor intreaties could move him to give it the neceſſary ſanction of his office. As a member of the council, we have already ſeen him in the office of prytanis, at the trial of the ſix generals, when his perſevering reſiſtance to the injuſtice of popular tyranny was rendered uſeleſs, through the want of equal conſtancy in his collegues, who yielded to the ſtorm. Under the Thirty again, we have ſeen him, not in office indeed, but daring to refuſe office, unworthy and illegal office, which the tyranny of the all-powerful Critias would have put upon him.

p. 28. Xen.

Xen. Mem. Socr. l. 4. c. 4. ſ. 2 & 5. Plat. apol. Socr. p. 32.

We are not informed when Socrates firſt became diſtinguiſhed as a ſophiſt; for in that deſcription of men he was in his own day reckoned. When the wit of Ariſtophanes was directed againſt him in the theater, he was clearly already among the moſt eminent. It was about the tenth or eleventh year of the Peloponneſian war, when he was ſix or ſeven and forty years of age, that after the manner of the old comedy, he was offered to public deriſion upon the ſtage, by his own name, as one of the perſons of the drama, in the comedy of Ariſtophanes called The Clouds, which is yet extant. Some antipathy, it appears, exiſted between the comic poets collectively and the ſophiſts, or philoſophers. The licentiouſneſs of the former could indeed ſcarcely eſcape the animadverſion of the latter, who, on the contrary, favored the tragic poets, competitors with the comedians for public favor. Euripides and Ariſtophanes were particularly enemies; and Socrates not only lived in intimacy with Euripides, but is ſaid to have aſſiſted him in ſome of his tragedies. We are informed of no other cauſe for the injurious repre-

Diog. Laert. vit. Socr. init.

repreſentation which the comic poet has given of Socrates[19], whom he exhibits, in The Clouds, as a flagitious, yet ridiculous pretender to the occult ſciences, converſing with the clouds as divinities, and teaching the principal youths of Athens to deſpiſe the received gods and to cozen men. The audience, accuſtomed to look on defamation with careleſſneſs, and to hold as lawful and proper whatever might amuſe the multitude, applauded the wit, and even gave general approbation to the piece; but the high eſtimation of the character of Socrates, ſufficed to prevent that complete ſucceſs which the poet had promiſed himſelf. The crown, which rewarded him whoſe drama moſt earned the public favor, and which Ariſtophanes had ſo often won, was on this occaſion refuſed him.

Ariſtoph. Nub. v. 112 & 246, v. 525.

Two or three and twenty years had elapſed ſince the firſt repreſentation of The Clouds; the ſtorms of conqueſt ſuffered from a forein enemy, and of four revolutions in the civil government of the country had paſſed; nearly three years had followed of that quiet which the revolution under Thraſybulus produced, and the act of amneſty ſhould have confirmed, when a young man named Melitus went to the king-archon, and, in the uſual form, delivered an information againſt Socrates, and bound himſelf to proſecute. The information ran thus, 'Melitus ſon of Melitus, of the 'borough of Pitthos, declares theſe upon oath againſt Socrates ſon of 'Sophroniſcus, of the borough of Alopece: Socrates is guilty of decry-'ing the gods whom the city acknowleges, and of preaching other 'new gods: moreover he is guilty of corrupting the youth. Penalty, 'death.'

Brunk. not. in Nub Ariſtoph. init.

Plat. Euth. p. 2. t. 1. & Apol. Socr. p. 24. Xen. Mem. Socr. init. Diog. Laert. vit. Socr.

Xenophon begins his Memorials of his revered maſter, with declaring his wonder how the Athenians could have been perſuaded to condemn to death, a man of ſuch uncommonly clear innocence and exalted worth. Ælian, tho his authority will bear no compariſon with Xenophon's, has, I think, nevertheleſs given the ſolution. 'Socrates,' he ſays, 'diſliked 'the Athenian conſtitution. For he ſaw that democracy is tyrannical, and

[19] The learned Brunck, in a Note on The Clouds of Ariſtophanes, contends that the poet bore reälly no ill-will to the philoſopher. He draws his proof chiefly from the circumſtance that in Plato's dialogue, intitled The Banquet, Socrates and Ariſtophanes are repreſented ſitting, in no unfriendly way, at the ſame table, and in confirmation of it he adduces the celebrated panegyrical epigram on Ariſtophanes, which has been commonly attributed to Plato. Ariſtoph. Brunck. p. 65. t. 2.

'abounds.

'abounds with all the evils of abſolute monarchy[20].' But tho the political circumſtances of the times made it neceſſary for cotemporary writers to ſpeak with caution, yet both Xenophon and Plato have declared enough to ſhow that the aſſertion of Ælian was well-founded; and farther proof, were it wanted, may be derived from another early writer, nearly cotemporary, and deeply verſed in the politics of his age, the orator Æſchines. Indeed, tho not ſtated in the inditement, yet it was urged againſt Socrates by his proſecutors before the court, that he was diſaffected to the democracy; and in proof they affirmed it to be notorious that he had ridiculed, what the Athenian conſtitution preſcribed, the appointment to magiſtracy by lot. 'Thus,' they ſaid, 'he taught his numerous followers, 'youths of the principal families of the city, to deſpiſe the eſtabliſhed 'government and to be turbulent and ſeditious; and his ſucceſs had been 'ſeen in the conduct of two, the moſt eminent, Alcibiades and Critias. 'Even the beſt things he converted to theſe ill purpoſes. From the moſt 'eſteemed poets, and particularly from Homer, he ſelected paſſages to in-'force his anti-democratical principles.'

Xen. Mem. Socr. l. 1. c. 2. ſ. 9.

ſ. 56. et ſeq.

Socrates, it appears indeed, was not inclined to deny his diſapprobation of the Athenian conſtitution. His defence itſelf, as it is reported by Plato, contains matter on which to found an accuſation againſt him of diſaffection to the ſovereinty of the people, ſuch as, under the jealous tyranny of the Athenian democracy, would ſometimes ſubject a man to the penalties of high treaſon. 'You well know,' he ſays, 'Athenians, 'that, had I ingaged in public buſineſs, I ſhould long ago have pe-'riſhed, without procuring any advantage either to you or to myſelf. Let 'not the truth offend you: it is no peculiarity of your democracy, or 'of your national character: but, wherever the people is ſoverein, no man 'who ſhall dare honeſtly to oppoſe injuſtice, frequent and extravagant in-'juſtice, can avoid deſtruction.'

Lyſ. or. pro Polyſtr.

Plat. apol. Socr.

Without this proof, indeed, we might reaſonably believe, that, tho Socrates was a good and faithful ſubject of the Athenian government, and would promote no ſedition, no political violence, yet he could not like the

[20] Σωκράτης δὲ τῇ μὲν Ἀθηναίων πολιτείᾳ οὐκ ἠρέσκετο· τυραννικὴν γὰρ, καὶ μοναρχικὴν ἰώμενα τὴν Δημοκρατίαν ὄυσαν. Ælian. var. hiſt. l. 3. c. 17. And this is conſonant to Ariſtotle's obſervation, quoted at the end of the firſt ſection of the twenty-firſt chapter, Ἡ Δημοκρατία ἡ τελευταία Τυραννὶς ἐστι.

Athenian

Athenian conſtitution [21]. He wiſhed for wholeſome changes by gentle means; and it ſeems even to have been a principal object of the labors to which he dedicated himſelf, to infuſe principles into the riſing generation that might bring about the deſirable change inſenſibly. His ſcholars were chiefly ſons of the wealthieſt citizens, whoſe eaſy circumſtances afforded leiſure to attend him; and, ſome of theſe, zealouſly adopting his tenets, others meerly pleaſed with the ingenuity of his arguments, and the livelineſs of his manner, and deſirous to emulate his triumphs over his opponents, were forward, after his example, to ingage in diſputation upon all the ſubjects on which he was accuſtomed to diſcourſe. Thus employed and thus followed, tho himſelf avoiding office and public buſineſs, thoſe who governed or deſired to govern the commonwealth through their influence among the Many, might perhaps not unreaſonably conſider him as one who was, or might become, a formidable adverſary; and at the ſame time it might not be difficult to excite popular jealouſy againſt him.

Melitus, who ſtood forward as his principal accuſer, was, as Plato informs us, no way a man of any great conſideration. His legal deſcription gives ſome probability to the conjecture that his father was one of the commiſſioners ſent to Lacedæmon, from the moderate party, who oppoſed the ten ſucceſſors of the Thirty Tyrants, while Thraſybulus held Peiræus, and Pauſanias was incamped before Athens. He was a poet, and ſtood forward as in a common cauſe of the poets, who eſteemed the doctrine of Socrates injurious to their intereſt. Unſupported, his accuſation would have been little formidable. But he ſeems to have been a meer inſtrument in the buſineſs. He was ſoon joined by Lycon, one of the moſt powerful ſpeakers of his time. Lycon was the avowed patron of the rhetoricians, who, as well as the poets, thought their intereſt injured by the moral philoſopher's doctrine. I know not that on any other occaſion, in Grecian hiſtory, we have any account of this kind of party-intereſt operating; but from circumſtances nearly analogous, in our own country, if we ſubſtitute for poets the clergy, and for rhetoricians the lawyers, we may gather what might be the party-ſpirit, and what the

Ch. 21. ſ. 3. of this Hiſt.

[21] His political principles may be ſeen in Plato's Crito.

weight

weight of influence of the rhetoricians and poets in Athens. With Lycon, Anytus, a man ſcarcely ſecond to any in the commonwealth in rank and general eſtimation, who had ſupported high command with reputation in the Peloponneſian war, and had been the principal aſſociate of Thraſybulus in the war againſt the Thirty and the reſtoration of the democracy, declared himſelf a ſupporter of the proſecution [22]. Nothing in the accuſation could, by any known law of Athens, affect the life of the accuſed. In England, no man would be put upon trial on ſo vague a charge: no grand jury would liſten to it. But in Athens, if the party was ſtrong enough, it ſignified little what was the law. When Lycon and Anytus came forward, Socrates ſaw that his condemnation was already decided.

By the courſe of his life, however, and by the turn of his thoughts for many years, he had ſo prepared himſelf for all events, that, far from alarmed at the probability of his condemnation, he rather rejoiced at it, as, at his age, a fortunate occurrence. He was perſuaded of the ſoul's
Plat. Phæd. immortality, and of the ſuperintending providence of an all-good Deity, whoſe favor he had always been aſſiduouſly endeavoring to deſerve. Men
Plat. apol. Socr. p. 29. fear death, he ſaid, as if unqueſtionably the greateſt evil; and yet no man knows that it may not be the greateſt good. If indeed great joys
Xen. apol. Socr. ſ. 7, & 23, & 27. & Mem. Socr. l. 4. c. 8. ſ. 6, & ſeq. were in proſpect for him, he and his friends might, with more ſhow of reaſon, regret his loſing it; but at his years, and with his ſcanty fortune, on the contrary, tho he was happy enough, at ſeventy, ſtill to preſerve both body and mind in vigor, yet even his preſent gratifications muſt neceſſarily ſoon decay. To avoid therefore the evils of age, pain, ſickneſs, decay of ſight, decay of hearing, perhaps decay of underſtanding, by the eaſieſt of deaths (for ſuch the Athenian mode of execution, by a draught of hemlock, was reputed) cheered with the company of ſurrounding friends, could not be otherwiſe than a bleſſing.

l. 4. c. 4. ſ. 4. Xenophon ſays that, by condeſcending to a little ſupplication, Socrates might eaſily have obtained his acquittal. No admonition or intreaty of his friends however could perſuade him to ſuch an unworthineſs. On the

22 Ἄνυτον—τῶν μεγίστων ὑπὸ τῆς πόλεως ἀξιούμενον. patron of the demiurgi. Plat. apol. Socr. p. 23. f. Xen. apol. Socr. ſ. 29. Anytus came forward as What were they?

contrary

contrary, when put upon his defence, he told the people that he did not plead for his own ſake, but for theirs, wiſhing them to avoid the guilt of an unjuſt condemnation. It was uſual for accuſed perſons to bewail their apprehended lot, with tears to ſupplicate favor, and, by exhibiting their children upon the bema, to endeavor to excite pity. He thought it, he ſaid, more reſpectful to the court, as well as more becoming himſelf, to omit all this; tho he was aware that their ſentiments were likely ſo far to differ from his, that judgement would be given in anger for it. Plat. apol. Socr. p. 30. p. 34.

Condemnation pronounced wrought no change upon him. He again addreſſed the court, declared his innocence of the matters laid againſt him, and obſerved that, even if every charge had been completely proved, ſtill all together did not, according to any known law, amount to a capital crime. 'But,' in concluſion he ſaid, "it is time to depart; I to die; 'you to live: but which for the greater good, God only knows.' Xen. apol. Socr. p. 24. p. 25. Plat. apol. Socr. in fine.

It was uſual at Athens for execution very ſoon to follow condemnation, commonly on the morrow. But it happened that the condemnation of Socrates took place on the eve of the day appointed for the ſacred ceremony of crowning the galley, which carried the annual offerings to the gods worſhipped at Delos; and immemorial tradition forbad all executions till the ſacred veſſel's return. Thus the death of Socrates was reſpited thirty days, and his friends had free acceſs to him in priſon. During all that time he admirably ſupported his conſtancy. Means were concerted for his eſcape; the jailer was bribed, a veſſel prepared, and a ſecure retreat in Theſſaly provided. No arguments, no prayers, could perſuade him to uſe the opportunity offered. He had, he ſaid, always taught the duty of obedience to the laws, and he would not furniſh an example of the breach of it. To no purpoſe it was urged that he had been unjuſtly condemned: he had always held that wrong did not juſtify wrong. He waited with perfect compoſure the return of the ſacred veſſel, reaſoned on the immortality of the ſoul, the advantage of virtue, the happineſs derived from having made it through life his purſuit, and, with his friends about him, took the fatal cup and died. Plat. Phæd. p. 58. t. 1. Xen. Mem. Socr. l. 4. Plat. Crit.

Writers who, after Xenophon and Plato, have related the death of Socrates, ſeem to have held themſelves bound to vie with thoſe who pre-

ceded them, in giving pathos to the ſtory. The purpoſe here has been rather to render it intelligible; to ſhow its connection with the political hiſtory of Athens; to derive from it illuſtration of the political hiſtory of Athens. The magnanimity of Socrates, the principal efficient of the pathos, ſurely deſerves admiration; yet it is not that in which he has moſt outſhone other men. The circumſtances of lord Ruſſel's fate were far more trying. Socrates, we may reaſonably ſuppoſe, would have borne lord Ruſſel's trial: but, with biſhop Burnet for his eulogiſt, inſtead of Plato and Xenophon, he would not have had his preſent ſplendid fame. The ſingular merit of Socrates lay in the purity and the uſefulneſs of his manners and converſation; the clearneſs with which he ſaw, and the ſteddineſs with which he practiſed, in a blind and corrupt age, all moral duties; the diſintereſtedneſs and the zeal with which he devoted himſelf to the benefit of others; and the inlarged and warm benevolence, whence his ſupreme and almoſt only pleaſure ſeems to have conſiſted in doing good. The purity of Chriſtian morality, little enough indeed ſeen in practice, nevertheleſs is become ſo familiar in theory, that it paſſes almoſt for obvious and even congenial to the human mind. Thoſe only will juſtly eſtimate the merit of that near approach to it which Socrates made, who will take the pains to gather, as they may from the writings of his cotemporaries and predeceſſors, how little conception was entertained of it before his time; how dull to a juſt moral ſenſe the human mind has reälly been; how ſlow the progreſs in the inveſtigation of moral duties, even where not only great pains have been taken, but the greateſt abilities zealouſly employed; and, when diſcovered, how difficult it has been to eſtabliſh them by proofs beyond controverſy, or proofs even that ſhould be generally admitted by the reaſon of men. It is through the light which Socrates diffuſed by his doctrine, inforced by his practice, with the advantage of having both the doctrine and the practice exhibited to higheſt advantage, in the incomparable writings of diſciples ſuch as Xenophon and Plato, that his life forms an era in the hiſtory of Athens and of man [23].

[23] The life and manners of Socrates remain reported with authority not to be found for any other character of heathen antiquity. Two men of the beſt ability and beſt reputation, who had lived familiarly with him, but whom circumſtances afterward ſeparated, and ſet in ſome degree at variance, have each deſcribed them in much detail. No deficiency of knowlege of their ſub-

je&

ject can be ſuſpected; nothing can be reprehended, in either account, on the ſcore of probability: clearly, without concert, they agree; and each bears the fulleſt teſtimony to the integrity of Socrates, and to the purity of his manners, purity beyond even the precepts of that age, as well as to the excellence of his doctrine. On the contrary, thoſe foul aſperſions upon his character, which remain ſcattered among later antient writers, and which the learned and ingenious author of The Obſerver has, now in our days, thought it worth his while to ſeek, to collect, and to exhibit in groop, in a daylight which they had not before known, are reported neither on authority to bear any compariſon with the ſingle evidence of either Plato or Xenophon, much leſs with their united teſtimony, nor have they any probability to recommend them. They carry every appearance of having originated from the virulence of party-ſpirit, the ſpirit of that party which perſecuted Socrates to death; and they have been propagated by writers in the profligate ages that followed, accommodating themſelves to the taſte of thoſe ages, which their own profligacy, apparently, has led ſome of them to defend and to flatter: for the propenſity to involve men of beſt report, in former times, in the ſcandal of that groſs immorality which diſgraced the fall of Greece and of Rome, is conſpicuous among ſome of the writers under the Roman empire.

The quarrel of the learned author of The Obſerver with Socrates, has been taken up in revenge for the imputations, which ſome admirers of the philoſopher, with more zeal than either candor or good ſenſe, have thrown upon the comic poet Ariſtophanes. The ſtory reported by Ælian, that Ariſtophanes was bribed by Anytus and Melitus to write the comedy of The Clouds, purpoſely to prepare the way for the impeachment of Socrates, which did not follow till after ſo many years and ſo many revolutions in the government, is evidently abſurd and malicious; and yet it is not impoſſible but that comedy may have contributed to the popular prejudices, which inabled the enemies of Socrates to procure his condemnation. Xenophon and Plato have omitted to inform us either what incited Ariſtophanes ſo to traduce Socrates, or how the poet and the philoſopher afterward became, as from Plato it appears they did become, familiar friends. Poſſibly Ariſtophanes, when he wrote The Clouds, was little acquainted with Socrates, and poſſibly bore him no particular malice. His object ſeems to have been to ſtigmatize generally the quibling of the ſophiſts, and to ridicule the trifling of the naturaliſts. Some of the principal jokes, ſuch as meaſuring the flea's jump, and accounting for the gnat's noiſe, ſeem to have no relation to any doctrine or uſual inquiry of Socrates; and poſſibly the philoſopher may have been choſen for the hero of the piece only becauſe he was more known to fame, more remarkable by his doctrine, by his manner, and, what might be a conſideration for a comic poet, by his perſon, than any other public teacher.

O 2 CHAPTER

CHAPTER XXIII.

Tranſactions of the GREEKS in ASIA and THRACE, from the Concluſion of the PELOPONNESIAN WAR, in which Perſia was the Ally of Lacedæmon, to the Renewal of WAR between LACEDÆMON and PERSIA.

SECTION I.

Increaſed connection of Grecian affairs with Perſian. Succeſſion of Artaxerxes Mnemon to the Perſian throne. Weakneſs of the Perſian government. Grecian forces raiſed by Cyrus, brother of the king: Clearchus, Proxenus, Xenophon.

IN the latter years of the Peloponneſian war, the affairs of Greece became, as we have ſeen, more than formerly implicated with thoſe of Perſia; and during the ſhort calm which ſucceeded the long troubles of the former country, ſome events in the latter will require our attention. The detail will lead us far from Greece; but, beſide involving information of Grecian affairs not found elſewhere, it has a very important connection with Grecian hiſtory, through the inſight it affords into circumſtances which prepared a revolution effected by Grecian arms, one of the greateſt occurring in the annals of the world.

By the event of the Peloponneſian war, the Aſian Greeks changed the dominion of Athens, not for that of Lacedæmon, the conquering Grecian power, but of a forein, a barbarian maſter, the king of Perſia, then the ally of Lacedæmon. Toward the end of the ſame year in which a concluſion was put to the war, by the taking of Athens, Darius king of Perſia, the ſecond of the name, died. He was ſucceeded by his eldeſt ſon Artaxerxes, alſo the ſecond of his name, and, for his extraordinary memory, diſtin-

Xen. Anab. l. 1. c. 1.

diſtinguiſhed among the Greeks by the addition of Mnemon, the Mindful. The old king, in his laſt illneſs, deſirous to ſee once more his favorite ſon Cyrus, ſent for him from his government in Lydia. The prince, in obeying his father's requiſition, travelled in the uſual manner of the Eaſtern great, with a train amounting almoſt to an army; and to exhibit, in his guard, the new magnificence of troops ſo much heard of in the upper provinces, but never yet ſeen, he ingaged, by large pay, the attendance of three hundred heavy-armed Greeks, under the command of Xenias, of Parrhaſii in Arcadia. As a friend and counſellor, he took with him Tiſſaphernes, ſatrap of Caria.

On the deceaſe of Darius, which followed ſhortly, a jealouſy, ſcarcely ſeparable from a deſpotic throne, but ſaid to have been fomented by the unprincipled Tiſſaphernes, induced the new monarch to impriſon his brother; whoſe death, it was ſuppoſed, in courſe would have followed, but for the powerful intercеſſion of the queen-mother, Paryſatis. Reſtored through her influence, not only to liberty, but to the great command intruſted to him by his indulgent father, Cyrus nevertheleſs reſented highly the indignity he had ſuffered. He ſeems indeed to have owed little to his brother's kindneſs. Jealous of the known abilities and popular character of Cyrus, apprehenſive of his revenge, and perhaps not unreaſonably alſo of his ambition, Artaxerxes practiſed that wretched oriental policy, ſtill familiar with the Turkiſh government in the ſame countries, of exciting civil war againſt the commanders of his provinces, to diſable them for making war againſt the throne. Orontas, a perſon related to the royal family, governor of the citadel of Sardis, was incouraged by the monarch's councils, to rebel againſt that ſuperior officer, under whoſe immediate authority, by thoſe very councils, he was placed, and oſtenſibly ſtill required to act. Cyrus ſubdued and forgave him. A ſecond opportunity occurring, Orontas again rebelled; again found himſelf, notwithſtanding the ſecret patronage of the court, unable to ſupport his rebellion; and, ſoliciting pardon, obtained, from the generoſity of Cyrus, not pardon only but favor. According to report, to which Xenophon gave credit, the queen-mother herſelf, Paryſatis, whether urged by the known enmity of Artaxerxes to Cyrus, or by whatever other cauſe, incited her younger ſon to ſeek the throne and life of the elder. Thus much however appears certain, that,

Anab. l. i. c. 1. ſ. 4.

c. 6. ſ. 1, 6, 7.

very

very ſoon after his return into Aſia Minor, Cyrus began preparations with that criminal view. For a pretence, it muſt be allowed, he ſeems not to have been totally without what the right of ſelf-defence might afford; yet his principal motives evidently were ambition and revenge.

Anab. l. 1. c. 6. ſ. 7. l. 2. c. 5. ſ. 2. The diſjointed, tottering, and crumbling ſtate of that empire, which, under the firſt Darius, appeared ſo well compacted, and really was ſo powerful and flouriſhing, favored his views. Egypt had been long in rebellion, and the fidelity of other diſtant provinces was more than doubtful. c. 6. ſ. 3. Within his own extenſive viceroyalty, the large province of Paphlagonia, governed by its own tributary prince, paid but a precarious obedience to the Perſian throne; l. 3. c. 2. ſ. 14. the Myſian and Peiſidian mountaineers made open war againſt the more peaceable ſubjects of the plains, and the Lycaonians, poſſeſſing themſelves of the fortified places, held even the level country in independency, and refuſed the accuſtomed tribute. A large part of Leſſer Aſia was thus in rebellion, more or leſs avowed. Hence, on one hand, the attention of the king's councils and the exertion of his troops were ingaged; on the other, an undeniable pretence was ready for Cyrus to increaſe the military force under his immediate authority.

Ch. 20. ſ. 1. of this Hiſt. On his firſt arrival in the neighbourhood of the Grecian colonies, Cyrus, as we have ſeen, became partial to the Grecian character. The degeneracy, effeminacy, pride, ſervility, and falſehood, prevalent among the Aſſyrian and Median great, ſeem to have led the firſt Cyrus to eſtabliſh as a maxim for the Perſians, that to excel in drawing the bow, riding on horſeback, and ſpeaking truth, ſhould be their characteriſtic, and the great object of Perſian education. Born with a generous temper, and ſuperior powers of body and mind, and excelling in the two former requiſites, the younger Cyrus would be likely to conceive a proud value for the latter; and, at an early age, to abhor and deſpiſe the duplicity and baſeneſs in which the Perſian were no longer diſtinguiſhed from the Median and Aſſyrian courtiers. With a mind capable of friendſhip, and naturally ſolicitous for the eſteem of thoſe like himſelf, the ſuperior character of men bred in the ſchools of Lycurgus, Anaxagoras, and Socrates, and formed in the wars and political turbulence of the Grecian commonwealths, could not fail to ſtrike him. His vanity would coöperate with his judgement

ment in courting their good opinion; and, as his penetration diſcovered the uſe to be made of them, even his ambition would lead him to cultivate their friendſhip. Anab. l. 7. c. 7. ſ. 3.

As ſoon as the deſign againſt his brother's throne was decided, Cyrus, with increaſed ſedulity, extended his connexions among the Greeks. They alone, among the nations of that time, knew how to train armies, ſo that thouſands of men might act as one machine. Hence their heavy-armed had a power, in the ſhock of battle, that no number of more irregular troops, however brave, could reſiſt. To men of character therefore, from any part of Greece, but eſpecially from Peloponneſus, whoſe heavy-armed were of higheſt reputation, introduction to Cyrus was eaſy. The fame of his munificence and of his liberal manner invited; and many became connected with him by the pledge of hoſpitality, which, with the Perſians, not leſs than among the Greeks, was held ſacred. Through the long and extenſive war lately concluded, Greece abounded with experienced officers, and with men of inferior rank, much practiſed in arms, and little in any peaceful way of livelihood. Opportunity was thus ready for raiſing a force of Grecian mercenaries, almoſt to any amount. What required circumſpection was to avoid alarming the court of Suſa; and this the defective principles and worſe practice of the Perſian adminiſtration made even eaſy.

The ſuperintending command of Cyrus extended over all Leſſer Aſia within the river Halys. The large province, committed to his immediate government, was compoſed of Lydia, the Greater Phrygia, and Cappadocia. The Ionian cities had been reſerved to the ſatrapy of Tiſſaphernes. But the prince's character was popular, the ſatrap's unpopular; inſomuch that thoſe cities, finding their offered homage acceptable, all, excepting Miletus, paid their appointed tribute to Cyrus, and no longer acknowleged the ſatrap's orders. To conteſt ſuch matters by arms, was become ſo ordinary among the Perſian governors, that raiſing troops for the purpoſe was little likely to give umbrage to the court; careleſs how the provinces were adminiſtered, provided only the expected tribute came regularly to the treaſury. Cyrus therefore directed his Grecian commanders, in the ſeveral towns, to inliſt Greeks, eſpecially Peloponneſians, as many as they could; with the pretence of ſtrengthening his garriſons againſt the apprehended Xen. Hel. Anab. l. 1. c. 9. ſ. 5. c. 1. ſ. 6.

hended attempts of Tiſſaphernes. In Miletus, ſo the popularity of his character prevailed, a conſpiracy was formed for revolting to him; but before it could be carried into effect, it was diſcovered, and, by the ſatrap's order, the ringleaders were executed, and many of their adherents baniſhed. Cyrus not only protected the fugitives, but beſieged Miletus by land and ſea; and this new war furniſhed an additional pretence for levying troops.

Notwithſtanding the character of frankneſs, honor, and ſtrict regard for truth, which Cyrus generally ſupported, the candor of Xenophon, his friend and panegyriſt, has not concealed from us that he could ſtoop to duplicity, when the great intereſts of his ambition inſtigated. So far from acknowleging any purpoſe of diſobedience to the head of the empire, he condeſcended to requeſt from that brother, againſt whoſe throne and life his preparations were already directed, the royal authority for adding Ionia to his immediate government. The requeſt was granted; at the inſtance, it was ſaid, of Paryſatis, who preſerved much influence with her elder ſon, while ſhe incited the nefarious views of the younger againſt him. Concerning intrigues in the Perſian court, however, we ſhould perhaps allow our belief cautiouſly, even to Xenophon; but we may readily give him credit for that weakneſs of the government, which, he affirms, induced the king to be pleaſed, rather than offended, at the private war between his brother and the ſatrap; inaſmuch as by conſuming their means in the diſtant provinces, it might prevent diſturbance from their ambition to the interior of the empire.

Anab. l. 1. c. 1. ſ. 8.

Among the many Greeks admitted to the converſation and to the table of Cyrus, was Clearchus, a Lacedæmonian; who, after ſerving in the armies of his own commonwealth, through the Peloponneſian war, found himſelf, at the age of fifty, ſtill uneaſy in reſt. Looking all around for opportunity of military employment, he thought he had diſcovered it in the Thracian Cherſoneſe, where the Greek ſettlers were harraſſed by incurſions of the neighboring barbarians; and he perſevered in repreſentation and ſolicitation to the ephors, till he obtained a commiſſion for a command there. He haſtened his departure; but at Corinth an order of recall overtook him. The diſappointment was more than he could bear; he reſolved to diſobey the revered ſcytalë; and proceeded, in defiance of it,

ſ. 9.

l. 2. c. 6. ſ. 2.

it, to act in purſuance of his commiſſion received. For this he was, in abſence, condemned to death; a ſentence operating to his baniſhment for life.

What fair hope now remained to Clearchus does not appear; but the need of military talents, continually and extenſively occurring among the various warring commonwealths and ſcattered colonies of the Greeks, always offered ſome proſpect for adventurers of any conſiderable military reputation; and, in the moment, a ſtill more inviting field, poſſibly always in his view, appeared in the court of Cyrus. Thither he went, and, under a forbidding outſide, a ſurly countenance, a harſh voice, and rough manners, the prince, diſcovering in him the character he wanted, after ſhort intercourſe made him a preſent of ten thouſand darics, between ſeven and eight thouſand pounds ſterling.

Clearchus did not diſappoint this magnificent generoſity. Military command and military adventure were his ſupreme delight; and, in the circumſtances of the age, a body of men under his orders was an eſtate. Employing therefore the whole of the prince's preſent in raiſing troops, he offered, as an individual adventurer, that protection to the Cherſoneſites, which, as a general of the Lacedæmonian forces, he had been commiſſioned to give, but which the Lacedæmonian government, tho claiming to be the protecting power of the Grecian name, had finally refuſed to afford. His ſervice was accepted; and his ſucceſs againſt the barbarians, together with the uncommon regularity and inoffenſiveneſs of his troops in the friendly country, ſo gratified not the Cherſonites only, but all the Helleſpontine Greeks, that, while he generally found ſubſiſtence at the expence of the enemy, they provided large pay for his army by voluntary contribution. Hence, with a diſcipline ſevere ſometimes to exceſs, he preſerved the general attachment of thoſe under him; and thus a body of troops was kept in the higheſt order, ready for the ſervice of Cyrus.

The circumſtances of Theſſaly afforded another opportunity. Ariſtippus, a Theſſalian of eminence, probably baniſhed by faction, had been admitted to the prince's familiarity. Returning afterward to his own country, and becoming head of his party, diviſions were ſtill ſuch that recourſe was had to arms. Then Ariſtippus thought he might profit from that claim which

the antient doctrine of hoſpitality gave him upon the generoſity of Cyrus. He requeſted levy-money for two thouſand men, with pay for three months. Cyrus granted them for four thouſand and ſix months; only ſtipulating, that, without previous communication with him, no accommodation ſhould be concluded with the adverſe party. Thus another body of troops, unnoticed, was maintained for Cyrus.

Proxenus, a Theban, of the firſt rank and higheſt connections, happy in his talents, cultivated under the celebrated Gorgias, of manners to win, and character to deſerve eſteem, diſſatisfied with the ſtate of things in his own city, paſſed, at the age of toward thirty, to the court of Cyrus, with the direct purpoſe of ſeeking employment, honor, and fortune; and, in Xenophon's phraſe, of ſo aſſociating with men in the higheſt ſituations, that he might earn the means of doing, rather than lie under the neceſſity of receiving, favors. Recommended by ſuch advantages, Proxenus not only obtained the notice, but won the friendſhip of Cyrus; who commiſſioned him to raiſe a Grecian force, for a purpoſe which the Perſian court could not diſapprove, the reduction of the rebellious Peiſidians.

Thus ingaged in the prince's ſervice, it became the care of Proxenus to obtain, in his forein reſidence, the ſociety of a friend, of diſpoſition, acquirements, and purſuits congenial to his own. With this view he wrote to a young Athenian[1] with whom he had long had intimacy, Xenophon ſon of Gryllus, a ſcholar of Socrates; warmly urging him to come and partake of the prince's favor, to which he ingaged to introduce him. In the actual ſtate of things at Athens, enough might occur to diſguſt honeſt ambition. Xenophon therefore, little ſatisfied with any proſpect there, accepted his friend's invitation; and to theſe circumſtances we owe his beautiful narrative of the inſuing tranſactions, which remains, like the Iliad, the oldeſt and the model of its kind[2].

Anab. l. 3. c. 1. ſ. 4—7.

For a Grecian land-force, Cyrus contented himſelf with what might be procured by negotiation with individuals, and the allure of pay. But he deſired the coöperation of a Grecian fleet, which, in the exiſting circumſtances of Greece, could be obtained only through favor of the Lacedæ-

[1], [2] Two notes, whoſe purpoſe is to warrant the text, but which are not wanted to elucidate it, are, on account of their length, referred to the end of the chapter.

monian

monian government. By a confidential miniſter, therefore, diſpatched to Lacedæmon, he claimed a friendly return for his aſſiſtance in the war with Athens. The ephors, publicly acknowleging the juſtneſs of his claim, ſent orders to Samius, then commanding on the Aſiatic ſtation, to join the prince's fleet, and follow the directions of his admiral, Tamos, an Egyptian. Xen. Hel. c. 1. ſ. 1.

SECTION II.

March of Cyrus to Babylonia: Battle of Cunaxa.

PREPARATION being at length completed, and the advantageous ſeaſon for action approaching, all the Ionian garriſons were ordered to Sardis, and put under the command of Xenias, the Arcadian, who had been commander of the Grecian guard that had attended Cyrus into Upper Aſia. The other Grecian troops were directed to join; ſome at Sardis, ſome at places farther eaſtward. A very large army of Perſian ſubjects, or rather of various Aſiatics not Greeks, whom the Greeks called collectively barbarians, was at the ſame time aſſembled. The pretence of theſe great preparations was to exterminate the rebellious Peiſidians; and, in the moment, it ſufficed for the troops. It could however no longer blind Tiſſaphernes; who, not chuſing to truſt others to report what he knew or ſuſpected, ſet off, with all the ſpeed that the way of travelling of an Eaſtern ſatrap would admit, with an eſcort of five hundred horſe, to communicate perſonally with the king. Xen. Anab. l. 1. c. 2. ſ. 4.

Meanwhile Cyrus marched from Sardis, with the forces already collected, by Coloſſæ to Celænæ in Phrygia, a large and populous town, in which he halted thirty days. There he was joined by the laſt diviſion of his Grecian forces, which now amounted to about eleven thouſand heavy-armed, and two thouſand targeteers. His Aſiatics or barbarians were near a hundred thouſand. Proceeding again eaſtward, he halted again at Peltæ. There he gave a very ſtrong and gratifying mark of attention to the Greeks. It being the ſeaſon of the Arcadian feſtival called Lycæa, ſ. 5—9. B. C. 401. Ol. 94. 3. April.

whence the Romans had their Lupercalia, he not only allowed the Arcadians of the army, under the ſuperintendency of the Arcadian general, Xenias, to celebrate the feſtival, with all its religious rites, as well as with games, after the manner of their own country, but he paid them the compliment himſelf to attend.

In this great undertaking indeed, every exertion of his talent for acquiring popularity was wanted. Either he had met with ſome great diſappointment, of which we are uninformed, or he ſet out unprovided with the firſt requiſite, money, to a degree far beyond what prudence could juſtify. Only fifty-two days had elapſed ſince the army moved from Sardis, when the pay of the Grecian forces was three months in arrear, and he was without means to furniſh it. Diſcontent of courſe aroſe, and grew, inſomuch that the ſoldiers would urge their clamorous demands, even to his very door. Much good ſenſe, ſome experience, and earneſt meditation on great deſigns, had taught Cyrus to reſpect men, who muſt be inſtruments of thoſe deſigns. Hence he had learnt to check the impetuous paſſions, whoſe ſallies had ſometimes diſgraced his earlier youth. He would himſelf often give a patient hearing to the ſoldiers: he would ſoothe them with expreſſions of ſorrow for his preſent inability; he would cheer them with the proſpect of better times, and with promiſes, in which his known generoſity diſpoſed them to confide; and he never failed to diſmiſs them hoping, and in ſome degree gratified.

It ſeems probable that Cyrus had been negotiating with Syenneſis, who reigned over the rich maritime province of Cilicia, which he held, if we may uſe a modern term very nearly appoſite, as a fief of the Perſian empire. To paſs from Lydia into Aſſyria, the immenſe ridge which under various names, Taurus, Caucaſus, and others, extends from the ſouth-weſtern corner of Aſia Minor to the Caſpian ſea, muſt neceſſarily be croſſed; everywhere with much difficulty and danger to an army, if an enemy oppoſed; but the neareſt way and the beſt was through Cilicia. It was therefore of much importance to Cyrus to gain Syenneſis to his intereſt; or, if that could not be, to deter oppoſition from him. But the ſituation of the Cilician prince was critical. Acceding to the requiſition of Cyrus, he would incur the reſentment of the great king; refuſing it, he might be overwhelmed by the prince's army, before aſſiſtance from the king

king could arrive. Hence ſeem to have ariſen the circumſtances, of ſtrange and myſterious appearance which followed. Proceeding from Peltæ, the army incamped in the plain of Cayſtrus, near a large town, whence it was ſupplied with proviſions; but, no pay yet iſſuing, the diſcontent of the Greeks became ſuch, that their officers with difficulty kept them within any bounds. In this ſtate of things, attention became generally ingaged with the myſterious arrival of a princeſs at the camp, Epyaxa, wife of Syenneſis, with a ſtrong eſcort of horſe, part Cilician, part Greeks of Aſpendus; and ſhortly, to the ſurprize almoſt equally as to the gratification of the army, pay was iſſued for four months. The means were univerſally attributed to the Cilician princeſs. Anab. l. 1. c. 2. ſ. 12.

Orders being given for reſuming the march, the Greeks now proceeded cheerfully. Epyaxa, with her eſcort, accompanied the army, moving as the Perſian prince moved, and incamping as he incamped; not without inſult to her fame from the licentious mouths of the ſoldiers. At Tyriæum, to gratify her, it was ſaid, Cyrus reviewed his forces. The barbarian troops firſt marched by. Then Cyrus in an open, Epyaxa in a covered carriage, paſſed along the Grecian line, which was formed four deep; the ſoldiers uniformly armed and clothed, with brazen helmets, ſcarlet tunics, greaves, and burniſhed ſhields. Taking a ſtation then in front, Cyrus ſent orders to advance with protended ſpears. The trumpet immediately giving the ſignal, the phalanx moved, and gradually quickening pace, at length advanced running, ſhouting at the ſame time aloud, in the uſual meaſured way of the Greeks, widely different from the irregular clamors of the barbarians. Twelve thouſand men, uniformly armed, exactly formed, moving regularly and ſhouting regularly, as if one machine, were a ſight ſo new to the Aſiatics as to excite alarm with aſtoniſhment. Epyaxa, for quicker flight, quitted her cumbrous carriage, and every ſutler ran from the camp. The Greeks were amuſed and flattered, and Cyrus was not anxious to conceal his ſatisfaction at the terror which they could thus eaſily excite among the Aſiatics.

In three days then the army arrived at Iconium, the laſt town of Phrygia. Here it was on the border of the rebellious provinces, the pretended object of the expedition. Its force was much greater than the rebels could undertake to incounter. During five days march through Lycaonia, ſ. 19.

the

the Greeks had permiſſion to plunder, and they met with no oppoſition, or none worth their hiſtorian's notice. In Lycaonia the Cilician princeſs took leave of Cyrus, to go, by the neareſt road acroſs the mountains, into her own country. In pretended, or perhaps reäl compliment to her, her eſcort was augmented with a body of Greeks, under the orders of Menon, a young Theſſalian, who held the immediate command of the troops raiſed by Ariſtippus. But, whatever might have paſſed between Cyrus and Epyaxa, the diſpoſition of Syenneſis was yet doubtful; and it ſeems to have been the principal object, in ſending Menon, to open a communication with the combined fleet under Tamos and Samius, which had been ordered to the Cilician coaſt, and by a force within the country, poſſeſſing that communication, to make the paſſage of the mountains, in all events, more ſecure for the body of the army.

Anab. l. 1. c. 2. ſ. 20.

ſ. 20–21. Meanwhile the prince, moving ſtill eaſtward through Cappadocia, in four days reached Dana, a large and populous town, whence a formed carriage-way, the beſt acroſs the rugged ridge of Taurus, led directly to Tarſus, the Cilician capital; ſteep, however, in many parts, and commanded, ſo that a very ſmall force might ſtop a large army. No intelligence had yet arrived from Menon, and report was circulated that Syenneſis in perſon, with a powerful body of troops, had occupied the heights commanding the paſſage. During the halt, which theſe circumſtances occaſioned, two Perſian officers of high rank were executed. Report went of a conſpiracy; but the uſual ſecreſy of a deſpotic adminiſtration denied all particulars to public knowlege.

After three days delay, the ſatisfactory intelligence arrived, that the paſſage of the mountains was open; that the detachment under Menon was already within the ridge; and, what had contributed not a little to deter the oppoſition meditated by Syenneſis, that the fleet was on the coaſt. The highlands were accordingly traverſed without oppoſition, and the army, proceeding then in four days above eighty miles, through a well watered, highly cultivated, and very fruitful vale, ſurrounded by lofty mountains, arrived at Tarſus.

With ſurprize and regret it was found, that this large and lately flouriſhing town had been plundered and was nearly deſerted; even the prince's palace had been ſtripped; and Syenneſis, with the principal inhabitants,

inhabitants, had withdrawn to a ſtrong hold on the neighboring mountains, to avoid farther injury from Menon. Cyrus had not penetrated this young man's character, through a fair exterior, ſo happily as that of the veteran Clearchus, under a forbidding aſpect. Menon poſſeſſed very conſiderable talents, recommended by an elegant perſon and an ingaging manner; but he had a moſt depraved mind, with an inordinate appetite for riches and pleaſure, unreſtrained by either fear or ſhame. In attributing this to him, ſays Xenophon, I give him but his well-known due. The alledged provocation for his violences at Tarſus was an attack among the defiles, in which a hundred Greeks had fallen. The loſs had certainly been ſuſtained; but the Cilicians averred that the intolerable rapines of Menon, as he traverſed the country, had provoked the attack. Cyrus ſent a meſſage to Syenneſis, requiring his attendance in Tarſus. The Cilician anſwered, 'That he never had appeared before a ſuperior, nor 'would he now.' Epyaxa however interfering as mediatrix, Syenneſis, after receiving ſolemn aſſurance of ſafety, obeyed the requiſition. An exchange was then made of honors for money. Syenneſis advanced a very large ſum to Cyrus, and received, in return, ſays the hiſtorian, ſuch gifts as are held honorable among princes; a horſe with a golden bit; a chain of gold, bracelets, a golden battle-axe, a Perſian robe, and a promiſe that his country ſhould be no farther plundered, and, moreover, that ſtolen ſlaves, wherever found, ſhould be reſtored to their owners; the only reparation, apparently, ever propoſed for the plunder of the capital. Anab. l. 1. c. 2. ſ. 27.

Cyrus halted in Tarſus twenty days. In this leiſure the Greeks obſerved among one-another, that the Peiſidian mountains were now left far behind them; that the pretence of war there had evidently been a fallacy; and many circumſtances gave to ſuſpect that the prince's reäl deſign was againſt his brother's throne. Of the generals, Clearchus only was in the ſecret; but the others were moſtly ready to concur in a project which, with conſiderable danger indeed, held out the hope of immenſe reward. The ſoldiers however, for whom the allurement was not equal, were leſs diſpoſed to the toil and the perils; and when at length orders came for marching ſtill eaſtward, they univerſally declared, it was for no ſuch diſtant ſervice they had ingaged themſelves, and they would go no farther. Clearchus immediately reſorted to his uſual rough means of compulſion; but they were c. 3. ſ. 1.

no-

no longer borne; the mutiny broke out with violence; ſtones were thrown, firſt at his ſumpter-horſes, then at himſelf, and with difficulty he eſcaped alive.

Information of theſe circumſtances gave Cyrus the deepeſt anxiety. He had already advanced too far to retreat with either honor or ſafety; and, deprived of his regular infantry, his force would be too inferior for any reaſonable hope of ſucceſs againſt the myriads of the great king. But the able and experienced Clearchus did not ſo ceaſe to truſt in his ability to ſway the minds of men. He deſired a meeting of his people, as in civil aſſembly, and they came quietly together. Addreſſing them in terms tending only to reconciliation and the recovery of their confidence, they liſtened patiently. Proteſting then that he would neither oppoſe nor deſert them, but, if they thought him unworthy any longer to command, he would obey; not only his own people declared their attachment, but more than two thouſand others, of the body drawn from the Ionian garriſons, hitherto under the Arcadian Xenias, and the troops raiſed for the ſiege of Miletus, under Paſion of Megara, now, without regarding any longer the orders of thoſe generals, arranged themſelves under the command of Clearchus.

Anab. l. 1. c. 3. ſ. 2—6.

ſ. 7.

But, in reſolving to proceed no farther with Cyrus, the means of returning to Ionia had been little conſidered by the ſoldiers; how the paſſage of the mountains was to be ſecured, and how, without pay, ſubſiſtence was to be obtained. More meetings were held; various and contrary opinions were urged; and the perplexity was ſo ſkilfully managed by Clearchus and his confidential officers, that, diſagreeing on every other propoſal, it was at length univerſally reſolved to ſend Clearchus himſelf, with ſome others, to demand of the prince on what ſervice he meant to employ them. Cyrus, being duly prepared by private communication, received the deputation graciouſly, and, in anſwer, ſaid, 'that according 'to intelligence lately arrived, his enemy the ſatrap of Syria, Abrocomas, 'was incamped on the bank of the Euphrates, only twelve days march 'from Tarſus. If he found him there, he meant to take vengeance on 'him; if not, he would there conſult with them what meaſure ſhould next 'be taken.'

ſ. 20.

This ſpeech did not deceive the Greeks; but it might incourage, by ſhowing them, as it ſtrongly marks to poſterity, the incoherent texture of the

the Perſian government, when the purpoſe of private war againſt the governor of a great province, ſo near the center of the empire, might be boldly avowed by the governor of another province, ſtill maintaining the pretence of allegiance to the throne. Their perplexity therefore not being in any degree relieved, if they perſiſted in their firſt reſolution, they preſently came to a determination, to profit as they might from the exiſting circumſtances, and accordingly to uſe them for a pretence to demand an increaſe of pay, rather than, by deſerting the prince's ſervice, to go without pay. Cyrus readily gratified them with the promiſe of an additional half daric monthly. Their former monthly pay was a daric, being nearly ſixpence daily. Anab. l. 1. c. 3. ſ. 21.

The march was now quietly reſumed, and in five days the army reached Iſſus, a large and wealthy ſeaport, near the eaſtern limit of Cilicia. The fleet was already arrived there, conſiſting of twenty-five Phenician and thirty-five Grecian ſhips. The Egyptian Tamos commanded in chief. The Lacedæmonian admiral Pythagoras, who, according to the uſual yearly change in the Lacedæmonian ſervice, had ſuperſeded Samius, ſerved under him. They brought an acceptable addition to the land-force, of ſeven hundred heavy-armed Greeks, commanded by Cheiriſophus, a Lacedæmonian. Another reïnforcement ſoon after arrived at Iſſus, ſmall in itſelf, but, from the attending circumſtances, highly gratifying to Cyrus. It conſiſted of about four hundred Grecian heavy-armed, who had been in the ſervice of Abrocomas, ſatrap of Lydia: ſo far did the Greeks now wander in queſt of military pay, and ſo extenſively were their valor and diſcipline in requeſt. But, whether the treatment they had met with diſguſted, or the fame of the prince's liberality allured, all deſerted the ſatrap, and offered themſelves in a body to Cyrus; profeſſing their readineſs to march anywhere under his orders, tho it ſhould be againſt the king himſelf. c. 4. ſ. 1, 2, 3. c. 2. ſ. 21. Xen. Hel. l. 3. c. 1. ſ. 1.

Leſs than twenty miles beyond Iſſus eaſtward, the ridge of Taurus meets the ſhore, ſo that a narrow way only, under lofty precipices againſt the ſea, remains practicable for an army. Two fortreſſes commanded this paſs; one on the Syrian ſide, garriſoned by the great king; the other on the Cilician ſide, held by the king of Cilicia; for ſo far the Cilician king was a ſoverein. Oppoſition was expected here from Abrocomas, ſuch as might prevent or very inconveniently delay the army's progreſs. Had ſuch Anab. l. 1. c. 4. ſ. 4. ſ. 5.

been found, it was propoſed to tranſport the troops by ſea to Phenicia. But the ſatrap, tho ſaid to have had three hundred thouſand men under his command, left the narrow unguarded, and the army entered Syria unreſiſted.

Anab. l. 1. c. 4. ſ. 6.

§ 7. The next halt was at Myriandrus, a Phenician ſeaport of conſiderable trade. There the Grecian generals Paſion and Xenias, without giving any notice of their purpoſe, imbarked aboard a merchant-ſhip, with their effects, and ſailed for Greece. No cauſe for this deſertion was known; unleſs it was that thoſe of the troops formerly under their orders, which, on occaſion of the mutiny at Tarſus, had ſeceded to Clearchus, remained ſtill under that general, and that Cyrus had not interfered to require their return under obedience to their former commanders. The unceremonious departure of thoſe generals excited alarm among ſome, and indignation among moſt of the Greeks; and it gave great uneaſineſs, with very juſt cauſe, to Cyrus. In the neceſſity of courting, at the ſame time, and in the ſame camp, the attachment of troops ſo different, and in ſome points oppoſite, in manners, ſentiments, and prejudices, as the Greeks and Orientals, it would often be difficult to decide how to manage command, ſo as to offend neither the proud ſervility of theſe, nor the turbulent independency of the others. To carry an equal and ſteddy diſcipline, indeed, would be ſcarcely poſſible; but, in all his communication with the Greeks, Cyrus ſeems to have ſhown a ſuperior mind, and not leaſt upon the preſent occaſion.

§ 8. Calling togeather the generals, he ſaid, 'Paſion and Xenias had 'left him. It would however be eaſy for his triremes to overtake 'their heavy veſſel, and bring them back, if ſuch could be his purpoſe. 'But they were free to go, with the conſciouſneſs which muſt attend 'them, that they deſerved worſe of him than he of them. Their wives 'and children, reſiding at Tralles, hoſtages at his command, ſhould alſo 'be reſtored to them: for thoſe who had once ſerved him well, ſhould 'never experience ſeverity from him for meerly quitting his ſervice.'

§ 9. His conduct altogether, very grateful to the Greeks, infuſed new alacrity among them, and a general readineſs appeared for proceeding ſtill eaſtward. A fortnight's march then brought the army to the large town of Thapſacus on the Euphrates. There Cyrus declared to the Grecian generals that his purpoſe was againſt his brother the great king, and deſired

§ 10, 11.

fired them to communicate the information to the ſoldiers, and endeavor to ingage their willing ſervice. Long as this had been ſuſpected, the communication, now at length made, was not well received. The ſoldiers accuſed their commanders of concealing from them a matter ſo intereſting, which themſelves had long known: tho in reality Clearchus alone had been intruſted with the ſecret. Among various murmurs, it was obſerved by ſome, that if they went on, they ſhould deſerve at leaſt a gratuity equal to what thoſe had received, who, under the command of Xenias, had attended Cyrus, when he went to viſit the late king his father. Theſe circumſtances being reported to the prince, he immediately promiſed a gratuity, conſiderably exceeding the demand, to the amount of ſixteen pounds ſterling for every ſoldier, on their arrival at Babylon, and their full pay beſides, till they ſhould reach Ionia again. Anab. l. 1. c. 4. ſ. 12. ſ. 13.

While ſome expreſſed themſelves highly ſatisfied with ſo liberal a promiſe from one unaccuſtomed to fall ſhort of his promiſes, but others yet heſitated at the proſpect of ſo hazardous an enterprize at ſuch a diſtance from their own country, Menon had the addreſs to perſuade his people to earn the firſt favor of a generous prince, who, if they only were true to him and to themſelves, would be ſoon by far the greateſt monarch in the world. Before the general reſolution of the army could be collected, he gave the word to march, and was obeyed. The Euphrates, whoſe occaſional violence denied bridges, whoſe depth in that part very rarely admitted fording, and from whoſe banks all boats had been removed by the care of Abrocomas, happened to be then juſt fordable. Menon led through; his troops followed, and immediately began to incamp on the other ſide. An officer was preſently diſpatched to them with the prince's thanks, and aſſurance that it ſhould be his care to deſerve their thanks; with the emphatical expreſſion added, that, if he failed, they ſhould no longer call him Cyrus. The ſervice was indeed very important, for the example was immediately deciſive; the whole army followed, and incamped on the left ſide of the river. ſ. 14—17.

The Greeks being thus at length clearly ingaged in war againſt the king, the army moved again, and in nine days reached the Meſopotamian deſert; deſcribed by Xenophon, under the name of Arabia, level as the l. 1. c. 4. ſ. 18. c. 5. ſ. 1.

ſea; not a tree to be ſeen; every ſhrub and herb, even to the very reeds, aromatic; but the principal produce wormwood. Five days this dreary country was traverſed, to Corſota, a large deſerted town on the river Maſcas; and there proviſions were diſtributed for the formidable march of near three hundred miles[a], through a ſtill more barren region, to the gate, as it was called, of the fruitful Meſopotamia. Thirteen days were employed in this paſſage, in which corn failed the men, and forage the cattle, inſomuch that many of the latter died. Some relief was at length obtained from a large town on the other ſide of the Euphrates; but during the halt made for the purpoſe, a diſſenſion aroſe among the Greeks, which threatened the moſt fatal conſequences. In the fear of giving umbrage, Cyrus had allowed each Grecian general to retain the independent command of the troops which had been under his orders before they aſſembled; himſelf alone acting as immediate commander-in-chief of the Grecian forces. But a diſpute ariſing between ſome of Menon's ſoldiers and thoſe of Clearchus, the Lacedæmonian general took upon himſelf to judge it, and ordered one of Menon's men to be whipped. It is, I believe, the firſt inſtance recorded of ſuch a military puniſhment among the Greeks; unleſs the chaſtiſement of Therſites by Ulyſſes, reported in the Iliad, might be conſidered as ſuch. On the ſame day, Clearchus, riding with a ſmall eſcort through Menon's camp, was aſſaulted by the incenſed comrades of the puniſhed ſoldier, with ſuch violence that his life was indangered. Eſcaping however to his own camp, his anger ſo overcame his prudence that he called his people to arms; and the fortunately ready intervention of Proxenus, with admonition and intreaty judiciouſly ſupported by the ſight of armed troops at hand, hardly reſtrained his fury. It gave time however for Cyrus himſelf to interfere, who haſtened to the Grecian line, and addreſſed the generals with this remarkable admonition: 'Of the conſequences of what you are about,' he ſaid, 'I am ſure you 'are not aware. If you fight with one-another, that very day I ſhall be

Anab. l. 1. c. 5. ſ. 4.

ſ. 5, 6.

[a] Xenophon has given the meaſure in parafangs; but they were computed only, and of courſe uncertain. According to the common allowance of four miles to a parafang, the diſtance would be more than three hundred miles. Thoſe who deſire critical information concerning the geography of the Anabaſis, will find advantage in conſulting Forſter's Diſſertation annexed to Spelman's tranſlation.

'cut

'cut off, and then your fate will not be distant. For this whole Asiatic 'army, if they see our affairs go ill, instantly will turn against us, and, in 'studious display of enmity to us, will even exceed the king's forces.' Clearchus felt the sensible, pathetic, and indearing rebuke, and quiet was restored in the Grecian camp.

The army marching again, had already entered the fruitful Mesopotamia, or Babylonia, when a letter was delivered to Cyrus, indicating a most dangerous treachery. Orontas, his kinsman, whom we have seen twice in arms against him, and still restored to favor and confidence, held a great command in the army. Apparently his extensive credit and influence, and, amid the general deficiency of the Persian officers, his superior military reputation, made his assistance so desirable and even necessary for the expedition, that much was knowingly hazarded to obtain it. The letter was from Orontas himself to the king, communicating intelligence, and promising service. Anab. l. 1. c. 7. s. 1. c. 6. s. 1, 2, 3.

In this danger from his Persian followers, we see a reason for the prince's attachment to his Greeks, perhaps not less weighty than that arising from his knowlege of their superiority as soldiers. From the moment they were decidedly ingaged in the enterprize, their interest was much more inseparably blended with his, than that of perhaps any of his Asiatics. Orontas, therefore, being arrested, and seven of the principal Persian officers summoned, as a military council, or court-martial, to the prince's tent, three thousand Greeks were ordered on guard around, and Clearchus was called in to assist at the deliberation. Cyrus himself explained the prisoner's crimes, and all that he said was allowed by Orontas to be true. If the proceedings of a Persian military tribunal were not decided by any very well-regulated system of distributive justice, we shall not wonder. But Cyrus seems to have been desirous to show, that not the unceremonious decision only of a despotic government, but the fixed rules of a free people, would condemn Orontas. He called upon Clearchus first to declare his opinion. The inattention of the Spartan general to any principle such as the fame of his republic for equal law might give to expect from him, and the declaration of his decision, on the contrary, by a rule of meer convenience, so adapted to purposes of tyranny that it might serve as a complete code of criminal jurisprudence for a Turkish bashaw, may indeed excite surprize. s. 4. s. 6—9.

'I think,'

'I think,' ſaid Clearchus, as the Athenian philoſopher without a comment reports his ſpeech, 'that the priſoner deſerves death, and I adviſe that it 'be inflicted; that ſo the neceſſity of conſtantly watching ſecret enemies 'may not prevent exertions for the advantage of our friends.' But whatever we may think of Clearchus as a lawyer, he was undoubtedly a politician. His argument at once decided the court. Tho ſome of the members were nearly related to the priſoner, all voted for his death. The prince himſelf pronounced condemnation; and Orontas was then conducted to the tent of Artapatas. As he paſſed, an inſtance of the decency of Perſian manners excited the admiration of the Greeks: tho the ſentence had been made public, yet all the crowd ſhowed him the ſame reverence as when in the height of his power and moſt in favor with the prince. After entering the tent of Artapatas, he was never more ſeen, nor was it ever known to the Greeks by what kind of execution he died, or how his body was diſpoſed of. The other circumſtances were not denied to the public; and as Clearchus related to his friends what paſſed in the prince's tent, it comes to us from the pen of Xenophon with an authority ſeldom to be found for ſuch tranſactions.

Anab. l. 1. c. 6. ſ. 10.

ſ. 11.

ſ. 5.

Treachery and ſedition being thus checked, the army moved, and after three days march in Babylonia, it was expected on the morrow to meet the king's forces. The want of ſyſtem in the command of the Grecian troops was now in ſome degree remedied. Cyrus directed that, for the order of battle, Clearchus ſhould command the right wing, and Menon the left. Next morning, ſome deſerters bringing accounts, ſuppoſed more certain, of the enemy's approach, Cyrus ſent for the Greek generals and lochages, and ſpoke to them in theſe remarkable terms:

c. 7. ſ. 1. B.C. 401. Ol. 94. 4. September.

ſ. 2.

'It was not, as you will readily ſuppoſe, in any want of your numbers 'to ſwell my army, that I ingaged you in my ſervice, but in the belief 'that you were much ſuperior to far greater numbers of barbarians. What 'therefore I have now to deſire of you is, that you ſhow yourſelves worthy 'of that freedom which you inherit, and for which I eſteem you fortunate; 'and I profeſs to you, that I ſhould myſelf prefer that freedom to all I 'poſſeſs, or to much greater poſſeſſions, held at the arbitrary will of an-'other.

ſ. 3, 4.

'For

'For the battle we expect, it may be proper then to apprize you, that 'the enemy's multitude will appear formidable; that their ſhout of onſet 'will be impoſing; but, if you are firm againſt theſe, I am even aſhamed 'to ſay what contemptible ſoldiers you will find my fellowcountrymen 'to be. You then only exerting yourſelves as may be expected, I am 'confident of acquiring means equal to my wiſhes, to ſend thoſe home 'the envy of their country, who may deſire to return home; but I truſt 'the far greater number of you will prefer the advantages which I ſhall 'have opportunity to offer in my ſervice.'

Gaulites, a Samian, replied to this ſpeech, declaring plainly the doubts of the army, both of the prince's diſpoſition and of his ability, whatever their ſervices and his ſucceſs might be, to perform ſuch magnificent promiſes. But Gaulites was in the prince's confidence[3]; and Xenophon's account altogether gives reaſon to ſuppoſe that his reply was preconcerted. It gave opportunity however for Cyrus, in a ſecond ſpeech, to remove all diſtruſt of him, and he diſmiſſed thoſe firſt called, and others afterward admitted, full of high hopes for themſelves, and zeal for his ſervice, which were communicated through the army. The tranſaction altogether ſhows that Cyrus had ſtudied the Grecian character carefully and ſucceſsfully. Anab. l. 1. c. 7. ſ. 5, 6, 7.

The Grecian forces being thus prepared (what paſſed in the Aſiatic line, probably little known, is ſeldom noticed by Xenophon) the whole army marched in order of battle. Only five miles onward, a wide and deep trench, extending above forty miles, had been formed purpoſely to obſtruct the prince's progreſs. The canals, little diſtant, connecting the Euphrates and the Tigris, gave opportunity to float it, ſo as to form a ſtrong line of defence to the country beyond. After ſo much expence and ſ. 11, 12, 13.

[3] Πιστὸς Κύρῳ.—Cyro fidus.—A man of fidelity to Cyrus. Spelman.

Thus the tranſlators. But the different ſenſe I have given, being, I think, unqueſtionably warranted by the original, I have no doubt in preferring it. Yet it ſeems as if Spelman thought πιστὸς would bear no other ſenſe than that expreſſed in his tranſlation; for in another place he has given the ſame interpretation of the ſame word, where the context would lead to ſuppoſe it wholly unwarrantable. Οἱ ἔσαν Κύρῳ πιστότατοι, is ſaid, by the hiſtorian, of men in the very act of a ſignal treachery. (Anab. l. 2. c. 5. ſ. 9.) This Spelman tranſlates, 'who had ſhown the greateſt fidelity 'to Cyrus.' It appears, I muſt own, to me not at all intended by the hiſtorian to give ſo honorable a teſtimony to ſuch men, but on the contrary to ſhow in a ſtronger light their baſe falſehood, by remarking that they had been much in the confidence of Cyrus.

labor,

labor, in ſo advantageous and important a ſituation, ſtrong oppoſition to the paſſage of that trench was expected. The tracks, however only, of a multitude of retreating men and horſes were found there. Upon this occaſion a remarkable inſtance occurred of Perſian reſpect for Grecian ſuperſtition; heightened however poſſibly by the exiſting urgency, which made the ſervice of the Greeks ſo important. On the eleventh day before
Anab. l. 1. c. 7. ſ. 14. the arrival of the army at the trench, an Ambraciot ſoothſayer, named Silanus, ſacrificing, had boldly aſſerted, as what his ſkill in divination enabled him to foretel, that, within ten days, the king would not fight. This being reported to Cyrus, whether pleaſed with the prognoſtic itſelf, or only ſeconding the incouragement it might infuſe into others, eſpecially the Greeks, he anſwered, 'Then he will not fight at all; and if the event "juſtifies the prophecy, I will give the ſoothſayer ten talents.' Mindful of his word, he accordingly ſent for Silanus, and gave him three thouſand darics; being, in Perſian money, the full amount of ten Attic talents, and more than two thouſand pounds ſterling.

But, whatever credit might be reälly given to the Ambraciot, the total deſertion of a defence, formed with ſo much labor and coſt, led Cyrus and
ſ. 15. his principal adviſers to believe that the king meant to avoid a battle. In the next day's march therefore order was leſs diligently kept, and in the day following, the prince himſelf quitting his horſe for his chariot, the whole army aſſumed the improvident careleſſneſs of a peaceful march; many of the ſoldiers, to relieve themſelves in the exceſſive heat of advancing day, committing their heavy armour to the waggons and ſumpter-horſes. The propoſed day's march was nearly completed, when Patagyas,
c. 8. ſ. 1. a Perſian of rank, came urging his fainting horſe's ſpeed, and, as he paſſed, calling out, in Perſian to the Aſiatics, in Greek to the Grecks, 'that the 'king's army was approaching in order of battle.' Tumult pervaded the
ſ. 2. extenſive line; all imagining the enemy would be upon them before they could be duly formed. Cyrus leaped from his chariot, armed himſelf, mounted his horſe, and haſtily iſſued his orders.

The diſpoſition for battle was nevertheleſs completed, midday paſſed,
ſ. 5. and no enemy appeared. Soon however, as the hiſtorian who was preſent deſcribes it, a duſt was obſerved in the diſtance, like a white cloud; and, after ſome time, a darkneſs ſpreading over the plain. Preſently then the glittering

glittering of the poliſhed armour was ſeen, and ſhortly the ſpears and the ranks became diſcernible. Cyrus rode himſelf to view the king's diſpoſition, and then, coming to the Grecian line, by his interpreter ordered Clearchus to direct his march to the enemy's center; 'for there,' he ſaid, 'the king has his ſtation; and nothing more is wanting to complete our 'buſineſs, than to defeat that part of their army.'

Cyrus, little experienced in military command, ſeems to have wanted able adviſers. Probably the jealouſy of the Aſiatics would not readily admit the aſſociation of Clearchus in their councils; and it was neceſſary for Cyrus, as far as poſſible, to avoid diſguſting any of his followers. His Greeks were now about ten thouſand four hundred heavy-armed, and two thouſand four hundred targeteers: his Aſiatics nearly a hundred thouſand, in large proportion cavalry; and he had twenty chariots armed with ſithes. The king's forces, according to the concurrent reports of deſerters, likely however to be exaggerated, were nine hundred thouſand; and his ſithed chariots were a hundred and fifty. The Greeks held the right of the prince's army, with their right flank covered by the Euphrates. Clearchus, of a temper not readily to obey any orders againſt his own opinion, was perhaps diſpleaſed not to have been conſulted about the diſpoſition for battle. He knew however that tho report might have amplified the king's numbers, they were certainly ſo ſuperior to thoſe of Cyrus, as to outflank him by more than half his army. He ſaw the ſafety of thoſe under him, his own credit, and perhaps the beſt proſpect of final ſucceſs to the prince's cauſe, in keeping his flank ſtill covered by the river. Reſolved therefore not to part with ſo important an advantage, he avoided a direct refuſal of obedience to the prince's command, by anſwering, in general terms, 'that 'he would take care all ſhould go well [4].' Anab. l. 1. c. 8. ſ. 9.

Cyrus continued riding in front of the line, viewing every part; and as he again approached the Grecian phalanx, Xenophon rode toward him, and aſked if he had any commands. 'Only,' ſaid the prince, 'let the 'Greeks be informed that the ſacrifices are all favorable.' At that inſtant a murmur through the Grecian ranks drew his attention, and he aſked what ſ. 10, 11.

[4] It is impoſſible to read Plutarch's criticiſm of the conduct of Clearchus (Plut. Artax. p. 1856.) without a ſmile at his preſumptuous ignorance; or to obſerve his eulogy of Xenophon, and at the ſame time his inattention to him, without ſome wonder at his extreme careleſſneſs.

it meant. Xenophon anſwered, that the officers were communicating a new word, given out for the occaſion. What is it? ſaid Cyrus. 'Protecting 'Jupiter and Victory,' anſwered Xenophon. 'I accept the omen,' replied the prince, 'be it ſo;' and immediately rode away toward the center of his army.

It was well known to the king's officers that no Aſiatic infantry could withſtand the Grecian phalanx, and that no Aſiatic cavalry would dare to charge it. The propoſed reſource, in this decided inferiority of the troops, was to uſe the armed chariots as an artillery; and they were indeed formidable weapons, when their operations were duly guided [5]. The horſes, to force their way through protended ſpears, bore defenſive armour [6]; a parapet on the chariot protected the driver; ſithes, projecting, downward under the axle-tree, and obliquely from each end, were adapted to make havoc of whatever came in their courſe.

Tiſſaphernes, as, of the king's general officers, moſt acquainted with the Grecian military practice, was appointed to the command of the wing oppoſed to the Greeks. He was already within half a mile of their line, when Cyrus left them. The Greeks, obſerving his approach, ſang the pæan, advanced, and, quickening pace by degrees, at length ran in phalanx. The effect of this ſpirited movement was beyond expectation. The charge of the chariots, which alone would have been formidable, was obviated by it. For, the Perſian infantry flying, without even diſcharging an effectual arrow, and the cavalry giving no ſupport, the charioteers moſtly quitted their carriages, and the reſt drove away. A few only of thoſe tremendous wheeled weapons, deſerted by their drivers, were borne by the frightened horſes againſt the Grecian line, and none with any effect. Some, the horſes ſtopping amazed, were taken, and ſome puſhing on with that heedleſs fury which fright often inſpires, paſſed through openings made for them by the ready diſcipline of the phalanx [7]. The greater part, turning after their own troops, inhanced the alarm and haſtened the flight, not without

Anab. l. 1. c. 8. ſ. 12, 13.

5. So we learn from Xenophon's account of their effect on another occaſion. Hel. l. 4. c. 1. ſ. 9.

6 In the paſſage referred to in the foregoing note, we find mention of the defenſive armour of the Perſian ſithed-chariot-horſes, which does not occur in the account of the battle of Cunaxa; in which nevertheleſs troop-horſes are mentioned bearing defenſive armour, ſo that it can ſcarcely be doubted but the chariot-horſes would be at leaſt equally protected.

7 This is the ſenſe that Spelman, by a judicious and apparently well founded correction, has given to the paſſage, which, in the printed copies of the Anabaſis, is contradictory and abſurd.

havoc

havoc of the diſorderly bands. The Greeks, ſurprized at their eaſy victory, with a ſteddy pace purſued.

Tiſſaphernes, not of a temper to ſet the example, generally ſo neceſſary to produce bold exertion among Aſiatic troops, and diſappointed of the effect of his chariots, on which he had wholly depended for ſucceſs againſt the Grecian phalanx, nevertheleſs formed hopes to gain, with little riſk, the credit of ſome ſucceſs againſt the Greeks, through his knowlege of the formation of their armies. Avoiding the heavy-armed, with his cavalry he charged the targeteers. But theſe opening (for they were highly diſciplined, and commanded by an able officer, Epiſthenes of Amphipolis) the horſe went through, and ſuffered from javelins in paſſing, without returning a wound. The attempt was not repeated; and thus a great victory, in all appearance, was obtained by the Greeks, almoſt without a battle; for a very few bowſhot wounds only had been received in the left of the phalanx [8], and not a man was killed. Anab. l. 1. c. 10. ſ. 5.

The deciſion had been ſo rapid, that the center of the armies was not yet ingaged. In ſome leiſure, therefore, the ſucceſs of the Greeks was obſerved by Cyrus and thoſe about him, and ſo large a portion of the royal forces were ſeen to join in the flight, that warm hopes were excited among all, and the ready flattery of ſome complimented the prince as already king. Cyrus however had a mind greater than to be ſo miſled. Attentive to all points, he had now ſatisfied himſelf that the king was in the center of his army, generally eſteemed his regular poſt. This extended beyond the extreme of the prince's left, and had in no degree partaken of the diſorder of the wing under Tiſſaphernes. It had been the advice anxiouſly urged to Cyrus by the Grecian generals, who knew that on his life all their hopes depended, not to riſk his perſon in action. Whether through vain glory, or falſe ſhame, or any juſt conſideration of the importance of his example to Aſiatic troops, he reſolved not to ſhun danger, but rather to lead the way to daring exertion. He was however waiting c. 8. ſ. 15. c. 7. ſ. 8.

[8] Ἐπὶ τῷ ἐνωνύμῳ τοξευθῆναί τις ἐλέγετο. Spelman has tranſlated this as if Xenophon had meant preciſely to ſay that only one man was wounded. It appears to me that Diodorus, who, tho a miſerable hiſtorian, was a good grammarian, and knew his own language well, has better given the true meaning of the phraſe: Τῶν δὲ Ἑλλήνων φασὶν ἀναιρεθῆναι μὲν ὀυδένα, τρωθῆναι δὲ ὀλίγους. l. 14. ſ. 25.

ſteddily for opportunity, when that large part of the king's line which outflanked him, wheeled to turn his flank. Cyrus then, with ready judgement, choſe the moment of evolution to charge the guard of ſix thouſand, which preceded the king. He routed them, and, according to report, he killed their commander, Artagerſes, with his own hand. The king's immediate guard, and the king himſelf, were thus laid open to view. Stimulated by ambition and revenge at the ſight, and flushed with ſucceſs, he then forgot the duty of the general. While the greater part of his troops, heedleſs of order, purſued the fugitives, he with a ſmall band made a furious charge, broke through to the king, rode at him with his javelin, and wounded him in the breaſt; but immediately received a wound in the face, and, being overpowered, was preſently killed, with eight of his principal officers, who vainly exerted themſelves in his defence. Theſe circumſtances, not within the means of Xenophon's perſonal knowlege, he has related on the authority of Cteſias, a Greek phyſician, then in the ſervice of Artaxerxes, and employed to cure the wound received from Cyrus.

Anab. l. 1. c. 8. ſ. 17.

ſ. 18, 19.

c. 10. ſ. 1. The prince's head and right hand, cut off and carried about, announced his fate to both armies. The right wing and center of the king's army then advanced with alacrity. The left of the prince's, commanded by Ariæus, did not wait the aſſault. They fled, and all the Aſiatic line followed the example; none ſtopping till they reached the preceding day's ſtation. Their camp became the unreſiſting prey of the conqueror.

ſ. 2. A Mileſian girl, of the prince's train, running almoſt naked from his pavilion, reached the Grecian camp, and was among the firſt to communicate alarm there. A Phocæan, who had been much in his favor, and who was admired for the extent of her knowlege and the elegance of her manners, even more than for her perſon, which ſtill in declining youth was beautiful, remained the king's priſoner [9]. The Mileſian found protection from the bravery and ſkill in arms of the ſmall number of her fellowcountrymen, left to guard their camp. It was preſently attacked,

[9] Their ſtory may deſerve this notice, not only as it aſſiſts to mark the manners of the times, but as it aſſiſts to mark the means occurring to the Greeks for knowing what they have related of the Perſians, which ſome modern writers have over-boldly and with little examination controverted.

and

and moſtly plundered; for they were unequal to the defence of its extent; but at length they repulſed the pillagers with much ſlaughter.

Intelligence was carried, nearly at the ſame time, to the king, that the Greeks had routed and were purſuing his left wing, and to the Greeks, that the king's forces were plundering their camp. Succeſs and purſuit were leading them away from each other. Both turned; but the king, inſtead of meeting the Greeks, paſſed them. The Greeks then changed their front, ſo that the river might ſecure their rear. Upon this the king alſo changed his front, as if to meet them. The Greeks advanced with confidence increaſed by the experience of the day; and they were not deceived; for from a greater diſtance than the wing under Tiſſaphernes, the Perſians now fled their aſſault. The Greeks purſued. On a hill, overlooking a village not diſtant, a large body of the Perſian cavalry checked its flight, and formed, as if reſolved to maintain that advantageous ground. No Perſian infantry then remained in ſight; and while the Greeks halted to prepare for attacking the horſe, theſe alſo fled and appeared no more. Anab. l. 1. c. 10. ſ. 3. ſ. 4, 6, 7. ſ. 8, 9.

The ſun was now ſetting, and the Greeks wondered that they had neither ſeen Cyrus, nor received orders from him; confident, nevertheleſs, that, as, with their ſmall numbers unſupported, they remained ſo completely maſters of the field, after ſo little effort, and with almoſt no loſs, he could be employed only by the conſequences of victory. After ſome conſultation whether they ſhould ſend for their tents and neceſſaries, they reſolved rather to return to their camp. Reaching it about dark, they found it ſo far plundered and waſted, that, after having all paſſed the day without refreſhment, moſt were obliged to go to reſt faſting; but ſtill with the ſatisfactory hope that victory had been on their ſide complete. ſ. 10. l. 2. c. 1. ſ. 1.

SECTION

SECTION III.

Return of the Greeks: Treaty with the King: March through Meſopotamia and Media: Circumvention of the Generals.

Anab. l. 2. c. 1. ſ. 2.

AT daybreak the generals met; ſtill wondering that neither orders were come from Cyrus, nor intelligence. It was preſently reſolved to march in queſt of him. By ſunriſe all was ready for moving, when the arrival of two officers, of high rank in the prince's Aſiatic army, occaſioned a pauſe; Glous, ſon of the Egyptian Tamos, admiral of the fleet; and Procles, deſcended from Demaratus, the baniſhed king of Lacedæmon, who attended Xerxes into Greece, and whoſe family injoyed hereditary emoluments and honors from the liberality of the Perſian government. Now firſt the mortifying intelligence was communicated, that Cyrus was no more. It was added, that Ariæus had conducted the flying remains of the Aſiatic army to the ground of the former incampment, where he would wait for the Greeks that day, but on the morrow would certainly proceed for Ionia.

Xen. Anab. ibid. & Hel. l. 3. c. 1. ſ. 4.

Anab. l. 2. c. 1. ſ. 4.

Depreſſing as this was to the hopes of thoſe who had thought fortune, far above any ordinary Grecian ſcale, already their own, from the bounty of a generous prince, raiſed by their ſervices to the poſſeſſion of almoſt countleſs wealth and boundleſs empire, ſtill, looking to their own ſucceſs, and to all appearances around, the Greeks would not immediately give up all their lofty expectations; and they thought they ſaw a reſource in the ſituation of Ariæus himſelf, who had before him, on one ſide, the fear of an ignominious death for his rebellion; on the other the empire, which the ſuperiority of the Grecian arms might give him. Menon, long connected by hoſpitality and familiar intercourſe with Ariæus, offered himſelf for the negotiation; and Glous and Procles did not refuſe to concur in it. At the deſire of Clearchus, the Lacedæmonian Cheiriſophus was joined in the commiſſion, and all preſently departed together.

Meanwhile the victorious Greeks were reduced to the neceſſity of killing their baggage-cattle for food, and breaking up the empty and now uſeleſs waggons

waggons for fire, for which however, with ſome ſatisfaction, they alſo collected Perſian arrows, darts, and wooden ſhields, innumerably ſcattered over the field of battle. They were thus occupied, when, about the middle of the forenoon, arrived ſome perſons, of whom one was a Greek, demanding, in the name of the king and of Tiſſaphernes, to ſpeak with the generals. The Greek was ſoon known to be Phalinus, who held a very honorable ſituation under the ſatrap, to which a reputation for military ſcience had recommended him. Their meſſage imported, that the king required the Greeks to come and ſurrender their arms at his gate; and that on no other condition would he ſhow them favor or mercy. Highly as their eaſy victory had given them to rate the power of their arms, this meſſage threw a ſudden damp on their ſpirits. It brought on the conſideration of their total want of neceſſaries in their preſent ſituation, the length of hoſtile continent, the rivers, mountains, and deſerts to be croſſed to reach their own country, the uncertainty of aſſiſtance from Ariæus, and, wholly deſtitute as they were of cavalry, the extreme difficulty of collecting proviſions in an enemy's country, and the danger of retreat, even from an enemy who might not dare to face them. Such circumſtances force away the veil with which, in ordinary ſituations, men are inabled, as prudence adviſes, to cover their ſentiments. The Arcadian Cleanor, eldeſt of the generals, could not repreſs his indignation. He ſternly replied, they would die before they would ſurrender their arms. Some, on the contrary, ſhowed ſigns of deſpondency; others caſt about for new project. It was recollected that Egypt, in revolt, had been long reſiſting the Perſian arms, and that ſome of the other diſtant provinces were rebellious: it was ſuppoſed the king might be glad of their ſervice, and the greater part were inclined to offer it. The diſcuſſion was long. In the end, the neceſſity of deciſion and the impoſſibility of bringing opinions to agree, ſeem to have produced a general deference to the authority of Clearchus. Politic as bold, he anſwered, in the name of all, 'We 'want our arms: if the king deſires our friendſhip, for his ſervice; if he 'means enmity, for our own ſafety.' Phalinus promiſed to report this anſwer faithfully, and then ſaid he was farther directed to inform them that, while they remained in their preſent ſtation, the king would conſider a truce

Anab. l. 2. c. 1. ſ. 6.

ſ. 14, 15.

a truce as exiſting with them; any movement he ſhould eſteem a meaſure of hoſtility. Clearchus took upon himſelf immediately to reply for all, 'Be it ſo.' 'How then,' ſaid Phalinus, 'truce or war?' 'Truce,' ſaid Clearchus, 'if we ſtay, and war if we move;' nor would he give a more deciſive anſwer.

Anab. l. 2. c. 2. ſ. 1. Soon after the departure of the king's deputies, Proeles and Cheiriſophus returned, leaving Menon with Ariæus. They reported that Ariæus declined the offer of aſſiſtance for pretending to the Perſian throne, alledging that his inferiority of birth to many among the Perſians too effectually excluded him: but that he was deſirous to have the Greeks accompany his march back to Ionia, and he would therefore wait for them in his preſent camp the inſuing night, but would unfailingly proceed next morning.

ſ. 2. Sunſet already approaching, quick deciſion was neceſſary. Some, vainly confident in their experience of ſuperiority in the field, were now for puſhing hoſtilities againſt the king. Clearchus, quick to repreſs equally raſh or deſpondent counſel, evinced the folly of the propoſal by telling them, 'that the king, as he knew by certain intelligence, had paſſed the 'Tigris, and they were totally without means to follow him. Want 'of proviſions then denied their ſtay in their preſent ſtation; and, in fact, 'choice of meaſures was out of queſtion: nothing remained but to march 'back to Ionia; which, tho hazardous and difficult, was not impoſſible. 'Beſides, the ſacrifices augured well to their return, and ill to every other 'meaſure.' This was a deciſive argument. All yielded to it, and Clearchus took upon himſelf to iſſue orders for marching that evening. Neither commiſſion nor election had given him authority over the other generals; but, in this hazardous criſis, all acquieſced under the evident ſuperiority of his talents and experience.

ſ. 3.

The Greeks were now, according to Xenophon's account, by the line of march, reputed the ſhorteſt and beſt, which they had purſued to Meſopotamia, near two thouſand miles from Epheſus in Ionia, whither they wiſhed to return, as the Grecian city, if not abſolutely the neareſt, yet the neareſt that would afford them ready means to proceed all to their ſeveral homes, and perhaps the neareſt that could be reached without even greater difficulties of way. This march had employed them ninety-three days,

days, excluſively of halting days [10]. The order for moving decided that they were at war with the king. If then deſerters could hope for any kind reception, the conſiderations urging to deſert might be powerful. Accordingly three hundred foot, with forty horſe, all Thracians, commanded by a Thracian named Miltocythes, and originally ingaged in the ſervice under Clearchus, deſerted as ſoon as it was dark. Anab. l. 1. c. 2. ſ. 4.

The reſt of the army joined Ariæus about midnight. Immediately the principal officers went to the Perſian general's tent, where the principal Perſian officers were alſo aſſembled. Circumſtances did not admit long conſultation. The Greeks muſt neceſſarily ſubmit themſelves to the guidance of the Perſians. The important object was to eſtabliſh mutual confidence and good faith. For this purpoſe recourſe was had to oaths, rendered more ſolemn and impreſſive by ſacrifice. A boar, a bull, a wolf, and a ram were the victims, in whoſe mingled blood the Grecian officers dipped their ſwords, the Perſian their javelins, as they ſeverally ſwore mutual fidelity and friendſhip. This ceremony being over, Ariæus obſerved that, ſ. 5. to return the way they came, ſeventeen days march through the deſert, unprovided as they were, was impoſſible. He propoſed therefore a more circuitous road, but through a plentiful country, and to begin with forced marches. Thus, he ſaid, danger from the immenſity of the king's numbers would be obviated: for with a great force, he could not overtake them; with a ſmall one he would not dare to attack them. The want of food then being among the moſt preſſing conſiderations, he promiſed a plentiful ſupply at ſome villages, which, if they moved at daybreak, they might reach by ſunſet.

The Greeks aſſenting, at daybreak the combined armies marched. In the afternoon circumſtances were obſerved, very unexpectedly indicating that the king's forces were near. Ariæus was alarmed. Clearchus, always-

[10] The learned author of the geographical diſſertation annexed to Spelman's tranſlation of the Anabaſis, has ſuppoſed ſome exaggeration in Xenophon's account of the diſtance; not without appearance of reaſon, if the ordinary calculation of the Perſian paraſang is applicable univerſally. I cannot however admit the learned author to be equally a good judge, with Xenophon, of the ſpace that an army, like that of Cyrus, was capable of marching in a day, in the countries which he traverſed. I ſhould rather ſuppoſe the paraſang of the Anabaſis generally a computed meaſure, and often decided rather by the time ordinarily employed in travelling it, than by any calculation of ſpace. That Xenophon did not pretend to nice accuracy, indeed, appears from his omiſſion everywhere to notice fractions of ſo large a meaſure as a paraſang.

more confident in his ability to reſiſt, or deter, than to outmarch the king's troops, had nevertheleſs thought it prudent to avoid expreſſing any diſſent from the meaſures propoſed by Ariæus; but nevertheleſs, aware of the importance of ſupporting the opinion univerſally ſpred of the great ſuperiority of the Grecian arms, he reſolved carefully to avoid ſhowing the leaſt appearance of a deſire to avoid action, and therefore continued his march directly to the villages. The king's officers however had judged better than to propoſe reſiſtance to him there. The villages, deſerted by their inhabitants, had been ſtripped of everything portable, ſo that the Greeks, after having paſſed the day faſting, were ſtill without food.

Anab. l. 1. c. 2. ſ. 8.

Men worn with fatigue, want, and diſappointment, are prepared for alarm; and, in the night, a panic, and tumult, its conſequence, pervaded the Grecian camp. Clearchus, after haſty inquiry into the circumſtances, ſent for his herald. A loud voice for proclaiming orders was, it appears, valued in Xenophon's days equally as in Homer's; and, by that quality, Tolmides, an Eleian, acquired fame under Clearchus, in the office in which Stentor became renowned under Agamemnon. The commanding voice of Tolmides having inforced ſilent attention, he proclaimed, in the name of the generals, that any perſon who would diſcover who turned the aſs among the arms [11], ſhould be rewarded with a talent of ſilver, above two hundred pounds ſterling. Nothing could either more readily, or more completely, convince the multitude that their alarm was vain and their generals watchful. Accordingly by this expedient, in its ſimplicity even ridiculous, yet well deſerving notice for its ſingular fitneſs to produce the

[11] A technical phraſe, uſed by Xenophon here, induced me to look to the tranſlators and commentators, for confirmation or correction of the ſenſe I attributed to it. Spelman diſapproves, and I think juſtly, the tranſlations of Leunclavius and Hutchinſon; but I cannot accede to his interpretation; and even the other paſſages of Xenophon which he quotes in confirmation (Anab. l. 2. c. 4. ſ. 8. & l. 3. c. 1. ſ. 3.) are to me additional and powerful proof that he is wrong. To corroborate my opinion I would farther refer to a third paſſage, l. 3. c. 1. ſ. 22. What may, I think, clearly be gathered from all the paſſages put together, is, that there was a place, in the Grecian camp, allotted for the collected arms; and, in front of it a ſpace analogous to the modern parade. The large ſhields and long ſpears of the Greeks would occupy much more room than our firelocks, and an aſs driven among them in the night, whether ſentries or a guard were or were not ſet over them, might likely enough give origin to tumult and alarm. Meerly turning the animal 'into the quarter of the heavy-armed 'men' (as Spelman has, with at leaſt unneceſſary boldneſs, turned the phraſe εἰς τὰ ὅπλα, literally, 'among the arms') would not be in itſelf ſo likely to produce diſturbance.

effect

effect in the moment ſo important, the tumult was preſently calmed, and the night paſſed in quiet.

At daybreak Clearchus called to arms, and the judiciouſneſs of his bold meaſure to puſh on his march toward the king's forces, became ſoon evident. No veſtige of an enemy was to be ſeen, and the ſun was ſcarcely riſen, when perſons came, in the king's name, not, as on the preceding day, demanding the ſurrender of arms, but propoſing negotiation on equal terms. Clearchus was in the moment viewing his parade. Verſed in the Aſiatic temper, he commanded that the Perſians ſhould wait his leiſure; and not till he had arranged his army ſo as to give it the moſt impoſing appearance, admitted them to ſpeak to him in front of his line. They ſaid they came impowered to communicate between the king and the Grecian generals. 'Go then,' ſaid Clearchus, 'and tell the king that we muſt fight 'before we treat; for we are without food; and among the Greeks it is 'held, that to propoſe negotiation is meer inſult from thoſe who deny them 'food.' Anab. l. 2. c. 2. ſ. 9. c. 3. ſ. 1, 2, 3.

Where the king was, the Greeks knew not, and they had no cavalry for exploring. The quick return however of the deputies, with an anſwer to the rough meſſage, proved that he, or ſome great officer authorized to treat in his name, was not diſtant. They ſaid that the king allowed the remonſtrance of Clearchus to be juſt; by which apparently was meant, that it was conſonant to the laws of hoſpitality, acknowleged among civilized nations, and which made indeed the beſt part of the antient law of nations. A truce was then ſolemnly concluded, and guides were appointed to conduct the Grecian army where it might be ſupplied. The country traverſed was ſo divided by deep canals, that the army hardly could have forced their way. Some of theſe were paſſed on permanent bridges; ſome on palm-trees cut for the occaſion. It was indeed ſuſpected to have been the purpoſe of the Perſians to give every poſſible appearance of difficulty to the march. At length however the army reached a village, where its wants were plentifully ſupplied. Corn, dates, a wine drawn from the palm-tree, and a vinegar prepared from that wine, afforded moſt advantageous refreſhment to thoſe who, in that ſultry climate, during three days, had, ſome faſted, and the reſt eaten only the fleſh of animals worn with the ſervice of the baggage. ſ. 4. l. 2. c. 3. ſ. 5. ſ. 8. ſ. 9.

Anab. l. 2. c. 3. ſ. 10. While the army halted here three days, everything, ſays Xenophon, ſeemed to promiſe peace and good faith. Nevertheleſs what he proceeds to report ſeems as if it might have warranted ſuſpicion. Tiſſaphernes with the brother of the reigning queen, and three other Perſians of high rank, attended by a large train, came to confer with the generals. Communi-

ſ. 11. cating by interpreters, Tiſſaphernes ſaid 'he was to demand, in the king's 'name, why the Greeks made war againſt him?' He profeſſed, for himſelf, a regard for their nation, as a neighbour, accuſtomed to intercourſe with them; and he recommended a conciliatory, by which he ſeems to have meant a ſubmiſſive, anſwer; that might inable him to do them the good offices he wiſhed, in the extreme difficulties in which he ſaw them involved.

ſ. 12. The Grecian generals withdrew awhile for conſultation, and then Clearchus reported the anſwer agreed upon. 'In entering into the ſervice 'of Cyrus,' he ſaid, 'they had no thought of war againſt the king; but 'on the contrary ſuppoſed themſelves ſerving him in ſerving the prince. 'Various policy had been uſed to allure them on into Aſſyria; and when 'once ingaged ſo far, choice was no longer in their power; not only gra-'titude for favours received, but the neceſſity of their ſituation bound them 'to the prince. Yet whatever doubt might be entertained concerning 'their paſt views, it was evident they could now have no view to anything 'ſo deſirable for them as to return peaceably home; prepared however 'always to revenge injuries, and always deſirous, to the beſt of their power, 'to requite kindneſſes.'

The Perſians departed to make their report; and on the third day Tiſſaphernes returned. If umbrage was taken at the unbending manner of Clearchus, it was not avowed. On the contrary, generoſity and benignity, on the part of the Perſian king, ſeemed marked in the treaty quickly concluded. It was agreed 'that the Greeks ſhould be faithfully con-'ducted home: that a market ſhould be provided for them on the march: 'that, in failure of the market, they might take their own meaſures for 'ſupplying their reaſonable wants; but, as in a friendly country, with 'the leaſt poſſible injury to the inhabitants.' Oaths were ſolemnly taken, and right hands mutually given, by Tiſſaphernes and the queen's brother, on the king's part, and by the generals and lochages, on the part of the Grecian

Grecian army, in confirmation of this agreement. Tiſſaphernes then, in taking leave, informed the Greeks, that the king had conferred upon him the great command lately held by Cyrus. His journey would, on this account, he ſaid, require the more preparation; but, with the leaſt poſſible delay, he would rejoin them, and be himſelf the conductor of their march. Anab. l. 2. c. 3. ſ. 12. Xen. Hel. l. 3. c. 1. ſ. 2. Anab. l. 2. c. 5. ſ. 2.

Tho the faithleſſneſs of Tiſſaphernes had been abundantly proved, yet the Greeks had confidence in his intereſt to cultivate their friendſhip, and in the honor of the Perſian king; and they flattered themſelves that, diſappointed as their hopes of high fortune were, yet the dark proſpect, which immediately ſucceeded, was intirely done away; that all the dangers of their expedition were ended; and that a ſecure return to their country and families would at leaſt be their ſolace for paſt labors, perils, and apprehenſions. It does not appear that, in the negotiation with the king, any notice was taken of Ariæus, tho he held his ground of incampment near that of the Greeks. But in the mean time he negotiated for himſelf, and ſo ſucceſsfully as to obtain his own complete pardon and that of his followers. Xenophon has not informed us that any faith, plighted or implied, was broken, either by him or by the Greeks; but there ſeems to have been, on their part, at leaſt a deficiency of attention to him. Of courſe he neglected them; inſomuch that public report firſt brought information, uncertain information, that his pardon was obtained. What we gain from the direct teſtimony of Xenophon is, that a coolneſs, before unexperienced, from the Aſiatic army toward the Grecian, followed the firſt rumors of that pardon; and that hence aroſe ſuſpicion and much uneaſineſs among the Greeks, while, more than twenty days, they waited for Tiſſaphernes; inſomuch that they urged their generals to ſtay no longer. Clearchus, himſelf unſatisfied, but provident of the diſtreſs they muſt incur, friendleſs, without guides, and deprived of the aſſiſtance of the cavalry under Ariæus, with difficulty perſuaded them to acquieſce. c. 4. ſ. 1, 2, 3.

This brooding uneaſineſs was at length checked by the arrival of Tiſſaphernes, with Orontas, ſatrap of Armenia, who had lately married the king's daughter, each commanding a numerous army [12]. All then ſ. 4.

[12] Xenophon giving no information, we can only gueſs that Orontas may have been ſon of the perſon of the ſame name, executed in Syria for treachery to Cyrus, and that the ſatrapy of Armenia and the king's daughter may have been the recompence for the ſufferings of the family.

again

again reſumed the appearance of friendſhip and good faith on the part of the principal Perſian officers. The united armies immediately moved for Lower Aſia: the Grecian market was always regularly and plentifully ſupplied, and nothing occurred on which to found complaint. Suſpicion nevertheleſs held among the Greeks, and the appearance of it among the Aſiatics. The Greeks had their peculiar guides allotted for the march: they uſually incamped three or four miles from the Aſiatics; and all communication between the two nations was managed with the precautions uſually taken between avowed enemies. Meanwhile it was obſerved that the forces under Ariæus incamped without any ſeparation from thoſe under the king's officers, or any precaution againſt them. No doubt was then any longer entertained, that the report of his pardon was well founded, for it had not hitherto been confirmed, and hence the ſuſpicion of the Greeks increaſed.

Anab. l. 2. c. 4. ſ. 6. In three days the armies reached the Median wall, a prodigious fortified line, intended, like thoſe of the Romans againſt the Picts, in our own iland, or the far more ſtupendous work of the Chineſe againſt the Tartars, to defend a whole country. It was built of brick, twenty feet in thickneſs, a hundred in height, and ſaid to extend ſeventy miles. Animoſity had now grown to ſuch a height between the Greeks and Aſiatics, that the foraging parties had more than once come to blows.

ſ. 7. In two days more, after croſſing two vaſt canals, the armies arrived at Sitacë, a large town within two miles of the Tigris. Clearchus, uneaſy at the growing diſſentions, had nevertheleſs conſidered them hitherto as the meer effuſions of national animoſity, and the indiſcretion of individuals in inferior ſtations. Here firſt the meaſures of the Perſian generals gave him ſome alarm. It was afterward diſcovered to have been their concerted purpoſe to excite alarm, but from a motive, not of enmity, but meerly of jealouſy. Sitacë was ſituated in an iland, ſingularly fruitful, highly cultivated, and ſo defended by the ſurrounding waters of the river and canals, that, as the numerous population conſiſted, in very large proportion, of unarmed ſlaves, if the Greeks, aware of its advantages, had choſen to eſtabliſh themſelves there, it was ſuppoſed they might have maintained the poſſeſſion againſt the whole force of the empire. The Greeks however,

ſ. 12, 13. having no ſuch view, quietly croſſed the Tigris next morning, under the guidance

guidance of their appointed conductors, on a bridge ſupported by thirty-ſeven boats. The apprehenſions of the Perſians being thus relieved, the ſuſpicious conduct ceaſed, to which they had given occaſion.

Nothing remarkable occurred then during a march of four days, in which the boundary of Meſopotamia was croſſed, and the armies, entering Media, ſoon reached Opis, a large town, where a numerous army, collected for the war with Cyrus, was waiting under the command of a baſtard brother of the king. Beyond Opis they preſently entered a deſert, through which the march was proſecuted ſix days without any cultivated land in ſight. They arrived then at ſome villages belonging to Paryſatis, the queen-mother, who, as the friend of Cyrus, ſeems to have been conſidered as the enemy of the king. Tiſſaphernes gratified the Greeks with permiſſion to plunder her villages; expreſſly, however, reſerving the ſlaves, perhaps the moſt valuable part of the moveable property, and excepting a few officers of the queen's, poſſibly the only deſcription of inhabitants. A march then followed, of five days more through a deſert, with the Tigris always near on the left; after which, the armies reaching a more plentiful country, watered by the Zabatas, a halt of three days was allowed for refreſhment.

Anab. l. 2. c. 4. ſ. 15.

ſ. 18.

In this leiſure, the mutual ill-will of the Greeks and Perſians more than ever ſhowing itſelf, gave much uneaſineſs to Clearchus; who nevertheleſs, with the moſt attentive obſervation, could diſcover neither anything indicating that the Perſian generals had any deſign againſt the Greeks, nor any probable cauſe for thoſe pointed marks of jealouſy among the Perſians, without excepting the generals, which had principally occaſioned the growing animoſity of the Greeks againſt them. He was the more uneaſy, becauſe he was not without ſuſpicion of treacherous conduct among ſome within his own army. Menon, intriguing, faithleſs, and ambitious in the higheſt degree, it was well known, ill brooked the ſuperiority which the other generals readily allowed to the talents, experience, and years of Clearchus, and to the dignity of the Lacedæmonian name. Some practices for withdrawing the affection and reſpect of the army from Clearchus were notorious. Under theſe circumſtances, the intimacy of Menon with Ariæus excited jealouſy; which was inhanced by the knowlege that he had been intro-

c. 5. ſ. 1, 2.

duced

duced by Ariæus to Tiſſaphernes, while the circumſtances and the reſult of the meeting were unknown.

Preſſed by all theſe conſiderations, Clearchus reſolved to deſire himſelf a conference with Tiſſaphernes. The requeſt was immediately granted. Anab. l. 2. c. 5. ſ. 4. Clearchus was received with the utmoſt apparent cordiality. The ſatrap made the moſt ſpecious profeſſion of a deſire, from political motives, to cultivate an intereſt with the Greeks. Clearchus gave him credit, and was altogether ſo ſatisfied with the explanation received, that his only remaining anxiety was to be aſſured of the ſecret enemy who had excited the late miſunderſtanding. Tiſſaphernes promiſed that, if all the Grecian generals and lochages would come together to witneſs what paſſed, he would declare the calumniator. Clearchus aſſented: Tiſſaphernes aſked him to ſupper. The circumſtance of eating together was held, equally among the Greeks and Perſians of old, as by the Arabs of modern times, to bind friendſhip by a ſacred tie; and the evening paſſed with every appearance of mutual ſatisfaction.

Next morning Clearchus aſſembled the principal Grecian officers, and related his communication with the ſatrap. Objections were ſtrongly ſtated ſ. 6. to his propoſal, for riſking all the generals and lochages together in the barbarian camp, on the faith of a man of ſuch experienced perfidy as Tiſſaphernes. Clearchus however ſo vehemently urged it, expreſſing ſuch confidence, not in the ſatrap's character, but in the intereſt of the Perſian c. 4. ſ. 3. court to cultivate the friendſhip of the Greeks, and ſuch ſuſpicion of thoſe who ſhould fear to undergo that teſt of their fidelity to the common cauſe of the Grecian army, that at length he prevailed. Four of the generals, ſ. 7. Menon, Proxenus, Agias, and Socrates, went with him, and twenty lochages, whom we may reckon of the rank of colonels, or, at leaſt, of field-officers. About two hundred inferior officers and ſoldiers, incited by curioſity, followed under pretence of marketing. On their arrival at Tiſſaphernes's tent, the generals were immediately admitted; the others waited without. A ſignal was obſerved, on which the generals were ſeized, thoſe without the tent, who had followed them, were maſſacred, and a body of horſe, iſſuing from the camp, extended the ſlaughter to all belonging to the Grecian army, free and ſlave, that could be found about the plain.

What

What paſſed in the Perſian camp was totally unknown in the Grecian; when the violence of the horſe, clearly ſeen, excited alarm and aſtoniſhment. An Arcadian, of thoſe who had followed the generals, eſcaping ſeverely wounded, firſt gave intelligence of what had paſſed about the tent of Tiſſaphernes. All then ran to arms, expecting immediate aſſault upon the camp. Fortunately that was too bold a meaſure for thoſe who directed the Perſian operations. A brother of Tiſſaphernes, with Ariæus, Artaozus, and Mithradates, three of the moſt confidential friends of Cyrus, eſcorted by only about three hundred horſe, approached, and communicated a requiſition for the remaining generals and lochages to come out and receive a meſſage from the king. The Lacedæmonian Cheiriſophus was accidentally abſent with a foraging party. The Arcadians, Cleanor of Orchomenus, and Sophænetus of Stymphalia, alone of the generals remained within the camp. They obeyed the requiſition, ſo far as to go out; and Xenophon, anxious for news of his friend Proxenus, accompanied them; but they advanced cautiouſly, and ſtopped as ſoon as within hearing. Ariæus, then addreſſing them, ſaid 'that Clearchus, having been convicted of violating the treaty, 'to which he had ſworn, had been juſtly puniſhed with death: that 'Proxenus and Menon, who had informed againſt him, were treated 'with honor: but that the king required of the Greeks to ſurrender their 'arms, which were truly his, ſince they had belonged to Cyrus, his 'ſubject[13].'

Cleanor, an honeſt old ſoldier, and no politician, without at all conſidering what the preſſing intereſts of the moment required, uſeleſſly vented his juſt indignation. 'Deceit,' he ſaid, 'perjury, every crime and every 'baſeneſs, from Tiſſaphernes might have been expected, but from the friends 'of Cyrus not.' Ariæus, in reply, inſiſted upon the diſcovered treachery of Clearchus. Xenophon, without command, and without a character in

[13] — Τοῦ ἐκείνου δούλου. Spelman, tranſlating this 'his ſubject,' has nevertheleſs ſaid in a note, 'literally, his ſlave.' Verbal criticiſm is not generally the hiſtorian's buſineſs, but where an important political diſtinction is in queſtion, it may come eſſentially within his duty. The Greek word appropriated to ſignify ſtrictly a ſlave, was Ἀνδράποδον. Δούλος was of a more extenſive ſignification, and we have no term exactly correſponding. It meant a ſubject, a ſervant; and as a ſlave is both a ſubject and a ſervant, ſlaves were included within its more extended meaning.

the army but that of the friend of Proxenus, ſeeing apparently that no perſon in authority was capable of managing the conference to any advantage, ventured, in ſuch preſſing circumſtances, to ſpeak. 'Proxenus and 'Menon,' he ſaid, 'it was obſerved by Ariæus, had deſerved highly of 'the Perſians. Thoſe generals therefore ſhould be immediately ſent back 'to the Grecian camp, and their advice would decide what the Greeks 'ſhould do.' The Perſians appeared at a loſs for a reply to this propoſition: they conſulted long among themſelves, and then without giving any anſwer, withdrew to their own camp.

It ſeems to have been long unknown to the Greeks what was the fate of their generals; nor has Xenophon ſaid how the account was at length obtained, which he has given as certain. But we have ſuch aſſurance of perſons of their nation being employed in various ways about the Perſian court, and in the ſervice of the ſatraps, that the eaſy poſſibility of juſt intelligence reaching them is obvious. According to Xenophon's report the generals were all conducted alive into the king's preſence, and, except Menon, all ſoon after beheaded; which among the Greeks and Perſians, as with us, was eſteemed the moſt honorable mode of execution. Menon was kept in wretched confinement a full year, and then executed as an ordinary malefactor.

Anab. l. 2. c. 6. l. 1.

f. 16.

This account of the conduct of the Perſian government, reſting on the authority of only one Grecian hiſtorian, may perhaps, to ſome, appear not to deſerve full credit. But Xenophon is, in himſelf, no mean authority. Had his friend Proxenus ſurvived, we might indeed have ſuſpected him of ſome partiality. Had Clearchus ſurvived, whom evidently he reſpected highly, we might have ſuſpected him of ſome partiality. But, in fact, the more he could fix blame upon thoſe who were gone, the more credit would attach to the principal ſurvivors, and particularly to himſelf. In the progreſs of the narrative he ſtrongly evinces his impartiality; and we find throughout ſuch a conſonancy to well-atteſted facts, and well-atteſted characters, national and individual, that, tho poſſibly an honeſt Perſian writer might have given a different color to ſome circumſtances, the whole ſeems to have every claim to credit that ſuch a narrative can in itſelf poſſeſs.

If

If then we ſeek the motives for conduct ſo nefarious and ſo baſe in the Perſian government, we may perhaps find them in the principles of oriental policy, ſtill in vigor in the ſame countries; or we may find them in the words attributed by Xenophon to the Greek ſoldiers, in their firſt uneaſineſs under the delay of their return, while they waited for Tiſſaphernes, after the concluſion of the treaty with them in the king's name: 'It is rea- 'ſonable,' they ſaid, 'to ſuppoſe that our deſtruction muſt be beyond all 'things the king's wiſh; as a circumſtance more than all others likely 'to deter the Greeks from future ingagements, like ours, in conſpiracy 'againſt his throne. It is indeed impoſſible he can be pleaſed that we 'ſhould go to relate in Greece, how our ſmall force overcame his im- 'menſe armies, at his very gates, and returned, in ſcorn of his power.' It would however be likely to occur, in the Perſian councils, that to attack the Greeks and Ariæus united, muſt be hazardous; but to divide them would probably not be difficult. If Ariæus was to be puniſhed, the Greeks muſt be gained; but if Ariæus might be pardoned, the Greeks might be deſtroyed. Poſſibly the intereſt that Ariæus poſſeſſed, or by intrigue found means to acquire, among men in power and confidence, more than any true policy, at length decided the reſolution. But, from the moment that Ariæus obtained his pardon, the purpoſe of the Perſian court ſeems to have been, to lead the Greeks where the hazardous attempt to deſtroy them might be made with the leaſt riſk to the capital, and its immediate neighborhood.

Anab. l. 2. c. 4. ſ. 2.

SECTION IV.

Return of the Greeks. Election of new Generals; Grecian Military Law: Paſſage of Mount Taurus; March through Armenia: Arrival at Trapezus.

IN the Grecian army, collected from almoſt all the numerous little republics of the nation, the ſyſtem of ſubordination was very incomplete. Every general held the independent command of the troops himſelf had raiſed; and no order of ſucceſſion was eſtabliſhed; but vacancies, through all the ranks, were to be ſupplied by election. Eight officers had borne the title of general; but Clearchus only had poſſeſſed the qualifications. In him alone was united extenſive experience with great talents. Diligent in the care of an army, in quarters or in camp, and ready in every emergency of the field, he was truly a ſuperior man: the reſt Xenophon has not ſcrupled to declare unequal to their ſituation.

Anab. l. 2. c. 6. ſ. 1—8.

c. 2. ſ. 3.

Called then by no poſitive duty, warranted by no acknowleged ſuperiority, and diffident of themſelves, the generals remaining in the camp took no lead, while dejection and diſmay pervaded the army. On that evening, ſays the eyewitneſs hiſtorian, few attended the parade[14], few fires were lighted, many touched no food, many would not even go to their tents, but threw themſelves on the ground where they happened to be, to paſs a ſleepleſs night, ruminating on their diſconſolate circumſtances. Xenophon had, at this time, no rank in the army: he was, according to his own phraſe, neither officer nor ſoldier. Having gone, at the invitation of Proxenus, from Athens to Sardis, on his arrival he found the army on

l. 3. c. 1. ſ. 3.

ſ. 4.

[14] Ἐπὶ δὲ τὰ ὅπλα πολλοὶ οὐχ ἦλθον. This is evidently a military technical phraſe. It indicates that, in the ordinary practice of the Grecian ſervice, the ſoldiers were aſſembled ἐπὶ τὰ ὅπλα, at leaſt once a day. What the preciſe meaning of the phraſe ἐπὶ τὰ ὅπλα was, we cannot know. It may have been a ſimple roll-call at the place where the arms were depoſited: it may have been an inſpection of arms: but it ſeems evidently to have been ſomething like the modern parade. The reader diſpoſed to critical inquiry on the ſubject may compare the paſſage with thoſe quoted in note [11] of the preceding ſection. He may alſo conſult Spelman; whoſe verſion of the paſſage, however, and notes upon it, I muſt own I cannot approve.

the

the point of marching eaſtward. He was immediately introduced to Cyrus, who, with condeſcending civility, joined his Theban friend in preſſing him to accompany them in the expedition, then pretended againſt the Peiſidians. When, at length in Cilicia, the reäl object was no longer doubted, Xenophon was one of the many, as himſelf confeſſes, who wiſhed, but were aſhamed, to withdraw themſelves; and he had proceeded with the army, meerly as a volunteer, the friend of Proxenus. The duty of a ſoldier was however not new to him; as, in the latter years of the Peloponneſian war, he was of age for that ſervice from which no Athenian was exempted. If he had never held command, he had however been diligent in ſtudy to prepare himſelf for it, and he had made large uſe of great opportunities for obſervation.

Under theſe circumſtances Xenophon partook largely in the grief and anxiety excited in the army by the circumvention of the generals, and by the manifeſtation of determined hoſtility, hoſtility knowing neither meaſure nor mercy, on the part of the Perſians. Without duty himſelf, his attention was alive to obſerve what meaſures would be taken by the remaining generals; and with deep concern he ſaw, that, inſtead of exertion increaſed, in proportion to the preſſure of the occaſion, their remiſſneſs amounted almoſt to a dereliction of command. Attack was univerſally expected with daylight; and yet no council held, no orders given, preparation of no kind made. From the common intereſts of the army, his conſideration then turned to that part of it with which he had been more particularly connected, and which, by the loſs of his friend, remained without a head. Holding no rank, he was, by no rule of Grecian ſervice, excluded from aſpiring to any rank. Circumſtances not invited only, but preſſed him to come forward: his youth alone deterred him. After much conſideration and reconſideration, ſtrongly impreſſed with the importance of deciſion, and ſtill doubting, a dream at length determined him. His works indeed abound with teſtimonies to his reſpect for the foreboding of dreams, and for the whole of the reputed ſcience of augury. Rouſed, then, according to his own report, by a dream, in conformity to its admonition, early in the night he ſprung from his bed, and called together the lochages of the troops which had ſerved under Proxenus. On their aſſembling, he obſerved to them what

Anab. l. 3. c. 1. ſ. 9, 10.

ſ. 11—22.

what remiſſneſs pervaded the army, without excepting the remaining generals; what imminent and extreme danger threatened; and how urgent the neceſſity for immediately chuſing a ſucceſſor to their own loſt commander. For himſelf, he ſaid, hitherto without a character in the army, in the preſent emergency he was ready to do his beſt in any ſituation, whether in command or in obedience, in which they might think he would be moſt uſeful: but with regard to the proſpect before them, it depended upon themſelves to make it good or bad; and, however juſt the melancholy, in the moment pervading the army, he was confident that vigor and prudence united might bear them through all oppoſing difficulties. He then ſtated the grounds of his confidence, and, at the concluſion of his ſpeech, the general wiſh was expreſſed, that Xenophon would take the command. One lochage only avowed his diſſent; adding his opinion, that they ought at once to throw themſelves on the king's mercy, as the only reſource affording a reaſonable hope. 'The king's mercy!' replied Xenophon, indignantly, 'you may judge of it from the tranſactions of yeſterday. 'Your own power to defend yourſelves has never yet failed you. The man 'who can make ſo baſe a propoſal, inſtead of holding command, ſhould 'not be allowed even to bear arms: he is fit only to carry the baggage; 'he is a diſgrace to the Grecian name.' 'He is no Greek,' replied immediately an Arcadian lochage, Agaſias of Stymphalia; 'tho his ſpeech 'is Bœotian, I have ſeen his ears bored like a Lydian's.' The ſpirit of the meeting was rouſed; the lochage's ears were examined; they were found to be as Agaſias ſaid, and he was immediately deprived of his rank.

Beſide what is more directly indicated, this remarkable tranſaction ſeems to offer, for the attentive obſerver, ſome curious information. How a Lacedæmonian army, or how an army of Athenian citizens was compoſed, is little marked by it; but birth, connections, and education, appear to have given great advantages in an army compoſed like that under Cyrus. Among the officers who ſerved under Proxenus, evidently none had thoſe advantages in a degree to inable them to aſpire to the chief command. Neither Xenophon nor any early writer has ſaid it, and yet it ſeems clearly to reſult from Xenophon's account, that his rank, derived from birth and connections, at leaſt approached that of his Theban friend. It ſeems very little likely that the ſuperiority of his talents and education alone would have procured him that inſtantaneous elevation, by the common voice of the

the officers, from a ſituation of no command, to the command of them all. But where birth and connections are evidently ſuperior, the ſuperiority of talents and education are leſs invidious. Deference, which would not be readily paid to either an accidental, or a natural, or an artificial ſuperiority alone, will be more willingly conceded to the three united.

The appointment, however, of a head, facilitated the means of united exertion to the officers of that diviſion of the army, and this was an important ſtep toward the reſtoration of order and energy through the whole. An immediate meeting of all the generals and lochages was deſired, and, toward midnight, they aſſembled, in number about a hundred. Hieronymus of Elis, eldeſt lochage of the troops which had ſerved under Proxenus, introduced Xenophon, as general elect of thoſe troops; and as the meeting had originated from them, it was his part to open the buſineſs. He animadverted upon the danger of leaving the ſoldiers to ruminate upon what was alarming and diſconſolate in their circumſtances, and upon the advantage of that animation, which action, or a view to action, only can ſupport. He urged the immediate election of ſucceſſors to the loſt generals, as a matter of firſt neceſſity; he declared his opinion, that confidence ſhould be wholly refuſed to the Perſians; and he concluded with explaining, in the ſame ſtrain of incouraging eloquence, as before to the officers of Proxenus, his ground for hoping, that vigorous exertion, united with prudent caution, would carry them happily and glorioufly through the difficulties at preſent ſo threatening. When he concluded, the Lacedæmonian Cheiriſophus riſing, ſaid, 'He had before known no more of Xenophon 'than juſt that he was an Athenian; but he nevertheleſs intirely approved 'all the ſentiments he had declared, and the propoſitions he had offered.' This was deciſive for the meeting, and they proceeded immediately to the election of generals. What intereſt or what views guided the choice does not appear. Timaſion of Dardanum, in Troas, was ſubſtituted for Clearchus; Phileſius and Xanthicles, Achaians, for Menon and Socrates; Cleanor, of Orchomenus in Arcadia, for Agaſias; and Xenophon was confirmed in the ſucceſſion to Proxenus.

Anab. l. 3. c. 1. ſ. 23.

ſ. 32.

At daybreak the troops were aſſembled, and Cheiriſophus, Cleanor, and Xenophon ſucceſſively addreſſed them. An accident, in itſelf even ridiculous, through the importance attributed to it by Grecian ſuperſtition, aſſiſted not a little to infuſe incouragement. Xenophon was ſpeaking of

c. 2. ſ. 1—5.

that

that favor from the gods, which a righteous cauſe intitled them to hope for againſt a perjured enemy, when ſomebody ſneezed. Immediately the general voice addreſſed ejaculations to protecting Jupiter, whoſe omen it was ſuppoſed to be[15]. A ſacrifice to the god was then propoſed; a univerſal ſhout declared approbation; and the whole army, in one chorus, ſang the pæan.

Thus was a turn fortunately given, through the army, from diſmay and deſpondency to hope and cheerfulneſs. Among the arguments, which the generals then gladly ſeized to improve the happy impreſſion, one, which the circumſtances offered, ſpoke home to the minds of ſoldiers, commonly little provident of diſtant good or evil, but intent upon preſent wants and near injoyments. The means of many to profit from that market which, according to treaty, had been hitherto provided, were nearly exhauſted; and all theſe heard with joy, that their ſwords might ſupply the deficiency of their purſes; that, in the rich country they were to traverſe, they might thenceforward take, as from enemies, whatever they could maſter. Nevertheleſs it being highly expedient to lighten the march, as much as poſſible, at the inſtance of Xenophon they cheerfully ſubmitted to burn their waggons and tents. They heard the ſame young general with careful attention, while he obſerved, that the enemy had juſt given them a leſſon of the utmoſt importance, in ſhowing that he dared not openly attack them, till he had deprived them of their generals. Thus he had manifeſted his conviction of the ineſtimable value of the Grecian diſcipline; and hence it followed, that it behoved the army to be even more ſtrictly obedient, as it certainly was the duty of the generals to be more watchfully careful, than at any former time. It was then unanimouſly voted, that any diſobedience to lawful commands ſhould be inſtantly puniſhed, and that it ſhould be the bounden duty of all preſent, to ſupport the commanding officer upon the ſpot, in the infliction of puniſhment. This vote, and the want of ſuch a vote, concur with all other remaining teſtimony, to mark the deficiency of the Greek military penal law; which, at the ſame time, was very lax and very arbitrary.

Anab. l. 3. c. 1. ſ. 13. & c. 2. ſ. 12.

c. 2. ſ. 17—20.

[15] We ſhould ſcarcely have looked to Greece for the origin of the popular practice in England, of exclaiming 'God bleſs you!' when a perſon ſneezes. Popular cuſtoms indeed, often very antient, often very widely diffuſed, often ſimilar and yet of different origin, can ſeldom, with any certainty, be traced to their origin. Were it worth while however, it might perhaps be not difficult to ſhow a probability, that the cuſtom of ejaculating a bleſſing on perſons ſneezing, came to England from Greece.

It

It ſeems not to have been at all in view to appoint a commander-in-chief. Xenophon, evidently, felt the aſcendancy, which eloquence, not leaſt among his ſuperior talents, gave him, in the council of officers, or in the council of the army at large. As youngeſt among the generals, and ſtill more perhaps, as an Athenian, he could not aſpire to the oſtenſible command-in-chief; but by the lead which was conceded to his abilities in council, he could in a great degree hold the effectual command. Others, conſcious of deficiency, avoiding to urge their advice, he recommended, That the order of march ſhould be a hollow ſquare, with the baggage, now reduced to a ſmall compaſs, in the center; that the leading diviſion ſhould be committed to Cheiriſophus, in virtue of his dignity as a Lacedæmonian; that Timaſion with himſelf, the two youngeſt generals, ſhould command the rear, and the older generals the flanks. This was approved and ratified.

Order and energy being thus reſtored to the army, the waggons and tents, with whatever baggage could by any means be ſpared, were burnt, conformably to the reſolution taken. All was then arranged for the march, and the army was on the point of moving, when Mithradates, approaching with an eſcort of only thirty horſe, deſired to ſpeak with the generals. His diſcourſe was begun with expreſſions of apprehenſion for himſelf, on account of his known attachment to Cyrus, and of friendſhip for the Grecks, undiminiſhed by events; but the tenor of it ſoon ſhowed that his purpoſe was to diſcover how far the Grecian generals were firm in any intention of oppoſition to the king, and to perſuade them, if poſſible, quietly to ſurrender themſelves. Suſpicion being thus excited, and his attendants being carefully obſerved, there was ſeen among them a known confident of Tiſſaphernes, upon which the conference was abruptly ended. Anab. l. 3. c. 3. ſ. 1.

Time however had been thus ſo waſted, that it was midday before the Grecian army moved, and ſoon after Mithradates again appeared, at the head of about two hundred horſe, and four hundred foot, all ſlingers and bowmen. He approached, as if his purpoſe was friendly; but preſently a diſcharge of arrows and ſtones demonſtrated his perfidy. His cavalry carried bows, which they diſcharged equally retreating as ſtanding; and the Cretan bows in the Grecian army were found ſo inferior in length of ſhot, as to be totally inefficacious. A purſuit, attempted by Xenophon, with the whole rear ſ. 5—8.

diviſion, was equally bootleſs. At the end of three miles the Greeks reached a village, where, according to their original purpoſe, they halted for the night; but the annoyance received in ſo ſhort a march, from ſo ſmall a force, was ſuch, that deſpondency again pervaded the army.

Anab. l. 3. c. 3. ſ. 9—12.

The attempt to purſue, which had had no other effect than to retard the progreſs of the army, and prolong the enemy's opportunity, was ſeverely blamed by Cheiriſophus, and the other older generals. Xenophon acknowleged his error; 'whence however,' he ſaid, 'advantage might be derived; 'for it marked the meaſures neceſſary for the future quiet of the march. Pur- 'ſuit with the heavy-armed, and ſhots from the Cretan bows, had been found 'equally unavailing. But there were Rhodians in the army, of whom many, 'he underſtood, were expert ſlingers, whoſe ſlings, formed to throw leaden 'bullets, would carry twice as far as the Perſian, accommodated for ſtones 'as large as the hand would graſp. There were alſo horſes, ſome his own, 'ſome which had belonged to Clearchus, and many employed in carrying 'the baggage. If the fitteſt among all theſe were mounted by men practiſed 'in the cavalry ſervice, poſſibly the enemy might hereafter be leſs ſecure 'in flight.' In purſuance of this admonition, a body of two hundred ſlingers was formed that evening; and next morning fifty horſe were equipped, and put under the command of Lycius, an Athenian.

ſ. 4.

During the night Nicarchus, an Arcadian lochage, deſerted, and carried about twenty men with him. Allurement, which the conferences had afforded opportunity for the Perſians to hold out, was ſuppoſed to have led to this. It was, in conſequence, reſolved by the generals to allow no more conferences, nor even to admit a meſſage from the enemy; in the perſuaſion, derived from the various acts of treachery experienced, that their beſt ſecurity depended upon thus giving war its moſt hideous aſpect, and offering themſelves for its moſt cruel operation.

l. 3. c. 4. ſ. 1—3.

Halting then a day, to make the equipment of the cavalry and ſlingers more complete, they moved next morning earlier than uſual. They had already croſſed a bottom, where they had expected attack, when Mithradates appeared on the height behind them, with about a thouſand horſe, and four thouſand ſlingers and bowmen. According to accounts, which Xenophon believed, he had promiſed Tiſſaphernes that, with this force, he would compel them to ſurrender. Why the Perſians employed ſuch

ſmall

ſmall portions only of their numbers, in theſe firſt aſſaults upon the Greeks, not directly ſtated by Xenophon, may be gathered from circumſtances on various occaſions related by him. The Grecian charge was ſo dreaded, that it would probably not have been eaſy to lead their greateſt multitudes near enough to the phalanx, even to diſcharge miſſile weapons with effect, unleſs the means of haſty retreat were obvious; which numbers would of themſelves impede. The purpoſe therefore being, by deſultory annoyance, without the riſk of a battle, to bring the Greeks to ſurrender, trial had been firſt made with a very ſmall force; and the ſucceſs had probably been beyond expectation. The inferiority of the Greek miſſile weapons, the inability of the heavy-armed for rapid purſuit, and the power of a very ſmall force to give great annoyance, had been ſo experienced, that Mithradates, while he calculated his preſent numbers to be the beſt proportion for his purpoſe, might perhaps not unreaſonably have ſuppoſed them equal to it. He had paſſed the bottom in purſuit of the Greeks, and was already within Perſian bowſhot, when the newly-formed Grecian cavalry advanced againſt him. Contemptible as their numbers alone might have appeared, they were rendered formidable by the body of the targeteers following them running, and the whole heavy-armed phalanx moving ſteddily in ſupport of theſe. The Perſians took to inconſiderate flight; much ſlaughter was made of their infantry; and, what the Greeks ſeem to have eſteemed a more important circumſtance, eighteen horſe, unable to diſengage themſelves from the bottom, were made priſoners. The march was then proſecuted without farther diſturbance during that day, and the army took its quarters for the night in a large deſerted town, which Xenophon calls Lariſſa, ſurrounded by a brick wall twenty-five feet thick and a hundred high, raiſed on a baſement of ſtone [15]. Anab. l. 3. c. 4. ſ. 4.

[15] The name of a town in Media, written exactly like the name of a principal city in Theſſaly, a name familiar in Greece, has excited ſurprize and inquiry. The conjecture of Bochart, approved by Le Clerc, Hutchinſon and Spelman, is at leaſt ingenious, and may be true. The name Lariſſa, tho Greek in form, ſeems clearly not of Grecian origin. Strabo and Stephanus mention ſeveral towns, in different countries, which by the Greeks were called Lariſſa, but they take no notice of Lariſſa in Media. Bochart ſuppoſes that the town to which Xenophon has here attributed that name, was the town ſpoken of by Moſes, in Geneſis (c. 10. v. 12.) where he ſays, *Aſhur built Reſen, between Niniveh and Calah; the ſame is a great city.* The ſituation, he obſerves, as well as the ſize, agrees, and the change in the name was obvious for men catching Aſſyrian ſounds with Grecian ears; for if the Greeks aſked, Of what town thoſe were the ruins? an Aſſyrian would anſwer

Anab. l. 3. c. 4. l. 6.

Next day, by a march of above twenty miles, the army reached another deſerted town, ſurrounded by a ſtill more extraordinary fortification. The wall, fifty feet thick, was a hundred and fifty high; of which the lower third was, at leaſt, faced with ſquared ſtone; the reſt was completed with brick. The circuit was above twenty miles; the name Meſpila. Both theſe Median towns had been depopulated, ſince the transfer of the empire to the Perſians [16].

ſ. 7.

On the day following, appearances ſeemed to announce that, as the attempts with a ſmall body, to bring the Greeks to ſurrender, had failed, it was reſolved to exert againſt them the united ſtrength of the formidable numbers which the Perſian power could ſo readily command. A very large army came in ſight, conſiſting of the troops of Ariæus, of Orontas, and of the king's natural brother, with a detachment of the king's own army under Tiſſaphernes, and the whole of the ſatrap's large eſcort of cavalry. They followed the march, and preſſing at the ſame time on the rear and both flanks of the army, they plied miſſile weapons. But the Greeks had the ſatisfaction to find, not only that they dared not charge with hand-arms [17], but that when the effect of the Rhodian ſlings had been a little experienced, carrying farther than moſt of the Perſian bows,

ſ. 8.

and the Greek bowmen, uſing the Scythian manner of drawing (which Xenophon has not explained) gave more efficacy than before to their ſhots, Tiſſaphernes withdrew haſtily to a ſafe diſtance, and his example was as a

anſwer *Le-Reſen*, of Reſen. Many of the Greek names about the Archipelago, have, in late ages, we know, been corrupted by a miſtake exactly analogous.

Cloſe to Lariſſa Xenophon deſcribes a pyramid, very inferior in ſize to thoſe remaining in Egypt, and differing much in proportions, being about one hundred feet ſquare at the baſe, and two hundred high. The comparatively very ſmall, but ſtill reälly large and coſtly ſtructure, the tomb of Caius Sextius, at Rome, approaches, in its proportions, to the character of the Median pyramid.

[16] The hiſtory of theſe countries is ſo uncertainly known, that the attempt were equally vain to reconcile Xenophon's account of Lariſſa and Meſpila with that which he gives, in the Cyropædeia, of the peaceful ſucceſſion of Cyrus to the Median kingdom in right of his mother, or to draw from it any proof in favor of Herodotus, who ſays that he acquired Media by conqueſt. I will however juſt obſerve, that it may have been of importance to the Median monarchs to ſupport at a great expence theſe towns, fortified, with ſuch aſtoniſhing labor, on the border of the deſert againſt Aſſyria, while Aſſyria was the moſt formidable neighbour to Media; and, when all was brought under one empire by Cyrus, the diſcontinuance meerly of the former attention, may have gone far to produce their fall.

[17] This is the able general Lloyd's term for what, as he obſerves, the French, whoſe affected phraſes have in ſuch abundance been aukwardly, ignorantly, and affectedly obtruded upon our military vocabulary, call *armes blanches*.

command

command to the whole army. The Perſians followed, during the reſt of the day, without at all preſſing the Greeks, and when theſe halted near ſome villages to incamp, they retired.

The circumſtances of this day ſeem to furniſh the reaſon why the Perſian generals choſe, and judiciouſly choſe, to ſend, at firſt, ſo ſmall a portion of their numbers to harraſs the Grecian march. The Perſian diſcipline was ſo deficient, that increaſe of numbers did not give proportional increaſe of force. The thickened ſhower of miſſile weapons ſtill fell with little effect among the looſe order of the Greek light-armed; whilſt theſe turned upon the Perſians their own numberleſs arrows; and, in the crowded multitude, almoſt deſtitute of defenſive armour, ſcarcely a ſhot failed of effect. Anab. l. 3. c. 4. ſ. 8—10.

Fortunately for the Greeks, the Perſians had ſo expected, by force or terror, to ſtop their march, that ſcarcely any meaſures were taken for, what would moſt effectually have ſtopped them, the removal of neceſſaries. In villages through which they had already paſſed, prepared guts, fit for ſlings, had been found, and lead for bullets; and, in thoſe where they now arrived, an abundant ſupply of corn. Halting therefore a day, they marched again on the morrow; when Tiſſaphernes again followed, watching opportunity of advantage, and endeavoring to harraſs; but from ſo ſafe a diſtance, that little diſturbance was given.

The remiſſneſs of the Perſians gave opportunity for the Greek generals to ſee, without in any conſiderable degree feeling, the defects of their own order of march. They had found it ſubject to dangerous hurry and derangement, when, in preſence of the enemy, bridges, or any narrows were to be paſſed; an inconvenience, which Xenophon's account ſhows to have ariſen, in great degree, from the deficiency of the Greek tactics of the age. The generals however took the beſt meaſure, perhaps that their circumſtances would admit, for obviating ill conſequences, by appointing a picket of ſix hundred men, formed in ſix diviſions, whoſe office, on ſuch occaſions, was to protect the rear, and at other times to be ready for any emergency[18]. ſ. 11—14.

In.

[18] The paſſage of Xenophon, whence this has been abbreviated, has puzzled tranſlators, and exerciſed the ingenuity of critics, literary and military. No interpretation of it that has fallen in

Anab. l. 3. c. 4. ſ. 15.

In the next day's march, the fifth march, and the ſeventh day after their ſeparation from the Perſians, the Greeks were cheered with the ſight of mountain-tops, riſing above the horizon of that, hitherto apparently endleſs plain,

in my way, is at all ſatisfactory; but a correction of the text propoſed by Spelman would remove the principal difficulty, with no more violence upon our preſent copies than the tranſpoſition of two words, λόχους and ἐνωμοτίας, putting each in the other's place. This correction has all probability in its favor, and, without it, no ingenuity of the critics, in my opinion, has relieved, or can relieve, the ſentence from groſs abſurdity.

In the paſſage altogether, which is intereſting for the military reader, Xenophon has deſcribed, in conciſe and general terms, adapted to thoſe to whom the tactics of the age were familiar, a ſeries of complex evolutions; the reduction of the hollow ſquare, compoſed of about ten thouſand men, incumbered with their baggage in the center, to a column of various front, accommodated to the accidental circumſtances of the narrow to be paſſed; the reformation of the column into a hollow ſquare; and the movements of a detached body, appointed to protect the general movements. We learn, from many paſſages of Thucydides and Xenophon, that the extenſion and reduction of the front of a body of heavy-armed infantry, formed in the uſual way, in line or in phalanx, was frequently practiſed; and, tho we have no preciſe information how it was performed, yet its being often done, without inconvenience, in the face of an enemy, ſufficiently proves that the method was orderly and good. But it ſhould ſeem that this method was not readily applicable to the hollow ſquare. Xenophon's account moſt clearly ſhows that, when circumſtances of the ground required the reduction of the front of the ſquare, a regular method, at leaſt ſuch as the army in which he commanded, could immediately practiſe, was wanting. When the circumſtances of the ground would no longer allow the leading face of the ſquare to hold its front intire, the center led; and the wings, falling back irregularly, according as they felt the preſſure of the impediment, followed as they could, till the narrow was paſſed, and then ran up again, ſtill irregularly, as opportunity offered, to form in line with the center. For the flank faces the buſineſs was eaſy; they had only to incline inward, as they approached the narrow, ſo as to be either before or behind the baggage. The rear did exactly as the leading face; at leaſt as far as the purſuing enemy would permit; but the evolution gave a purſuing enemy great opportunities. For the ſecurity of the Grecian heavy-armed, againſt either miſſile or hand weapons, depended much upon the 'array' (according to Milton's phraſe) 'of ſerried ſhields,' which, in the courſe of ſuch evolutions, would be long diſordered, and the ſhield, for the time, almoſt a uſeleſs incumbrance.

With this previous explanation, and if Spelman's correction may be allowed, I am not without hope that the following tranſlation of the paſſage in queſtion may be found intelligible and juſt.

"The Greeks were now aware that the "ſquare is an inconvenient order of march, when "an enemy follows. For when circumſtances of "the ground, or a bridge to be paſſed, compel to "narrow the front, the wings, of neceſſity, bending, the heavy-armed are driven out of regular "order; they march inconveniently; and being "at the ſame time crowded, and their ranks and "files diſordered, they are incapable of efficacious action againſt an enemy. When the defile then is paſſed, and the wings open again to "wheel into line, there is neceſſarily an interval "in the center, which is a diſcouraging circumſtance to the ſoldier when the enemy follows; "ſo that whenever a bridge or other narrow is to "be paſſed, all are eager to be foremoſt, and "hence increaſe of opportunity for the enemy. "To remedy theſe inconveniencies, the generals "formed a picket of ſix lochi, each of a hundred "men, with proper officers. Whenever then "occaſion required that the wings ſhould fall "back, the picket had its poſt in the rear, to "protect them during the movement;" (occupying the hollow between them while any remained, or, if the narrowneſs of the paſs compelled the wings to cloſe) "keeping clear beyond "them to the rear. When, as the ground then "would allow, the wings wheeled up into line, "the picket again filled the opening. If it was "ſmall, the picket was formed in column of "enomoties;

plain, over which they had now ſo long been urging their weariſome way, under continual threats of attack from a purſuing cavalry, more numerous than their whole army. Ere long hills appeared, ſo far projected from the mountain baſes, that the army ſoon entered the winding of their vallies. But the Perſian generals, aware that the opportunity for effective operation with their cavalry was gone, knew alſo the advantage to be derived from the highlands they were approaching. A large detachment of their foot-archers, men of the loweſt rank, were ſent forward to occupy the heights commanding the way; a guard of ſoldiers of ſuperior degree attending, whoſe office was to inforce their exertion. Driven by ſtripes and the fear of death from the imperious band behind them, the Perſian archers preſſed in ſuch numbers, ſo cloſe upon the Rhodian ſlingers and other Greek light-armed, as to compel them to retire within the ſquare, and then they exceedingly galled the whole army. The deficiency however of ſpirit, diſcipline, and military ſcience of the Perſians, afforded opportunity for the Grecian generals ſoon to put an end to this annoyance. Tho ſo inferior in force, they might always dare to detach. They ſent therefore a body of targeteers to a height commanding that occupied by the enemy, and the very ſight ſufficed: archers, and thoſe appointed to inforce their exertion, fled together. The march was then continued uninterrupted to a village, where fortunately was found a ſupply of wheat-meal and wine, with large ſtore of barley, collected for the ſtables of the governor of the province. For the ſake of the wounded they halted here three days; and, on this occaſion firſt, we find mention of ſurgeons in the Grecian army: eight were, according to Xenophon's phraſe, now appointed. It is indeed perhaps the firſt mention of army-ſurgeons, by any extant Grecian writer ſince Homer; who has attributed very high value to the ſervices, and very high honors to the perſons, of the ſons of Æſculapius, in the early age of the Trojan war.

Anab. l. 3. c. 4. ſ. 16—19.

"enomoties; if larger, in column of pente-
"coſtyes; if larger ſtill, in column of lochi, ſo
"as always to fill the interval. Thus there was
"no longer the former confuſion in paſſing de-
"files or bridges; the lochages" (not, as Spelman has tranſlated, *of theſe ſeveral companies*, but of the whole army) "leading their diviſions in
"orderly ſucceſſion; and if a body of heavy-
"armed was wanted to act anywhere upon any
"occaſion," (this I think to be clearly the meaning of εἴ που δέοι τι τῆς φάλαγγος, which Leunclavius has totally perverted by his tranſlation; *ſi phalange opus eſſet*) "theſe were ready."

A more

Anab. l. 5. c. 4. f. 20.

A more level country ſucceeded the firſt hills; and here the enemy renewed their deſultory aſſaults, ſo as exceedingly to diſtreſs the Greeks, incumbered with their numerous wounded; inſomuch that, after a ſhort march, they halted at the firſt village. Incouraged thus, the Perſian generals, who had never yet ventured to attack the Greeks in any ſtation, reſolved to attempt it here. Opportunity, indeed, muſt ſoon be ſeized, or the Greeks would be among mountains, where, tho not likely to find their own ſafety, they would be beyond the purſuit of that cavalry, without which the ſatraps and generals would not follow them. The credit therefore, which theſe had promiſed themſelves, from carrying all the Grecian generals into the king's preſence, would have been loſt; and as ſo much ſeems to have been completely expected from them, cenſure and deprivation of command might follow, ſeldom, under a deſpotic government, unattended with deprivation of life, and ruin to the whole family. But they found (it is the obſervation of Xenophon) a wide difference between annoying a line of march and aſſaulting a ſtation. They advanced indeed no nearer than to attack with miſſile weapons. In ſuch a feeble mode of aſſault, their numbers, little availing to themſelves, gave greater opportunity to the enemy, and they were repulſed with ſuch loſs that the attempt was not repeated.

Nevertheleſs it behoved the Greek generals to take every meaſure for obviating or evading ſuch annoyance to their march, as that which they had laſt ſuffered. They had now learnt that the enemy were vehe-

f. 11. mently fearful of nightly aſſault; for which (it is again Xenophon's remark) a Perſian army is indeed very ill accommodated. For its principal force conſiſts in cavalry, whoſe horſes are always tied at night, and commonly ſhackled [19]; ſo that, on any call to arms, the ſoldier has to take off the ſhackles, to looſen the halter, to ſaddle [20] and bridle the

[19] The general want of tenacity in the ſoil over the vaſt plains of Aſia, refuſing efficacy to the European method of Picketing, ſeems to have occaſioned the common practice of Shackling.

[20] Ἐπισάξαι. It has been generally ſuppoſed that a cloth or rug was all that the Greeks and Romans uſed, to relieve the ſeat on a horſe's back. Whether anything like that heavy, awkward implement, the modern oriental ſaddle, was in uſe among the antient Perſians, muſt be now ſo difficult to determine, that, in the abundance of opportunity for noticing inaccuracies in D'Ablancourt's tranſlation of the Anabaſis, Spelman's cenſure on his uſe of the word *ſaddle*, in this paſſage, might well have been ſpared; eſpecially as the word *houſing*, which he has given inſtead, ſeems far from unobjectionable.

horſe,

horſe, and to put on his own corſlet; things not all done with ready certainty, in darkneſs and under alarm. It was therefore the practice of the Perſian generals, in purſuing the Greeks, always to withdraw early in the afternoon, and to incamp not leſs than ſeven or eight miles from them. The Greek generals therefore waited for the afternoon before they would move; and, marching when they had aſſured themſelves that the Perſians were decidedly withdrawn for the night, they put ſuch a diſtance between the armies that, during the next two days, they ſaw no enemy. Anab. l. 5. c. 4. ſ. 22, 23.

The Perſian generals, tho totally indiſpoſed to daring meaſures, nevertheleſs retained their anxiety to ſtrike ſome blow which might do them credit, before opportunity ſhould be completely loſt. Availing themſelves of their knowlege of the country, they ſent forward a conſiderable force; and, on the third day after the evening march, the Greeks were alarmed with the ſight of a body of the enemy, on a height commanding the way they muſt paſs; the army under Tiſſaphernes and Ariæus at the ſame time preſſing on their rear. Quick deciſion was neceſſary. A body of targeteers, with three hundred choſen heavy-armed under Xenophon, puſhed for a ſummit commanding that occupied by the enemy. The Perſian generals at the ſame time ſent forward a detachment for the ſame purpoſe. Uſing the utmoſt exertion, the Greeks arrived firſt. The Perſians on the lower height then immediately fled. Tiſſaphernes, finding his purpoſe thus baffled, preſently changed the direction of his march, and the Greeks deſcended, unmoleſted, into a vale, waſhed by the Tigris, rich in paſture, and abounding with villages. ſ. 24—30. Anab. l. 3. c. 5. ſ. 1.

Hitherto the Perſian generals had avoided all waſte of the country through which the Greeks directed their march. Here firſt villages were ſeen in flames. The Perſian cavalry, by a circuitous march, entered the vale about the ſame time with the Greeks, cut off ſome of them, ſtraggling after plunder, and ſet fire to the dwellings of the peaceful inhabitants. The Greeks however vindicated to themſelves the poſſeſſion of the villages at which they arrived firſt, with all their contents. Various valuable ſupplies were found in them, and much cattle in the adjoining fields; and the generals took occaſion to incourage the troops with obſerv- ſ. 2—4.

ing, that now the Perſians evidently acknowleged their ſuperiority, for they made war as if the country was no longer their own.

Anab. l. 3. c. 5. ſ. 5—12.

Nevertheleſs new and preſſing difficulties occurred. Hitherto the march had been proſecuted along a great road, the principal communication from Babylon to the northern provinces, and never far from the courſe of the Tigris. A new face of country now preſented itſelf; they were arrived at the foot of that vaſt ridge, which, under various names, ſtretches from the Ægean ſea to the Caſpian. The great northern road inſinuated itſelf among the mountains. But two other great roads offered: one leading eaſtward to Ecbatana and Suſa, the ordinary ſpring and ſummer reſidences of the great king; one weſtward, acroſs the river, directly to Lydia and Ionia; being apparently that by which Ariæus had propoſed to march, had he not ſucceeded in his negotiation for peace and pardon. This was the deſirable road for the Greeks. But the river was ſo deep, that the longeſt ſpear, it was found, would not reach the bottom; and could boats have been collected, or rafts formed, a large body of cavalry ſeen on the farther bank, while the army under Tiſſaphernes watched their rear, would have made the paſſage next to impracticable. Mountain-precipices overhanging the eaſtern bank, denied even the attempt to ſeek a paſſage higher up. Under theſe circumſtances, in a country of which the moſt ſlender report had never yet reached Greece, the generals had recourſe to their priſoners. They were informed by theſe, that the mountains before them were held by the Cardoos[21], a moſt fierce and warlike people; who, tho ſurrounded by the dominions, had never owned the ſovereinty of the great king: that an army of a hundred and twenty thouſand men had once been ſent to reduce them, and the current report was that not one of the number had ever returned:

[21] Καρδουχοι. From this people the modern Curdies ſeem to have derived their blood, their name, and their character; for which Volney and other travellers may be conſulted. The laſt ſyllable of the name has apparently been added by the Greeks, as neceſſary for the inflexions of their language. The χ has been intended to repreſent an oriental guttural, alien to all Engliſh enunciation, and perhaps, like the French final *n*, rather a modification of the preceding vowel than a clearly diſtinct conſonant. Thus a ſouth Welſhman, in pronouncing the Britiſh word *Wyn*, begins with a guttural ſound, moſt nearly repreſented in Engliſh orthography by the letter *g*, whence the word is written *Gwyn*; and a Spaniard, at leaſt a Caſtilian, endeavoring to ſpeak the Engliſh words *White*, *What*, *When*, pronounces nearly *Gwite*, *Gwat*, *Gwen*; which ſeems to have been alſo nearly the pronunciation of the old Lowland Scots, who often wrote *gub* for the Engliſh *wb*.

that

that nevertheleſs they ſometimes were, by compact, upon good terms with the neighboring ſatraps, who did not diſdain to enter into treaty with them, and then communication was open between their country and the Perſian provinces: that beyond their mountains lay Armenia, an extenſive and very plentiful country, whence communication was ready to all quarters.

After every inquiry in their power, having weighed all circumſtances, the Greek generals reſolved to purſue the way into Armenia. The uſual animoſity of the Cardoos againſt the Perſians, it was hoped would diſpoſe them to friendſhip with the enemies of the Perſians. At leaſt, annoyance from the Perſian cavalry would be obviated; and it was indeed little likely that Tiſſaphernes would, with any part of his army, venture to follow them among the mountains. In the latter ſpeculation they were not deceived. Tiſſaphernes immediately turned his march; probably thinking that, next to having the heads of the Grecian generals to lay before the king, the certainty of their being ingaged among the Cardoo highlands, was of all things moſt deſirable for him: for, with little riſk of contradiction, he might now make any report of his own proweſs againſt them. Truth indeed, as the modern hiſtory of the Eaſt abundantly evinces, ſo hardly finds its way to a deſpotic throne, that the baſe circumvention of the Grecian generals may very poſſibly have been totally diſguiſed, and thoſe unfortunate men may have been preſented to Artaxerxes as priſoners of war, honorably made, proofs of the meritorious exertion of his victorious forces [22].

Much however as the Greeks had already given up of thoſe conveniencies for the long march to the Ionian ſhore, which they might have preſerved, had the way been friendly, it became neceſſary now ſtill farther to lighten their baggage. Slaves, a ſpecies of plunder unknown to modern Europeän armies, were much coveted by the Grecian ſoldier. They required no cattle, like other plunder, to tranſport them; on the contrary, they ſerved, as cattle, to tranſport other plunder. Since their breach with the Perſians, the Greeks had collected numerous ſlaves, male and female. Anab. l. 4. c. 8.

[22] Such a deception is perhaps more than untravelled Engliſhmen will readily conceive poſſible, much as many of them are diſpoſed to revile every adminiſtration of their own country; but in the Eaſt it would appear familiar.

For the march over the mountains it was held requiſite to abandon a large proportion of them. Accordingly the males were moſtly diſmiſſed, but diſcipline was not powerful enough to make the ſoldiers part with their women.

Advancing then among the mountains, they had the mortification to find every endeavor vain, for bringing the fierce Cardoos to any accommodation. Obliged to fight their way, they incountered, with little remiſſion, during ſeven days, far greater difficulties and dangers than had been experienced in the plains, from the countleſs cavalry of the great king. Meanwhile, from the chill of autumnal rains, frequent and heavy among the highlands, they ſuffered the more, as it ſo quickly followed the heats of an Aſſyrian ſummer. The road, always through narrow defiles, often ſteep, was often commanded by precipices; whence, with no other weapons than rolling fragments of rock, a few men might ſtop an army. But the Cardoos had other weapons. They gave extraordinary efficacy to their bowſhots, by a method of drawing, aſſiſted by the foot, by which they diſcharged arrows three feet long, with ſuch force as to pierce ſhields and corſlets. The Cretan bowmen learned, from their enemies, to improve their own practice, ſo as to be highly uſeful in this paſſage; but the Cardoo arrows were ſo above proportion for their bows, that they could uſe them only as darts. Neverthleſs ſcience and diſcipline, with ſuperior defenſive armour, inabled the Greeks everywhere to overbear oppoſition; and when they could reach the towns, which were numerous, and all unfortified, they found good houſes and abundant proviſions; for the Cardoos, in a rude ſtile, lived well among their mountains.

Anab. l. 4. c. 2. ſ. 14.

Compelled thus to fight their way, and to take by violence what they wanted, when at length they had completed the laborious and dangerous paſſage of the mountains, and the Armenian plain came in view, increaſed difficulty occurred. A deep and rapid river, waſhing the foot of the mountains, croſſed the road. On the farther bank, a Perſian army appeared, prepared to diſpute the paſſage. It was commanded by the ſatrap Orontas, who, by another road, had reached his ſatrapy before them. The Cardoos, with ſharpened animoſity, having followed their march, were gathered on the heights behind, ready, at the favorable moment, to fall upon their rear.

c. 3.

While

While the Greek generals were at the greateſt loſs to chuſe among the difficulties before them, a more favorable ford than that lying in the direct courſe of the great road, was, by meer accident, diſcovered at no great diſtance, and unguarded. Without hefitation they proceeded to profit from it, and the firſt diviſion of the army had no ſooner paſſed, than the Perſians began to fly. It appears probable that the ſatraps had promiſed themſelves and their troops an eaſy victory, over the ſmall remains of the Grecian army which might eſcape, if indeed any ſhould eſcape, the Cardoo arms. The ſight of their numbers, not ſenſibly diminiſhed, and the obſervation that the fierce highlanders feared to attack them, even with miſſile weapons, till more than half their force had croſſed the river, ſeem to have occaſioned the panic which urged the whole Perſian army to fly; ſo profuſely, that the very ſmall body of the Grecian cavalry purſuing, ſupported only by the targeteers, took a conſiderable part of the baggage. The rear diviſion of the Greeks, which the Cardoos, watching the favorable moment, at length attacked, was commanded by Xenophon; who, in relating his precautions to evade, and his efforts to check their aſſaults, confeſſes that their activity, boldneſs, and ſkill were highly diſtreſſing; and, tho the loſs altogether was not great, they did more execution than all the ſatrap's army.

The hazardous paſſage of the mountains and the river being thus fortunately effected, one enemy left behind, unfit indeed to act in a plain, and the other which in the plains ſhould have been formidable, flying before them, the Greeks proſecuted their march ſixteen or eighteen miles uninterrupted, over a fine champain country, of gentle riſe and fall, appearing ſingularly to incite habitation and cultivation, yet without a dwelling to be ſeen; all was waſte through the inability or neglect of the Perſian government to protect its ſubjects againſt the inroads of the Cardoos. In the evening they reached a large village, where, to their great advantage, they found farther proof of Perſian ſupineneſs. Tho it was the leſs likely to be forgotten, or neglected, as the ſatrap had a palace there, it abounded with proviſions; as if purpoſely left for their preſent refreſhment, and future ſupply.

Anab. l. 4. c. 4. l. 1.

Five

Five days then they proceeded, expecting always oppoſition, but finding none. On the ſixth, arriving at the river Teleboas, which divides Eaſtern from Weſtern Armenia, they ſaw the farther bank occupied by an army commanded by Teribazus, governor of the latter, who ſeemed prepared to diſpute their entrance into his country. Soon however it became evident that the hope of ſucceſs in open conteſt with ſuch a force of Grecian heavy-armed, which had been abandoned in the center of the empire, under the monarch's eye, was not reſumed in that diſtant province. A meſſage of peace ſoon arrived from Teribazus, with a propoſal that, if they would abſtain from uſeleſs devaſtation within his government, not only their paſſage ſhould be unmoleſted, but they ſhould be allowed to take neceſſary proviſions. Such a propoſal was accepted gladly, and a treaty, of which it was the baſis, was quickly concluded.

Anab. l. 4. c. 4. ſ. 4. The march of the next three days was then as through a friendly country; tho Teribazus followed with his army, at no great diſtance, watching their motions. But, in a ſmall variation of latitude, mounting gradually from the burning flats of Meſopotamia; little raiſed above the Indian ocean's tide, to the lofty plains among which the Tigris and Euphrates have their ſources, they experienced a violent change of climate; a change apparently unforeſeen, when, on the ſouthern ſide of the mountains,

ſ. 7. they burned their tents. While they ſlept, unſheltered, on the ground, ſo heavy a ſnow fell as to bury men and cattle. Wood fortunately abounded, with which they made large fires. Olive oil, which in Greece was commonly uſed to relieve the inconveniences, equally of exceſſive cold and exceſſive heat, the ſevere winters of Armenia denied; but oils of

ſ. 7. bitter almonds, ſeſame, and turpentine ſupplied the deficiency; or, if theſe failed, the abundance of lard was a reſource which the Greeks did not ſpurn at for copious unction of their whole bodies. In other points they were plentifully ſupplied; the Armenian villages abounding not only with neceſſaries, but luxuries; not only with corn and meat, but variety of pulſe, dried fruits, and wines old and flavored.

All circumſtances conſidered, their condition ſeemed now even fortunate; when the neceſſity of diſpenſing with the regularity of a camp, for the ſake of ſhelter among unfortified villages, produced an untoward change.

change. The authority of the generals, ſcarcely ſufficing always to inforce due order in the aſſembled army, could not inforce regular conduct in ſcattered quarters; and, againſt the faith of the treaty, ſome houſes were, in meer wantonneſs, ſet on fire, at the time of marching in the morning, by thoſe who had profited from their ſhelter during the night. This was probably among the circumſtances which ſtimulated Teribazus, inſtead of longer following the Greeks, to advance before them, and occupy the heights commanding a defile which they muſt paſs. A priſoner fortunately gave information of this circumſtance, and a diſpoſition was made for driving the Perſians from the commanding ground. The Perſians however fled, before aſſault reached them, leaving their camp, with the pavilion of Teribazus, and all its furniture, the ſilver-footed bed, the table plate, and many of the houſehold ſlaves, the eaſy prey of the victors. The regard for truth which Xenophon generally evinces, the candor with which he often declares the crimes of his fellowcountrymen, even thoſe in which, as we ſhall find, he was compelled to take a leading part, juſtly intitle him to our general credit; yet it muſt be confeſſed that his narrative rather ſtammers here; and if Teribazus was perfidious, as Xenophon affirms, he certainly took his meaſures very ill.

Anab. l. 4. c. 4. ſ. 11—13.

Thus eaſily as they diſpoſed of the Perſian forces that would have oppoſed them, the Greeks now found new and moſt formidable difficulties to incounter. In Eaſtern Armenia, according to the information which Xenophon obtained, they had croſſed the Tigris near its ſource. They now approached the head of the Euphrates; and while winter ſtill advanced, and they ſtill gradually aſcended to a higher level of ground, a very diſadvantageous change of country occurred. For three days march all was deſert; the ſnow, generally ſix feet deep, had blotted out all roads: the northwind, always extremely ſharp, often blew violently. Guides were procured from the villages without difficulty; but proviſions failed, and wood became ſcarce. The Greeks, unpractiſed in ſuch climates, ſeem not to have obtained information from the natives how to manage their fires, or to profit from the ſhelter which ſnow itſelf may afford. In traverſing the ſnowy deſerts of America, the firſt buſineſs, where it is propoſed to halt for the night, is to clear a ſpace for each fire, ſufficient

c. 5. ſ. 1—4.

to

to contain the party that is to ſleep around it. The ſnow then diſſolves little, and the party reſt on the ground, warmed by the fire, and ſheltered
Anab. l. 4. c. 5. ſ. 5. from all wind. But the Greeks diſcovered the depth of the ſnow only by its melting, where they made their fires on it; and on the ſnow itſelf they laid themſelves to reſt, expoſed to the bitter blaſt. Marching, and thus
ſ. 9, 10. halting, they ſuffered nearly alike. Some loſt their toes, ſome their eyes; many ſlaves, and even ſome of the Greeks, died of cold and hunger. The baggage-cattle of courſe ſuffered, and many periſhed.

In this extraordinary country, in the latitude of the fineſt climates, the rigor of an arctic winter drove the inhabitants to the ſame reſources which
ſ. 19—23. are familiar in Siberia and Tartary. They formed their houſes under ground, and there men and cattle herded together. Nevertheleſs the produce of the country was not niggardly. In ſome villages, where the Greeks at length arrived, they found proviſions abounding; meat of various kinds, fowls, and wheaten bread. Wine, as in the lower country, the climate denied; but the people conſoled themſelves with beer, which Xenophon commends, under the name of barley-wine. Altogether the Greeks found ſo advantageous a change of their condition here, that Xenophon, evidently from his feelings on the occaſion, ſpeaks of it as a land of luxury. The inhabitants, ſecluded from communication, believed their confident aſſertion that they were the king's troops, and treated them with the utmoſt
c. 6 ſ. 1. kindneſs and reſpect. Here therefore they reſted eight days, to prepare for new fatigue.

During this halt, Xenophon reſided in the houſe of the chief officer or magiſtrate of one of the villages, with whoſe behaviour he was much ſatisfied. When the army moved again, this man was taken as a guide, and his ſon as a hoſtage for his fidelity. The march then being proſecuted three days, and no habitation ſeen, while men and cattle ſuffered much, Cheiriſophus, impatient, imputed to the guide the purpoſe of avoiding the villages; and refuſing credit to his aſſertion, that the country neceſſarily to be traverſed was uninhabited, in anger ſtruck him. The man ſo felt the indignity, that, tho his ſon remained in the hands of the Greeks, he left them the following night, and was ſeen no more. Xenophon expreſſes himſelf much hurt by this Spartan brutality and its conſequence.

quence. He adds however that it was the only occaſion, during the whole march, on which he had any difference with Cheiriſophus.

'The army ſoon after reached the Phaſis, whoſe courſe, for ſeven days, directed the march [23]. Diverging then, in two days more it reached the defiles leading, from the lofty plains of Armenia, to the lower country ſpreading between the Caſpian and Euxine ſeas. Here the warriors of three fierce tribes, the Phaſians, Chalybs, and Taoes, none owning the great king's allegiance, were aſſembled to diſpute the paſſage. Stratagem however, with ſuperior arms and ſuperior diſcipline, inabled the Greeks to force their way, with little loſs. The defiles being paſſed, oppoſition ceaſed, and, in the plain beyond, villages were found, abundantly ſtored with proviſions for preſent ſupply. But, in a march of five days afterward, no food could be obtained: the Taoes had removed everything to ſtrong holds on the hills, and the Greeks were reduced to the ſad neceſſity of adding ſlaughter to robbery for ſubſiſtence. It may be feared that mild methods were not duly tried, for bringing the rude people to an accommodation. One of their ſtrong holds was ſtormed; and ſuch was the abhorrence, among the unfortunate families who held it, of falling into the power of the Greeks, that, when reſiſtance was found vain, the women threw their own children down the ſteeps, and then, with the men, precipitated themſelves. An Arcadian lochage, Æneas of Stymphalia, endeavoring to ſtop one whoſe dreſs ſeemed to mark ſuperior rank, was dragged down the precipice with him, and they periſhed together.

The cattle, thus acquired, ſupported the Greeks in traverſing, during ſeven days, the country of the Chalybs; a people diſtinguiſhed, among the Aſiatics, by their ſuperior armour, adapted to cloſe fight, and by their courage to ingage in cloſe fight. This people had removed everything from the villages, and it was not till after proceeding four days through the more level territory of the Scythinians, that the Greeks found a freſh ſupply. After four days march again, they arrived at Gymnias, a large and wealthy city. It is remarkable that only one town of ſuch a deſcription, Opis on the river Phyſcus in Media, has occurred in the whole length of

B.C. 400. Ol. 94. 3. January. Forſter's Diſſ.

Anab. l. 4. c. 7. ſ. 1—9.

ſ. 10—13.

ſ. 14.

[23] The author of the diſſertation on the geography of the Anabaſis, has ſuppoſed that the guide, who deſerted, had purpoſely miſled the Greeks, and that they continued long to wander out of their way. Xenophon furniſhes no ſufficient ground for ſuch a ſuppoſition; and, on the contrary, the accounts of antient and modern travellers ſeem to explain ſufficiently why an experienced, intelligent, and faithful guide would prefer a circuitous road. That of Tournefort, quoted in the next note, may alone vindicate the probability of Xenophon's narrative.

way from Sitacë in Meſopotamia to this place. We read only of villages; meaning apparently towns inhabited ſolely by huſbandmen, with the few artificers neceſſary to huſbandry. Here fortunately was found a diſpoſition to prefer peaceful accommodation to the chance of war. The chief, or governor, furniſhed the Greeks with a guide; and, by the ſame meaſure, relieved his people from gueſts whom they feared, and revenged them on neighbours whom they hated; for, the guide, in purſuance of his inſtructions, conducted the Greeks through a country which he incouraged them to plunder, and even urged them to burn and deſtroy. He had ingaged, at the peril of his life, to ſhow them the ſea in five days, and he made his word good. From a hill, on the fifth day, the Euxine was diſtinctly ſeen. A ſhout of joy was immediately raiſed by the leading diviſion, which was preſently repeated by thoſe next in the line; while the rear, ignorant of what the growing tumult meant, apprehended an enemy in front, and danger more than common. Preſſing, however, forward, to give the aſſiſtance that might be wanting, they preſently diſtinguiſhed the reïteration of the cheering words 'the ſea the ſea.' Joy then filled every eye; congratulations flowed from every lip; and, in the tumult of gladneſs, without waiting for orders or regular permiſſion, all ſeduloufly employed themſelves in collecting ſtones, with which a large barrow was quickly raiſed, as a monument of the happy event. Want of generous gratitude was not among the national vices of the Greeks. The guide was liberally rewarded. A horſe, a ſilver cup, a Perſian dreſs were preſented to him, with ten darics in money, and, at his particular requeſt, many rings. He then pointed out a village at a diſtance, which would afford commodious quarters, gave directions for the way forward, through the country of the Macrons, and in the evening took his leave.

Anab. l. 4. c. 7. f. 16—18.

f. 19.

c. 8. f. 1—6. Next day a circumſtance occurred, in another manner indicating the approach of the army to the ſphere of Grecian communication and commerce. While the advanced guard were felling ſome trees, to facilitate the paſſage of a river, a body of the Macrons approached, to oppoſe it. Orders were not yet given for meaſures to force the way, when a targeteer of the Grecian army came to Xenophon, and told him 'he had overheard the 'enemy's converſation, and underſtood their language; in ſhort, that 'circumſtances altogether gave him to believe theirs to be his native country; 'for, tho long ſince free, he had originally been imported to Athens as a 'ſlave.

'ſlave. If, therefore, he might be permitted, he would ſpeak to them.' The Macrons readily liſtened to a man ſpeaking their own language; and, being told that the Greeks deſired their friendſhip, and were enemies to the king of Perſia, they inſtantly laid aſide all appearance of animoſity. A treaty, preſently concluded, was ratified by the exchange of a Grecian for a Macron ſpear, and ſome invocations of their reſpective deities. The barbarians then aſſiſted ſedulouſly in felling trees and clearing the way, mixed without reſerve in the Grecian camp, and, in a march of three days through their country, providing the beſt market it could readily afford, conducted the army to the Colchian mountains.

Treaty with the Colchians being either neglected or unavailing, an effort of ſome difficulty and hazard here became neceſſary. But againſt ſuperior arms and diſcipline, directed by ſuperior ſcience, the numbers and bravery of barbarians, tho ſeconded by very advantageous ground, as uſual failed; and, in two days more, the army reached the firſt great object of its wiſhes, a Grecian town, Trapezus, now vulgarly Trebizond, on the ſhore of the Euxine ſea. At this place, a large and flouriſhing commercial ſettlement from Sinopë, itſelf a colony from Miletus, they found that friendly reception which, from thoſe claiming the ſame anceſtry, ſpeaking the ſame language, acknowleging the ſame religion, tho unconnected in civil government, they had promiſed themſelves. Here therefore, as for their firſt arrival in a territory intrinſically friendly, they performed ſacrifices, vowed to the ſuppoſed guides of their march, Protecting Jupiter and Hercules. Games, in the Grecian manner, were added; horſeraces, footraces, wreſtling, boxing and the pancratium. Thus they propoſed at the ſame time to celebrate their own adventure, to entertain their kind hoſts, and to ſhow farther their reſpect and gratitude to the gods[24].

Anab. l. 4. c. 8. ſ. 7—17.

February. Forſter's Diſſ.

ſ. 18—21.

[24] The Greeks paſſed through Armenia in midwinter. Tournefort ſet out from Trebizond for Erzerum, the modern capital of Armenia, in the train of the baſhaw of that place, toward midſummer. Even at that ſeaſon the baſhaw took a circuitous way, as the more commodious and leſs rugged. On the ſeventh of June nevertheleſs they paſſed over bare mountains, with ſnow on the ground; the cold ſevere; the fog ſo thick that they could not ſee one-another four paces off; and even in the valley, in which they halted for the night, not a ſtick, nor even a cowſlot, ſays Tournefort, was to be found to burn; even the baſhaw could have no victuals dreſſed that day. From Trebizond thus far (a journey of five days) the country bore a near reſemblance to the Alps and Pyrenees. Even in deſcending the mountains, on the ſouthern ſide, the way was through narrow, barren, woodleſs valleys, inſpiring, according to Tournefort's expreſſion, nothing but melancholy. It was not till the tenth or eleventh day's march, in that favorable ſeaſon, with all the advantages that a baſhaw, going in peace to take poſſeſſion of his government, could command, that

SECTION V.

Return of the Greeks. Tranſactions at Trapezus, Ceraſus, (beneficial effect of Grecian Superſtition) Cotyora, (ſpirit of Grecian Military Diſcipline) Sinopë, Heracleia, Port-Calpë: Authority of Lacedæmonian officers: Arrival at Chryſopolis.

IT was not eaſy to perſuade the multitude that, when once thus arrived on Grecian ground, any conſiderable dangers or difficulties could neceſſarily interfere with their progreſs to Greece. But their numbers, hitherto ſo important for their preſervation, became now their hindrance. One or two, or perhaps a hundred of them, might readily have found conveyance by ſea. But how, at Trapezus, veſſels could be collected for tranſporting all, and how, in the interval, ſo large an addition to the population of a town, with ſo ſmall a territory, could be ſubſiſted, were matters apparently not within calculation. On the contrary, for a ſmall party to paſs by land, to any point of the connected line of Grecian colonies, was perhaps impoſſible; yet their united ſtrength might probably command its way, tho far through a hoſtile country, mountainous and difficult, with a few Grecian ſettlements only, at wide diſtances, on the coaſt. The ſoldiers, however, alive to the impreſſion of paſt fatigues and perils, were thoughtleſſly eager for the paſſage by ſea. 'I am tired,' ſaid one, 'of eternally 'collecting my neceſſaries, walking, running, marching in rank and file, 'mounting guards, and fighting. With the ſea before us, why ſhould 'we not uſe the advantage, and proceed the reſt of our way, like Ulyſſes, 'ſleeping, to Greece[25]?' This improvident ſpeech was received with gene-

Anab. l. 5. c. 1. ſ. 2, 3.

that they arrived among fertile fields, in which various grains were cultivated; and not till the twelfth day that they reached Erzerum. Snow had fallen at Erzerum on the firſt of June. At midſummer, for an hour after ſunriſe, the cold was ſo ſharp there as to benumb the hands and incapacitate them for writing, tho the midday heat was inconvenient, even to a Languedocian. Not a tree nor a buſh is to be ſeen around Erzerum: fir, brought a two or three days journey, is the only wood known for burning: the common fewel is cowdung; of the effect of which upon his victuals, and the ſmell everywhere, Tournefort vehemently complains. Voy. au Levant, Lettre 18.

It appears from every account likely that the direct way from the Armenian plains to Trapezus (from Erzerum to Trebizond, according to Tournefort, is, by the ſhorteſt way, for a ſingle man, in the favorable ſeaſon, only a five days journey) would have been impracticable for the Grecian army, and that it was neceſſary to diverge eaſtward. Georgia, tho to the north, has a much milder climate, and ſupplies Armenia with fruits. It ſeems therefore every way probable that the guide, while he remained with the Greeks, executed his office faithfully and ably; conducting them by a circuitous, indeed, but the moſt favorable, and, at that ſeaſon, for ſuch an army, the only practicable way.

[25] Referring to Homer's deſcription in the thirteenth book of the Odyſſey, v. 116.

ral

ral applauſe; and Cheiriſophus, a well-meaning and zealous, but not an able officer, confirmed the impreſſion, by exciting hope that he could give practicability to the propoſal: 'Anaxibius,' he ſaid, 'who, I am inform-'ed, now commands the Lacedæmonian fleet, is my friend, and if you 'will commiſſion me, I think I can bring both tranſports to carry, and 'triremes to convoy you.' This was deciſive: the ſoldiers, who, in the deficiency of eſtabliſhed ſubordination, had been ſummoned by their generals to common debate upon the occaſion, immediately voted that Cheiriſophus ſhould go without delay.

It remained then for Xenophon, the other generals little aſſiſting in difficult circumſtances, to provide that the army ſhould have ſubſiſtence, and to preſerve in it that order and diſcipline, without which it would riſk to become a nuiſance to friends or a prey to enemies. Few had wherewithal to buy neceſſaries in the Trapezuntine market, nor could the Trapezuntines furniſh a market equal to the demand. To rob the neighboring barbarians ſeemed the only reſource; and under ſanction of the common Grecian tenet, that, againſt thoſe to whom they were bound by no compact, they were by no moral or religious law forbidden any violence, it was put in practice without ſcruple; at the propoſal of Xenophon himſelf, and under regulations of his propoſal. At firſt this nefarious expedient was ſucceſsful; but repeated loſſes taught the barbarians to ſecure their property, and revenge themſelves on the robbers. A maroding party, conſiſting of two lochi, was moſtly cut off; Clænetus, the commanding lochage, fell; and the ſlaughter was altogether greater perhaps than, in any one action, the army had yet ſuffered. Nothing was now any more to be found within ſuch a diſtance that the expedition could be completed in a day; for the guides furniſhed by the Trapezuntines, inſtructed in the conſiderations neceſſary for the welfare of their town, avoided the nearer tribes, whoſe friendſhip had been cultivated, or was deſirable, and led the parties to the more diſtant, who were either hoſtile, or whoſe diſpoſition the Trapezuntines little regarded. Thus, without advancing, the Greeks underwent the fatigues and dangers of a march through an enemy's country. Yet the neceſſity was urgent for continuing the practice, and giving it, if poſſible, increaſed efficacy. Intelligence therefore being obtained of a ſtrong hold in the mountains, where the tribe eſteemed the moſt warlike of the coaſt had collected their cattle, Xenophon put himſelf at the head.

Anab. l. 5. c. 1. ſ. 3.

Ch. 15. ſ. 4. of this Hiſt.

ſ. 11.

ſ. 12.

c. 2. ſ. 1.

c. 3. ſ. 2.

head of half the army, and, not without riſk of defeat and deſtruction, equal to any undergone in the whole expedition, ſtormed it, and led off the booty.

Anab. l. 5. c. 3. ſ. 3. The ſtore thus iniquitouſly acquired was however nearly exhauſted, and where to procure another ſupply nobody could tell, while the return of Cheiriſophus, and intelligence from him, remained equally in vain expected. Xenophon, always fearing that veſſels for tranſporting ſo large

c. 1. ſ. 7, 8. an army could not be procured, had propoſed ſending requiſitions to the Grecian towns on the coaſt, to repair the roads communicating between them, for the purpoſe of facilitating the march, if to march ſhould at laſt become neceſſary; but the ſoldiers would not then hear of marching, or give their ſanction to anything that might promote the purpoſe. Of his own authority, nevertheleſs, he ſent to recommend the meaſure to the magiſtrates, urging the inconvenience that might ariſe from the delay of ſo large an army in their narrow territories; and general attention was paid to his recommendation. A propoſal to preſs veſſels for the tranſport-ſervice had been better received by the army, and a penteconter, borrowed from the Trapezuntines for the purpoſe, was committed to Dexippus, a Lacedæmonian. But this man immediately betrayed the truſt, ſailed for the Helleſpont, and left the deceived army to account to the Trapezuntines for the loſs of their veſſel. Theſe nevertheleſs lent a triaconter, one of the ſmalleſt veſſels uſed as ſhips of war by the Greeks, having only thirty oars. Polycrates, an Athenian, appointed commander, was dili-

ſ. 6, 9, 10. gent and ſucceſsful; many veſſels were preſſed, and the cargoes being landed at Trapezus, were preſerved for the owners.

The evident neceſſity for moving was now become ſuch that none any

c. 3. ſ. 3. longer refuſed or heſitated. An eſtimate being made of what the veſſels collected might carry, it was preſently agreed that, under the two oldeſt generals, Phileſius and Sophænetus, all who had paſſed their fortieth year ſhould be indulged with conveyance by ſea, together with the ſick, the many women and children, and the heavy baggage; and that the reſt ſhould march by land. The road, through the fortunate precaution of Xenophon, was already prepared; the marching and the navigating diviſions moved together, and, on the third day, met again at Ceraſus, another ſettlement of the Sinopians, on the Euxine ſhore; the place to which

Tournefort. Voy. au Levant. lett. 17. Europe owes the cherry, the natural produce of the ſurrounding hills; firſt carried to Italy by Lucullus, the Roman conqueror of the country, above three

three hundred and thirty years after the expedition of Cyrus; thence, within little more than a century, naturalized in Britain, and ſtill, wherever it has ſpred, bearing in its name the memorial of its origin.

On reäſſembling at Cerafus the army was muſtered, and the heavy-armed were found to be ſtill eight thouſand ſix hundred, remaining out of about ten thouſand. It is certainly matter for wonder, that no greater loſs was ſuffered from the various enemies incountered; but what, with thoſe who have the care of armies, infinitely more deſerves the conſideration, is that, in ſuch a ſervice, without even ordinary conveniencies, without tents, without ſtores, paſſing through changes of climate the moſt violent, tho ſome had been frozen to death, ſcarcely any had periſhed by ſickneſs[26]. Anab. l. 5. c. 3. ſ. 4.

The delay at Trapezus had given opportunity to diſpoſe advantageouſly of the ſlaves, taken in the courſe of the march. It ſeems to have been a principal object of the traffic of theſe diſtant ſettlements, on barbarian ſhores, to ſupply Greece with ſlaves; and there ſeems too much reaſon to fear that, opportunity exciting cupidity, cattle and corn were not alone ſought in the various excurſions from Trapezus, but the wretched barbarians, when they could be caught, were themſelves taken, and expoſed in the Trapezuntine market. The ſpoil, which muſt have been moſtly collected ſince the circumvention of the generals, was now of large amount, ariſing chiefly from the ſale or ranſom of priſoners. At Cerafus it was divided, and, according to cuſtom, a tenth was committed to the generals, to be diſpoſed of in offerings to the gods; principally to the Delphian Apollo and the Epheſian Diana. ſ. 5—13.

As, in approaching Greece, apprehenſion of dangers and difficulties wore away, a careleſſneſs, approaching to ſcorn, of diſcipline and ſubordination, grew: the generals were regarded, only as attention to them was neceſſary either to profit or ſafety. The eve of departure from Cerafus, therefore, after a ſtay of ten days, was choſen by a profligate band, collected by a profligate lochage, for an attempt to plunder a village of friendly barbarians in the neighborhood. Meaſures however were ſo ill taken, that the outrage was ſucceſsfully reſiſted, and the lochage himſelf killed, with Anab. l. 5. c. 7. ſ. 9—15.

[26] Xenophon's ſummary detail, if it may be ſo called, of the loſs, is remarkable: Οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι ἀπώλοντο ὑπό τε πολεμίων, καὶ χιόνος, καὶ εἴ τις νόσῳ, as if he was hardly certain that any had died of ſickneſs. The paſſage may perhaps be moſt nearly tranſlated thus: *The reſt periſhed by enemies and ſnow, and perhaps a few by ſickneſs.*

many

many of his aſſociates. But the barbarians, alarmed even at their own ſucceſs, ſent three of their elders to Cerafus, to complain of the injury attempted againſt them, to deprecate revenge apprehended for the unpremeditated ſlaughter made in their neceſſary defence, and to offer, what they knew Grecian prejudices made important, the bodies of the ſlain for burial. The marching diviſion of the army was already gone when they arrived; but the Cerafuntines aſſuring them that the injurious attack had been the unapproved meaſure only of ſome worthleſs individuals, they would have followed by ſea to the next Grecian town on the coaſt, rather than appear deficient in compliment and apology to the generals and army. Unfortunately the miſcreants, who had fled from the victorious barbarians, were ſtill in Cerafus. Learning what was going forward, and fearing juſt vengeance, their reſource was to excite a tumult, in which the unfortunate elders were ſtoned to death; and as an inflamed multitude is not guided by reaſon, paſſion took new objects, the generals themſelves were alarmed, and ſome of the Cerafuntines periſhed before quiet could be reſtored.

Theſe however were the actions of a profligate few, or an impaſſioned multitude, diſowned and reprobated by the generals, and, in any moment of reflection, by the greater part of the army; whoſe principles of humanity and morality nevertheleſs, as we become more acquainted with them, will not riſe in our eſtimation. Soon after quitting Cerafus, the marching diviſion entered a country of uncommonly rugged mountains, occupied by an independent hord, the Moſyneeks, with complexions ſingularly fair, and manners ſingularly uncouth. The diſſentions of this people among themſelves principally facilitated the march; which one tribe had no ſooner reſolved to oppoſe, than another became diſpoſed to favor. Thus, in a paſſage of eight days, the Greeks found means to obviate oppoſition. Equally unreſiſted, they croſſed the ſtill loftier mountains of the Chalybs, ſubjects of the Moſyneeks, and employed by them in working the ſteel, the valuable produce of their rugged ſoil. Deſcending then into the more champain country of the Tibarenes, they were met by heralds, bearing preſents, the pledges of hoſpitality. But peace here loſt its charms. The generals themſelves had obſerved from the heights, with longing eyes, that the villages of the Tibarenes were in aſſailable ſituations; and plunder, and gratification to the diſhoneſt deſires of their troops, were immediately propoſed. The

Anab. l. 5. c. 4. ſ. 1.

c. 5. ſ. 1,

offered

offered preſents were therefore rejected; for acceptance would have ingaged them in compact with the givers; and this would have ingaged the gods in oppoſition to the robbery, for which, on the contrary, they hoped to obtain divine approbation and favor. Sacrifice was accordingly reſorted to, but the ſymptoms were adverſe: more victims were immolated, but in vain. The augurs were unanimous in declaring that the gods totally diſapproved war with the Tibarenes.

Between two writers, ſo near together in all other points as Thucydides and Xenophon, the difference appears extraordinary, which we find in their manner of ſpeaking of the religion of their age, and particularly of the reputed ſcience of divination, which was ſo intimately connected with the religion. Thucydides, a man evidently of very ſerious and generally juſt thought on religious and moral ſubjects, never ſhows any faith in pretenſions to prophecy, nor attributes any conſequence to a ſacrifice. On the contrary, Xenophon is continually holding out the importance of various ceremonies, eſpecially ſacrifice, and avowing implicit credit in that ſcience which pretended, from the ſymptoms of victims killed in ſacrifice, from dreams, and from various occurrences in nature, to learn the will of the gods, and to foretel future events. It is hazardous to undertake to ſay for another what he thought, which he has not ſaid, on a ſubject on which he has ſaid much; but ſome paſſages in the writings of Xenophon ſeem to afford ground for ſuppoſing, that the ſtrong feeling he had of the want of ſome check upon the paſſions of men, which the religion and morality of his age did not offer, led him to value a ſuperſtition which might be employed to the moſt ſalutary purpoſes, and to carry the profeſſion of his belief ſometimes rather beyond the reality. On more than one occaſion we find cauſe to ſuſpect his influence among the prophets and augurs of the Cyreian army; and indeed if ever deceit might be allowed, to prevent evil, it would do credit to the ſcholar of Socrates, in the buſineſs of the Tibarenes; for, apparently, nothing but the advantage made of a ſalutary ſuperſtition, could have preſerved the property of that unoffending people from plunder, their perſons from ſlavery, and probably many lives from ſlaughter. The augurs, not preaching any purer morality than the army profeſſed, not holding as any general rule 'that unoffending men might not, without offence to the 'gods, be plundered, inſlaved, or murdered,' but meerly inſiſting 'that the

'gods denied their approbation in the exiſting circumſtances,' the preſents of the Tibarenes were at length accepted. The army then proceeded peaceably through their country, and in two days arrived at Cotyora, a third Grecian colony from Sinopë, with a port on the Euxine ſea.

B. C. 400. June. Forſter's Diſſ.

Whether ill report had preceded them to Cotyora, or what elſe was the cauſe, they found there ſomething very different from the hoſpitality expected, and hitherto experienced, from Grecian towns. Admiſſion, even for their ſick, was denied; a market, even without the walls, was refuſed. Plunder thus became a neceſſary reſource; and the farms of the Cotyorites, and the villages of the neighboring Paphlagonians, ſuffered. But the conduct of thoſe who directed the counſels of the Cotyorites (we find it attributed to the Sinopian ſuperintendant) appears to have been remiſs as it was illiberal. Without violence (as far as our information goes) the troops found opportunity to enter the town. Immediately poſſeſſion was taken of the gates, to inſure the freedom of future ingreſs and egreſs, and quarters were required for the ſick; but the reſt of the army remained incamped without the walls, and no farther force was put upon the people. Information quickly communicated to Sinopë, brought a deputation thence to the army, and a friendly accommodation followed. It was agreed that the ſick ſhould remain in quarters, that a market ſhould be provided, and that veſſels ſhould be furniſhed for tranſporting the army to Heracleia, the next Grecian town beyond Sinopë, and the moſt eaſterly on the coaſt, independent of that city. Heracleia was a colony from Megara.

Anab. l. 5. c. 5. ſ. 5. & ſeq.

This arrangement fortunately prevented hoſtilities, threatened between Greeks and Greeks, but did not inable the ſoldiers without money to profit from the market provided. Tho the farms of the Cotyorites therefore were ſpared, plunder was continued among the Paphlagonian villages. But this was not tamely borne: not only ſtragglers from the camp were cut off, but nightly alarm was ſometimes extended to the camp itſelf. During this awkward leiſure, while the tranſports were waited for, inquiry was made about the way by land through Paphlagonia: but accounts were far from incouraging to attempt the march. Weſtward of Heracleia a very lofty range of mountains, extending far inland, ends in precipices againſt the ſea. One only practicable road, through moſt hazardous defiles, traverſed this range. Spacious plains followed, but interſected by four large rivers, of which the

l. 6. c. 1. ſ. 1.

l. 5. c. 6. ſ. 3.

the Halys and Parthenius were not fordable. The country was united under one prince, who, with a hundred thouſand men at his orders, his cavalry the beſt in Aſia, had dared refuſe obedience to the commands of the great king.

Such being the formidable obſtacles to the paſſage by land, while means for procuring ſufficient veſſels for the tranſport by ſea were yet doubtful, the ſucceſsful example of thoſe Greeks, who, from ſmall beginnings, had raiſed thoſe flouriſhing colonies on the Euxine ſhores, ingaged the conſideration of Xenophon. What advantages would not be open for ſuch a force as that of the Cyreian army (for by that name it became now diſtinguiſhed among the Greeks) could its united exertions be directed to the eſtabliſhment of a colony? Thoſe whom home invited, might eaſily find their paſſage by ſea; the far greater number would probably ſtill be deſirous, indeed their wants would urge them, to join in promiſing adventure; and could they any other way end ſo advantageouſly, or ſo honorably, an expedition of much glory, but hitherto of little profit, as by extending the Grecian name and dominion, in a new colony on the Euxine coaſt? Xenophon communicated his ideä to the Ambraciot Silanus, the principal ſoothſayer of the army; but he was unfortunate in this communication. Silanus had preſerved thus far, through all difficulties, the three thouſand darics, preſented to him by Cyrus for his fortunate prophecy, previous to their meeting with the king's army in Meſopotamia, and he was beyond all things anxious to get them ſafe into his own country. A project therefore, which tended directly to check the progreſs of the army toward Greece, alarmed him: he communicated it to thoſe who, he thought, would moſt zealouſly oppoſe it; and a very miſchievous ferment inſued. The principal movers were the general Timaſion, and a Bœotian lochage, named Thorax. The great purpoſe of Timaſion, an exile from Dardanum in Troas, was to make the powerful army in which he had been raiſed to ſo high a rank, inſtrumental to his reſtoration; and, to ingage the general view that way, he propoſed the plunder of the rich ſatrapy of Pharnabazus, of which the fertile region of Troas was only a ſmall part, as the object that ſhould ingage their attention. That, he ſaid, would indeed reward the labors of the expedition, and ſend all wealthy to their ſeveral homes. Thorax had been competitor with Xenophon for the command formerly held by Proxe-

Anab. l. 5. a. 6. ſ. 7, 8.

nus, and had ever ſince been attentive to opportunities for oppoſing his ſucceſsful rival, and leſſening his credit with the army. Theſe two men were ſedulous in exciting alarm among the Heracleots and Sinopians, readily jealous of a new eſtabliſhment in their neighbourhood, ſo powerful as the Cyreian army might have made. Having aſſured themſelves, as they thought, of ſupport from thoſe people, they made promiſes to the army, which they found themſelves unable to perform. Then they became apprehenſive of the army's indignation: they ſolicited accommodation with Xenophon, and themſelves put forward a project for a ſettlement on the river Phaſis in Colchis, at the eaſtern end of the Euxine, the ſcene of the celebrated fabulous adventure of the golden fleece. This again excited the jealouſy of Neon, who commanded for Cheiriſophus in his abſence; and thus ſhortly the whole army became divided in views, and filled with moſt inconvenient jealouſies.

In his account of this buſineſs, it has been clearly the purpoſe of Xenophon to apologize for himſelf. Circumſtances apparently would not allow him to ſpeak the whole truth; but the project of colonization, evidently enough, was not popular in the army. The ſoldiers deſired to grow rich by a more compendious method than tilling an uncultivated country among barbarians; and, while their generals diſagreed among themſelves, they grew careleſs of their generals, and held their own aſſemblies to conſider of putting forward their own projects. Xenophon then took upon himſelf to call the army together. He explained his conduct and intentions ſo as to give general ſatisfaction; and, incouraged by finding himſelf ſo far ſucceſsful, he proceeded to urge to conſideration the dangers and the diſgraces already incurred, through deficiency of ſubordination. He related the tranſactions on their quitting Ceraſus, the particulars of which were not generally known; and he called their attention to the portentous pollutions incurred and hazarded. 'Greeks, their fellowſoldiers,' he obſerved, 'attempting a moſt unjuſtifiable outrage, had met a juſt fate. Barbarians, not 'only connected with them by friendly intercourſe, but veſted with the ſacred 'character of heralds, had been wickedly murdered. That the corpſes of 'their fellowſoldiers were at length obtained for burial, they owed to the 'moderation, and reſpect for religion, of the barbarians, and to the kind 'interference of the injured Ceraſuntines. If enormities like theſe were 'permitted, inſtead of returning glorious to Greece, amid the applauſes and

'careſſes

'careſſes of their fellowcountrymen, if indeed their miſconduct did not 'firſt bring deſtruction on them, they would be avoided, repelled, and de-'teſted, wherever they went or were heard of.'

Moved by this ſtrong remonſtrance, the army reſolved, That all the late tranſactions ſhould be taken into conſideration, and that a better order of things ſhould be inforced by the puniſhment of paſſed irregularity. The lochages, as the intermediate order between the generals and the ſoldiers, were reckoned fitteſt to decide on the conduct of both, and the whole body of them was conſtituted a court-martial. After accuſations againſt inferiors had been judged, the generals themſelves were called to account. Sophænetus, Phileſius, and Xanthicles had been, by a vote of the army, appointed commiſſioners for the care of the cargoes of the merchant-ſhips preſſed at Trapezus, and goods had been miſſing. Sophænetus, for having refuſed the office, was fined ten mines, about thirty-five pounds; Phileſius and Xanthicles, who had undertaken it, were fined twenty mines, about ſeventy pounds, each, the eſtimated value of the miſſing goods[27]. Accuſation was then brought againſt Xenophon, for acting with injurious haughtineſs in command, and particularly for beating ſome ſoldiers. He acknowleged ſtriking ſeveral for diſorderly conduct; quitting their ranks, to run forward for plunder; indangering themſelves and the whole army, by yielding to the impreſſion of fatigue and cold, while the enemy was preſſing on the rear. But he inſiſted that he had puniſhed none excepting when the good of all, and even their own good required: he had given blows of the fiſt (for that is his expreſſion) to ſave them from ſtrokes of the enemy's weapons[28]: and thoſe who were now ſo forward to complain, he was confident would be moſtly found ſuch as Boïſcus, the Theſſalian boxer; who had been clamorous, on pretence of ſickneſs, to have his ſhield carried for him, and now, unleſs report groſſly belied him, had been

[27] This ſeems to me the ſenſe of the paſſage, which has ſome difficulty. The editors have indeed ſuppoſed an omiſſion in tranſcription. It does not however appear to me that Xenophon has, like his tranſlators, Latin and Engliſh, imputed peculation to Phileſius and Xanthicles. He meerly ſays that they were fined to the amount of the deficiency, without declaring whether that deficiency was occaſioned by their diſhoneſty, their negligence, or their inability. Indeed it would be a ſtrange award, to puniſh the man who had meerly avoided an office, and not to puniſh thoſe who had been guilty of peculation in an office; for if they were fined only to the amount of goods they had fraudulently taken, they were not puniſhed.

[28] Ἔπαισα μὲν, ὅπως μὴ λόγχῃ ὑπὸ πολεμίων πατάξῃ.

waylaying

waylaying and robbing many of the Cotyorites. If he had ever offended any of a better character, they, he truſted, would recollect if any were indebted to him for benefits; if he had ever relieved any in cold, in want, in ſickneſs, and in perils from the enemy; if, while he puniſhed the diſorderly, he was always ready, to the utmoſt of his power, to honor and reward the deſerving. It ſufficed to mention theſe things, and Xenophon was honorably acquitted.

Such detached and incidental information only, which, when collected, will give no ſyſtem, is all that remains from which to gather an ideä of Greek military law. In an army ſo formed as the Cyreian, we may ſuppoſe the ſyſtem leſs perfect than under the government of Lacedæmon, or even of Athens. But we may, perhaps in Xenophon's account of this expedition, more than anywhere, diſcover the general ſpirit of the military ſyſtem of the age. What we find principally ſtriking is, that it was at the ſame time arbitrary and lax. We wonder to find thoſe who, in civil government, were zealots for liberty, even to licentiouſneſs, ſubmit ſo readily, in military, to an undefined command. At the ſame time we may wonder, in a command ſo liable to interruption and control from an undefined right of reſiſtance to injury, to find regularity and ſubordination neverthleſs generally exiſting. Two motives however we may obſerve, comparatively little felt in modern armies, powerfully and almoſt conſtantly operating upon the Greek; the hope of profit from the plunder of the enemy, and the fear of ſuffering from the enemy's revenge. Almoſt unceaſing wars, within a narrow country, taught every Greek the value of military diſcipline. Alone he felt himſelf weak, in a phalanx he felt himſelf powerful: being weak, his lot would be death or ſlavery from the enemy: being ſtrong, all the enemy's poſſeſſions would, in ſhare, be his; a price even for the enemy's perſon, ſold to ſlavery, would reward him for his ſubmiſſion to diſcipline. Diſcipline, in ſhort, was preſerved among the Greeks (the compariſon appears degrading, but it is appoſite) as among the ſmuglers with us; by a ſtrong ſenſe of a common intereſt in it. Strong acts of arbitrary power then are congenial and neceſſary to every ſimple government, whether monarchy, ariſtocracy, or democracy. Being therefore familiar to the Greeks in civil adminiſtration, they were eaſily borne in military.

The

The army waited forty-five days at Cotyora, for a ſufficient number of veſſels to take their whole number, and then proceeded for Sinopë, a flouriſhing Grecian town, very advantageouſly ſituated on the Paphlagonian coaſt; the mother-city of Cotyora, Ceraſus, and Trapezus, which it held in dependency; itſelf a colony from Miletus. We cannot here but pay a tribute of admiration to the bold and ſucceſsful adventure of a few Greeks, who, wandering thus far from the ſoft climate of Ionia, could wreſt, from one of the moſt powerful vaſſals of the Perſian empire, a ſea-port and territory in the middle of his coaſt, and thence ſtill extend the Grecian name, in various ſettlements on barbarian ſhores, to ſuch a diſtance. Arriving in Armenë, one of the ports of Sinopë, the army had the ſatisfaction to find Cheiriſophus, with ſome triremes, on his way to meet them. On landing they were greeted with a preſent of meal and wine from the Sinopians; much for that people to give, but far below their wants. They had hoped to have theſe more amply provided for by Cheiriſophus; but he brought them only approbation and applauſe, from Anaxibius the Lacedæmonian admiral, with a promiſe that they ſhould be taken into pay, as ſoon as they reached the ſhore of the Propontis.

Anab. l 5. c. 5. ſ. 5. l. 6. c. 1. ſ. 8, 9.

Hitherto, to return home in ſafety had been the great object. Now, with a nearer view of its accompliſhment, they began with more anxiety to conſider how they ſhould live at home, or how, before they yet returned, they might acquire means to live there in ſome credit and eaſe. Plunder was the mode, which the principles and circumſtances of the age ſo recommended, that they thought they ſhould be wanting to themſelves, if, before they ſeparated, they did not uſe their united ſtrength for the purpoſe. Where it ſhould be exerted remained to be determined; but they now conſidered that nothing was more neceſſary to ſucceſs than unity of command. For a commander-in-chief, then, the general view was directed to Xenophon: many officers conferred with him in private; and, tho he declared his reſolution to avoid the invidious honor, yet when the army aſſembled to decide on the ſubject, he was propoſed, and the nomination ſupported by a very large majority. He nevertheleſs perſiſted in refuſing what, he confeſſes, very much allured his ambition. The ſtate of Greece, and the umbrage that would be taken by the Lacedæmonian govern-

ſ. 11.

ment,

ment, deterred him; but the army would not be ſatisfied with ſuch an excuſe; and he was obliged to recur to his common reſource, the ſuperſtition of the age. Confirming his aſſeveration with an oath by all the gods and goddeſſes, he ſaid he had conſulted the deity in ſacrifices, whether it would be better for the army and himſelf that the command-in-chief ſhould be conferred upon him; and the divine will was declared in the negative, in ſo clear a manner, that the moſt inexperienced in augury could not miſtake it.

Anab. l. 6. c. 1. ſ. 21.

ſ. 22. Unable to reſiſt ſuch an argument, the army then elected Cheiriſophus, who appears to have been not of ſhining talents, but a prudent and worthy man. He declared, that had their choice fallen on another, he ſhould have ſubmitted. On the acceptance of Xenophon's refuſal, nevertheleſs, he congratulated both them and Xenophon; whoſe appointment, he ſaid, could ſcarcely have been otherwiſe than unfortunate, on account of the ill offices done him with the admiral Anaxibius, by the unprincipled Dexippus, who had deſerted with the penteconter from Trapezus. He then freely acknowleged that he had found his own intereſt with Anaxibius not ſuch as he had hoped. His beſt exertions however ſhould not be wanting to ſerve them in the honorable ſituation in which they had placed him, and he meant to ſail the next day for Heracleia. Accordingly, after a

ſ. 11. ſtay of only five days at Sinopë, they imbarked, and on the morrow

c. 2. ſ. 1, 2. reached Heracleia, a colony from Megara, flouriſhing in population and commerce. They were greeted, as at Sinopë, with a preſent, the pledge of hoſpitality from the Heracleots; and a preſent liberal and even magnificent for a ſtate like theirs, a ſingle city. It conſiſted of meal equal to that given by the Sinopians, a larger quantity of wine, and the valuable addition of twenty oxen and a hundred ſheep.

It ſeems to have been the purpoſe of Cheiriſophus to check the project of robbery and plunder which had been cheriſhed, and to conduct the army quietly to Byzantium, where he expected it would be immediately taken into Lacedæmonian pay. This however was not generally ſatisfactory; and ſome licentious ſpirits, foreſeeing oppoſition to their views againſt the property of barbarians, and incouraged by a degree of contempt, which ſeems to have been general, for the abilities of Cheiriſophus, began to conceive more criminal deſigns. More than half the army were Arcadians

or

or Achaians; and the generals, who had the particular command of thoſe troops, not ſuperior in abilities to Cheiriſophus, were far inferior in eſtimation, as their cities were in political conſequence inferior to his. Hence opportunity occurred for ſome worthleſs officers, by indulging licence, and flattering with promiſes, to gain a leading influence among the troops. All were aſſembled to deliberate whether to proceed by land or ſea; a meaſure indicating that, either the authority committed to the commander-in-chief was very defective, or he doubted himſelf, and wanted talent for command. Lycon, an Achaian lochage, roſe and ſaid, 'It was matter of 'wonder to him, that the generals did not think of meaſures for providing 'ſubſiſtence: what had been juſt received as a preſent would not laſt three 'days; in his opinion demand ſhould be made upon the Heracleots for not 'leſs than three thouſand Cyzicenes.' The Cyzicene was a gold coin, named from the Greek city of Cyzicus on the Propontis, in value about a guinea. This extortion ſeemed over modeſt to others, who were for requiring a month's pay, not leſs than ten thouſand Cyzicenes. Preſently it was voted that commiſſioners ſhould be appointed to go into the city, and Cheiriſophus and Xenophon were named. Military authority ſeems to have ceaſed: the commander-in-chief could meerly excuſe himſelf from obeying the orders of the army, become a popular aſſembly; and Xenophon interfered no farther than to join with Cheiriſophus in a kind of proteſt, that no violence ought to be put upon a friendly Greek city. Regardleſs of this proteſt, the troops appointed the Achaian Lycon, with two Arcadian officers, Callimachus and Agaſias, to go as their deputies to the Heracleots. Lycon, according to report, was not ſparing of threats to inforce the inſolent demand. The Heracleots, with prudent calmneſs, anſwered that they would conſult upon it. The leiſure thus gained they employed in bringing in their effects from the country, and they ſhut their gates and manned their walls.

Anab. l. 6. c. 2. ſ. 6.

ſ. 3.

ſ. 4.

ſ. 5.

The mutineer officers, diſappointed by theſe meaſures, accuſed the generals of having cauſed the miſcarriage, and perſuaded the Arcadians and Achaians to ſeparate themſelves from the reſt of the army. They did ſo, to the number of four thouſand five hundred, all heavy-armed, and elected ten commanders among themſelves. They then negotiated with the Heracleots, for tranſports to convey them forward; and anxiety for rid-

ſ. 6.

ſ. 10.

Anab. l. 6. c. 2. f. 11. c. 3. f. 1. dance of ſuch inmates promoting the buſineſs, they were quickly ſupplied. In all haſte then they ſailed, eager to be foremoſt in plundering the Bithynian Thracians.

c. 2. f. 7. Thus ended the command of Cheiriſophus, about the ſeventh day from his elevation. Veſſels to carry the remainder of the army being evidently not to be procured, Xenophon offered to march, ſtill under the Lacedæmonian general, to the Propontis. But Cheiriſophus, diſguſted at what had happened, depreſſed, apparently, by ſickneſs, and perſuaded by f. 8—11. ſome of his officers, who deſired the excluſive advantage of veſſels expected from Byzantium, declined the offer: he would take charge only of the ſmall f. 10. body particularly attached to him, conſiſting of about fourteen hundred Grecian heavy-armed, and the Thracian targeteers who had ſerved under Clearchus, in number about ſeven hundred. There remained with Xenophon about ſeventeen hundred heavy-armed, three hundred targeteers, and forty horſe, being the whole cavalry of the army.

c. 4. f. 1. No Grecian town, no friendly people was to be found between Heracleia and the Boſporus; a diſtance, in a right line, of more than a hundred miles[29], occupied by the Bithynians, a Thracian hord, the moſt inimical to the Greeks, and the moſt ſkilled in war, of any barbarians of that continent. Cheiriſophus proceeded along the coaſt to an unoccupied c. 3. f. 7. harbour, about midway, called Port-Calpë; thinking there to meet the expected veſſels. No occurrence diſturbed the march, but, preſently after c. 4. f. 8. his arrival, a fever ended the general's days[30].

c. 3. f. 7. Xenophon took a more inland road; hoping by briſk progreſs, directly to Chalcedon, to arrive before the Bithynians could aſſemble in any great numbers to oppoſe him. But this hope was rendered vain, by the diligence of the Arcadians in the execution of their project for maroding. Having landed by night at Port-Calpë, they had proceeded immediately inland,

29 Τριήρους μὲν ἴσιν ἐις Ἡράκλειαν ἐκ Βυζαντίου κώπαις ἡμέρας μάλα μακρᾶς πλοῦς. This we ſhould ſuppoſe could not be 100 miles. Yet Arrian, in his Periplus, reckoning no doubt the winding of the coaſt, calls the diſtance 1670 ſtadia. This, at 8 ſtadia to the mile, is more than 200 miles, but it may very poſſibly be more than double the direct diſtance.

30 According to Spelman, it was a medicine that killed him; but I think the expreſſion of Xenophon may be interpreted more favorably for the phyſician; and ſo Leunclavius, by his Latin verſion, appears to have thought.

and,

and, dividing at daybreak, to fall at once upon ſeveral villages, they ſucceeded in their purpoſe of ſurprize: numbers of cattle were taken, and many ſlaves. Whether theſe were the ſlaves or the children of the Bithynians, the hiſtorian has not ſpecified, but they were probably both; for abundant teſtimony concerning the manners of the Greeks gives to ſuppoſe, that, upon ſuch an occaſion, free and bondmen, any that would fetch a price in the ſlavemarket, would be equally taken. Such being the ordinary Grecian practice, we ſhall little wonder if the Bithynians earned the character which report gave them, of ſingular cruelty to any Greeks, who by ſhipwreck, or other accident, fell into their hands.

Ch. 18. ſ. 4. of this Hiſt.

Anab. l. 6. c. 4. ſ. 1.

A hill had been agreed upon by the Arcadians, where to reäſſemble. But the Bithynians meanwhile collecting in force, preſſed them, ſo that, while ſome joined with their booty, and ſome without, one party was intirely cut off, and, of another, only eight men eſcaped, The incouragement of ſucceſs coöperating powerfully with the ſtimulation of reſentment, the numbers of the Bithynians increaſed rapidly; and the Arcadians, paſſing the night on the hill, found themſelves in the morning ſurrounded and beſieged. The Bithynian cavalry were numerous, the infantry all targeteers; while the Arcadians, all heavy-armed, open to annoyance from miſſile weapons, could not return a wound; and ſhortly they were excluded from their watering-place. Totally at a loſs for meaſures, they propoſed a treaty, and terms were agreed upon; but, the Bithynians refuſing to give hoſtages, the Arcadians feared to truſt them, and, in extreme anxiety, they paſſed a ſecond night on the hill.

c. 3. ſ. 4—6.

Xenophon meanwhile preſſing the march of his heavy-armed, employed, at the ſame time, his ſmall body of cavalry in ranging the country, to collect intelligence and obviate ſurprize; and thus he obtained information of what had befallen the Arcadians. It was highly deſirable, not only to relieve them, for the ſake of many valuable officers and deſerving ſoldiers, led unavoidably as the multitude had inclined, but to form a junction with them for the ſecurity of the farther march, which the alarm given to the country would make otherwiſe highly dangerous. In the deficiency of his force, therefore, Xenophon had recourſe to ſtratagem. He directed his targeteers and horſe, ſpreading from the heavy-armed, to ſet fire to everything combuſtible that fell in their way. Chooſing his ground for the night on an

ſ. 7.

ſ. 12.

eminence, whence the enemy's camp-fires were viſible at the diſtance of about five miles, he cauſed numerous fires to be lighted, to give the appearance of extent to his camp, and, early in the night, all to be ſuddenly extinguiſhed. Thus he hoped to incourage the Arcadians and alarm the Bithynians. At daybreak he marched, propoſing, by a ſudden aſſault, to pierce the Bithynian line, and join the Arcadians, who would coöperate on the other ſide. His ſtratagem took effect beyond his expectation: the Bithynians, fearful of nightly attack, withdrew ſilently. The Arcadians, finding themſelves, with the dawn, at complete liberty, marched for Port-Calpë; and when Xenophon's horſe arrived at the hill, ſome old men and women only were remaining; with a few ſheep and oxen, part of the booty taken, which, in the haſte of the troops to move, had been neglected. Xenophon followed to Port-Calpë, where he found the Arcadians, together with the forces which had marched under Cheiriſophus; but that general was already dead.

Anab. l. 6. c. 4. ſ. 6. Reſting the next day, Xenophon prepared on the morrow [31], with the accuſtomed ceremony of ſacrifice, for an inroad into the country to collect proviſions: and he truſted that the alarm, which he had excited among the Bithynians, would not yet be ſo far ſubſided, but that he might have leiſure for burying the Arcadian ſlain. The ſymptoms of the victims being declared favorable, the Arcadians went out, under cover of his march, and themſelves buried their dead, and in the evening all returned together to the camp. Misfortune and diſgrace had now ſufficiently excited diſguſt among the Arcadians toward thoſe who had perſuaded the ſeceſſion,

ſ. 7, 8. and prepared them for ſober counſel. The older and more reſpectable of their officers, therefore, Agaſias of Stymphalus, Hieronymus of Elis, and others, calling a meeting of the whole army, it was reſolved, that the former order of united ſtrength, under the former generals, ſhould be reſtored, and that in future it ſhould be death to propoſe a diviſion of the army.

But tho union and ſubordination were thus renewed, ſome very incon-

ſ. 2—10. venient jealouſies and ſuſpicions remained among the ſoldiers. It was

31 Ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἡμέρα ἐγένετο τῇ ἐς ταυτὸ συνόδου. —Something ſeems wanting here; but the meaning is ſufficiently decided by the expreſſion, ſoon following, ἤδη γὰρ ἦσαν ἐπὶ λαῖοι, whence it appears that Leunclavius has tranſlated well, and Spelman ill. The day next after the battle, in the Greek mode of expreſſion, the *ſecond day*, the Arcadians paſſed on the hill, the third they marched to Port-Calpë, the fourth they reſted, and the fifth buried the ſlain.

imagined

imagined that the generals, eſpecially Xenophon, bent upon founding a colony, were deſirous of delaying and impeding the return to Greece. At Port-Calpë, nearly midway between Heracleia and Byzantium, a ſpace yet wholly unoccupied by Greeks, a peninſular rock, with precipitous ſides, containing room for the habitation of ten thouſand men, commanding a plentiful fountain, and a commodious harbour, was connected, by a narrow neck, with a great extent of fruitful country, abounding with well-inhabited villages, and bearing, even on the water's edge, a profuſion of excellent ſhiptimber. The combination of advantages for a military and commercial ſettlement was uncommon. But the greater part of the ſoldiers, having families and friends in Greece, whom they had left, not through want at home, but ſome urged by a diſpoſition for adventure, others allured by the fame of advantages gained in the ſervice of Cyrus, were now, beyond all things, anxious to return to Greece. The reäl difficulties, however, ſtill oppoſing, were not ſmall. Could veſſels have been procured, the paſſage to Byzantium was eaſy; but ſo much was not hoped for. Meanwhile they were without proviſions; and to prevent them from collecting any from the country, and to check their march through it, the fierce and active Bithynians were now joined by the well-appointed cavalry of the ſatrap Pharnabazus. Under theſe circumſtances, the generals deſired to place the incumbrances of the army in the peninſular rock of Calpë, where a ſmall guard would ſecure them, while the moſt active of the troops ſought neceſſaries for all. But the obvious advantages of the port and the adjoining territory, ſtrengthening the ſuſpicion entertained, that the generals wanted to intrap them there, command and perſuaſion were equally ineffectual to induce the ſoldiers to paſs the neck [32].

Under theſe difficulties Xenophon recurred to his uſual reſource, the power of ſuperſtition over Grecian minds. We are equally with him, as with his maſter Socrates, at a loſs to know what to think of their belief; but notwithſtanding the ſerioufneſs with which Xenophon continually ſpeaks of his confidence in augury, and the pains he has taken frequently, and eſpecially upon the preſent occaſion, to juſtify his conduct under the declared will of the gods, his own account nevertheleſs appears clearly to

[32] Spelman has ſatisfied himſelf here with tranſlating unintelligibly, what, in the original, is indeed not by itſelf very clear, but ſeems ſufficiently explained in the ſequel.

indicate

indicate policy in all his meaſures. This at leaſt ſeems certain, that no confidence in any ſymptom of the victims ever induced him to neglect any part of the duty of a general. Calling the army, however, together, he pointed out the impoſſibility of proceeding by ſea, the difficulties and dangers of the march by land, and the abſolute neceſſity of moving, which nevertheleſs their preſſing wants occaſioned; and he concluded with propoſing ſacrifice, to learn whether the gods would favor their march. The
Anab. l. 6. c. 4. ſ. 10. Ambraciot Silanus having deſerted the army at Heracleia, to paſs, with his three thouſand darics, by ſea to Greece, the Arcadian Arexion, his ſucceſſor in the dignity of chief prophet, preſided at the ſacred ceremony. He declared all the ſymptoms unfavorable, and the march was ſtopped for the day; while the ſoldiers, hungry and diſſatisfied, did not ſcruple, ſome of them, to ſay that the prophet's declaration had been influenced by Xenophon.

ſ. 11. Informed of this, Xenophon cauſed proclamation to be made, that ſacrifice ſhould be again offered on the morrow, when all prophets, if any were in the army, ſhould attend, and any ſoldiers might be ſpectators. Many came; ſacrifice was thrice repeated, and the ſymptoms always unfavorable. The diſappointment was in ſome degree relieved by a report, ſaid to have been communicated by a merchant-ſhip, paſſing along the coaſt, that Cleander, harmoſt of Byzantium, was coming, with triremes and tranſports. It was then more cheerfully reſolved to wait the day; but
ſ. 12. ſtill it was urged, that ſacrifice ſhould be offered, to know if the gods would approve an inroad to collect proviſions. Sacrifice, thrice again repeated, forbad this equally as the march. The ſoldiers thronged about Xenophon's tent, complaining of want of food; but he perſiſted in declaring he would undertake nothing with unfavorable omens.

ſ. 14. On the next day ſacrifice was again offered, and the anxious ſoldiers crouded around. The victims ſtill forbidding, the generals agreed that the march was not to be undertaken. They however aſſembled the army, and Xenophon ſpoke for them: 'Probably,' he ſaid, 'the enemy were 'now collected in force, and, for whatever purpoſe they moved, it might 'be neceſſary to fight: if therefore the baggage were depoſited in the 'ſtrong poſt in the peninſula, and they marched prepared for action, poſſi-'bly the victims might favor the meaſure.' Here appears ſome explanation

of

of the myſtery of Xenophon's conduct. At leaſt his expreſſion amounts to a declaration, afterward explicitly made [33], that he thought the gods commonly favored human prudence, and would not give the reward of wiſdom and juſt precaution to folly and raſhneſs, or of diligence and vigor to remiſſneſs and ſloth. Preſſed however as the ſoldiers were by hunger, their jealouſy of the purpoſe of the generals prevailed: they exclaimed againſt moving into the peninſula, and called for immediate ſacrifice. Draft-oxen only could be found for victims: theſe were immolated, and ſtill the ſymptoms adverſe. Anab. l. 6. c. 4. ſ. 15.

The want of food now became ſevere. Neon, an Aſinæan (not a Lacedæmonian, but of thoſe ſubjects of Lacedæmon who were included under the more comprehenſive name of Laconians) had been raiſed to the rank of general, in the room of Cheiriſophus. Deſirous of gratifying in his new command, he offered to lead any who would put themſelves under him, notwithſtanding any foreboding in the ſacrifices, to plunder ſome villages, to which an Heracleot, following the army, undertook to conduct. About two thouſand turned out, with ſacks, leathern bottles, and javelins. While diſperſed among the villages for plunder, they were attacked by a body of the ſatrap's cavalry: full five hundred were killed; a few reached the camp; the reſt, aſſembling on a hill, defended themſelves, but dared not move. In the whole expedition, ſo great a loſs had not been ſuffered from an enemy. ſ. 16, 17.

On the firſt intelligence of the event, Xenophon aſſembled the army, and having ſacrificed a draft-ox (it is to be preſumed the ſymptoms were favorable, tho he has omitted to ſay it) he marched with all under thirty years of age, and brought off the diſtreſſed party. The Bithynians however followed, occupied the thickets about the camp, and, after duſk, ſuddenly attacking the outguards, killed ſome, and drove the reſt within the line. Great alarm inſued through the army; and tho by a proper diſpoſition immediate danger was ſoon obviated, no ſmall deſpondency remained. ſ. 18—20.

Thus at length the minds of the ſoldiers were ſufficiently tamed, to obey the orders or take the advice of their generals. Next morning they ſubmitted to be conducted into the peninſula, and an intrenchment, ſtrengthened c. 5. ſ. 1.

[33] See forward p. 184. and Xen. Anab. l. 6. c. 4. ſ. 2, 6 & 12.

with

with a paliſade, was made acroſs the neck. Fortunately, on the ſame day, a veſſel arrived from Heracleia, with corn, wine, and live cattle, or in the hiſtorian's phraſe, victims [34].

Anab. l. 6. c. 5. ſ. 2, 3. Early on the morrow Xenophon roſe to ſacrifice, and not only the prognoſtics, from the very firſt victim, were favorable, but, as the ceremony drew to a concluſion, the prophet Arexion ſaw an eagle portending good fortune. Immediately he exhorted Xenophon to march. The ſlaves, camp-followers, and baggage were left in the peninſula, with a guard, compoſed of all the ſoldiers who had exceeded their forty-fifth year, under the command of Neon: all the reſt marched under Xenophon.

ſ. 4. They had not proceeded two miles, when they fell in with ſome ſcattered bodies of thoſe ſlain in the laſt excurſion. It was their firſt care to bury theſe as they advanced. Arriving about midday near the villages, they col-

ſ. 5. lected ſome neceſſaries, but avoided diſperſing for plunder; and ſuddenly the enemy appeared, Perſian horſe and Bithynian foot, upon ſome hills, not two miles off, in large force, checking their march upon diſcovering the Greeks, and forming in order of battle. Arexion immediately ſacrificed,

ſ. 6. and the very firſt victim was favorable. Xenophon, knowing the temper of the enemy, thought it important immediately to march againſt them.

ſ. 7, 8. While he was directing the reſerve, the head of the column halted at a deep glen [35], croſſing the way. The generals heſitated to paſs it, with the enemy ſo near; and the Arcadian Sophænetus, oldeſt of thoſe preſent, gave his opi-

ſ. 9—13. nion decidedly againſt the riſk. Xenophon however, confident that it was ſafer to attack ſuch an enemy, cavalry and targeteers, than to retreat before them, inſiſted upon going forward: 'the victims had been all favorable,' he ſaid, 'the omens all happy;' and this argument inabled him to prevail.

ſ. 16. Having paſſed the glen, unmoleſted, apprehenſion changed into over-hardineſs, and the targeteers ran forward, without orders. The Perſian horſe, with the crowd of Bithynian foot, met them, with advantage of

ſ. 17—20. ground; put them to flight, followed toward the heavy-armed phalanx,

[34] Ἱερεῖα.

[35] Νάπος. I do not heſitate to thank Spelman for his explanation of this word. The Latin tranſlators, ſatisfied with the word *ſaltus*, at leaſt riſk to miſlead their readers. Xenophon has certainly meant to deſcribe a valley, and not a foreſt.

which

which was advancing briſkly, and approached it with an appearance of firmneſs. But when the trumpet ſounded, the pæan was ſung, and, with a ſhout, ſpears were preſented, not waiting the charge, they turned and fled. Timaſion, with the ſmall body of Grecian horſe, completely diſperſed the left wing; but the right, preſſed by no troops capable of rapid purſuit, collected again, and the phalanx was obliged to advance twice more to charge. Meanwhile the targeteers rallied, and exerting themſelves againſt thoſe whom the heavy-armed had thrown into confuſion, the rout at length became complete; the enemy's horſe flying from the Grecian foot, even down the ſteep ſides of a glen, ſays the hiſtorian, as if horſe were purſuing them. Raiſing their trophy then, the Greeks returned, and, about ſunſet, reached their camp.

The advantage of Xenophon's policy became quickly manifeſt. An army of Perſians and Bithynians differed widely from itſelf, incouraged by ſucceſs or dejected by defeat. Directing their care to remove their property, out of reach of thoſe againſt whom they now deſpaired of defending it, they gave no more diſturbance to the Greeks. Their families and more portable effects were carried up the country. Apparently the ſlaves employed in tillage, as well as the produce of tillage, were left; for parties, ſent daily from the Grecian army, brought in corn, wine, pulſe, and figs. The hiſtorian has not ſpecified that this booty was, in any part, contribution by compact, obviating the deſtruction of farms and villages; but ſuch profitable excurſions could not be laſting, without ſome moderation and method in plunder. We find however abſolute freebooting (perhaps only againſt the more diſtant or refractory townſhips) not only was allowed, but regulated by a common vote of the army; by which it was eſtabliſhed that, when no military duty interfered, parties might marode on their private account: when the generals directed an expedition, booty taken by any party belonged to the common ſtock. But the expectation of a profitable trade now brought ſupplies from the Grecian towns on the coaſt, a circumſtance probably foreſeen by Xenophon, ſo that there was a conſtant and plentiful market. Thus the army patiently waited for Cleander, who was expected from Byzantium. Meanwhile rumor having circulated of an intention to eſtabliſh a colony at Port-Calpë, not only the Greek merchants were looking to it for new ſources of commerce, but the neareſt

Anab. l. 6. c. 6. ſ. 1—3.

ſ. 2 & 15.

ſ. 2, 3.

Bithynian tribes ſent a deputation to Xenophon, to know upon what terms they might be received into friendſhip and alliance.

The hiſtory of the expedition of Cyrus and the return of the Grecian army, thus far, tho relating to no great political intereſt of any republic within Greece, yet, for the peculiar information it affords concerning many intereſting particulars of the Grecian character, manners, religion, art of war, and military policy, as well as of thoſe Grecian colonies, ſupporting themſelves, and flouriſhing, inſulated among fierce and warlike barbarians, far from the mother-country, may claim its place, at leaſt as a juſt appendage, in Grecian hiſtory, and, from its uſe as an introduction to matter hereafter to occur, it derives no ſmall additional title. The ſequel has another value: tho a defert ſhore of Bithynia was the ſcene, yet it gives inſight into the political ſtate of Greece itſelf, which no account remaining, of tranſactions within the country, will equally furniſh.

Anab. l. 6. c. 6. ſ. 3, 4.

Cleander, harmoſt of Byzantium, ſo long expected, at length arrived at Port-Calpë; but, inſtead of a fleet, he brought only two triremes, and no tranſport. With him came Dexippus the Lacedæmonian, who had deſerted with the penteconter borrowed from the Trapezuntines. Depending on the favor of Anaxibius and Cleander, Dexippus was reſtrained, neither by fear nor ſhame, from returning to the army ſo groſſly injured by him. It happened that, when they landed, a large part of the army was abſent on an expedition; and ſome maroders, who thought the opportunity favorable for private plunder, were returning with a large number of ſheep, ſtolen in the neighbourhood[36]. Falling in with Cleander, they feared they ſhould loſe their booty; but, knowing the character of Dexippus, they propoſed to deliver the whole to him, to return them a part at his pleaſure. Some other ſoldiers, accidentally witneſſes of the tranſaction, remonſtrating that the ſheep were the common property of the army, Dexippus ordered them to diſperſe. The ſoldiers diſregarding the commands of

ſ. 5

[36] Στράτευμα means here not *the army*, *exercitus*, ſimply, as Spelman and the Latin tranſlators have turned it, but *agmen* or *exercitus qui in expeditionem educitur*, as Hederic juſtly explains the word. The generals, it appears, were moſtly preſent, while the στράτευμα was out. The ὄρος, mentioned in this paſſage, ſeems to be the hill, one end of which formed the peninſula, and the other ſtretched into the plain country, as deſcribed by Xenophon in his account of Port-Calpë, l. 6. c. 4. ſ. 3.

one

one ſo little intitled to reſpect, Dexippus haſtened to Cleander, and telling his ſtory uncontradicted, received an order, in conſequence of which he arreſted a ſoldier of the lochus of the Arcadian Agaſias. The lochage accidentally paſſing, reſcued the man, conceiving the interference of Dexippus to be groſſly impertinent. A tumult inſued; the ſoldiers reviled Dexippus as a deſerter and traitor: their paſſions warmed; they began to throw ſtones; and Cleander's ſeamen, and in the end Cleander himſelf, alarmed, ran toward the ſhore. Xenophon and the other generals preſently interfering, ſtopped the tumult and apologized for it; but Cleander, previouſly inſtigated by Dexippus, and now vexed at the fear he had ſhown, threatened to depart immediately, to proclaim the army enemies to Lacedæmon, and to ſend directions that no Grecian city ſhould receive them: nor would he accept any apology, leſs than the delivery of the ſoldier arreſted, and the officer who releaſed him. Anab. l. 6. c. 6. l. 6.

To Greeks and freemen, who had been aſſerting the glory of the Grecian name, at a diſtance before unthought-of for Grecian arms, who had been defying the power of the greateſt monarch in the world, in the very center of his vaſt empire, this, from the governor of a little colony of their fellowcountrymen, was a ſtrange greeting, juſt as they were returning to their country, powerful they thought ſtill while they held together, and reſpectable when they ſhould ſeparate. The generals, aware that the buſineſs might be ſerious, aſſembled the army. Some made light of Cleander and his threats: but Xenophon addreſſed the aſſembly thus: 'Fellow- l. 7.
'ſoldiers, we are already approaching the Grecian cities, and you know
'that the Lacedæmonians preſide over Greece. Perhaps however you do
'not enough know that, in every Grecian city, the will of any Lacedæ-
'monian ſuffices for any act of authority. Should Cleander then, who
'commands Byzantium, report us to the other governors as a lawleſs band,
'refractory againſt the authority of Lacedæmon, and, eſpecially, ſhould
'he find credit with Anaxibius, the commander-in-chief, it would be equally
'difficult for us to ſtay here or to go elſewhere. We muſt therefore neceſ-
'ſarily obey whatever thoſe command, whom the cities whence we come
'obey. I therefore (for I underſtand Dexippus accuſes me of perſuading and
'ſupporting Agaſias) will exonerate you from the imputation and its con-

'sequences, by ſubmitting myſelf to judgement. and I hold that all others 'accuſed ought equally to ſurrender themſelves; that ſo you, juſtly expect-'ing to receive credit and honor in your country, may not, on your return 'to it, be deprived of the common rights of Grecian citizens.'

Anab. l. 6. c. 6. ſ. 10, 11. Agaſias, always attached to Xenophon, warmly exculpated him, and declared his readineſs to ſurrender himſelf. He requeſted only that ſome officers might be appointed to aſſiſt in his juſtification; and the choice being left to him, he deſired the generals. Accordingly theſe, with Agaſias, and the man reſcued by Agaſias, going to Cleander, declared they ſ. 12. came, in purſuance of a common vote of the army, to offer themſelves, and all that army, or any member of it, to be judged by him, and diſpoſed of at his diſcretion [37]. It is difficult to conceive a more complete acknowlegement of deſpotic authority over the Greek nation, not in one ſoverein, but in every Spartan in office. Agaſias then preſented himſelf as the perſ. 13—15. ſon who had reſcued the ſoldier; alledging his knowlege of the ſoldier's merit and of Dexippus' treachery; and declaring that he had no thought of reſiſting Cleander, or any whom he knew to act under his authority. Cleander however required that Agaſias and the ſoldier ſhould be left in cuſtody; and diſmiſſing the generals, told them that he ſhould deſire their attendance at the trial.

ſ. 16. Xenophon, again aſſembling the army, recommended that a deputation, in the name of all, ſhould requeſt from Cleander the liberation of the priſoners. It was accordingly voted, that the generals and lochages, with Dracontius a Spartan, and a few others ſelected for the occaſion, ſhould wait upon him. That formidable army, which had made the Perſian monarch tremble on his throne, and traverſed his empire in defiance of his force, then threw itſelf, by the voice of its favorite general, in theſe humble terms, on the mercy of a Lacedæmonian governor of a town in Thrace; out of his government, and ſupported, on the ſpot, by no greater ſ. 17. force than the crews of two ſmall ſhips: 'The accuſed,' ſaid Xenophon to Cleander, 'are in your power; and the army ſubmits them and itſelf to 'your diſcretion. Nevertheleſs it is the deſire and prayer of all, that they 'be not put to death, but reſtored to the army, with which their former

37 Theſe are ſtrong terms, but they are faithful to the original of Xenophon, κρίναντα σταυτὸν χρῆσθαι ὅ τι ἂν βούλῃ.

'merits

'merits have been great. Should this favor be obtained, the army pro-
'miſes, if you will take the command, to ſhow themſelves orderly and
'obedient, and able, the gods willing, to defy any enemy. It is indeed
'their earneſt wiſh to ſerve under your immediate orders; that you may
'know, from experience, the comparative merits of Dexippus and all others,
'and reward every man according to his deſert.'

Such ſubmiſſion (ſuch ſervility it might perhaps on ſome occaſions be called) at length ſatisfied Cleander. When we meet with teſtimonies like this from cotemporary authors, what ought we to think of the praiſe laviſhed upon Grecian liberty? Can we imagine that thoſe ever ſaw the works of Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon, who extol Greece as the favorite land of freedom, in which it peculiarly flouriſhed, from the age of Peiſiſtratus to that of Philip? Bold ſtruggles indeed were made, which we may juſtly admire. The ſpirit of liberty ran high, but the ſubſtance was little found. Taking, for inſtance, the moment juſt deſcribed from Xenophon, is it eaſy to foreſee what worſe was to inſue? Could the battle of Chæroneia be more fatal to Grecian freedom than that of Aigoſpotami? Xenophon certainly felt that Greece was not then free; and if, from what actually was, we turn to the obſervations and ſchemes of the ableſt men who ſpeculated upon it at the time, we find Plato, Iſocrates, and Ariſtotle, unable to propoſe how Greece ſhould be free. This muſt be Xenophon's apology for the politics recommended, in that work ſo admired by the antients, his Cyropaideia. Fortunately for us, experience has taught us better things.

Cleander, feeling enough his importance as a Lacedæmonian in office, had however liberality, as well as talents. 'The conduct of the army,' he ſaid, 'ſufficiently confuted the report of its diſaffection to Lacedæmon. 'The accuſed ſhould be immediately reſtored, and he would not refuſe the 'honorable office offered to him of leading it to Greece.' He immediately entered into a connection of hoſpitality and friendſhip with Xenophon; but the ſacrifices being, for three ſucceſſive days, unpropitious to the march, he aſſembled the generals, remitted the command into their hands, and, promiſing the army the beſt reception in his power on its arrival at Byzantium, after mutual compliments paid, he departed by ſea.

Anab. l. 6. c. 6. ſ. 18.

ſ. 19, 20.

ſ. 21.

The

Anab. l. 6, c. 6. ſ. 22.

The army then, marching under the former generals, traverſed Bithynia unmoleſted; but, finding no plunder in the direct way, turned, and collected large booty of ſlaves and cattle. On the ſixth day they arrived at Chryſopolis on the Boſporus, overagainſt Byzantium, where they were ſo among Grecian colonies, that they might reckon themſelves almoſt arrived in Greece.

SECTION VI.

Return of the Greeks. Tranſactions at Byzantium: Deſpotiſm of Lacedæmonian commanders: Summary of the affairs of Thrace: Service of the army with the Thracian prince Seuthes: Paſſage to Aſia, and march to join the Lacedæmonian forces.

IT was not without exciting alarm among the Perſian governors, and ſome apprehenſion even in the Grecian republics, eſpecially Lacedæmon, that the Cyreian army, or the Ten-thouſand (the former name diſtinguiſhing it in its own day, the latter among poſterity) returned to the weſtern ſhore of Aſia. Foreſight of this had probably occaſioned the wiſh of the generals to put themſelves under Cleander's orders, as the beſt meaſure for obviating the inconveniencies likely to follow; and it is not impoſſible but ſome apprehenſion of invidiouſneſs, attaching to ſuch a command, might aſſiſt the ſymptoms of the ſacrifices at Port-Calpë, in determining Cleander to avoid it. For the ſatrap Pharnabazus was the ally of Lacedæmon; Bithynia, which had been plundered by the Cyreians, was a province of his ſatrapy, and his cavalry, aſſiſting the people to protect their property, had been repeatedly fought and defeated. The arrival therefore of the army at Chryſopolis excited apprehenſion in the ſatrap, that the richer parts of his country might invite its next enterprize. Applying therefore to Anaxibius, the Lacedæmonian commander-in-chief, he preſſed earneſtly for the removal of the Cyreians out of Aſia.

Anab. l. 7. c. 1. ſ. 2, 3.

Anaxibius,

Anaxibius, an intereſted man, whoſe object was to make the moſt profit of his great command while it laſted, careleſs of the advantage and honor of his country, reſolved to gratify the ſatrap. Sending therefore for the generals and lochages to Byzantium, he offered immediate pay for the army upon croſſing the ſtrait. This had been now for ſome time the great object of the hopes of all, and the propoſal was received with joy. Xenophon had declared his purpoſe to ſail immediately for Athens; but at the requeſt of Anaxibius he held his command for the paſſage to Byzantium. There at length finding themſelves once more on Europeän ground, and ſuppoſing themſelves eſtabliſhed in the ſervice of the republic that commanded Greece, the Cyreians felicitated themſelves, as if all extraordinary difficulties were ended, and they were already at home. Anab. l. 7. c. 1. ſ. 5.

No pay however had yet been iſſued, when they were ſurprized with an order to aſſemble, out of the town, with arms and baggage, as for a march. Under much uneaſineſs, anxiety, and diſcontent, this order was ſlowly obeyed. Nearly all however were aſſembled, when Anaxibius came, and calling together the generals and lochages, directed them ſ. 8, 9.
'to march to the Cherſoneſe, where Cyniſcus,' he ſaid, 'the Lace-
'dæmonian governor, would take them into pay; and proviſions for
'the way they might take from the Thracian villages.' The generals ſurprized, yet obedient, began making the neceſſary inquiries concerning the roads, and the ſtate of the country to be paſſed. Meanwhile intelligence of the purpoſe getting among the ſoldiers, ſet them inſtantly in a fury. Snatching their arms, ſome ran back toward the gate, and, upon ſ. 10.
its being ſhut againſt them, with vehement complaints of ill treatment, threatened to force it; others, running to the ſhore, found an eaſy paſſage over the mole into the town, where ſome of their comrades were yet loitering. Joined by theſe they forced the gate, and the whole army ruſhed in.

The utmoſt alarm and terror pervaded Byzantium. The agora was inſtantly deſerted. Some barricaded themſelves in their houſes, ſome fled aboard the ſhips, all expected the rapine and carnage uſual in a place taken by ſtorm. Anaxibius himſelf, running to the ſhore, paſſed in a fiſhing-boat to the citadel, and ſent in haſte to Chalcedon for a reïnforcement to the ſmall garriſon.

The

The Cyreian generals themſelves feared that, in the circumſtances which the diſhoneſt and weak policy of the Spartan commander-in-chief had ſuperinduced, they ſhould hardly be able to reſtrain the army from outrage. Xenophon, who had ſtill attended at the particular requeſt of Anaxibius, apprehenſive for the town, for the army, and for his own character and ſafety, when he ſaw the gate forced, had preſſed in with the ſoldiers. Quickly he ingaged their attention. Crowding about him, they ſaid, 'Now, Xenophon, is the time to raiſe yourſelf and ſerve us: the 'army is at your devotion; and the city, and the fleet in the harbour, 'and all that both contain, are your own.' 'Right,' ſaid Xenophon, 'but the firſt thing neceſſary is order among you. Form, as quickly as 'poſſible.' The Thracian ſquare, where they happened to be, having ſpace enough, he was inſtantly obeyed: the heavy-armed formed in column, fifty deep, the targeteers ran to the flanks. Having thus checked thoughtleſs violence in the outſet, Xenophon, in a ſoothing ſpeech, repreſented to the army the 'iniquity and diſhonor of injuring the Byzantines, who 'had never injured them, and the impoſſibility of reſiſting the power of 'Lacedæmon, which had ſubdued Athens and now commanded Greece;' and in concluſion he recommended 'that a deputation ſhould be ſent to 'Anaxibius, to aſſure him that they had returned into the town with no 'purpoſe of outrage, but certainly with the wiſh to obtain from him that 'aſſiſtance which he had promiſed; that ſhould he ſtill refuſe it, they were 'ready to march away at his order; but they were deſirous of demon-'ſtrating that their obedience was willing, and that to beguile them was 'unneceſſary.' The army was perſuaded, and the deputation was ſent.

Anab. l. 7. c. 1. ſ. 12.

ſ. 14, 15.

ſ. 16—20.

ſ. 21.

The circumſtances both of Greece and of the ſurrounding countries, offered numerous opportunities for adventurers, eſpecially for military adventurers. There happened to be in Byzantium a Theban, named Cyratades, who profeſſed the buſineſs of a general, ready to ſerve anywhere in the command of troops, for Greek cities or foreign nations. While the army was waiting, this man came and propoſed himſelf for their leader, undertaking to conduct them to profitable enterprize in Thrace, and, in the interval, to provide them ſubſiſtence from his private means. The mention at the ſame time of pay and plunder excited attention. Meanwhile the officers who were ſent into the citadel, returned with a meſſage from

ſ. 22.

from Anaxibius, aſſuring the army that they ſhould have no cauſe to repent their moderation and obedience: that he would report to the Lacedæmonian government their good conduct, and would conſider by what means he might immediately ſerve them. Soothed thus by Anaxibius, and upon the point of loſing Xenophon, who was ſtill bent upon returning to Athens, officers and men acceded to the propoſal of Cyratades. He promiſed that every neceſſary, for ſetting out on their propoſed expedition, ſhould be ready next morning, victuals, drink, victims, and a prophet (it is Xenophon's liſt) and upon this they quietly marched out of the town. They were no ſooner gone, than Anaxibius cauſed the gates to be locked, and proclamation to be made, that if any ſoldiers of the Cyreian army were any more found in Byzantium, they ſhould be ſold for ſlaves. Such was the treatment of this gallant army, on its firſt arrival in a Europeän Greek city, from the commander-in-chief of the united forces of Greece.

Xenophon (who had ſtaid thus long at the particular requeſt of Anaxibius) in return for his ſervice in preſerving the town from pillage and ſlaughter, now found himſelf, in common with the whole army, baniſhed from its walls. Applying to Cleander, the governor, his hoſt, he obtained, with ſome difficulty, permiſſion to enter; but upon condition that he would ſail with Anaxibius, who, on the approaching expiration of the term of his command, was to return to Greece. Anab. l. 7. c. 1. ſ. 24.

Whether the policy of Anaxibius, or his own preſumptuous folly, had urged the new general, Cyratades, to an undertaking which could only involve him in immediate ſhame, does not appear; but, being utterly unable to provide one day's ſubſiſtence for the army, obedience was inſtantly withdrawn from him. The immediate reſource of the remaining generals, was to take quarters in the Thracian villages; but, none having influence enough to unite the reſt in any ſettled deſign, the army waſted in inaction. Many of the ſoldiers ſold their arms; ſome got their paſſage for Greece; ſome ſettled themſelves in the Greek towns on the Propontis. The intereſted and weak Anaxibius rejoiced in this decay of that once-powerful and proud army; leſs as he feared injury to any Grecian ſettlement, or to the Lacedæmonian authority, than as he hoped to be paid for gratifying the Perſian ſatrap. ſ. 25. c. 2. ſ. 1, 2.

Anab. l. 7. c. 2. ſ. 3.

Accordingly, in his voyage toward Greece, Xenophon accompanying him, he ſtopped at Parium, at the northern entrance of the Helleſpont, whence he might readily communicate with Pharnabazus. But, without a character to win eſteem, upon loſing his power he could no longer command reſpect. The policy of Aſiatic councils was now directed to cultivate the friendſhip of the ſuperſeding officers, Ariſtarchus, who had paſſed up the Propontis to take the government of Byzantium, and Polus, the new commander-in-chief, who was daily expected in the Helleſpont. The promiſe of Ariſtarchus was already ingaged, that no diſturbance ſhould be given by the Cyreian army to the Bithynian ſatrapy. To what a degree, under the Spartan government, foreign command might be miſmanaged, we learn from the authentic account of theſe tranſactions; and the fairneſs with which Xenophon relates how he became the dupe of diſappointed avarice and corruption, is a ſatisfactory voucher for his veracity. Anaxibius propoſed to him to go to the army and bring it over into Aſia: offering a veſſel for the paſſage, with orders that horſes ſhould be furniſhed for his uſe, and obedience paid to his commands. Xenophon, knowing that, however the generals were divided, the ſoldiers would univerſally rejoice in the opportunity to make war in the rich ſatrapies of Pharnabazus and Tiſſaphernes, undertook the buſineſs. Being received by the army with all the joy he expected, he led it immediately to Perinthus, there to imbark for Aſia.

ſ. 3.

As ſoon as the controuling authority of Anaxibius was removed from Byzantium, Cleander the governor, with a juſt regard for humanity, for the Greek nation, and for his friendſhip contracted with Xenophon, had been kindly attentive to all Cyreian ſoldiers in the place and neighbourhood, particularly, directing quarters to be provided for the ſick. But ſo differently was the new governor Ariſtarchus diſpoſed, ſwayed apparently by a deſire to gratify the ſatrap, that one of his firſt meaſures was to order all Cyreian ſoldiers that could be found in the town to be arreſted; and in ſtrict purſuance of the tyrannical edict of Anaxibius, he ſold four hundred for ſlaves. Such was the treatment to which the citizens of various Grecian republics, calling themſelves free, were liable, from the officers of that ſtate which had long pretended to be protectreſs of the liberties of Greece.

ſ. 7.

Hearing then of the march of the army to Perinthus, Ariſtarchus went thither

thither with two triremes, and forbad its paſſage to Aſia. In vain Xenophon urged the authority of Anaxibius. From his own account ſeemingly he ſhould have known that Anaxibius neither had authority, nor deſerved influence. Ariſtarchus anſwered, that Anaxibius was no longer commander-in-chief; that he was himſelf governor there, and that he would ſink any veſſel attempting to tranſport troops to Aſia. Next day he ſent for the generals and lochages to attend him in Perinthus. They obeyed the ſummons; but, as they approached the town, intelligence was communicated to Xenophon, that if he entered the walls he would be arreſted, and either ſuffer on the ſpot, or be delivered to Pharnabazus. Under pretence of a ſacrifice, therefore, he returned to the camp. The reſt proceeding, were not admitted to the preſence of Ariſtarchus, but deſired to attend again in the evening; and this confirmed Xenophon in the opinion that the information given him was founded.

To croſs into Aſia, in oppoſition to the Lacedæmonian commanders, would be neither eaſy to effect, nor ſafe, if effected. In the Cherſoneſe, whither Anaxibius had pointed their view, they would be, as in a trap, under the power of the Lacedæmonian governor there; and having experienced Spartan fraud, they feared Spartan policy. A reſource remained. A Thracian prince of the neighbourhood, Seuthes ſon of Mæſades, had ſolicited their ſervice. His immediate means of remuneration were ſmall; but his promiſes, ſhould ſucceſs attend their exertions in his favor, were alluring. Seuthes was deſcended from Teres, that powerful chieftain, who, as we have formerly ſeen, united under his dominion all the Thracian clans, from the Ægean to the Danube, and from the Euxine to the Strymon; whoſe ſon and ſucceſſor Sitalces married a Greek lady, and accepted the freedom of Athens; and whoſe grandſon, Seuthes ſon of Sparadocus, married Stratonicë, ſiſter of Perdiccas king of Macedonia. The advantage of ſuch connections, being added to that of a dominion ſuperior in extent, revenue, and military force to any other then in Europe, it might be expected would bring civilization into Thrace, and raiſe that country to a political importance equal to any then in the world. The ſplendor of the monarchy accordingly was increaſed by Seuthes ſon of Sparadocus, who ſucceeded his uncle Sitalces; and no misfortune befel it of which Thucydides has left notice. But a nation is not ſo ſoon to be

Anab. l. 7. c. 1. ſ. 4. c. 2. ſ. 6, 18. ſ. 12.

Ch. 14. ſ. 26 of this Hiſt.

Thucyd. l. 2. c. 97.

changed: the manners and prejudices of the Thracian people involved the princes in the national degradation, before the princes could effect any conſiderable improvement of the people. What were the convulſions that produced the decline of the Odryſian power, we are not informed; but we learn from Xenophon that it had a rapid fall, and that the Thracians remained barbarians.

Anab. l. 7. c. 2. ſ. 18.

When the Cyrean army returned from the eaſt, Medocus reigned over the Odryſians; and, tho very inferior to his predeceſſors, was ſtill the principal potentate of Thrace. His uſual reſidence was at the diſtance of twelve days journey within land from the Propontis. Mæſades had poſſeſſed a principality, apparently a ſubordinate principality, over three conquered tribes in the neighbourhood of Byzantium; but, in the decay of the Odryſian power, had been expelled by them, and died ſoon after. The ſucceſsful revolters maintained themſelves in a wild ſort of republican freedom, while Seuthes, the infant ſon of Mæſades, was kindly entertained by his ſoverein and kinſman Medocus. But the ſpirit of a Thracian could not brook inactive dependency. On attaining manhood, Seuthes requeſted of his protector that, inſtead of remaining a burthen upon his generoſity, looking up to him like a dog (his expreſſion reported from his own mouth by Xenophon) he might be allowed ſuch force as could be ſpared him, to attempt the recovery of his inheritance. A ſmall body, horſe and foot, was granted; and, from that time, Seuthes, unable to ſubdue the people, had however ſupported himſelf and his followers by plunder from his paternal principality[39].

c. 3. ſ. 7.

ſ. 18.

Such

[39] The genealogy of a chieftain of three ſmall tribes of barbarians cannot be, in itſelf, very important; but, for the ſake of high authority wantonly attacked, and of the conſiſtency of hiſtory, which is liable to groſs injury from haſty and unexamined ſurmiſes, eſpecially of able commentators, I ſhall take ſome notice of that of Seuthes. With a mixture of raſhneſs and careleſſneſs, which one cannot but be ſurprized to find in him, Spelman would have Seuthes, mentioned by Xenophon as ſon of Mæſades, the ſame perſon with the Seuthes mentioned by Thucydides as ſon of Sparadocus. (See the ſecond note of the ſixth book, and the fifteenth note of the ſeventh book of his tranſlation of the expedition of Cyrus.)

Among the Greeks, we know, as among the Welſh, the father's name ſerved, in the want of a family name, to diſtinguiſh the individual from others of the ſame name, and was therefore, in deſcribing perſons, an object for careful attention. Sparadocus and Mæſades have no ſuch reſemblance as could occaſion the miſtake of one name for the other, by either author or tranſcriber; and the connection of Thucydides, and the communication of Xenophon, with Thrace, were ſuch, that deficient information cannot reaſonably be

Such was the ſtate of things when the Cyreian army arrived at Chryſopolis. Before it croſſed the ſtrait, agents came from Seuthes to invite its ſervice. The overtures, then rejected, but renewed when it was driven from Byzantium, were, through diſagreement among the generals, again fruitleſs. But now, when, diſappointed in all other views, while the ſeaſon (for it was midwinter) denied the paſſage for ſuch numbers to Greece, and the ſoldiers were without means for providing themſelves in a friendly country, to go wherever an enemy to be plundered could be pointed out, ſeemed the only reſource for ſubſiſtence. Xenophon therefore reſolved to poſtpone his return to Athens, and endeavour to ſerve the army, by going himſelf to negotiate with Seuthes. Anab. l. 7. c. 3. ſ. 6. c. 2. ſ. 9.

The connection of Neon, as an Aſinæan, with Lacedæmon, had decided his politics. He had attached himſelf to Ariſtarchus, and ſeceding now from the army, with about eight hundred men, he incamped apart. ſ. 6.

be imputed to either. Spelman has not undertaken to ſay which was miſtaken, but, without the ſlighteſt reaſon alledged, his ſurmize neceſſarily attributes a miſtake to one of them. If, inſtead of ſuch able cotemporary authors, who had ſuch uncommon means of information, he had attributed ſuch an error, even by a meer gueſs, to ſuch a writer as Diodorus, who, according to Dodwell's phraſe, confounded hiſtory ſome hundred years after, he would have been more excuſable; unleſs evidence as clear, as what in this caſe he ought to have been aware of, contradicted the ſuppoſition. For, ſetting aſide the diſtinction of the fathers names, generally deciſive for identification among the Greeks, had he taken the trouble to compare the hiſtory of the Seuthes mentioned by Thucydides, with that of the Seuthes under whom Xenophon ſerved, he would have ſeen that they could not be the ſame. Seuthes ſon of Sparadocus paſſed his youth with his uncle Sitalces, to whoſe extenſive and powerful dominion, after long acting under him as his principal favorite, on his death he ſucceeded (Thucyd. l. 2. c. 101.). That dominion conſiſted of the chieftainſhip of the conquering clan, the Odryſians, which was the antient inheritance of his family, with the paramount ſovereinty over all the other Thracian tribes, acquired by the conqueſts of Teres; and the revenue, at leaſt, of this large dominion, as Thucydides aſſures us, he himſelf improved. During his youth, and after his acceſſion, therefore, the Odryſian power was at its height. But Mæſades, father of Xenophon's Seuthes, was prince only of three conquered tribes, the Melandepts, Thyns and Thranipſes, bordering on the Propontis, while Medocus reigned over the Odryſians. Xenophon expreſſly ſays it was in the decay of the Odryſian power, that Mæſades was expelled by his ſubjects; and Seuthes, his ſon, was then under age, a meer boy; for ſo much not only is implied in the term ὀρφανὸς (pupillus, as Leunclavius has rendered it), but fully confirmed by the phraſe that follows, ἐπὶ δὲ παιδίσκος ἐγενόμην. Seuthes ſon of Mæſades was protected and educated by Medocus king of the Odryſians, and never himſelf pretended to the Odryſian throne, but was happy to recover his principality over the three tribes above-mentioned, more than twenty years after Seuthes ſon of Sparadocus had ſucceeded his uncle Sitalces in the monarchy of Thrace. All this being ſo clearly ſtated by the two able cotemporary hiſtorians, without the leaſt appearance of contradiction between them, Spelman's fancy, as unneceſſary for any explanation, as unfounded on any authority, ſeems unaccountable.

All

All the other generals approved the propoſal of Xenophon, and each named a confidential officer to attend him. With theſe, to whom he added Polycrates, an Athenian lochage, as his own aſſiſtant, Xenophon rode by night to a caſtle, where Seuthes was then reſiding, ſcarcely eight miles from the camp. As they approached, many fires were ſeen, but no people, and they imagined Seuthes had ſuddenly moved his reſidence. Preſently however the hum of voices was heard, and communication of ſignals. An interpreter then advanced, and, after due explanation, an eſcort of two hundred targeteers came and conducted Xenophon with his attendants to the caſtle. Everything around, it was obſerved, marked extreme precaution againſt ſurprize. By the diſtant fires, whatever approached was viſible, while darkneſs involved the caſtle and its watch. The horſes of a ſurrounding outguard of cavalry, fed only by day, were kept bridled and ready for inſtantly mounting all night. It was requeſted of Xenophon that only two of his attendants might enter with him. Such were the fears in which this prince habitually lived; the Thyn-Thracians, poſſeſſors of the country, his revolted ſubjects, being eſteemed ſingularly expert and daring in nocturnal enterprize.

Anab. l. 7. c. 2. ſ. 10.

ſ. 11.

ſ. 12.

ſ. 13.

Xenophon then, with his two companions, being introduced to the prince, horns of wine, according to the Thracian cuſtom, were preſented with the firſt ſalutation. After ſome converſation, Xenophon deſired that his other principal followers might be admitted; but, to obviate the prince's jealouſy, directed that they ſhould leave all weapons without. Seuthes however exclaiming that he miſtruſted no Athenian; that, on the contrary, he conſidered all as his kinſmen and friends, the whole party was introduced. The prince's propoſals were then declared. His purpoſe was to ſubdue the country formerly ſubject to his father, which he ſaid, with the Grecian army added to his own forces, he was confident would be eaſy. He offered, for monthly pay, a Cyzicene, about a guinea, to every ſoldier, two to the lochages, and four to the generals; which ſeems to have been a common proportion in the Grecian ſervice. Protection, to thoſe who might want it againſt the Lacedæmonians, he readily promiſed at the motion of Xenophon; and, as land was what a Thracian prince could perhaps of all things moſt cheaply give, he offered it in any quantity; but he alſo promiſed to make it valuable, by adding oxen for cultivation, and a fortified ſeaport, for

ſ. 16.

ſ. 17.

ſ. 18—20.

ſecurely

ſecurely exporting the produce. To Xenophon in particular he promiſed Biſanthe, his beſt town on the coaſt, with the offer of his daughter in marriage, and aſſurance that, if Xenophon had a daughter, he would buy her, according to the Thracian cuſtom.

The liberality of theſe promiſes ſeems ſo nearly to have approached extravagance, that it might not unreaſonably have excited ſuſpicion. If Xenophon however had any, he has not declared it. Right-hands were mutually given, and Xenophon with his followers returned to their camp before day. In the morning, Ariſtarchus again ſent for the generals, but they refuſed to go. The army being aſſembled, the propoſal of Seuthes was explained and joyfully accepted: Neon and others from Ariſtarchus endeavoured to diſſuade; holding out promiſes of advantage from the Lacedæmonian government, for ſervice in the Cherſoneſe, but they were little heard. Anab. l. 7. c. 3. ſ. 1. ſ. 2, 3.

Xenophon led, and the army marched. Before they had advanced four miles, Seuthes met them, and took the office of guide. In the afternoon they reached ſome villages, ſtored with proviſions, where the ſoldiers were well ſupplied, while the generals and lochages ſupped with the prince. The detail of this entertainment, the moſt curious of its kind remaining from antiquity, ſhows, among the Thracians, conſiderable reſemblance to cuſtoms, yet common, among the politeſt people of the Eaſt; and, among the Greeks, not that correctneſs of manners, tho Xenophon himſelf is an exception, which might be expected. At ſunſet, when, after a plentiful repaſt, the cup had ſufficiently circulated, the Greeks roſe, alledging the neceſſity of poſting their night-guards and giving out the word. Their knowlege of Thracian manners, and their obſervation of wine conſumed, gave them to ſuppoſe that Seuthes would not riſe ſober; but, without any appearance of ebriety, he followed them, and propoſed, by marching that night, to ſurprize the enemy yet uninformed of his increaſed ſtrength. Much plunder he hoped might be taken, and many priſoners; which, as the Greek towns of the neighbourhood afforded a ready market for ſlaves, might be turned to good account. ſ. 4. l. 6. c. 3. ſ. 7—16. ſ. 17. ſ. 18—20.

The Greeks approved, and at midnight the army marched. Not however till toward noon next day, they reached the ſummit of a mountain-ridge, covered with deep ſnow, and deſcending, unexpected, into the plain beyond, ſ. 21.

Anab. l. 6. c. 3. ſ. 28. beyond, they found the expected prey. About a thouſand ſlaves were taken, with two thouſand head of neat, and ten thouſand of ſmaller cattle.

l. 7. c. 4. ſ. 1. Next morning Seuthes burnt all the villages, not leaving a houſe; propoſing, by the fear of loſing their ſhelter and ſubſiſtence, in the ſeverity of winter, to bring the people to ſubmiſſion. The booty was ſent to be ſold at Perinthus to provide pay for the army.

ſ. 2. In this country, in ſo ſouthern a latitude, and only two days march from the ſea, a heavy ſnow falling, the cold was ſo intenſe, that water froze as it was carried from the ſpring, and even the wine in the veſſels became ice. The Greeks had not ſo profited from experience in Armenia and Pontus, but that, with their ſhort cloaks and bare thighs, they ſuffered ſeverely; and ſome, froſtbitten, loſt ears and noſes. Then they diſcovered the advantage of the Thracian military dreſs, which at firſt had appeared uncouth: foxſkin caps covering the ears, cloaks reaching below the knee, and warm covering for the horſemen's legs, protected Seuthes' troops againſt the inconveniences of weather, to which their conſtitutions alſo were, by yearly practice, more hardened.

In ſuch a ſeaſon however the Thyns, who were driven from their villages to ſeek refuge among the mountains, could not but be diſtreſſed.

ſ. 8, 9. Finding themſelves unable to reſiſt the deſtruction, threatened to all their vallies, they ſent propoſals of ſubmiſſion, and requeſted Xenophon's mediation in their favor.

ſ. 10—15. A perfidious attack on the Grecian quarters followed, and particularly againſt Xenophon's. It was however ſucceſsfully reſiſted, and the forces of Seuthes being greatly increaſed by

ſ. 16. Odryſian volunteers, the Thyns threw themſelves on his mercy. The Thracian prince paid the compliment to Xenophon, to offer him any revenge he might chuſe, for that perfidy which had been directed againſt his life. Xenophon anſwered, that, if he deſired revenge, he ſhould have it abundantly, in the change of the condition of the people, from independency to ſubjection under deſpotic authority[40]. Xenophon, it appears,

[40] Ἐι ἔυλοι δοῦλοι ἔσοιλο ἀντ' ἐλευθέρων.—'If 'theſe people were, inſtead of freemen, to be-'come ſlaves.' Spelman. This does not convey to Engliſh readers the exact ſenſe of the original. Δοῦλος was not confined to the ſtrict meaning of *ſlave* with us, for which the Greeks uſed

appears, knew how to value freedom; but was not nicely ſcrupulous of ſupporting the cauſe of deſpotiſm.

Anab. l. 7. c. 5. ſ. 1—9.

Seuthes having thus recovered his patrimony, found himſelf, within the ſhort ſpace of two months, from a wandering freebooter, become prince of a conſiderable territory. His army was increaſed, not only with the ſtrength of the conquered people, but his ſucceſs had allured numerous Odryſians to his ſtandard. To the north of Byzantium, bordering on the Euxine ſea, lived a Thracian hord, who had never owned the dominion of Mæſades, but, having been formerly ſubdued by Teres, had ſince aſſerted independency. Seuthes marched againſt theſe, and quickly compelled them to become his tributaries. Turning then ſouthward again, his Thracian numbers now conſiderably exceeding the Greeks, they together approached the Propontis and incamped near Selymbria. It is remarkable that, in this winter campain, in ſo ſevere a climate, againſt an enemy much overpowered indeed, but ſingularly expert and enterprizing in deſultory war, not a Greek was loſt.

Active and bold, characteriſtical qualities of a Thracian, Seuthes had no great underſtanding and no clear honor. Mean deception, however, and groſs diſhoneſty ſeem to have been leſs his own purpoſe, than what he was led to by a profligate Greek, Heracleides of Maroneia, who had acquired his confidence, and was one of his principal counſellors before the Cyreian army entered into his ſervice. This man, having ſucceeded in the endeavour to excite apprehenſion and diſlike of Xenophon, inſtigated him, ſince he no longer wanted the ſervice of the Grecian army, to refuſe the arrear of pay, when a ſmall part only, of what by agreement was due, had yet been iſſued. He failed in an endeavour to divide the generals; but diſcontent grew among the ſoldiers, while all Xenophon's applications, for the pay owing, were anſwered with evaſion.

uſed the term ἀνδράποδον, but was applied to any who lived under a deſpotic government. Thus Xenophon makes Cyrus call himſelf δοῦλος, and that ſubjection to Lacedæmon, under which the Thirty propoſed to govern Athens, is termed by Iſocrates and Lyſias δουλεία and δουλεύειν. Iſocr. Areiop. p. 140. v. 2. & Lyſ. περὶ τῆς Ευανδρ. δοκιμ. p. 177 vel 804. But Lyſias calls his manufacturer ſlaves ἀνδράποδα. Adv. Eratoſth. p. 388. If we ſometimes apply the term *ſlave* to the ſubjects of arbitrary governments, it is by a rhetorical licence, and not in the ſober language of hiſtorical narrative: we do not conſider a Chineſe mandareen, a Turkiſh baſhaw, or a Spaniſh grandee, as the ſame deſcription of perſon with a Weſt Indian ſlave; nor would the Greeks have called Cyrus ἀνδράποδον, though he might call himſelf δοῦλος. Xen. de rep. Ath. c. 1. ſ. 11. uſes the expreſſion of δουλεύειν ἀνδραπόδοις—meaning that the Athenian people were ſubſervient to their ſlaves, not ſlaves to them.

Anab. l. 7. c. 5. f. 9. In this ſtate of things, while on one ſide Seuthes was ſurrounded by his numerous Thracian forces, ſtrong in cavalry, of which the Greeks were deſtitute, on the other, judging from paſt tranſactions, no degree of enmity was not to be apprehended from the all-powerful officers of Sparta, difficulty and danger ſeemed again accumulating againſt the unfortunate Cyreians, and particularly againſt Xenophon. An unforeſeen event relieved them. c. 6. f. 1. The Lacedæmonian government had reſolved upon war with Perſia, and thus the Cyreian army, before an object of jealouſy, now would be a valuable acquiſition. Accordingly two Lacedæmonian officers, Charminus and Polyneices, came to Selymbria, authorized to ingage them, at the ſame pay promiſed by Seuthes, to go to that moſt inviting of all fields for military ſervice, the rich ſatrapy of Tiſſaphernes. The propoſal f. 7. was joyfully received; and the more, as beſide other advantages, the f. 29. commanding interference of Lacedæmon, it was now hoped, would obtain the arrear of pay due from the Thracian prince. But Seuthes was governed by a few intereſted counſellors: and it was not till the army was ſent to live at free quarters, in ſome villages which he had given to one of the chief of them, that an interview, deſired by Xenophon and long evaded, was at length obtained. An Odryſian who aſſiſted at the conc. 7. f. 6. ference, with generous indignation declared his ſhame of that officer's conduct. His great ſoverein Medocus, he ſaid, he was ſure would not approve ſuch baſe diſhoneſty, nor give any ſupport to thoſe who could be guilty of it. Seuthes excuſed himſelf, diſavowing knowlege of the circumſtances, and laying the blame on his Greek counſellor Heracleides. Payment was then made, in the manner of the country. A ſingle talent was all that could be obtained in money: ſix hundred oxen, four thouſand ſheep, and f. 31. a hundred and twenty ſlaves, were given for the remainder due. The diſf. 34. poſal of theſe, for the benefit of the army, was dexterouſly referred by Xenophon, as a compliment, to the Lacedæmonians Charminus and Polyneices, who incurred no ſmall blame in the conduct of the invidious buſineſs.

c. 8. f. 1, 3. The army then croſſed to Lampſacus, where two Lacedæmonian officers arrived ſoon after, with pay, which was immediately iſſued for the march to inſue. The plain of Troy, mount Ida, Antandrus, and the vale of Thebë, were then traverſed, in the way to Pergamus in the vale of Caïcus. There a circumſtance occurred, in itſelf, and in Xenophon's manner of relating it, ſtrongly characterizing the times. Generally earneſt in inculcating

cating humanity and liberality, and ſtudious to demonſtrate his own diſintereſtedneſs, the ſoldier-philoſopher nevertheleſs gives, without any apparent compunction, a detailed account of a nocturnal expedition which he undertook with a few favorite officers, to ſurprize a wealthy Perſian, with his family, in a caſtle at ſome diſtance in the vale. A Grecian family of rank in Pergamus had ſuggeſted the meaſure, apparently to ſhare in the ſpoil. The prophet, employed to ſacrifice on the occaſion, declared, from the ſymptoms of the victims, that the gods approved and would favor the robbery. Reſiſtance nevertheleſs was found ſo much more vigorous than expected, that the party was obliged to retreat, with many wounds, and conſiderable riſk of being all cut off. A feigned movement, with the whole army, induced the Perſian to leave his caſtle. The attempt being then renewed, it was taken, with his wife, children, ſlaves, horſes, and all his effects. The capture was ſo conſiderable, that Xenophon's ſhare inabled him, according to his own phraſe, to confer benefits; tho before ſo diſtreſſed as to be reduced to ſell his horſe, at Lampſacus, for fifty darics, about thirty-five guineas. The army returned to Pergamus, there to wait the orders of the Lacedæmonian commander-in-chief.

Anab. l. 7. c. 8. ſ. 6.

ſ. 12.

ſ. 13.

ſ. 3.

NOTES from the End of the Firſt Section of the Twenty-third Chapter.

[1] It ſeems a whimſical circumſtance that, among other writers, Spelman, the applauded tranſlator, and Hutchinſon, the able editor of the Anabaſis, have choſen to contradict or explain away their author's own account of his own age; and that for the purpoſe of eſtabliſhing a calculation of it, founded upon authority ſo dubious and ſo deficient, that even were there nothing on the other ſide, it could ſcarcely prove anything. Lucian, in his Treatiſe on Long Life, has ſaid that Xenophon paſſed the age of ninety years, without ſaying when he was born or when he died. Diogenes Laertius affirms that he died in the firſt year of the hundred and fifth Olympiad; without adding at what age. Strabo (l. 9. p. 618.) has related that he fought at the battle of Delium, in the eighth year of the Peloponneſian war. But Athenæus has ſhown, from Plato, that this could not be; and indeed the ſtory altogether is ſo nearly abſurd, that we may wonder rather that Strabo ſhould have related it, than that Diogenes ſhould have copied it from him. Diogenes is not famous for accuracy, any more than for judgement; ſo Spelman profeſſes to reſt on Lucian's account, which, he ſays, he ſees no reaſon to diſbelieve. I ſee no reaſon to diſbelieve it either; becauſe it reälly affirms no more than that Xenophon lived to the age of more than ninety, without any contradiction, expreſſed or implied, of Xenophon's own account, which appears to me to deſerve the firſt credit. Xenophon has indeed not ſtated his own age preciſely; but he has marked it, I think clearly, within two or three years; and ſo the learned and ingenious friend of Spelman has thought, the author of the geographical diſſertation annexed to his tranſlation of the Anabaſis. Spelman and Hutchinſon, giving full authority to the compared accounts of Lucian and Diogenes (for neither alone will ſerve their purpoſe) reckon Xenophon near fifty when he ingaged with Cyrus: the author of the geographical diſſertation ſuppoſes him only five-and-twenty. If Xenophon's own account of himſelf deſerve any credit, and if it ought not to be tortured to a meaning to which it cannot without torture be brought, he was certainly under thirty. The matter is not important, but having taken the pains, perhaps more than it was worth, to examine it, I will not deny the reader who may have curioſity for it, the benefit, if he can draw any, from my trouble.

Among the first occasions on which the name of Xenophon occurs in the Anabasis, (l. 2. c. 1. s. 10.) he is addressed with the appellation of Νεανίσκε, which Spelman observes, however ill it might apply to one near fifty, must be translated *Young man.* Now it happens that we have information, from Xenophon himself, to what age a man might properly be called Νέος. The question occurs in his Memorials of Socrates (l. 1. c. 2. s. 35.) and thirty is there named as its utmost term, and rather beyond the age to which it was ordinarily given. Νεανίσκος then, a diminutive from Νέος, would not be commonly applied to a more advanced age. As the titles Νέος and Νεανίσκος are, more than once in the Anabasis, given to Xenophon, this alone seems pretty strong proof that he was under thirty. But there is besides, in the Anabasis, what appears to me, complete confirmation of it. Proxenus was, we are in direct terms informed, about thirty, when he was put to death, or when the army was deprived of his services. Xenophon, when he first conceived the idea of offering himself for successor to Proxenus in his command, was deterred by the consideration of his youth. This seems decisively to mark that he was younger than Proxenus, and of course under thirty. It is indeed so strong to the purpose that it has evidently staggered Spelman; who nevertheless has been so resolved to abide by his deduction from Lucian and Diogenes, that rather than allow his author to give evidence against it, he has chosen to mistranslate it, and even to risk contradictions. *What age do I wait for?* is his very just version of Xenophon's words, when he was hesitating whether to offer himself for the command; words certainly bearing no very evident sense, if they did not imply that he apprehended objection would be taken to his youth. In answer then to this objection, he proceeds thus: Οὐ γὰρ ἐγωγ' ὅτι πρεσβύτερος ἔσομαι, ἐὰν τήμερον προδῶ ἐμαυτὸν τοῖς πολεμίοις. (Anab. l. 3. c. 1. s. 10.) *If I abandon myself to the enemy this day,* (so he turns the passage,) *I shall never live to see another.* It cannot be said, in excuse for the miserable insipidity of this version, that it is litteral. A litteral translation would here not only give the sense more exactly, but even more spiritedly: *I shall never be older* (replying to his own question, 'What age do I wait for?') *if to-day I betray myself to the enemy*; meaning, *if through false delicacy, in consideration of my youth, I omit that exertion, by which I and the army with me might be saved from the enemy.*

Another passage soon after occurs to the same purpose, of which Spelman has very ingeniously given a litteral translation, with a sense completely dubious. When actually offering himself for the command, Xenophon apologizes for his youth thus: Εἰ δὲ ὑμεῖς τάττοιτέ με ἡγεῖσθαι, οὐδὲν προφασίζομαι τὴν ἡλικίαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀκμάζειν ἡγοῦμαι ἐρύκειν ἀπ' ἐμαυτοῦ τὰ κακά. *If you appoint me to be your leader* (says Spelman's translation) *I shall not excuse myself by reason of my age, but think myself even in the vigor of it to repel an injury.* It is obvious that this might come either from a man too old or from one too young for the office. To fix the sense, therefore, the reader is referred, by a note, to the translator's former notice of Xenophon's age. Spelman seems to have been so aware of the absurdity of stating it as a general proposition, that fifty was an age either too early or too advanced for a man to undertake the office of general, that he chose rather to refer the reader to a former discussion, than to shock him with the direct mention, in this place, of the result of it. Leunclavius has translated the passage very differently, and I think very properly, thus: *Si me ducis munere fungi jubetis ætatis excusatione nequaquam utar; sed adolescentiæ vigorem ad propulsandum mala mihi profuturum arbitror.* We find that Cleärchus, who is represented as a general of most vigorous exertion, was fifty; and Cleanor was older. If Xenophon was near fifty, he would not have said 'What age do I wait for?' The whole of the apology for his age, whether as supposing him too old or too young, would have been absurd. But every mention of him with any implication of his age, throughout the Anabasis, shows him to have been much younger. A few weeks before his appointment to the command, he was addressed with the appellation of Νεανίσκε, *Youth.* After his appointment, we are informed, (l. 3. c. 2. s. 25.) that Timasion and he were the two youngest of the generals. If he was too old, how improper must the choice of the others have been! But, in the various actions that followed, we always find him taking, and always mentioning it as becoming him, that more active duty, which in the Grecian service was appropriated to the youthful. Supposing him between twenty-

twenty-five and thirty, the interpretation, where he ſpeaks of himſelf, is always obvious, and all is conſiſtent; but ſuppoſing him fifty, or near it, even the forced interpretation of Spelman is full of contradiction and abſurdity.

If then I cannot commend the judgement, the accuracy, or the fairneſs of Spelman, in forming and ſupporting his opinion of Xenophon's age, I can ſtill leſs be ſatisfied with the more direct and leſs qualified contradiction of his author, in the account which in his introduction he has given of the Lacedæmonian Cleärchus. Totally neglecting Xenophon's ſhort but clear hiſtory of the principal circumſtances of that general's life, he has truſted implicitly to the very different account of Diodorus Siculus, 'who, beſides the 'character he has deſervedly obtained,' he ſays, 'for fidelity and exactneſs, had the advan-'tage of living many centuries nearer the tranſ-'actions he recounts, than thoſe who differ from 'him in chronology.' This ſeems really a curious reaſon for preferring the account of Diodorus, who lived full three centuries after Cleärchus, to that of Xenophon, who ſerved under him, and cannot but have known intimately, if not Clearchus himſelf, yet many who muſt have known him intimately. As to the character which Diodorus has deſervedly obtained for fidelity and exactneſs, thoſe who know him beſt, I fear, will be moſt inclined to join with the penetrating, judicious, and diligent Henry Dodwell; who, compelled, by the purſuit he was ingaged in, to ſtudy him cloſely, and indignant at length at the inceſſancy of his vexatious inaccuracies, calls him *imperitus hiſtoriarum variarum epocharumque* commiſſor *Diodorus*. (Chron. Xenoph. ad ann. A. C. 396.)

It is an unpleaſant taſk, which the writer of Grecian hiſtory cannot always decline, to decry the general authority of thoſe on whom he muſt ſometimes reſt for authority: if he would vindicate hiſtorical ſincerity, it is indiſpenſable. Plutarch, living more than four centuries after Xenophon, and more than one after Diodorus, has choſen to contradict the accounts of both. Inſtead of a condemned exile, as Xenophon, or a rebel, as Diodorus, reports Cleärchus to have been, Plutarch affirms that he had a regular commiſſion from the Lacedæmonian government to ſerve under Cyrus. (Plut. vit. Artaxer. p. 1854.) It is evident from the whole tenor of Xenophon's narrative, the only connected and conſiſtent narrative remaining of the tranſactions of the age, that this could not be. Let thoſe who, in reſpect for any reputation which Plutarch may have gained among litterary men little converſant with the world, would put his authority in any competition with Xenophon's, but look to the puerility and abſurdity of the account he has given of the communication between Cyrus and the Lacedæmonian government, previous to the expedition; and, if they deſire a ſample of his careleſsneſs, let them compare his praiſe of Xenophon, in his account of the battle of Cunaxa, with his continual and unqualified contradictions of Xenophon.

[z] The account of the expedition of Cyrus and of the return of the Greeks, remaining to us with the title of Κύρου Ἀνάβασις, having paſſed, apparently without queſtion, for the work of the Socratic Xenophon, among the antients, from his own age downward, it cannot but ſeem ſtrange that any doubt about it ſhould have gained in modern times. Nevertheleſs ſuch a doubt, excited by a paſſage in the work itſelf, having been cheriſhed by men eminent among the learned, ſome notice of it may be neceſſary here.

The tenor of the narration, in Xenophon's Grecian annals, required ſome account of the expedition of Cyrus, and the return of the Grecian army; but, inſtead of giving any, the author has referred his reader to an account which he attributes to Themiſtogenes of Syracuſe. This at firſt ſight will of courſe give to ſuppoſe that an account written by a Syracuſan, named Themiſtogenes, was then extant; but it can at no rate prove that the work now extant on the ſubject, which always paſſed among the antients for Xenophon's, was written, not by Xenophon, but by Themiſtogenes. It is however remarkable that, from the age of Xenophon to that of Suidas, no mention occurs, in any extant work, of ſuch an author as Themiſtogenes, while we find an extraordinary aſſemblage, of names the moſt eminent in litterature, bearing teſtimony to the extant Anabaſis as the work of Xenophon. Dionyſius of Halicarnaſſus, Strabo, Cicero, Laertius, Lucian, Ælian, Heſychius, Pollux, Harpocration, Ammonius, and

are enumerated by Hutchinſon; and to theſe, I think, ſhould be added Demetrius Phalereus, or the author of the work attributed to him, Plutarch, and Longinus; and when in an age comparatively modern, the collector Suidas choſe to controvert this weight of evidence, he has offered no argument but the ſimple words of Xenophon, which all thoſe authors had red and could underſtand at leaſt as well as he.

Why then, it will of courſe occur to aſk, did Xenophon, in his Grecian Annals, refer to the work of Themiſtogenes? Plutarch, in his treatiſe on the Glory of the Athenians, has accounted for it thus: 'Xenophon,' he ſays, 'was 'a ſubject of hiſtory for himſelf. But when he 'publiſhed his narrative of his own atchieve-'ments in military command, he aſcribed it to 'Themiſtogenes of Syracuſe; giving away thus 'the litterary reputation to ariſe from the work, 'that he might the better eſtabliſh the credit of 'the facts related.'

This explanation, tho I give it credit as far as it goes, is, however, not by itſelf completely ſatisfactory. Nevertheleſs I think every reader of the Anabaſis, attending, at the ſame time, to the general hiſtory of the age, may draw, from the two, what is wanting to complete it. He cannot fail to obſerve, that it has been a principal purpoſe of the author of the Anabaſis to apologize for the conduct of Xenophon. In the latter part of the work, the narrative is conſtantly accompanied with a ſtudied defence of his conduct; in which, both the circumſtances that produced his baniſhment from Athens, and whatever might give umbrage or excite jealouſy againſt him in Lacedæmon, have been carefully conſidered. But there are paſſages in the work, ſpeeches of Xenophon himſelf on delicate occaſions, particularly his communication with Cleander the Lacedæmonian general, related in the ſixth book, which could be known only from himſelf or from Cleander. That theſe have not been forgeries of Themiſtogenes, is evident from the teſtimony of Xenophon himſelf, who refers to the work, which he aſcribes to Themiſtogenes, with intire ſatisfaction.

One, then, of theſe three concluſions muſt follow: either, firſt, the narrative of Themiſtogenes, if ſuch ever exiſted, had not in it that apology for Xenophon, which we find interwoven in the Anabaſis tranſmitted to us as Xenophon's, and conſequently was a different work; or, ſecondly, Themiſtogenes wrote under the direction of Xenophon; or, thirdly, Xenophon wrote the extant Anabaſis, and, for reaſons, which thoſe acquainted with the circumſtances of his life and the hiſtory of the times will have no difficulty to conceive may have been powerful, choſe that, on its firſt publication, it ſhould paſs under another's name. The latter has been the belief of all antiquity; and, indeed, if it had not been fully known that the aſcription of the Anabaſis to Themiſtogenes was a fiction, the concurrence of all antiquity, in ſtripping that author of his juſt fame, ſo completely that, from Xenophon himſelf to Suidas, he is never once named as a writer of merit, in any work remaining to us, while, in ſo many, the Anabaſis is mentioned as the work of Xenophon, would be, if at all credible, certainly the moſt extraordinary circumſtance in the hiſtory of letters.

For the political and military hiſtorian, the important reſult of what has here been ſtated is, that, under every conſideration, the facts reported in the Anabaſis have the full authority of Xenophon. For myſelf, I will venture to add, I ſee no room for reaſonable doubt but that Xenophon was the writer.

CHAPTER

CHAPTER XXIV.

History of LACEDÆMON from the Reſtoration of the ATHENIAN Democracy, and Affairs of the GREEKS in ASIA from the Renewal of War between LACEDÆMON and PERSIA till the Recall of AGESILAUS from ASIA, in Conſequence of renewed War within GREECE.

SECTION I.

War reſolved by Lacedæmon againſt Perſia: Thimbron commander-in-chief: joined by the Cyreian Greek forces. Liberality of the Perſian government. Dercyllidas commander-in-chief: Truce with the ſatrap of Lydia, and war with the ſatrap of Bithynia. Mania ſatrapeſs of Æolia: Succeſſes of Dercyllidas in Æolia. Winter operations in Bithynia. Protection given to the Cherſoneſe. Proſperity of the Grecian Colonies. Ill-judged orders from Lacedæmon. Danger of the Grecian Colonies. Treaty concluded between Dercyllidas and Tiſſaphernes, for the complete emancipation of the Aſian Greeks from Perſian dominion.

WHEN the Lacedæmonians put an end to the Athenian empire, they vindicated to themſelves the ſovereinty of the ilands and of the Europeän cities; they placed their own governors, with the title of harmoſt, in Byzantium and in the Cherſoneſe; but they neither claimed any dominion on the continent of Aſia, nor aſſerted the freedom of the Grecian republics there: the allegiance of the Aſian Greeks was transferred from the Athenian people to the Perſian king; and, under him, to the ſatraps, Pharnabazus and Tiſſaphernes. Ken. Hel. l. 3. c. 1. ſ. 2.

We have ſeen that, among the Greeks of Aſia, Cyrus was popular, and Tiſſaphernes unpopular; inſomuch that, by a kind of rebellion againſt the ſatrap, the Ionians had attached themſelves to the prince. The event therefore

therefore of the expedition againſt the king, and the appointment of Tiſſaphernes to the great command which Cyrus had held, could not but be highly alarming to them. But, on the other hand, the glorious retreat of the Greeks who had accompanied the prince, and the clear evidence which their return in ſafety bore to the ſuperiority of the Grecian arms, afforded ground of incouragement. If the patronage of Lacedæmon could be obtained, whoſe councils commanded the united arms of Greece, little, it was hoped, would be to be apprehended from the ſatrap's vengeance. Refuſing therefore to acknowlege his authority, the Ionians ſent miniſters to Lacedæmon to ſolicit protection.

The Lacedæmonian government, leſs expecting friendſhip from the king and from Tiſſaphernes, on account of their connection with Cyrus, and valuing it leſs, as the fame of the actions of the Cyreian army taught to deſpiſe their enmity, reſolved that the Ionians ſhould be protected. Poſſibly circumſtances at home might contribute to this determination. It might be deſirable to employ a part of their people on forein ſervice; and for ſervice againſt an enemy, ſo much famed for wealth, and ſo little for bravery and military ſkill, volunteers would be numerous among the poor commonwealths of Peloponneſus. Four thouſand men were required from the allies. Only one thouſand were added from Lacedæmon; and they were all of thoſe called neodamodes; who, owing to the neceſſities of war their promotion from the condition of ſlaves to the rank of citizens, were on the return of peace looked upon with ſo invidious an eye, that an occaſion for ſending them on forein ſervice would be acceptable, both to the government and to themſelves. Cavalry was very deſirable for war in Aſia: but the utmoſt force that Peloponneſus could raiſe was very ſmall; and the principal citizens of the wealthieſt republics, who alone compoſed it, would not be the moſt willing partakers in diſtant adventure. Application was therefore made to Athens; where recent diſorders, extreme political jealouſy, and a total want of protection againſt any momentary caprice of the people, made the ſituation of men of rank and fortune ſo precarious, that the offer of pay for three hundred horſe found ready acceptance there. Thimbron was appointed commander-in-chief in Aſia, with the title of harmoſt.

Xen. Hel. l. 3. c. 1. ſ. 3.

B. C. 400. ending or 399 beginning Ol. 95. 1.

B. C. 399. Arriving in Ionia with his Europeän forces early in ſpring, Thimbron circulated a requiſition for an apportionment of troops from every Grecian city

city in Aſia; where, ſays Xenophon, at that time, all obeyed whatever a Lacedæmonian commanded. The Cyreians, under Xenophon, had been already ingaged for the ſervice, and were marching to join the Lacedæmonian army. Meanwhile, tho his force was conſiderable, Thimbron feared to traverſe the open country, in preſence of the Perſian cavalry, and thought it well if he could give ſome protection, againſt its ravages, to the country around poſts which he could ſecurely occupy. The junction of the Cyreians however gave him a decided ſuperiority; and many towns, before awed by the Perſian power, with ready zeal then opened their gates to him.

Four perſons, whoſe circumſtances deſerve notice, took this opportunity for embracing the Grecian cauſe; Euryſthenes and Procles, deſcendants of Demaratus, the exiled king of Lacedæmon who attended Xerxes into Greece, and Gorgion and Gongylus, deſcended from the Eretrian Gongylus, who, by his conduct alſo during the Perſian invaſion, had merited baniſhment from his country and favor from the Perſian monarch. The towns of Pergamus, Teuthrania, and Haliſarnia, given to Demaratus, and Gambrium, Palaigambrium, Myrina, and Grynium, to Gongylus, remained the property of their poſterity. Theſe gifts, from the Perſian king, ſeem to have had much of the nature of fiefs, in the Gothic kingdoms[1]. It would have been a gratification, at leaſt to our curioſity, if Xenophon had been fuller in explanation on the ſubject. From their attachment to the cauſe of Cyrus, and conſequent dread of the king's vengeance, apparently aroſe the revolt of thoſe Grecian ſubjects of the Perſian empire; which would, otherwiſe, mark groſs ingratitude to a beneficent government. For the teſtimony here given by Xenophon, remarkably correſponding with what remains from Herodotus and Thucydides, ſtrongly confirms, what has been heretofore remarked, that there was uncommon liberality in the deſpotiſm of the Perſian empire. Public faith was kept; property was not without ſecurity; it was not there, as under the preſent wonderfully barbarian government of the ſame fine country, a crime to be rich. Large eſtates, given even to foreiners, paſſed to their late poſterity; and inſtead of the tyranny which now depopulates towns and provinces, and againſt which the remain-

Xen. Hel. l. 3. c. 1. ſ. 4.

[1] In the Anabaſis, Procles is called ἄρχων, chief, or lord, of Teuthrania. Anab. l. 2. c. 1. ſ. 3.

ing ſubjects recur to the patronage of ſome forein ambaſſador, the Perſian government ſo extended liberal protection to all, that Grecian cities could prefer the dominion of the Perſian king to that of the Athenian or Lacedæmonian commonwealths, and flouriſh under it.

But, if the Perſian government was generally mild and liberal, it had been, ſince the reign of Xerxes, always weak, and verging to diſſolution. The Lacedæmonian general Thimbron, who, with comparatively a ſmall force, had been making conqueſts againſt it, ſhowed no conſiderable abilities in the field, and in camp and in quarters his diſcipline was very deficient. The allies ſuffered from the licentiouſneſs of his army, and complaints, in conſequence, were ſo urged at Lacedæmon, that, on the expiration of his year, he was ſentenced to baniſhment.

Xen. Hel. i. 3. c. 1. ſ. 5, 6.

B. C. 398. Ol. 95 $\frac{2}{3}$.

Dercyllidas, who ſucceeded him, was more equal to a great and difficult command. Having already ſerved in Aſia, under Lyſander, he knew the characters of the two ſatraps, who divided between them, in almoſt independent ſovereinty, the dominion of the weſtern provinces. The inſtructions of the ephors directed him to lead the army into Caria, the hereditary government of Tiſſaphernes. But the deſire of revenging a diſgrace he had formerly incurred, when harmoſt of Abydus, in conſequence of an accuſation from Pharnabazus, aſſiſted at leaſt, according to the cotemporary hiſtorian, his friend, in determining him to act otherwiſe. He negotiated with Tiſſaphernes, and that daſtardly ſatrap, ill-diſpoſed toward Pharnabazus, and always readier for negotiation than for battle, inſtead of exerting the great power, with which he was veſted, for the general defence of the empire, bargained for a particular peace for his own provinces, and conſented that the Grecian arms ſhould, without oppoſition from him, be carried into the Bithynian ſatrapy. Dercyllidas, having thus provided for the ſafety of the rich fields of Ionia, which would otherwiſe have been liable, in his abſence, to ſuffer from the Perſian cavalry, haſtened his march northward; and, in the length of way from Caria to the borders of Æolia, he maintained an exactneſs of diſcipline that gained him the greater credit with the allies, as it was contraſted with the licentiouſneſs from which the country had ſuffered while Thimbron commanded.

ſ. 6, 7, 8.

The circumſtances of Æolia might reaſonably have invited the attention of the general, tho revenge had not inſtigated. According to that

that liberal policy, more than once already noticed as ordinary among the Perſians, Pharnabazus had appointed Zenis, a Greek of Dardanum, to be governor, or, according to Xenophon's phraſe, ſatrap, of that fine country, ſo intereſting in earlieſt hiſtory, as the kingdom of Priam, and the ſeat of the Trojan war. Zenis died early, leaving a widow, Mania, alſo a Dardanian. This extraordinary woman ſolicited the ſucceſſion to her late huſband's command; and ſupported her ſolicitation with preſents ſo agreeable to the ſatrap's fancy, and proofs ſo pregnant of her own talents and ſpirit, that ſhe obtained her ſuit. Being accordingly veſted with the government, ſhe did not diſappoint, but, on the contrary, far exceeded the ſatrap's expectation. None of his governors collected and remitted the revenue more regularly; none accompanied the remittance with preſents more acceptable; none, when he made his progreſs through his ſatrapy, received him with ſuch elegant magnificence, or entertained him ſo agreeably. Theſe were a woman's merits, but ſhe united with them manly virtues. In the frequency of diſaffection and revolt among the Perſian provinces, no diſturbance happened under her government. She not only held all in due obedience, but, raiſing a body of Greek mercenaries, ſhe reduced the maritime towns of Lariſſa, Hamaxitus, and Colonæ, which had hitherto reſiſted the Perſian dominion. Herſelf attended the ſieges, viewing the operations from her chariot, and by praiſes and preſents, judiciouſly beſtowed, excited ſuch emulation, that her army acquired repute ſuperior to any other body of mercenaries in Aſia. When Pharnabazus required troops for ſuppreſſing the incurſions of the rebellious Myſians and Peiſidians, ſhe attended in perſon. In conſequence of her able conduct and high reputation, he always treated her with great reſpect, and ſometimes even deſired her aſſiſtance in his council.

Xen. Hel. l. 3. c. 1. ſ. 8, 9.

ſ. 10.

Mania was another Artemiſia; and the weighty authority of Xenophon, for the hiſtory of the Dardanian ſatrapeſs, not a little ſupports the account given by Herodotus of the Halicarnaſſian queen. But, tho Mania could govern provinces and conduct armies, yet, in the incouragement which the groſs defects, equally of Grecian and Perſian government, offered for daring villainy, ſhe could not ſecure herſelf againſt domeſtic treachery. She had ſcarcely paſſed her fortieth year, when ſhe was murdered in her palace, by Meidias, who had married her daughter. But a ſingle murder would not anſwer the execrable villain's purpoſe. Her ſon, a moſt promiſing

Ch. 8. ſ. 5. of this Hiſt.

ſ. 11.

miſing youth of ſeventeen, was cut off. The aſſaſſin had then the impu-
Xen. Hel. l. 3. c. 1. f. 12. dence to aſk, of the ſatrap, the ſucceſſion to the government held by the deceaſed Mania, ſupporting his ſolicitation by large preſents. But he ſeems to have founded his hopes on a knowlege, rather of the general temper and practice of the Perſian great, than of the particular character of Pharnabazus; who, with a generous indignation, refuſed his preſents, and declared he would not live unleſs he could revenge Mania. Meidias prepared to ſupport himſelf by force or intrigue, as circumſtances might direct. He had ſecured Gergis and Scepſis, fortified towns in which Mania's treaſures were depoſited: but the other towns of the province, with one conſent, refuſing to acknowlege his authority, adhered to Pharnabazus.

f. 13. Dercyllidas arrived upon the borders in this critical conjuncture. The ſatrap was unprepared, the Lacedæmonian name was popular; and the towns of Lariſſa, Hamaxitus, and Colonæ, in one day opened their gates. A declaration was then circulated, that the purpoſe of Dercyllidas and the Lacedæmonian government was to give perfect independency to the Æolian cities; deſiring only alliance defenſive and offenſive, with quarters for the army within their walls, whenever it might become requiſite in that ſervice, whoſe object was the common liberty of all Grecian people. The garriſons were moſtly compoſed of Greeks; attached to Mania, but indifferent to the intereſt of Pharnabazus[2]. The towns of Neandrus, Ilium, and Cocylus, acceded to the Spartan general's invitation. Hope of large
f. 14—16. reward for his fidelity induced the governor of Cebren to adhere to the ſatrap; but, upon the approach of the army, the people ſoon compelled him to ſurrender.

f. 17. Dercyllidas then marched toward Scepſis. The aſſaſſin Meidias fearful, at the ſame time, of the Spartan general, the Perſian ſatrap, and the Scepſian citizens, conceived his beſt hope to lie in accommodation with the former. He propoſed a conference, to which Dercyllidas conſented; and, ten principal men, of different cities, being ſent to him as hoſtages, he went to the Grecian camp. Deſiring to know upon what conditions he might

[2] Καὶ γὰρ οἱ φρουροῦντες Ἕλληνες ἐν αὐλαῖς (ταῖς πόλεσιν) ἐπεὶ ἡ Μανία ἀπέθανεν, οὐ πάνυ τι καλῶς περιέπονλο.—Quia, poſt mortem Maniæ præſidiarii Græci non admodum erga eos (cives urbium prædict.) recte ſe geſſerant. I have no ſcruple in giving the very different interpretation in the text. Smith, whoſe verſion differs here from both, is far from compenſating, in his Xenophon as in his Thucydides, for extreme inelegance, by a general exactneſs of litteral tranſlation.

be

be admitted to friendſhip and alliance, Dercyllidas anſwered, upon condition of allowing freedom and independency to the towns in which he had garriſons. But the march to Scepſis was not interrupted. Dercyllidas entered the town unoppoſed, ordered the garriſon to quit the citadel, and then aſſembling the people, directed them to aſſume the government, as became Greeks and freemen. He then proceeded to Gergis, taking Meidias with him. Intelligence of his liberality to the Scepſians had prepared his reception, and Meidias acquieſced. Acquitting himſelf then to that miſcreant, by reſtoring all his private property, with liberal allowance for all his claims, he ſeized the wealth of Mania, as now belonging to the ſatrap, the common enemy; and it was his boaſt, a grateful boaſt to the army, that he had inriched the military cheſt with a twelvemonth's pay for eight thouſand men.

Having thus, according to Xenophon's expreſſion, in eight days, taken nine cities (that is, having recovered from the Perſian dominion nine towns, accuſtomed each to its ſeparate and independent government, except as it might be occaſionally compelled to obey the commands of a maſter) it became the conſideration of Dercyllidas, how to preſerve their territories againſt the ravages of the Perſian cavalry, without burthening the people by quartering his army among them. Againſt their walls he little feared the efforts of Perſian arms. He was more apprehenſive of the licentiouſneſs, difficult to controul, of a republican army in quarters, and of complaints at Lacedæmon, like thoſe which had driven his predeceſſor into exile. He ſent propoſals of truce therefore to Pharnabazus. That generous ſatrap, unaſſiſted from the capital of the empire, and deſerted and betrayed by the great neighboring officer, whoſe more peculiar duty it was to afford him aſſiſtance, readily accepted them. Xenophon indeed ſays, that he was little diſturbed with the loſs of Æolia; eſteeming that province, under Lacedæmonian protection, while he had himſelf peace with Lacedæmon, rather a uſeful barrier againſt other enemies. What is meant by this we can only collect from what follows. The Bithynians, tho, as tributary ſubjects of the empire, he had aſſiſted them againſt the Cyreian army, were always licentious, ſometimes perhaps rebellious, and they frequently carried hoſtile depredation among the more peaceful and ſettled inhabitants of his ſatrapy.

Xen. Hel. l. 3. c. 2. ſ. 1.

Among

Xen. Hel. l. 3. c. 2. ſ. 2.

Among theſe people Dercyllidas reſolved to take his winter quarters, as in a hoſtile territory, and Pharnabazus expreſſed no diſſatisfaction.

That country muſt be naturally very productive, in which, under the management of ſuch a people as thoſe Bithynians who have been on a former occaſion deſcribed, an army, powerful enough to overbear oppoſition, could ſupply itſelf by plunder through the winter, plentifully, and without riſk. That the army of Dercyllidas did ſo, we are aſſured by Xenophon, who ſeems to have ſubſiſted from that plunder, much to his own ſatisfaction. Such ſucceſsful freebooting allured a body of Odryſians, ſubjects of Seuthes, from Europeän Thrace. Two hundred horſe and three hundred targeteers [3] came as allies of Lacedæmon to reïnforce Dercyllidas. They took their ſtation between two and three miles from the Grecian army, and throwing up a ſlight fortification, requeſted a Grecian guard for it, to inable them to marode in greater force. Dercyllidas allowing them two hundred heavy-armed, they exerted themſelves in depredation with ſuch ſkilful diligence, that ſhortly their camp was filled with booty, a large portion of which conſiſted in priſoners, whom they propoſed to ſell for ſlaves.

The Bithynians, unable or fearful to reſiſt theſe plunderers, were however attentive to their motions; and having obſerved the ſmallneſs of their camp, and learnt the amount of its guard, reſolved to take opportunity of their abſence for attacking it. Aſſembling accordingly in great numbers, horſe and foot, and watching the march of the Odryſians to a ſufficient diſtance, they made their aſſault. Their miſſile weapons ſo reached every part of the ſmall incloſure, that the Greeks were unable to withſtand them. Fifteen only made their way through the irregular aſſailants and reached their own camp; the reſt were killed. The Bithynians then broke into the Odryſian camp, recovered their priſoners and effects, killed all the tentkeepers [4], and retired ſo rapidly, that the Greek army, marching as ſoon as intelligence of the aſſault reached them, found nothing but naked corpſes.

The funeral ceremony of their dead occupied the Odryſians on their return. It was graced with games, as among the Greeks of Homer's age;

[3] An error may perhaps reaſonably be ſuſpected in theſe numbers. They ſeem too ſcanty for what we ſhall find they effected; eſpecially if we compare it with what we may recollect the Cyreians ſuffered in the ſame country.

[4] Σκηνοφύλακες.

but

but the favorite game of the Odryſians, leſs known to the father of poetry, was the ſimple horſerace. Large quantities of wine were alſo drunk over the graves; a practice ſpred, perhaps among the deſcendants of the Odryſians, over the diſtant iland of Britain, and preſerved to this day, equally in the bleak mountains of Scotland, fartheſt north, and among the ſoft hills of Wight, ſevered by the tide from the ſouthern coaſt. Providing then for the future ſecurity of their camp, by pitching it cloſe to the Grecian, the Odryſians no longer contented themſelves with plunder, but carried revenge by fire and ſword extenſively through Bithynia.

In ſpring Dercyllidas led the army to Lampſacus. He had carried command in a manner ſo ſuperior to his predeceſſor, that, inſtead of complaint, report ſo favorable had been tranſmitted to Lacedæmon, that, againſt the general rule, he was continued a ſecond year in his ſituation. In Lampſacus he found commiſſioners ſent to notify that honor to him, and to communicate the commendations of the ephors to the army, particularly for their regular and inoffenſive conduct among the allied cities. They came alſo authorized to inſpect the ſtate both of the army and of the allies. Dercyllidas gladly forwarded them, to witneſs the peace and proſperity which Æolis and Ionia injoyed under his ſuperintendency, and to hear the grateful teſtimonies of a happy people to his ability, probity, and diligence. B. C. 397. Ol. 95. 3/4.

Since he had been in Aſia, Dercyllidas had fought no great battle, nor taken any town by aſſault; but, in an army which, under his predeceſſor, had been ſo lawleſs as to be a terror more to friends than enemies, he had reſtored exact diſcipline, and yet was the favorite of that army. With that army then he had awed the two great ſatraps, each commanding a province equal to a powerful kingdom, and both together acting under the mightieſt empire in the world; ſo that, after having given independency and ſecurity to the long line of Ionian and Æolian colonies, he could direct his views another way for the benefit of the Grecian name. Xen. Hel. l. 3. c. 2. ſ. 6.

The Thracian Cherſoneſe, once the principality of the renowned Miltiades, lately, in large proportion the property of another great and ſingular character, Alcibiades, and by its fertility, its many harbours, and its advantageous ſituation for trade, always a great object for induſtrious adventurers from Greece, was however always ſubject to dreadful incurſions from

from the wild hords of Thracians, who made it their glory to live by rapine. Alcibiades, maintaining a military force for the defence of his property, and extending the advantage of its protection to the Grecian ſettlers generally, ſeems to have held a degree of dominion among them. Perhaps Cleärchus, forbidden, as we have ſeen, by the Lacedæmonian adminiſtration, but inabled, by the bounty of Cyrus, to become their next protector, aſpired at leaſt to ſimilar dominion. Before the return of the Cyrean army, however, the Lacedæmonian adminiſtration had ſo far directed their attention to the Cherſoneſe, as to have ſent a governor thither, with their uſual title of harmoſt; but, either he had been withdrawn, or the force intruſted to him, or his ability to uſe it, were deficient; for the Thracian inroads were renewed, and ſo ſucceſsfully, that the Cherſoneſites, in a petition to Lacedæmon for protection, declared that if it was not granted they muſt abandon the country. Dercyllidas, informed of this, before orders could come to himſelf from Lacedæmon, or another could be ſent with the commiſſion, reſolved to execute the ſervice. He ſent to Pharnabazus a propoſal for prolonging the exiſting truce, which was immediately accepted; and, having thus provided for the tranquility of Aſia, he tranſported his army to the Europeän ſhore. Immediately he viſited the Thracian prince Seuthes, by whom he was very hoſpitably entertained; and having arranged, apparently to his ſatisfaction, thoſe matters in which his commonwealth and that prince had a common concern, he marched to the Cherſoneſe. There he employed his army, not in plunder and deſtruction, but in raiſing a rampart acroſs the iſthmus, to ſecure the peace of the rich country and induſtrious people within. The iſthmus is only four miles over; the peninſula contained eleven conſiderable towns, many harbours, a large extent of rich land under various cultivation, arable, vineyard, fruit-plantations, ſpacious paſtures adapted to every kind of cattle, and ſtill conſiderable tracts which might be allotted to new coloniſts. The poſſeſſors of this valuable territory were unequal to its defence; becauſe, for its cultivation, they uſed principally the induſtry of ſlaves, whom they dared not truſt with arms. The work of Dercyllidas inabled them to become their own protectors. Begun in ſpring, it was completed before autumn [5], and the army was reconveyed

Xen. Hel. l. 3. c. 2. ſ. 7, 8. Diod. l. 14. c. 39.

B. C. 397. Ol. 95 ¾.

[5] Πρὸ ὀπώρας.

into

into Aſia. Dercyllidas then made a progreſs through the Aſiatic cities, to inſpect the ſtate of things, and had the ſatisfaction to find everywhere peace, proſperity, and general content. Xen. Hel. l. 3. c. 2. ſ. 9

A ſingle exception will deſerve notice, as it tends to illuſtrate the political circumſtances of the country, and manners reſulting from them. With governments ſo imperfect, and territories ſo narrow, as thoſe of the Grecian republics, ſo liable to inteſtine commotion, ſo open to forein attack, peace and civil order could be ſecure, only under the ſtrong controul of a ſuperintending power, lodged, fortunately for a time, in honeſt and able hands. Thus the condition of the Aſian Greeks, in the confeſſion of that honeſt eulogiſt of democracy, Herodotus, was improved by their reduction under the Perſian empire, after their rebellion againſt the firſt Darius. In the want of ſuch a ſuperintending power, faction had now expelled a number of Chians from their iland. Men driven from their homes and poſſeſſions to vagrancy, beggary, and ſtarving, ſometimes in numbers amounting almoſt to half the free population of a republic, would be likely to reſort to violent expedients. The firſt thing to look out for was ſubſiſtence; and, while neceſſity drove, allurement ſometimes invited, to maroding, as a profeſſion. The Chian exiles ſeized Atarneus, a ſtrong poſt on the continent, overagainſt their iland; and the produce of the rich Ionian fields, cultivated by unarmed ſlaves for unwarlike maſters, became in large proportion theirs. When Dercyllidas came to the protection of the Ionians, the Chian exiles had collected proviſions for eight months. He formed the blockade of their hold, too ſtrong for the art of attack, of that age, to reduce by any other mode of ſiege. While their proviſions ſerved, they reſiſted; and then, by their ſubmiſſion, the tranquility of Ionia and Æolia became complete.

But, while the cities of thoſe provinces, proſpering and happy, and adminiſtering each its own affairs, under the able and benign ſuperintendency of Dercyllidas, injoyed at leaſt the preſent bleſſings of freedom, thoſe of Caria had to complain, that their intereſts had been neglected, that they had been diſappointed even of a promiſed relief, and that the treaty, concluded with Tiſſaphernes, was an expreſs compact for their continuance in ſ. 10.

ſubjection to a forein dominion. The ſea being open to them, they could communicate with Lacedæmon, and they ſent to requeſt, that their ſituation might not be overlooked, by the vindicators of the liberties of Greece. If the Lacedæmonian arms were carried into Caria, they ſaid, Tiſſaphernes, to ſave his own large property there, would readily grant the independency, ſo neceſſary to their happineſs, and ſo deſirable for the glory of the Grecian, and eſpecially of the Lacedæmonian name. The ephors ſeem too lightly to have yielded to their arguments, without communication with their able commander, or with any others duly acquainted with the circumſtances of Aſia. They ſent orders, for war to be carried into Caria; for the army under Dercyllidas to march thither; and for the fleet, then commanded by Pharax, to coöperate with it.

B. C. 396. Ol. 95. 4. Spring.

The firſt effect of theſe ill-concerted meaſures appears to have been to produce, or at leaſt to haſten, a union between the two ſatraps, Tiſſaphernes and Pharnabazus; whoſe long variance had, in no ſmall degree, contributed to thoſe great ſucceſſes, which the Greeks, with a force otherwiſe inadequate to a contention with the Perſian empire, had been inabled to obtain. Pharnabazus, unſupported by the court of Suſa, and baſely deſerted, or worſe than deſerted, by Tiſſaphernes, his immediate ſuperior in command, had acquieſced under the loſs of Æolia. But, as ſoon as the threatened attack of Caria afforded a probability that Tiſſaphernes would be diſpoſed to change his conduct, Pharnabazus went to wait upon him, and declared his readineſs to coöperate zealouſly in meaſures for driving the Greeks out of Aſia. This propoſal, to which the jealouſy and puſillanimity of Tiſſaphernes otherwiſe would ſcarcely have liſtened, was made acceptable by the indiſcreet violence of the Spartan government. The two ſatraps went together into Caria, and, having arranged matters for the defence of that country, returned to take the command of an army which threatened Ionia with deſtruction.

Xen. Hel. l. 3. c. 2. ſ. 11.

Xen. ut ſup. Diod. l. 14. c. 40.

Dercyllidas was already marching for Caria, when information reached him, that all his hitherto-ſucceſsful labors, for the welfare of the colonies, were upon the point of being rendered utterly vain. He conſulted Pharax, and they ventured together to diſobey their ill-judged inſtructions. Returning haſtily northward, Dercyllidas met intelligence that the ſatraps had already

Xen. Hel. l. 3. c. 2. ſ. 12.

already entered the Epheſian territory. He was puſhing his march through the rich vale of the Meander, in whoſe luxuriant ſoil the growth of corn commonly exceeds a man's height, when ſome of his advanced guard, mounting on ſome tombs by the road-ſide (for the road-ſide was the place of burial among Greeks as well as Romans) diſcovered the Perſian army in order of battle. Immediately he gave orders for forming; but, while he attended the ſacrifice, which the Lacedæmonians held indiſpenſable before action, numbers of his Aſian Greeks left their arms in the corn, and fled; and it became evident that his dependence muſt be upon his ſmall force of European troops alone. B. C. 396. Ol. $\frac{95}{96}$. 1. May ending or June beginning. Xen. Hel. l. 3. c. 2. ſ. 13.

In theſe moſt alarming circumſtances, the intereſted puſillanimity of Tiſſaphernes relieved him. Pharnabazus was deſirous of ingaging, but Tiſſaphernes, already more than half ſatisfied, ſince his property in Caria was no longer in immediate danger, would firſt try the effect of a conference. A herald was accordingly ſent to the Grecian general. Dercyllidas, anxious to prevent obſervation of the ſtate of his army, advanced with a choſen eſcort. Such then being the circumſtances, that both parties were deſirous to avoid a battle, it was preſently agreed, that the Greek army ſhould march to Leucophrys, the Perſian to Tralles, and that a place ſhould be appointed where the generals ſhould next day meet. The conference being held accordingly, Dercyllidas inſiſted on the ſimple propoſition, ſ. 15. 'that all Grecian cities ſhould be independent.' To this the ſatraps conſented, with the conditions, 'that the Grecian army ſhould quit the king's 'territory' (by which ſeems to have been meant Aſia, including the Grecian colonies) 'and that the Lacedæmonian governors ſhould quit the 'Grecian towns.' Upon theſe terms a truce was concluded, to hold till the pleaſure of the king and of the Lacedæmonian government could be known. ſ. 14.

This was the firſt treaty, reported on any authentic or even probable teſtimony, by which, ſince the early times of the Lydian monarchy, it was provided that the Aſian Greeks ſhould be completely emancipated from foreign dominion. All the Ionian and Æolian cities, it appears, had the immediate injoyment of independency in peace. The Carians ſeem to have waited the confirmation of the treaty by the king of Perſia and the

Lacedæmonian government. But it was a quiet revolution: no great battle gave it ſplendor; none of thoſe ſtriking events attended, which invite the attention of the writer, in proportion as they are fitted to impreſs the fancy of the reader. It forms nevertheleſs a memorable and intereſting era in Grecian hiſtory; and the fame of Dercyllidas, leſs brilliant, yet far purer, than that of moſt of the great men of Greece, tho being recorded by the pen of Xenophon, it is indeed ſecured againſt periſhing, yet deſerves to have been more generally and more pointedly noticed than we find it, by writers whoſe theme has been Grecian hiſtory, or panegyric of the Grecian character [6].

Diod. l. 14. c. 39.

We have from Diodorus an account, which may deſerve notice, of the manner in which the affairs of Lacedæmon were adminiſtered, in its colony of the Trachinian Heracleia. It was when Dercyllidas was ſent to command in Aſia, that the ſuperintendancy of Heracleia was committed to Herippidas. The colony had been, in the uſual way of Grecian cities, diſtracted by faction. Herippidas ſummoned a general aſſembly, in which perſons of all parties met; apparently in ſome confidence, that the repreſentative of the preſiding commonwealth of Greece would adminiſter juſtice in mercy to all. But he took a more ſummary method, for reſtoring quiet, than could eaſily conſiſt with juſtice. Surrounding the place of meeting with an armed force, he ſeized five hundred of thoſe ſuppoſed adverſe to the Lacedæmonian intereſt, or to the intereſt of that party in Lacedæmon with which he was connected, and they were all put to death. We ſhall give credit to report from Diodorus, always in proportion to its conſonance with the accounts of writers of beſt judgement, cotemporary, or moſt nearly ſo, with the tranſactions; and his account here is but too much in conſonance with all that we learn on beſt authority. After this military execution, upon an unreſiſting people, Herippidas marched againſt the rude inhabitants of the neighboring highlands of Œta, who had rebelled

[6] ——Πρότερον δὲ διὰ Θίμβρωνος ἔιτα διὰ Δερκυλλίδου πολεμοῦντες (οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι) οὐδὲν δὲ πρατοιτις ἀξιολογον.—Plut. vit. Artax. p. 1867. t. 3. Plutarch had either forgotten what he had red in Xenophon, or, with his uſual deficiency of judgement in military and political affairs, very much miſeſtimated the merit of Dercyllidas; and modern hiſtorians ſeem to have neglected the informed and able cotemporary, who was a witneſs to the fact, to follow the ſpeculator of ſome centuries after.

againſt

againſt the Lacedæmonian ſovereinty. He was ſo ſucceſsful as to compel the whole tribe to migrate, with their families, into Theſſaly, whence they afterward paſſed into Bœotia, invited by ſome circumſtances, not reported to us, which favored their reception.

SECTION II.

War of Lacedæmon and Elis. Death of Agis, king of Lacedæmon, and ſucceſſion of Ageſilaus. Sedition in Lacedæmon.

FORMERLY the inſtitutions of Lycurgus had ſufficed to inforce, very generally among the Lacedæmonians, that modeſty in command, which, united with dignity of manner, contempt of wealth, and ſuperiority in military and political knowlege, induced the Grecian republics, conſcious of the neceſſity, for general quiet, of having ſomewhere a head, to yield a willing obedience to them. But in the long and wide courſe of the Peloponneſian war, communication with ſtrangers, unavoidably much greater than the inſtitutions of Lycurgus would approve, together with the neceſſity of raiſing and employing a public revenue, far greater than ever entered into the legiſlator's contemplation, had altered and corrupted Spartan manners; ſo that, when the war was at length concluded, ſo happily in their favor, they were no longer capable of bearing their high fortune. We have ſeen, in the account of Xenophon, their friend and panegyriſt, what plenitude of power their officers, in tranſmarine commands, aſſumed, and with what haughty tyranny they exerciſed it. Unqueſtionably it muſt have been far other conduct that eſtabliſhed that reputation of Lacedæmon, which had led united Greece to refuſe obedience to any but a Lacedæmonian commander, even in naval war againſt the Perſians, when Lacedæmon contributed ſo very ſmall a proportion to the national fleet; which led the rich Sicilian cities to union under a Lacedæmonian general, bringing

Ch. 8. ſ. 4. of this Hiſt.

Ch. 18 ſ. 5—8. of this Hiſt.

bringing no force with him but the ſplendor of the Lacedæmonian name; which, at the Olympian and other national meetings, made, as Iſocrates ſays, every Lacedæmonian more an object of general curioſity and admiration than the victors in the games; which in ſhort eſtabliſhed, through the Greek nation, a reſpect for the Lacedæmonian character, ſuch as never perhaps was paid to that of any other people.

Iſocr. Archid. p. 76 t. 2.

Of the circumſtances which, ſo ſoon after the concluſion of the Peloponneſian war, introduced diſcord again among the Grecian cities, and excited oppoſition to Lacedæmon where it might leaſt have been expected, our information is very defective. From the following occurrences only we gather, in ſome degree, the cauſe of that diſguſt and alienation, which we have already ſeen manifeſted in the conduct of Thebes and Corinth. Thebes claimed ſovereinty over the other towns of Bœotia. Lacedæmon favored the claim of thoſe towns to be independent of Thebes, with the purpoſe of holding them in dependence upon herſelf. Probably ſome haughty and ungracious interference of Lacedæmon, raiſing extenſive diſſatisfaction in Thebes, had afforded that advantage to the democratical leaders, which inabled them to gain the aſcendant over the ariſtocratical party, always in ſome degree the Lacedæmonian party, which had ſo long ruled that city. The ſucceſs of the democratical party in Thebes would of courſe raiſe hope and energy in that of Corinth, which always held friendly communication with Argos. It ſeems to have been with the ſupport of Argos and Thebes, that democracy gained aſcendancy in Corinth; and thus the two cities, which were the principal allies of Lacedæmon throughout the Peloponneſian war, became alienated, almoſt immediately after its concluſion.

Ch. 21. ſ. 3. of this Hiſt.

That Lacedæmon itſelf was diſtracted by faction, and its adminiſtration conſequently unſteddy, we learn from the circumſtances which led to the reſtoration of the Athenian democracy; and hence, while among the Aſiatic cities, as Xenophon ſays, every one obeyed whatever any Lacedæmonian commanded, the cities of Greece more readily ventured reſiſtance to the moſt formal orders of the Lacedæmonian government. It does not appear that any meaſures were immediately taken, in reſentment for the protection afforded by Thebes to Athenian fugitives, of the party moſt inimical to Lacedæmon, or for the refuſal of both Thebes and Corinth

to

to obey requiſitions, which the treaty of confederacy authorized. A nearer intereſt, or one which more affected the feelings of the Lacedæmonian people, drew their attention.

In that ſyſtem, if it may be ſo called, by which the various members of the Greek nation were in ſome degree held together, we find a ſtrange mixture of undefined, and ſometimes repugnant claims, more or leſs generally admitted. While the Lacedæmonians preſided, with authority far too little defined, over the political and military affairs of Greece, the Eleians aſſerted a preſcriptive right to a kind of religious ſupremacy, alſo too little defined; univerſally allowed nevertheleſs, in a certain degree, but, like the Lacedæmonian ſupremacy, not always to the extent to which the claimants pretended. In the ſchiſm of Peloponneſus, which occurred during the Peloponneſian war, it may be remembered, the imperial ſtate of Lacedæmon was ſummoned to the Eleian tribunal, as one of our corporations might be ſummoned to our courts at Weſtminſter, a fine impoſed, its citizens interdicted the common games and ſacrifices of the nation, an opprobrious puniſhment publicly inflicted upon an aged and reſpectable Spartan, who, but by implication, offended againſt their decrees; and, finally, theſe meaſures ſupported by avowed hoſtilities, and alliance with the enemies of Sparta. The neceſſity of the times induced the Lacedæmonians to make peace, with theſe affronts unrevenged; but their ſmothered reſentment had been revived and increaſed by what they eſteemed a new indignity. Before the concluſion of the Peloponneſian war, Agis king of Lacedæmon being ſent, in purſuance of a ſuppoſed prophetical direction, to perform a ſacrifice to Jupiter at Olympia, the Eleians forbad the ceremony. They affirmed that, according to antient law, no oracle ſhould be conſulted for ſucceſs in wars between Greeks and Greeks, and they would allow no prayer for victory in ſuch a war. There is a beneficence, a liberal and extended patriotiſm in this ideä, ſo conſonant to the ſpirit with which Iphitus is ſaid to have founded the Olympian feſtival, and ſo oppoſite to the tenets afterward generally prevailing in Greece, that they ſeem to mark the law for antient and genuine. The Lacedæmonians however were not the leſs offended with the Eleians, for bringing forward, upon ſuch an occaſion, what, if thoſe maxims only were conſidered, which

Xen. Hel. l. 3. c. 2. ſ. 16.

prevailed

prevailed through ſucceeding ages, it muſt be confeſſed would carry much the appearance of a complete novelty.

Xen. Hel. l. 3. c. 2. ſ. 27.

The judgement paſſed againſt the Lacedæmonians and the fine impoſed, the interdiction of the games, the puniſhment of Leichas, the confederacy with Athens and Argos, the hoſtilities inſuing, and finally the refuſal of permiſſion for ſacrifice at Olympia, are ſtated by the cotemporary hiſtorian as the motives which diſpoſed the Lacedæmonians to war. We gather from him however that others exiſted; the democratical party at this time governed Elis, and Elis held many towns of Elcia in ſubjection. The Lacedæmonians did not abſolutely require oligarchy in every ſtate of Greece; for they had lately permitted the reſtoration of democracy in Athens; and even their own government had a mixture of democracy: but they always beheld, with peculiar jealouſy, dominion exerciſed by a democratical commonwealth. Urged then at the ſame time by reſentment for paſt inſults, and conſideration of a preſent political intereſt, the ephors aſſembling the people, it was decreed 'That the Eleians ſhould be chaſ-
B. C. 396. Ol. 95. 2. 'tened,' or, as the hiſtorian's word may be explained, 'ſhould be com-
'pelled to a conduct better regulated by prudence and modeſty[7].'

In purſuance of this reſolution, miniſters were ſent to Elis with a declaration 'That the Lacedæmonians deemed it juſt and proper for the 'towns, held in ſubjection by the Eleians, to be reſtored to independency.' The Eleians, alledging the right of conqueſt, refuſed to reſign their ſovereinty; and upon this the ephors ordered the king, Agis, to march into their country. The uſual ravage of Grecian armies was already begun, when an earthquake, imagined a divine admonition, alarming the aged prince and his ſuperſtitious people, they retired out of Eleia, and the troops were diſmiſſed to their ſeveral homes.

Whether as marking the favor of the gods or the weakneſs of their enemies, this conduct greatly incouraged the Eleians. In either view it improved the hope of gaining to their cauſe many Grecian ſtates, known

[7] Σωφρονίσαι αὐτούς.

[8] Dodwell places the beginning of the Elcian war in the 4th year of the 94th Olympiad, B. C. 401. But he appears to me thus inconſiſtent with Xenophon, and even with himſelf. The Eleian war was concluded early in its third year. The death of Agis clearly followed in the ſame ſummer; and it does not appear, nor does Dodwell ſay, that there was any conſiderable interval before the determination in favor of Ageſilaus, of whoſe ſucceſſion he ſays, Hoc certe hujus Olympiadis xcv anno 4; that is, after midſummer, B. C. 397.

to

to be diſaffected toward Lacedæmon. But if the Lacedæmonian ſovereignty was tyrannical, theirs apparently was not leſs ſo; and while they were cheriſhing the hope of forein aſſiſtance, they did not take wiſer precautions than other Grecian ſtates for ſecuring the attachment of their ſubjects. In the next ſpring, Agis again entered Eleia with an army, to which all the allies contributed, except Corinth and Bœotia. Immediately Lepreum revolted to him; Maciſtus and Epitalium quickly followed the example, and theſe were imitated, as he advanced into the country, by Leprinë, Amphidolia, and Marganeæ. In this defection of their towns, the Eleians were utterly unable to face the Lacedæmonian army in the field. Agis proceeded, unoppoſed, to Olympia, and ſacrificed, now unforbidden, on the altar of Jupiter. The territories of the revolting towns of courſe had been ſpared; but plunder and devaſtation marked the way from Olympia to Elis, whither the king next directed his march. Nor did the country ſuffer only from the conquering army. The opportunity of freebooting invited the rapacity of the neighboring Arcadians and Achaians; and ſlaves and cattle and corn were carried off to ſuch an amount, that all the markets of Peloponneſus were glutted with Eleian plunder. It was ſuppoſed that Agis would not, rather than that he could not, take Elis itſelf, which was unfortified. After deſtroying many fair buildings of the outſkirts, he proceeded to Cyllenë, the principal ſeaport of the Eleians, and ravage was extended from the mountains to the ſea.

Xen. Hel. l. 3. c. 2. ſ. 19.

Occaſion has already frequently occurred to remark, that ſcarcely any misfortune could befall a Grecian ſtate, which would not bring advantage, or at leaſt the hope of advantage, to ſome conſiderable portion of its ſubjects. The ariſtocratical party in Elis, oppreſſed by the demagogue Thraſydæus, looked to the preſent ſufferings of their country as the means of relief; but with no better conſideration of any political or moral principle, than might have guided the wildeſt ſavages, or the moſt profligate among the loweſt populace in civilized nations. They propoſed to aſſaſſinate Thraſydæus, with a few of his confidential friends; and then, in the name of the commonwealth, to open a negotiation with Lacedæmon. The people, they truſted, deprived of their leader, and dreading the arms of the Lacedæmonians, would acquieſce; and thus the principal power in the ſtate would of courſe come into their hands. The plot failed through

ſ. 20.

a miſtake, by which another was murdered for Thraſydæus. The people, however, for ſome time, thought their favorite dead, and reſted in ſilent dejection; but, while the conſpirators were arming, and ſtationing their party, the demagogue awoke, where drunkenneſs and ſupervening ſleep had, overnight, checked his way. The people immediately flocked about him; a battle followed, and the conſpirators, overpowered, fled to the Lacedæmonian camp.

Xen. Hel. l. 3. c. 2. ſ. 21.

The conduct of the war was ſuch as we have ſo often ſeen in Greece. When plunder no longer remained to employ the Lacedæmonian army profitably, Agis marched home, leaving only a garriſon in Epitalium on the Alpheius, where he eſtabliſhed the Eleian fugitives. Hence rapine was occaſionally proſecuted through the autumn and winter. Elis could not, like Athens, ſupport itſelf under the continual ravage of its territory.

B C. 397. Ol. 95. 3.

In ſpring therefore Thraſydæus opened a negotiation with Lacedæmon, and at once offered the independency of all the towns over which the Eleians claimed ſovereinty by right of conqueſt; propoſing only to keep Epeium, whoſe territory they had purchaſed from the inhabitants, for thirty talents, fairly paid.

ſ. 22.

The Lacedæmonians however, conſidering, or affecting to conſider, the purchaſe as forced, required that Epeium ſhould be free like the reſt. The diſpoſition thus apparent in the Lacedæmonians to depreſs Elis, incouraged the villagers of the Piſan territory to aſſert their claim to the ſuperintendancy of the Olympian temple, violently taken from their anceſtors by the Eleians, when their city was deſtroyed. But, whatever might have been the antient right, the Lacedæmonian adminiſtration, thinking thoſe uneducated pretenders unfit for an office of much ſolemnity and dignity in the eyes of all Greece, would not interfere. Upon the condition therefore that every town of Eleia ſhould be, as a free republic, a ſeparate member of the Lacedæmonian confederacy, peace was made; and Elis, according to the decree before the war, humbled and chaſtened, was itſelf alſo reſtored to its place in that confederacy.

The imputation of impiety, under which, from the Eleians at leaſt, the Lacedæmonians began the war, perhaps urged them to a more oſtentatious diſplay of reſpect for the gods at the end of it. Agis himſelf was deputed

c. 3. ſ. 1.

to offer, at Delphi, the tenth of the ſpoil. In his return, he was taken ill

at

at Heræa, and he died ſoon after his arrival at Lacedæmon. In the magnificence of his funeral, the Lacedæmonians probably meant alſo to exhibit their own piety, as well as to teſtify their opinion of the deceaſed prince's merit. They failed however in their eſtimate of the prevailing prejudices of the Grecian people. Honor to the gods indeed, was ſuppoſed to be beſt ſhown, and religion principally to conſiſt, in pompous proceſſions and expenſive ſpectacles; but general opinion condemned the ſplendor of the funeral of Agis, as greater than could become the moſt illuſtrious mortal.

B. C. 397. Ol. 95. 4. After Midſummer.

If circumſtances occurring, ſince the Peloponneſian war, have not ſhown the Spartan conſtitution very well adapted to extenſive empire, thoſe brought forward, by the death of Agis, will not give any very favorable impreſſion of its interior ſyſtem. Agis left a reputed ſon, Leotychides; whom however he had been known to diſown; and even his queen Timæa was reported to have declared, that her adulterous commerce with Alcibiades had given birth to the child. Againſt the claim of this dubious prince, Ageſilaus, half-brother of Agis, being ſon of Archidamus by a ſecond wife, was ſupported by Lyſander, who ſtood at the head of a powerful party. Ageſilaus, many years younger than Agis, was yet in the vigor of youth [9], but lame; and the partizans of Leotychides urged againſt his pretenſion the authority of an antient oracle, which admoniſhed the Lacedæmonians 'to beware of halting royalty.' This objection to his friend, Lyſander anſwered by a different interpretation of the oracle. Such abſurdity, he inſiſted, was not intended by the god as to admoniſh men to provide that a man ſhould never be lame; the purpoſe of the divine admonition was to guard the ſucceſſion in the poſterity of Hercules; and then only royalty would truly halt, when a man not of the royal line ſhould aſcend the throne. When we find a diſcuſſion of ſuch importance related by the pen of Xenophon, and when we know that two at leaſt of the perſons intereſted, Ageſilaus and Lyſander, were able and great men, we ſhould impute perhaps to change of circumſtances and manners, the

Xen. Hel. l. 3. c. 3. ſ. 2. Plut. vit. Ageſ. init.

[9] Ἀγησίλαος τοίνυν, ἅτι μὲν νέος ὢν ἔτυχε τῆς βασιλείας. Xen. Ageſil. init. Agis was ſon of Archidamus by Lamprido, Ageſilaus by Eupolia.

difficulty we have to discover any dignity, almost any decency or even common sense in the proceedings. Leaving them, therefore, for readers whose curiosity may lead them to consult the cotemporary historian, suffice it here to say, that, by the votes of the general assembly of the Lacedæmonians, it was decided that Agesilaus should reign.

Athens, in the age of which we are treating, is nearly as well known to us as our own country, two hundred years ago. The remaining works of historians, orators, lawyers, poets, and philosophers, give almost every information we could wish. But about Lacedæmon we are much in the dark. The Lacedæmonians wrote no books, published no speeches, discountenanced the residence of foreiners among them, and made secrecy in matters of government a maxim, not only of their policy, but of their religion. We know the Lacedæmonians therefore almost only in forein command. With the prerogatives of their kings, which were principally exercised in forein command, we are well acquainted; but of the proper authority of the ephors, of the senate, of the people, of the lesser assembly, which seems to have been composed of Spartans only, of the greater assembly, to which the people of the provincial towns or their deputies were summoned, we learn little. Something of the state of parties becomes occasionally discovered, through its connection with forein polities. But internal transactions, gradual revolutions in laws, manners, and politics, and those deviations from the system of Lycurgus, which length of time and great changes in the circumstances of the commonwealth had produced, conquests, forein connections, extensive power, more extensive influence, the various communication of its people, in command and in negotiation, in war and in peace, the avowed introduction of public wealth for the maintenance of fleets and armies, the surreptitious acquisitions of individuals by the various means which forein service afforded, and, what was not least in importance, the accumulation of property in the hands of individual citizens, through inheritance from females; of all these matters we have but very obscure information. All accounts of the system of Lycurgus indicate, that he allowed no distinction of rank or privileges among his people, but from age or merit. But, in the course of centuries, a very material distinction had arisen. The families established in the capital, peculiarly

peculiarly named Spartans, had ingroſſed almoſt the whole power of the commonwealth. The reſt of the people, included under the general name of Lacedæmonians, or the ſtill more extenſive appellation of Lacons or Laconians, were excluded from the higher offices, civil and military. So early as the age of Xerxes, we find a great diſtinction; for, in the army which fought under Pauſanias, at the celebrated battle of Platæa, every Spartan was attended by ſeven Helots, every other Lacedæmonian by only one. The Spartans in that army were, according to Herodotus, five thouſand, and the Lacedæmonians only an equal number. In the age of Xenophon, the Spartan families appear to have been very much reduced. In Sparta itſelf they made but a ſmall proportion of the inhabitants; and the diſtinguiſhing name of PEERS [10] was then attached to thoſe families which were allowed to pretend to the ſuperior dignities of the ſtate.

Herod l. 9. c. 29.

Xen. Hel. l. 3. c. 3. ſ. 5.

It is however evident, from all accounts of Lacedæmonian affairs, that, from the age of Lycurgus till toward the period to which we are now arrived, the diſtinction of ranks in Lacedæmon was leſs invidious than in any other Grecian ſtate: the whole body of the people was better amalgamated; and the factions, known by the ſeveral names, marking however nearly the ſame diſtinctions, of the rich and the poor, the nobles and the commons, the Few and the Many, which divided every other Grecian republic, are there little heard of [11]. But it appears probable, that, after the concluſion of the Peloponneſian war, when, through the vaſt acqui-

[10] Τῶν Ὁμοίων. Xen. Hel. l. 3. c. 3. ſ. 5.

[11] It by no means however follows that ſlaves, or thoſe known of ſervile origin, were admitted, as Barthelemi pretends, (c. 42. p. 103. vol. 4. ed. 8°.) to the firſt honors of the ſtate. The attention with which Barthelemi has ſtudied Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon, or even the authority of Plutarch, ſhould have ſufficed to make him diſtruſt the weak aſſertion of Ælian, that Callicratidas, Gylippus and Lyſander were of neodamode families. It very ſufficiently appears, from the cotemporary writers, that none ſuch could, in their age, arrive at the high ſtations which they filled. Herodotus has commemorated the firſt ſtrangers, known to have been admitted to the privileges of Spartans; and it was not forty years after, that Cleandridas, father of Gylippus, occupied the exalted office of regent. Gylippus himſelf was choſen for the Sicilian command, not more for his abilities, than for his rank. His known dignity of Spartan blood, was the very circumſtance propoſed to induce the deference of the Sicilians to his authority; and, for Lyſander, Barthelemi himſelf has in another place taken the account of Plutarch, who ſays he was of a Heracleid family. (Anach. v. 4. p. 285.) Barthelemi is in general little careful to diſtinguiſh the different practices of diſtant ages, when the Greek republics were in widely different circumſtances; and he quotes, with far too much indifference, the higheſt and the loweſt authorities, Thucydides, Xenophon, or Iſocrates, and Heſychius, Julius Pollux, or Suidas.

ſition

ſition of power made by Lacedæmon, new and great temptations offered for coveting high office, while at the ſame time the ſervices of the body of the people were leſs neceſſary to thoſe in authority, the Spartans, or peers, began to ſet a wider diſtinction between themſelves and others, to aſſume authority with leſs reſerve, and exerciſe it with leſs diſcretion.

Ageſilaus had not been a year on the throne, when the invidious diſtinctions, which had been growing in the Lacedæmonian ſtate, and the impolitic conduct of thoſe peculiarly called Spartans, gave riſe to a plot for a complete change of government, for the accompliſhment of which, kings, ephors, and ſenate, were to be aſſaſſinated. The leader, Cinadon, was a young man, already placed, by birth and talents, above the crowd, and indignant to be excluded, by arbitrary diſtinctions, from the poſſibility of ſtill advancing himſelf. To ingage thoſe of his own rank in his views, it was his practice to deſire them to count the Spartans in the full agora. They would be, beſide the kings, the ephors, and the ſenate, perhaps forty, while the Lacedæmonians, ruled by theſe, and denied the means of admiſſion to high office, were more than four thouſand. He deſired them then to advert to the ſtate of the towns and villages of Laconia; and in each they would find one maſter, and many friends: apparently meaning one Spartan magiſtrate, with many Lacedæmonians, like themſelves, excluded from Spartan honors. All the Helots, all the newly-admitted citizens, the lower people of the capital, and the people of the provincial towns univerſally, he proceeded, would be of their party; for all theſe, it was known, whenever the ſubject occurred in converſation, were unable to conceal their deteſtation of the Spartans.

Xen. Hel. l. 3. c. 3. ſ. 6.

This conſpiracy being indicated by one of the aſſociates, the ephors were ſo dubious of the diſpoſition of the people of Sparta itſelf, that they feared to apprehend Cinadon there: they feared even to ſummon the leſſer aſſembly. Conſulting only with ſome of the ſenators, they ſent Cinadon, on pretence of public ſervice, with a ſmall command, to the frontiers. There he was arreſted, and the names of his principal accomplices being drawn from him, their perſons were ſecured, before any diſcovery was ſuſpected. Cinadon, being queſtioned what was his object in the plot, anſwered, 'Not to be inferior to others in Lacedæmon.' He was executed, together with his principal accomplices, with torture and public ignominy.

ſ. 8, 9, 10.

ſ. 11.

Sedition

Sedition was thus daunted, and the Spartans, or peers, retained the injoyment of their excluſive privileges. The means of Xenophon, through his intimacy with Ageſilaus and many other Spartans of high rank, to obtain a knowlege of theſe circumſtances, give an authenticity to the detail, which in the ſcantineſs of our information concerning the interior tranſactions of Sparta, make it highly valuable.

SECTION III.

War renewed with Perſia. Inſult of the Thebans to Ageſilaus. Firſt campain of Ageſilaus in Aſia. Preparations for the ſecond campain. Battle of the Pactolus. Death of Tiſſaphernes, Weakneſs of the Perſian government.

DOMESTIC diſturbance was thus fortunately obviated, when very ſerious alarm aroſe from a forein quarter. A Syracuſan, named Herodas, arrived at Lacedæmon from Phenicia, with intelligence of great preparations in the ports of that country. Many triremes were equipping, many building, many arrived from other maritime provinces of the Perſian empire. Rumor went that a fleet of three hundred was to be formed; where to be employed nobody knew; but, among orders coming from various great officers, ſome were from Tiſſaphernes: whence ſuſpicion aroſe, that Greece, or ſome of the Grecian ſettlements, were in view. Herodas, whom mercantile buſineſs only had led to Phenicia, anxious to communicate intelligence probably ſo important to the common welfare of the Greek nation, had taken his departure in the firſt ſhip. B.C. 397. Ol. 95. 4. Xen. Hel. l. 3. c. 4. ſ. 1.

This communication made much impreſſion at Lacedæmon. No aſſurance had been received, that the treaty, concluded with Tiſſaphernes by Dercyllidas, had been ratified by the king, or would be ratified. Indeed it could not be ſuppoſed very acceptable to him or to his council; and the ſatrap's faithleſſneſs had been abundantly experienced. There was therefore

fore ample reaſon to apprehend, that the Greek nation, and eſpecially the Aſiatic colonies, were the objects of the great armament preparing in the Phenician ports. For the colonies the apprehenſion was the greater, becauſe, ſince the departure of Dercyllidas, all there had gone into diſorder. Immediately on the concluſion of the Peloponneſian war, democratical government had been everywhere aboliſhed by Lyſander, who eſtabliſhed, in every city, a council of only ten men, in whoſe hands he placed the ſupreme authority. If intire credit ſhould be given to the invective of Athenian orators, it was a moſt oppreſſive and degrading tyranny that was univerſally exerciſed by thoſe oligarchies. Some exaggeration in their pictures, however, we may reaſonably ſuppoſe; and yet the tenor of Grecian hiſtory, and many facts reported by Xenophon, too well warrant the belief that, under ſuch governments, unleſs when power committed to the liberality of a Dercyllidas controuled them, oppreſſion, and groſs oppreſſion, would be not uncommon. The Spartan government nevertheleſs did not refuſe attention to the complaints of the people. Their meaſures ſhow indeed more liberality than wiſdom. Haſtily undertaking to legiſlate for a country with which they were unacquainted, they directed everywhere the abolition of the council of Ten, and, in general terms, the reſtoration of the old conſtitution. Every city was at once torn by the utmoſt violence of faction. Democracy, ſuch as it had ſubſiſted under the ſupremacy of Athens, was nowhere completely reſtored, but univerſal anarchy inſued.

Xen. Hel. l. 3. c. 4. ſ. 2, 7.

Confuſion thus pervading the ſubject ſtates, and apprehenſion of an enemy, ſo powerful as the Perſian empire, agitating Lacedæmon, a congreſs of the confederacy was ſummoned. Hoſtilities had of late years been frequent with one or other of the bordering ſatraps; but it was long ſince the force of the Perſian empire, united under the direction of its head, had been exerted againſt Greece. Lyſander, however, taking a leading part in the debates, was ſucceſsful in his endeavours to obviate alarm. 'Of 'the ſuperiority of the Greeks by ſea,' he ſaid, 'there could be no rea- 'ſonable doubt; and, of what they were capable by land, againſt the Per- 'ſian empire, the late return of the Cyreian army very ſufficiently demon- 'ſtrated. With regard to the diſturbances among the Aſian Greek cities, 'it was obvious, that a reverſal of the meaſures, which had occaſioned the

'preſent

'preſent confuſion, would of courſe reſtore the former order. He could 'not heſitate therefore to declare his opinion that a force ought to be 'ſent into Aſia for the protection of that large part of the Greek nation 'which was ſettled there.' Since Leotychidas, who, with Xanthippus father of Pericles, defeated the army of Xerxes at Mycalë, a Spartan king had never croſſed the Ægean. Ageſilaus, incited by Lyſander, now offered himſelf for the command. He required only thirty Spartans, with two thouſand neodamode Lacedæmonians, and ſix thouſand heavy-armed of the allies. His offer incouraged the aſſembly; the expedition was voted, and troops preciſely as the king deſired.

Xenophon reports of Ageſilaus, that, by courting equally ephors, ſenate, and people, and ſeeming always anxious to defer to their authority, he obtained a more commanding influence, and more real power, than any of his predeceſſors for a long time had injoyed. It ſeems to have been in purſuance of this policy that he deſired the attendance of thirty Spartans. Ten, we may remember, had been appointed to attend Agis, in an expedition againſt the Argians, as a controuling council; and this check upon the formerly uncontrouled power of the kings in military command, once eſtabliſhed, would not be readily remitted. By deſiring thirty inſtead of ten, Ageſilaus ſeemed to pay a compliment to the body of the peers, while he reälly diminiſhed the conſequence of each individual of his council, and perhaps made it eaſier to himſelf to rule the whole.

He was not equally happy in his ſpeculations in forein as in domeſtic politics, or perhaps he neglected them. An occurrence of a ſtrange nature, far from clearly accounted for by the cotemporary hiſtorian his friend, foreboded ill to the peace of Greece, while he imbarked for Aſia. Geræſtus in Eubœa was the appointed port, where the troops were to aſſemble. In his way thither, attended by a ſmall eſcort only, he went to the port of Aulis in Bœotia; and, on account of the fame of that place for the ſacrifice of Agamemnon, and the departure of the united forces of Greece for the Trojan war, he made a point of ſacrificing there. He was already in the middle of the ceremony, when the Bœotarcs, at the head of a conſiderable force of horſe, interfered, rudely ſcattered the offering from the altar, and peremptorily forbad the ſacrifice. Ageſilaus, ſurprized and incenſed, but unable to reſiſt, imprecated the vengeance of the

gods upon the Bœotians for the impious violence. Poſſibly the Bœotians may have eſteemed the attempt of the Spartan king an impious intruſion. Evidently he had been deficient in precaution, and they appear to have been brutal, either in inſult or in reſentment. In the moment nothing ſeems to have followed: Ageſilaus proceeded to Geræſtus, whence he conducted his armament ſafely to Epheſus: but the remoter conſequences were, as we ſhall ſee, deeply unfortunate, to Bœotia and to Lacedæmon.

Xen. Hel. l. 3. c. 7. f. 5. B.C. 396 [12]. Ol. 95. 4. Novem. or December.

The arrival of the Spartan king, with a Grecian army, in Aſia, could not but alarm the ſatraps there. Tiſſaphernes ſent a deputation to inquire the cauſe of a meaſure, which ſo ſtrongly implied a diſpoſition not to abide by the treaty concluded with Dercyllidas. Ageſilaus replied, that his purpoſe was not to diſturb the peace of the king of Perſia's dominions, but only to aſſure the independency of the Grecian cities in Aſia. Tiſſaphernes anſwered, that he was himſelf ſtill deſirous of peace, upon the terms already ſettled; nor did he ſuppoſe the king averſe; and he therefore deſired time to ſend to Suſa, before any hoſtilities ſhould take place.

Xen. Hel. & Ageſ. l. 3. c. 4. f. 6.

Ageſilaus, who ſeems not to have been commiſſioned by the Spartan government for any purpoſe of conqueſt, but only to inforce the honorable terms of peace already concluded upon, acceded to the ſatrap's propoſal. Dercyllidas, who was among his officers, was ſent with two others to the

[12] We are frequently miſſing, in Xenophon, the convenient accuracy of Thucydides in marking times and ſeaſons; and Dodwell has not been fortunate in his endeavours to explain the difficulties, occurring about the period of the commands of Dercyllidas and Ageſilaus. In aſſigning the arrival of Ageſilaus in Aſia to the concluſion of the year B. C. 396, he ſays,—Hoc nempe arctè cohæret cum hiſtoriâ Dercyllidæ. It certainly does not cohere. Under the adminiſtration of Dercyllidas, the Aſian Greek cities ſingularly flouriſhed in peace and concord. (Xen. Hel. l. 3, c. 2. ſ. 7 & 9.) But, before the expedition of Ageſilaus was thought of, all was already confuſion there, through the removal of the councils of Ten. (c. 4. f. 2 & 7.) Dodwell ſeems totally to have overlooked this latter circumſtance; and ſo has attributed the congreſs at Sparta, which decreed the expedition of Ageſilaus, to the ſame year B. C. 397, to which he has given the progreſs of Dercyllidas and of the Spartan miniſters through the Aſiatic cities, when they were found ſo peaceable and flouriſhing. Having then attributed the reſolution taken in Greece, for war with Aſia under Ageſilaus, to the year 397, he attributes the treaty of peace made by Dercyllidas to the following year B. C. 396, and the arrival of Ageſilaus in Aſia to the concluſion of the ſame year 396. Here, evidently, all is not conſiſtent. I have however been unable, with the leiſure I could give to the ſubject, and perhaps ſhould be unable at any rate, to accommodate the dates of theſe tranſactions perfectly to one another, and to preceding and following events; and I have therefore thought it beſt, with this admonition to the reader, generally to give Dodwell's dates in the margin. The reader beſt acquainted with his labors, will probably be moſt ready to excuſe my failure, in the inveſtigation of a labyrinth, in which his learning, ingenuity, and diligence, directed to that as his principal object, have been bewildered.

ſatrap's

ſatrap's court, and a truce was concluded for three months. Tiſſaphernes, wholly unſcrupulous, had no ſooner ſworn to the treaty, than he took meaſures for haſtening the arrival of troops, which might inable him to break it. This became known to Ageſilaus, who nevertheleſs reſolved ſtrictly to abide by the compact made.

Among the thirty Spartans, who attended Ageſilaus, was his friend Lyſander. Ageſilaus himſelf was yet little known among the Aſian Greeks. The reputation therefore of Lyſander, high while he held command among them, and ſince ſo greatly increaſed by the conqueſt of Athens, drew the attention of all. The violence of party, and the diſordered ſtate of the governments, gave occaſion for various repreſentation, remonſtrance, ſolicitation, and intrigue. All were anxious to obtain the intereſt of Lyſander with the king; and ſuch was the conſequent attendance upon him, that it appeared, ſays the hiſtorian, as if Lyſander had been king, and Ageſilaus a private perſon. Xen. Hel. l. 3. c. 4. ſ. 7 & Plut. Ageſ.

The umbrage likely to be taken, at a ſuperiority ſo pointedly attributed to him, was firſt manifeſted by his collegues of the Thirty; ſatisfied with their ſituation of counſellors to the king, but ill bearing to be conſidered as attendants upon one of their own body. At their inſtigation, at length, Ageſilaus began to ſhow his diſſatisfaction, by conſtantly denying the ſuits of thoſe who came recommended by Lyſander. Whether that officer had before been unbecomingly aſſuming, does not appear; but the affront, now put upon him, he bore with becoming moderation. Gently diſmiſſing the crowd of followers, who uſed officiouſly to attend him, he told all who ſolicited his intereſt, that his interference would only injure their cauſe. With the united reſpect and frankneſs, due to a king and a friend, he then opened himſelf to Ageſilaus; expreſſed his regret that he could no longer be uſeful in his preſent ſituation; requeſted that he might be ſent on any duty, where he might equally avoid giving umbrage and incurring diſgrace; and promiſed that, to the beſt of his ability, it ſhould be faithfully performed. ſ. 8. & Plut. Ageſ. ſ. 9. ſ. 10

Ageſilaus did not deny this petition; and Lyſander, being ſent to take the Helleſpontine command, found an early opportunity to do a ſervice highly acceptable to him. Spithridates, a Perſian of rank, thought himſelf injured by Pharnabazus. The bond of connection between the govern-

ment at Suſa and the great men of the diſtant provinces, lax before the expedition of Cyrus, had been ſtill weakened by that event. The addreſs of Lyſander therefore ſufficed to perſuade Spithridates to renounce a government which gave no ſecurity to its faithful ſervants, and paſs over to the Greeks with his family and effects, and two hundred horſe under his command. Leaving theſe under the protection of Lyſander in Cyzicus, Spithridates proceeded, with his eldeſt ſon only, to wait upon Ageſilaus in Ionia. The viſit was, on many accounts, highly gratifying to that prince, and, among other things, for the information he acquired by it of the country under the government of Pharnabazus.

Xen. Hel. l. 3. c. 4. ſ. 11. B. C. 395. Ol. 96, ½.

Tiſſaphernes only waited to be aſſured of the approach of the troops, particularly cavalry, which he expected from the interior provinces, and then ſent a declaration to Ageſilaus, 'that unleſs the Europeïn forces 'were immediately withdrawn from Aſia, he and all who adhered to him, 'muſt expect the vengeance of the great king.' Not only the deputies from the Aſiatic cities were alarmed, but the officers of the army, and even the Lacedæmonians could not without uneaſineſs compare the ſmallneſs of their force with the numbers reported of the enemy. Ageſilaus however was not unprepared for this demonſtration of the ſatrap's falſehood. Receiving the communication with cheerfulneſs, he bad the Perſian miniſters tell their maſter, 'that he thanked him for making 'the gods, avengers of perjury, enemies to the Perſian and friends to the 'Grecian cauſe.' Inſtantly he diſpatched notices for the Ionian, Æolian, and Helleſpontine forces to join him; iſſued orders for the troops with him to prepare for marching; and to indicate that he meant not to wait attack, but to carry the war where he knew the ſatrap's intereſted feelings would be moſt vulnerable, he ſent requiſitions for the towns on the way to Caria to prepare markets for the army.

Xen. Hel. ibid. & Ageſil.

ſ. 12.

Tiſſaphernes, informed of theſe diſpoſitions, directed his meaſures, not to the proſecution of the great intereſts of the empire, but to the preſervation of his own large property in Caria. That mountainous province being unfit for the action of horſe, he ſent thither almoſt the whole of his infantry. Deſcending then with his numerous cavalry into the vale of the Mæander, he hoped with that alone to trample in duſt the Grecian army before it could reach the highlands. Ageſilaus was aware that, in the plain,

plain, he muſt ſuffer in conteſt with the Perſian horſe. As ſoon therefore as he was aſſured that his feint had fixed the attention of the ſatrap to the ſouthward, he directed his own march the contrary way. Thus he joined, more readily, and without oppoſition, the forces from the northern colonies, among whom were the Cyrcian troops; and falling, wholly unexpected, upon the ſatrapy of Pharnabazus, the country was plundered without reſiſtance, the towns yielded as he approached, and he inriched his army with a very great booty. Incouraged thus, he approached Daſcylium, the ſatrap's reſidence; but there he experienced how formidable the Perſian cavalry were ſtill capable of being. His ſmall force of horſe, preceding the march of the infantry, met nearly an equal force of the enemy's horſe. Immediately the Greeks formed in line, four deep. Unlike the deſultory manner of the modern Aſiatics, the Perſians charged in column, only twelve in front. Every Grecian lance oppoſed to them was broken; and twelve men, with two horſes, were inſtantly ſlain. The Greeks ſo felt their inferiority, that they immediately retreated. Fortunately the heavy-armed, under Ageſilaus, were near enough to give them ſecurity. Modern tacticians generally hold the charge of cavalry in column abſurd. The fact only is given here as it is related by the ſoldier-hiſtorian. The account however, it ſhould be obſerved, is among the numerous inſtances of candid confeſſion, which intitle Xenophon to our credit when he relates the ſucceſſes of the Greeks, and diminiſh, tho certainly they cannot intirely remove, our regret, that we have no Perſian accounts to confront with the Grecian.

Xen. Hel. l. 3. c. 4. ſ. 20.

ſ. 14.

Ageſilaus, prudent as brave, ſaw quickly what was to be done. On the morrow after the action of the cavalry, the entrails of the victims in the ſacrifice were found imperfect. This paſſed for an admonition from the gods to proceed no farther, and Ageſilaus immediately directed his march back toward the coaſt; aware, ſays the hiſtorian, in phraſe pretty ſtrongly implying that the omen had been preconcerted, of the impoſſibility of acting in the plains, without a ſufficient force of horſe. Fortunately winter was approaching, when annoyance to the Grecian territories, from the enemy's powerful cavalry, was leſs to be apprehended.

ſ. 15.

Againſt the inſuing campain, Ageſilaus took meaſures for being better provided. Requiſitions were ſent for the wealthy, in every Grecian city of Aſia, to prepare themſelves for that ſervice which the Grecian political

inſtitutions

inſtitutions impoſed, at the ſame time, as an honor and a tax. Thoſe requiſitions were however accompanied with notice, that inſtead of perſonal attendance, able ſubſtitutes, well mounted and well armed, would be accepted; and the levies were completed, ſays Xenophon, with a diligence and diſpatch, as if every noble and wealthy Ionian thought he was hiring a man to die for him.

Xen. Hel. l. 3. c. 4. ſ. 16. B. C. 394. Ol. 96. 2.

Early in ſpring, Ageſilaus aſſembled his whole force in Epheſus, and there beſtowed an attention, more than was uſual among the generals of that age, in preparing his troops for ſervice. Commonly, among the Grecks, the ſoldier's arms were what his means inabled, or his zeal in the cauſe and regard for his own ſafety, induced him to procure: his diſcipline was what the inſtitutions of his commonwealth required of all its ſubjects, occaſionally improved, through the ſame motives which excited care in the choice of arms. The man, unprovided with the armour and unacquainted with the diſcipline of the heavy-armed, was caſt among the ignobler crowd of the light-armed: his pay, if any, was inferior; he had no allowance for a ſervant; if a priſoner, he was neglected; if killed, unnumbered. But, ſerving among the heavy-armed, in proportion as his armour was imperfect, and his perſonal ſkill deficient, his danger in action was greater. Ageſilaus however would not truſt the ſervice of his country, and his own glory, to the various effect of ſuch conſiderations upon the various tempers of men. Heavy-armed, middle-armed, bowmen, and cavalry were all ſeverally called out to exerciſe: emulation was excited by the inſtitution of prizes for thoſe who excelled; arms were examined; artizans and traders were invited and incouraged; the agora of Epheſus was crowded with horſes, and warlike implements of every kind; and the city, ſays the ſoldier-hiſtorian who was preſent, ſeemed a laboratory of war [13].

ſ. 17.

Amid theſe military cares, the attention of Ageſilaus to acts of religion contributed to infuſe, at the ſame time, confidence and a ſpirit of order among his troops. It was his common practice to lead the way, from the field of exerciſe, to the temple of Diana; where thoſe, who had gained prizes, offered their chaplets, the honorary part of their reward, to the goddeſs. 'And what,' proceeds the hiſtorian, 'may not be hoped from an 'army, dutiful to the gods, diligent in military exerciſes, and zealous in 'ſubordination?'

ſ. 18.

[13] Πολέμου ἐργαστήριον.

Another

Another meaſure of the Spartan prince, to excite confidence among his troops, conſonant as doubtleſs it was to the manners eſteemed beſt in that age, and accordingly mentioned by Xenophon, not only without reprobation, but among things praiſeworthy, will be otherwiſe thought of by the better-taught humanity of modern times. Among the priſoners in Epheſus, taken in the Perſian provinces, by thoſe freebooters who, in the deficiency of law and government, made their livelihood by ſuch violences [14], were ſome of wealthy families and higher rank; accuſtomed, ſays the hiſtorian, to ride in carriages, and unaccuſtomed to toil. Theſe Ageſilaus ordered to be expoſed naked, for public ſale by the common crier. Unpractiſed in thoſe naked exerciſes, in which the bodies of men of all ranks among the Greeks became imbrowned, their ſkins were white, their limbs delicate, they appeared incapable of activity or labor, and the Greek ſoldiers drew the concluſion, that they ſhould have no more to apprehend in battle from ſuch men, than from ſo many women. Xen. Hel. l. 3 c. 4. ſ. 19. & Ageſil.

According to the uſual rotation in the Lacedæmonian ſervice, when the firſt year of the command of Ageſilaus was completed, Lyſander and the reſt of the Thirty returned home, and were ſucceeded in their ſituation by an equal number of other Spartans. Among theſe the king was to diſtribute the commands under him at his diſcretion. The cavalry accordingly he committed to Xenocles; the Lacedæmonian neodamodes to Scythes; to Herippidas, the Cyreians; and the Aſian Greeks to Migdon. He then notified his intention to march directly into the richeſt of the enemy's country, in defence of which the utmoſt exertion was to be expected, and he therefore admoniſhed all to be prepared in body and mind accordingly. ſ. 20. B. C. 394. Ol. 96 $\frac{3}{4}$.

The wily yet weak Tiſſaphernes was again deceived through his very fear of deception. Being informed of the notice given in public orders by the Spartan king, he thought it a feint, like that of the former year; and ſuppoſing Caria ſo much more certainly now the reäl as it was leſs the pretended object, he again ſent his infantry thither, and again incamped with his formidable cavalry in the vale of Mæander. Ageſilaus, in preciſe ſ. 21.

[14] Ὑπὸ τῶν λῃστῶν ἁλισκομένους.

conformity

conformity to his declared intention, marched into the Sardian territory, and, three days unoppoſed, his army collected plunder on all ſides.

Xen Hel. l. 3. c. 4. ſ. 22. On the fourth day, the followers of the Grecian camp were diſperſed for booty, about the rich banks of the Pactolus, when a body of Perſian cavalry ſuddenly came upon them, and killed ſeveral. Ageſilaus ordering his horſe to their relief, the whole Perſian army appeared, forming in order of battle. The ground was not favorable for ingaging ſo ſuperior a body of cavalry; but the whole Grecian force was collected, and the Perſian infan-

ſ. 23. try abſent. Ageſilaus therefore reſolved to uſe the opportunity. He ordered his horſe to charge, with aſſurance of being ſupported: he commanded his middle-armed to follow running; and he led his phalanx with a briſk yet ſteddy pace after them. The Perſians repelled [15] the

ſ. 24. charge of the Grecian cavalry; but the ſight of the middle-armed, followed by the formidable array of the phalanx, diſmayed them; they turned, and preſently fled. Some, intangled in the courſe of the Pactolus, were killed or made priſoners. Againſt the reſt the purſuit of the Greeks was little deſtructive; but it gave them poſſeſſion of the Perſian camp. The middle-armed, as would be likely, ſays the hiſtorian, immediately fell to plunder. But Ageſilaus diſappointed their rapacity, by ſurrounding the camp with his more regular troops; and, incloſing thus together friends and foes, he inſured the juſt diſtribution of a very great booty. Many camels, an animal then little known in Greece, being carried thither by Ageſilaus in his return, were much noticed among the trophies that diſtinguiſhed this victory.

ſ. 25. & Ageſil. Intelligence of this event excited great alarm in Sardis, and vehement complaint againſt the ſatrap; who was in his palace there when the miſfortune happened, which his preſence with the army, and the animation he might have infuſed by ſharing its dangers, it was held, ought to have prevented. The alarm was quickly inhanced, and the complaint ſharpened, by the appearance of the Grecian army before the walls, and by

Xen. Ageſil. the plunder and deſtruction of everything around. The Spartan king endeavoured to increaſe the diſorder, by a proclamation, declaring himſelf

[15] So much, I think, is implied in the word ἐξαγω, uſed both in the Hellenics and in the Ageſilaus.

the

the friend and protector of all who desired freedom, ready to contest in arms the right of any who claimed to hold Asia in subjection. It does not appear that any important desertion followed: but great alarm was communicated even to the distant court of Persia; insomuch that the ruin of Tissaphernes was in consequence resolved upon. According to the manner nearly of the Turkish empire at this day, Tithraustes came to Sardis, commissioned from the king, at the same time to supersede and to behead him. Such was the end of that worthless satrap; who, in a long course of years, had had such various transactions with the Greeks. Both his sovereins, and their subjects committed to his government, had undoubtedly enough to complain of him; yet, as far as the Greeks were interested in his character, his weakness and cowardice seem to have been more beneficial to them than his profligacy was injurious [16].

The first act of the government of Tithraustes, after the execution of his predecessor, marks a weakness in the Persian empire, which, notwithstanding the many instances that have occurred, still appears surprizing. When, in the distant provinces, private interest or private animosity led the late satrap to measures directly opposite to what the service of his soverein required, we see only a common consequence of weak government. But the new viceroy came immediately commissioned from the supreme council of the empire, and yet did not come to revenge the injuries of the Persian subjects, or repair the disgraces of the Persian arms, suffered in the invasion of the empire, by the forces of a little distant republic. He entered immediately into negotiation with Agesilaus; rather apologized for passed measures, laying the blame upon his predecessor; observed that justice was now executed upon that worthless officer; and protested that the king his master desired no other than that the Grecian cities in Asia should be free; paying the antient tribute or rent for their lands, which had always been confessedly held of his empire; and that, upon these conditions only, he expected that the European troops should be withdrawn. Agesilaus professed himself willing to treat, but without authority to conclude.

[16] Cornelius Nepos, in his life of Conon, says that Tissaphernes rebelled, and that his death was the just punishment for that crime: but the biographer abounds with instances of carelessness, and of a deficient judgment, which led him sometimes, even in contradiction to the best authorities, to report utter improbabilities. Indeed many of the lives ascribed to him bear much the appearance of juvenile exercises; the works of a youth of talents, in a course of Greek reading, practising Latin composition.

Tithrauſtes deſired that authority might be ſent for, and, in the mean time, that hoſtilities againſt his ſatrapy at leaſt might ceaſe: 'Conſider Pharnabazus,' he ſaid, 'ſtill as your enemy; and invade his territory; but for myſelf, I have a fair claim to be treated as the friend of the Greeks, having done them juſtice againſt him, who was the principal author of their wrongs.' This was ſubmiſſive language from the lieutenant of the great king. What followed, however, ſtill more marks the conſciouſneſs of utter inability, in the adminiſtration of the empire, to extend, from the capital to the diſtant provinces, the energy neceſſary to hold all united in juſt obedience and under due protection. Ageſilaus did not ſcruple to require, as the price of truce with one ſatrapy, to be paid the expence of carrying war into another; and to this ſtrange propoſal the new ſatrap acceded: thirty talents, above ſix thouſand pounds ſterling, were paid, expreſſly to defray the expence of the Grecian army's march into the Bithynian ſatrapy [17]. Examples of a policy ſomething ſimilar perhaps may be found in the modern hiſtory of Turkey. Of the fact however we cannot reaſonably doubt; for Xenophon, holding his command in the Cyreian troops, and intimate with Ageſilaus, was in a ſituation certainly to know what he related; and his zeal for the glory of his friend and patron, would not lead him deſignedly to exaggerate the ſatrap's folly, or the weakneſs of the Perſian empire.

In the early part of his command, the views of Ageſilaus appear to have been moderate. He would have been contented with the glory of giving independency to the Greeks of Aſia, and peace to thoſe of Europe. But experience of the eaſe with which greater advantages and higher fame might be acquired, ſeems to have excited his ambition. Poſſibly however he may have found good reaſon to believe, that moderation was not ſo ſafe, as on a tranſient view it might appear. He may have thought, and perhaps juſtly, that there could be no ſecurity for peace, but in the enemy's inability to make ſucceſsful war. Poſſibly he may have known ſome cauſe, not likely to be laſting, for the new ſatrap's ſubmiſſive conduct, apparently ſo unbecoming the officer of a great empire in ſo great a command; and he may have been influenced by the

[17] The ſatrapy of Pharnabazus was variouſly called, the Bithynian, the Phrygian, the Helleſpontine, or of Daſcylis or Daſcylium, the ſatrap's principal reſidence.

conſideration,

conſideration, that, if Tithrauſtes was not as faithleſs as Tiſſaphernes, an early ſucceſſor might be ſo. Meanwhile the ſucceſs of his friends at home, in managing his political intereſts, was an incouragement to follow the path of ambition. A commiſſion arrived, putting the fleet under his command, equally with the landforces, and authorizing him to appoint the admiral. He proceeded immediately to uſe this new power, with a view not to peace, unleſs as it might follow farther ſucceſs in war. He communicated to all the towns of the coaſt and ilands his wiſh to have his naval force increaſed; leaving it to themſelves to decide what ſhips they would add to their ſquadrons. Ageſilaus was popular; the war was popular; to many it had been lucrative; and, the zeal of wealthy individuals vying with that of communities, the fleet was ſtrengthened with a hundred and twenty new triremes. In the appointment of his admiral, Ageſilaus allowed his partiality for a friend and relation to lead him to an injudicious choice. Superſeding Pharax, who had done conſiderable ſervices, he committed the important command to Peiſander, his queen's brother; a man of approved courage and clear honor, but unverſed in naval affairs.

Xen. Hel. l. 3. c. 4. ſ. 26.

ſ. 27.

SECTION IV.

Miſſion of Timocrates into Greece from the ſatrap of Lydia: Bribery of the democratical leaders in the Grecian republics: Enmity excited againſt Lacedæmon: War between Phocis and Locris leading to war between Lacedæmon and Thebes: Athens gained to the Theban alliance: Invaſion of Bœotia: Death of Lyſander: Proſecution and flight of Pauſanias king of Lacedæmon.

THESE preparations, demonſtrating that the Lacedæmonian king had neither peace, nor any little object in view, alarmed Tithrauſtes. The military of the Perſian empire was weak, but its wealth was ſtill powerful. Means to be informed of the ſtate of Greece, of the diſſenſions among its little republics, one with another and each within itſelf, of the violence of

B. C. 394. Ol. 96 3. Xen. Hel. l. 3. c. 5. ſ. 1.

party in all, and, what was moſt important, of the extenſive diſlike to the Lacedæmonian ſupremacy, and the growing jealouſy of the Lacedæmonian power, were open to the ſatrap. A Perſian, verſed enough in Grecian politics and Grecian manners, to manage an intriguing negotiation among the Grecian republics, was probably not to be found. Tithrauſtes therefore employed a Greek, Timocrates of Rhodes. The general purpoſe of his miſſion was to conciliate, to the Perſian intereſt, the leading men of every republic where he could find opportunity, and excite them to active meaſures againſt Lacedæmon; directing his view particularly to thoſe where averſion toward Lacedæmon was known moſt to prevail. Among means, bribery was much depended upon: a political engine even then of great efficacy, tho it had not, as our moral poet has obſerved, that facility of operation which modern refinements in commerce have given it. Paper credit was unknown: Timocrates was neceſſarily to be incumbered with gold [18]. In the poverty of the Grecian republics however, about twelve thouſand pounds ſterling, ably and faithfully diſtributed, was ſufficient to make a great change in the political face of the country [19]. Xenophon has not ſcrupled to name the party-leaders, in Thebes, Corinth and Argos, who partook of it. The Athenians, if we may truſt his impartiality in ſpeaking of his fellowcountrymen, clear of that baſeneſs, were led only by ambition and the hope of recovering their loſt preëminence in Greece, to deſire a confederacy againſt Lacedæmon.

Xen. Hel. l. 3. c. 5. ſ. 2.

Xen. ibid.

But, whatever the operations of ſecret intrigue might be, the reſult became quickly evident. The general aſſemblies in the ſeveral cities reſounded with invectives againſt Lacedæmonian tyranny. 'Since the con-'cluſion of the twenty-ſeven-years war,' it was aſked, 'and the overthrow

[18] Bleſt paper-credit! laſt and beſt ſupply!
That lends Corruption lighter wings to fly!
Gold, imp'd by thee, can compaſs hardeſt things;
Can pocket ſtates, can fetch and carry kings;
A ſingle leaf ſhall waft an army o'er,
Or ſhip off ſenates to a diſtant ſhore;
A leaf, like Sibyls, ſcatter to and fro
Our fates and fortunes, as the wind ſhall blow:
Pregnant with thouſands flits the ſcrap unſeen,
And, ſilent, ſells a king or buys a queen.
Pope's Moral Eſſays, ep. 3.

[19] Whether Xenophon was or was not exactly informed of the ſum which Timocrates brought and diſtributed, tho it is reaſonable to ſuppoſe he had ſome good ground for his poſitive aſſertion, he was however competent to judge whether the ſum he has named was probably equal to the effect aſcribed to it.

'of

'of the tyrannous dominion of Athens, what benefit has accrued to 'Greece from the transfer of empire to Lacedæmon? Of what command, 'what honor, what revenue have the allies been allowed to participate? 'thoſe allies who ſo zealouſly ſhared all labors, all dangers, all expences? 'On the contrary, adding indignity to injury, have not the Lacedæmonians 'ſent Helots, with their title of harmoſt, to govern Grecian republics, and 'conducted themſelves, in all reſpects, as if they claimed to be maſters of 'their free confederates?' The apprehenſions, the indignation, and the animoſity of the Many were thus extenſively excited. But a pretence for hoſtility was yet wanting; for the Lacedæmonian government, however its officers, or however itſelf might be occaſionally oppreſſive, had ſcrupulouſly avoided any direct breach of thoſe treaties, by which the Grecian republics were united under its ſupremacy. The Thebans were the ingenious politicians who deviſed the provocation, which led to a renewal of the miſeries of a general war in Greece; likely, more than at any former period, to ſuperinduce the common ruin of Grecian independency, tho it was perhaps beyond the ken of the cleareſt human foreſight, then, to diſcover where the overbearing power was at length to ariſe.

Xen. Hel. l. 3. c. 5. ſ. 3.

The borders of Phocis and the Opuntian Locris were in one part diſputed[20]. Androcleidas, one of thoſe popular leaders in Thebes, whom Xenophon has not ſcrupled to name as a partaker in the Perſian gold, perſuaded the Locrians to raiſe contributions on the doubtful land. The Phocians, preciſely as Androcleidas expected and deſired, immediately made repriſals. For this aggreſſion, as the party affected to call it, againſt the allies of Thebes, it was then not difficult to excite the Theban multitude againſt the Phocians. Accordingly Phocis was invaded and plundered. Unable to contend with Thebes, and ſtill more with Thebes and Locris united, the Phocians ſent miniſters to Lacedæmon, claiming that protection to which they were intitled, as members of the confederacy in which the greater part of Greece was united. The Spartans rejoiced in the fair pretence afforded, for repreſſing by arms the injurious inſolence of

Xen. Hel. l. 3. c. 5. ſ. 5, 6, 7.

[20] ——— Οἱ ἐν τᾶις Θήβαις πρωτεύοντες—πείθουσι Λόκρους τοὺς Ὀπουντίους ἐκ τῆς ἀμφισβητησίμου χώρας φωκεῦσι τε καὶ ἰαυτοῖς χρήματα τελέσαι.—*Thebanæ civitatis principes—Locris Opuntiis perſuadent ut ex agro inter Phocenſes et Thebanos controverſo pecunias penderent.* It is clear, from what follows in the next ſection, that this is ill tranſlated: ἰαυτοῖς means, not the Thebans, but the Locrians.

Thebes. The ſucceſs of Ageſilaus againſt the Perſian empire elated them; no other commotion within Greece interfered; and the cauſe appeared ſo juſt, that they thought they might depend upon the willing ſupport of the confederacy. War was accordingly reſolved; the forces of the confederacy were ſummoned, and orders were iſſued for a Lacedæmonian army to march.

B. C. 392. Ol. 96 2/3.

Thebes being thus ingaged in a conteſt very unequal, unleſs powerful ſupport could be obtained, its leaders, little known by name in hiſtory, but evidently able daring men, poſſibly true to their party, but ſcrupulous of nothing for party-purpoſes, directed their view to Athens. They knew that a diſpoſition hoſtile to Lacedæmon was extenſive there; but they knew, moreover, that a warm ſenſe of many and ſevere injuries, received from the Thebans, was alſo ſtrongly impreſſed. Miniſters were therefore ſent to Athens, inſtructed to ſoothe, flatter, and incite. Careleſs themſelves of the general welfare of Greece, and believing that a majority in Athens would poſtpone it to the ſeparate intereſt of their own city or of their party, they held out the probability of gaining the alliance of the Perſian king, now decidedly the enemy of Lacedæmon, which, they ſaid, would inſure ſucceſs; and they did not even ſcruple to propoſe the recovery of that dominion to Athens, which ſhe had formerly held over ſo many Grecian ſtates, as an object which ought to decide the Athenians in their favor. Thraſybulus, it appears, countenanced their meaſure; which coincided with his intereſt as head of the democratical party in Athens; and probably he had his particular connections with the democratical leaders in Thebes. Under ſuch circumſtances the propoſal was carried, in the Athenian aſſembly, for joining in the war with Thebes againſt Lacedæmon.

ſ. 7.

ſ. 8.

ſ. 9.

The intereſt of Lyſander, ſtill powerful at Sparta, is likely to have contributed to the reſolution for war with Thebes. He was immediately appointed to an important command, for which the popularity of his character ſeems to have concurred, with the ſuperiority of his abilities and experience, to render him peculiarly qualified. Going into Phocis, he aſſembled, according to his inſtructions, the Phocian, Œtæan, Heracleot, Malian, and Ænian forces. Marching directly to Orchomenus, where the ſupremacy affected by Thebes was borne with reluctance, the gates, after ſhort negotiation, were opened to him, as a pro-

ſ. 6, 7.

a protector, the vindicator of Bœotian freedom. Strengthened then by the Orchomenian troops, he proceeded to Haliartus, where, according to a concerted plan, Pauſanias king of Lacedæmon was to meet him on an appointed day, with the army from Peloponneſus. Pauſanias failed him: he nevertheleſs approached the place, and obtaining a conference with the leading people, would have prevailed, there as at Orchomenus, but ſome Thebans preſent, not without difficulty, prevented. Xen. Hel. l. 3. c. 5. ſ. 10, 11.

Informed of the loſs of one city and the danger of another, the Thebans marched in haſte againſt Lyſander. Whether that able general was ſurprized by their rapidity, or his paſt ſucceſſes led him to confide too much in his own ability, in the zeal and diſcipline of his troops, and in the deficiency of the enemy, under the walls of Haliartus, which he was preparing to aſſault, he was overpowered and killed. His army fled; but quickly reaching the neighboring highlands, turned upon the purſuers, and with advantage of ground, and an artillery which that ground afforded, fragments of rock rolled down upon the compact body of the heavy-armed, while weapons of every kind were uſed with ſuperior effect, the enemy were at length compelled to retreat, with conſiderable loſs. ſ. 12.

The Thebans erected their trophy at that gate of Haliartus, near which they had been conquerors and Lyſander had fallen; yet they were not a little dejected by the final event of the day. The morrow however ſhowed how important the life of one man may be: Orchomenians, Malians, Ænians, Heracleots, Œtæans, and Phocians, tho victorious, having loſt the leader who united all, and in whom all confided, haſtened to their ſeveral homes, and the army was no more. Then the Thebans were again elated, and their ſucceſs appeared important. But when, ſoon after, Pauſanias arrived in their territory with his powerful army from Peloponneſus, alarm and dejection anew pervaded them. The arrival of the Athenian forces, on the following day, reſtored animation; and when it was obſerved that the meaſures of Pauſanias indicated no ability, no vigor, then ſecurity and preſumption afreſh prevailed. Xen. ut ſup.

It has been obſerved upon ſome occaſion in modern times, that, when a commander deſires to avoid fighting, he calls a council of war; and this, in antient as in modern ages, might ariſe either from cowardice or from

from a view to the intereſt of a party; nor would it, in antient, any more than in modern ages, be always eaſy to aſcertain which was the prevailing motive. The buſineſs of recovering, for burial, the bodies of Lyſander and thoſe who fell with him, a rite which Grecian ſuperſtition made ſo important, neceſſarily ingaged the attention of Pauſanias. To conſult whether a battle ſhould be fought or a truce ſolicited, not the polemarcs and lochages only, but all the pentecoſters of the army were aſſembled. It was obſerved, that the army was very deficient of the ſtrength propoſed; Corinth had refuſed its troops, and the reïnforcement expected with Lyſander was diſperſed; that the allies ſerving were not zealous in the cauſe; that the enemy was very ſuperior in cavalry; and that even a victory would ſcarcely inable them to accompliſh their purpoſe of recovering the bodies, lying within reach of miſſile weapons from the towers of Haliartus. It was accordingly reſolved to ſolicit a truce. The Thebans, elated, refuſed to grant it, but upon condition that the army ſhould immediately quit Bœotia. This humiliating condition was accepted, and then the dead were reſtored. Pauſanias and thoſe about him appeared ſatisfied: but, whatever might be their ſentiments or their views, the army felt its diſgrace; and the uneaſineſs was inhanced by the contumelious behavior of the Thebans, who, in attending its retreat, purſued with blows any who deviated from the ſtrict line of the highway.

Xen. Hel. l. 3. c. 5. ſ. 15.

ſ. 16.

ſ. 17.

The conduct of Pauſanias would appear, at home, the more inexcuſable, on being compared with that of Lyſander; when it was obſerved what one did, in the command of a few troops of the northern allies, with what the other did not, at the head of a Peloponneſian army. Being capitally proſecuted, Pauſanias fled to Tegea, and to avoid the conſequence of the ſentence, in his abſence pronounced againſt him, he paſſed his remaining days in baniſhment there.

ſ. 18. Diod. l. 14. c. 90.

Of the great men of antiquity, none ſeems to have ſuffered more from the calumny of party, than Lyſander. Not only much injurious conduct in foreïn command has been imputed to him, but alſo a plot againſt the Lacedæmonian government. He is ſaid to have aimed at the tyranny, immediately of Lacedæmon, and ultimately of all Greece. With this view, according to reports preſerved only by writers who lived ſeveral centuries after him, he put forward intrigue, for ſetting aſide, by a decree

Corn. Nep. & Plut. vit. Lyſand.

decree of the general aſſembly, the ſucceſſion to the Spartan thrones in the family of Hercules, and laying it open to all Spartan citizens, hoping that ſo his popularity and influence, without violence, would carry him to his object. But it is utterly unlikely that ſuch a project would eſcape the notice of the cotemporary hiſtorian, the friend of the reigning king of Sparta, and of his ſon and ſucceſſor. So far from any ſuch imputation, the teſtimony of Xenophon to the public conduct of Lyſander is honorable upon all occaſions.

SECTION V.

Plan of Ageſilaus for diſmembering the Perſian empire: Alliance of the prince of Paphlagonia with Lacedæmon: Winter campain in Bithynia: Conference between Ageſilaus and Pharnabazus.

WHILE the flame of internal war was thus rekindled in Greece, and Lacedæmon, ruled by the ephors, was rapidly loſing her conſideration and influence there, Ageſilaus had been ſucceſsfully proſecuting a plan of operations againſt Perſia, the beſt calculated of any known to have been ever formed, for promoting, not meerly the intereſt of Lacedæmon, or even of Greece alone, but the common good of a very large portion of mankind. Stimulated, no doubt, by the love of glory, but allured by no vain, intereſted, deſtructive project of conqueſt, he propoſed to diſmember the Perſian empire, leaving the ſeparated parts free. The philoſopher, his friend and hiſtorian, gives him the intire credit of this wiſe and liberal policy. None before Ageſilaus, he ſays, ever thought of ſo depriving the Perſian king of his provinces, as not to bring ruin upon the people. But the revolt of Cyrus, which had led Lacedæmon, lately the ally, to become the enemy of the king, had at the ſame time prepared matters for this great deſign, pointed out the means of execution, and demonſtrated the probability of ſucceſs. A ſhock had been given to the fidelity of the great vaſſals in the diſtant provinces; and the exigency which had compelled the Greeks

B. C. 394. Ol. 96 3/3.

Xen. Ageſ. c. 7. ſ. 7.

who accompanied Cyrus, to fight their way from the center to the extremity, had afforded ſure grounds for calculating the force neceſſary to attack it. The revolt of Spithridates was then an important point already gained: it gave not only hope of farther defection, but means to procure it. Cotys, or Corylas[21], king of Paphlagonia, a tributary of the Perſian empire, tho he had not concurred in the rebellion of Cyrus, yet, on receiving ſummons from the king to join the royal army with his forces, had refuſed obedience. Probably the fear of vengeance would make the Lacedæmonian alliance acceptable to him, and Spithridates undertook to manage the negotiation. Meanwhile Egypt, long ſince in revolt, remained unſubdued.

Xen. Hel. l. 4. c. 1. ſ. 1, 2.

It does not appear that Ageſilaus was aware of the intrigues which Tithrauſtes was carrying on in Greece, when in purſuance of his ingagement with him, early in autumn he quitted the Lydian and entered the Bithynian ſatrapy. No due preparation had been made by Pharnabazus to defend the country. In the field no oppoſition was attempted; and as the Grecian army proceeded toward Paphlagonia, ſome towns voluntarily ſurrendered, ſome were taken by aſſault, and waſte and plunder were extended on all ſides. The negotiation with Cotys meanwhile proceeded ſucceſsfully. That prince met Ageſilaus on the borders of his territory, and concluded a treaty of alliance with the Lacedæmonian commonwealth. Ageſilaus, much gratified with the event, at the ſame time to ſtrengthen the union with Cotys and to reward Spithridates, propoſed a marriage, which was preſently agreed upon, between the Paphlagonian prince and the Perſian nobleman's daughter. But, in the deficiency of accommodations in the intervening country, the young lady could not travel into Paphlagonia from Cyzicus, where her father had left her, before the following ſpring. Ageſilaus gratified all parties by ordering a trireme of his fleet, with a Spartan commander, to convey her to the Paphlagonian coaſt.

B. C. 394. Ol. 96 3.

ſ. 3—7.

ſ. 8.

We have had many occaſions to obſerve how economically, in the ſcantineſs of their public revenues, the Greeks commonly made war. For an army far from home, it was particularly deſirable to find winter-quarters

[21] Cotys is the name we find in our copies of Xenophon's Hellenics, as well as of Diodorus and Plutarch, but, in our copies of Xenophon's Anabaſis, it is written Corylas.

in

in the enemy's country. Having acquired the important reïnforcement of a thouſand Paphlagonian horſe, beſide two thouſand targeteers, Ageſilaus reſolved to march to Daſcylium, the capital of the Bithynian ſatrapy, and with the plunder of its rich territory to ſubſiſt and reward his army. The territory of Daſcylium was the inherited property of Pharnabazus. His palace was ſumptuous, and ſurrounded with every appendage of convenience and delight. Xenophon, himſelf both a ſportſman and a farmer, particularly notices the incloſed parks and open chaces, abounding with game of every kind, the river ſtored with fiſh, the many large villages and well-cultivated farms, with a numerous population, unaccuſtomed to ſee or to apprehend an enemy. The ſatrap being without infantry which he could oppoſe to the Grecian phalanx, his own and his people's property became the prey of the invaders. Xen. Hel. l. 4. c. 1. ſ. 8.

All the care and foreſight of Ageſilaus were however inſufficient to guard againſt the effects of the contempt, naturally growing, for an enemy ſo apparently helpleſs; while Pharnabazus, without troops for ſteddy defence, had however thoſe with which he could ſtrike a ſudden blow; and he wanted neither activity nor ſpirit to direct and lead their exertions. A body from the Grecian army, ſent to collect proviſions, was wandering careleſſly after plunder, when the ſatrap came upon them, with a ſmall body of horſe and two ſcythe-armed chariots. The Greeks had notice of his approach timely enough to aſſemble to the number of ſeven hundred. Pharnabazus, tho his cavalry were only four hundred, did not heſitate to attack them. At the battle of Cunaxa the charge of a hundred and fifty ſcythe-armed chariots had been directed againſt ten thouſand Greeks in phalanx, without any effect. Two only now, probably under bolder guidance, threw ſeven hundred into confuſion; and a vigorous charge of the cavalry immediately following, completed the rout. A hundred were killed; and flight would have ſaved few of the reſt, had not Ageſilaus, with the main body of the army, been fortunately near enough to give them protection. ſ. 9.

This action, honorable to Pharnabazus and incouraging to his troops, was however ſcarcely a ſtep toward relief from circumſtances highly diſtreſſing. He was conſtantly watching, with his cavalry, to give protection to his property and people, againſt detachments and maroders from the ſ. 11.

Grecian army; but, through fear of nightly attack, which an army of cavalry was little fit to reſiſt, he dared reſt nowhere. Moving therefore daily, he was always anxious to keep it unknown where he meant at night to incamp or take his quarters. But precaution, which might have ſufficed againſt the Greeks, did not ſuffice againſt the knowlege of the country, and the means for procuring intelligence, which Spithridates poſſeſſed. Within three days after the ſurprize and defeat of the Grecian detachment, Spithridates obtained information that the ſatrap was at Cava, a large village about twenty miles from the Grecian camp. He communicated with the Spartan Herippidas, who commanded the Cyreian troops; a man covetous of fame, and always eager for enterprize; and Herippidas requeſted of Ageſilaus permiſſion to attempt the ſurprize of the ſatrap in his quarters; deſiring for the purpoſe two thouſand heavy-armed, as many targeteers, the Paphlagonian cavalry, with that under Spithridates, and as many of the Greek as would be volunteers on the occaſion. Ageſilaus conſented: the preparatory ſacrifice was performed, and the augur declared that ſucceſs was portended. The detachment was ordered to aſſemble, at the cloſe of evening, in front of the camp. But darkneſs, and the want of thoſe convenient and cheap materials for writing, with which, in modern times, the loweſt officer ſo readily forms his roll, gave opportunity for evaſion, and not half the propoſed number of any of the troops appeared. Fear of deriſion nevertheleſs ſtimulating, Herippidas reſolved to proceed, and Spithridates did not ſhrink from the undertaking.

Xen. Hel. l. 4. c. 1. ſ. 10.

Marching accordingly, they reached Cava before day, and, with the firſt dawn, aſſaulted and preſently carried the principal outguard. The whole Perſian army inſtantly fled, and the camp was taken. Spithridates and the Paphlagonians were haſty in appropriating its contents. The ſatrap's baggage, a multitude of ſlaves, and numerous beaſts of burthen, for accompanying the rapid marches of the cavalry with accommodations for the ſatrap and his train, fell into their hands. Herippidas, anxious to get credit for the amount of the capture, as well as to do juſtice to himſelf and his detachment, ſtationed his Greek troops ſo as to intercept thoſe who bore and drove the plunder, and he put all in charge of the common prize-ſellers of the army[22]. This meaſure, in itſelf apparently right, he ſeems to

ſ. 11.

[22] Λαφυροπῶλαι.

have

have made wrong by the Spartan roughneſs, by the too little condeſcenſion for Aſiatic prejudices, with which he carried it into execution. The Paphlagonians were diſguſted, as if they had received a groſs injury; and Spithridates ſo reſented what he conſidered as a diſgracing inſult, that on the following night he left the army, and led away the Paphlagonians with him. Going to Sardis, he ſurrendered himſelf with them to Ariæus, in whom, as having himſelf borne arms againſt the king, they expected the readier diſpoſition to excuſe their deſertion. No event, during his command in Aſia, gave Ageſilaus ſo much uneaſineſs. Xen. Hel. l. 4. c. 1. ſ. 12.

The hope of an acquiſition however, that would much more than compenſate the loſs thus ſuſtained, about the ſame time preſented itſelf. Apollophanes, a Greek of Cyzicus, who had been long connected by hoſpitality with Pharnabazus, was at this time living as a gueſt with Ageſilaus. He propoſed to negotiate an interview between the ſatrap and the Lacedæmonian king, and he ſucceeded. A place was appointed in the ſ. 13. open air. Ageſilaus, attended by his thirty Spartans, arrived firſt; and finding ſome greenſward, all, with Spartan ſimplicity, ſeated themſelves on it. Preſently Pharnabazus came, gorgeouſly habited, and attended by a numerous train, who proceeded ſedulouſly to ſpread fine carpets and place ſoft cuſhions, after the Perſian faſhion. The ſight of the Spartan king ſtruck him with a generous ſhame: he ordered away all the apparatus of luxury, and, in emulation of the ſimplicity which he admired, ſeated himſelf on the ground. The cuſtomary ſalutation then having paſſed, Pharnabazus offered his right hand, which Ageſilaus with his right hand received; after which the ſatrap, as the elder, ſays the hiſtorian, began the conference. Mentioning the alliance he formerly had with Lacedæmon, ſ. 14. and the important ſervices he had rendered that ſtate in the war with Athens, he ſaid, 'None could accuſe him of doubledealing like Tiſſaphernes: 'yet his recompence was the deſtruction of his property, with ſuch diſtreſs 'to himſelf, that he could not command a ſupper from his own eſtate, un- 'leſs, like the dogs, he could pick up any crumbs left by the Grecks. If 'then,' he added, 'I am ignorant of what is juſt and ſacred, I wiſh you to 'teach me how this can be conſiſtent with generoſity and gratitude.'

The Thirty felt the reproach[23] in reſpectful ſilence. Ageſilaus, after ſ. 15. & Plut. Ageſ.

[23] This interpretation of Xenophon's words, in the Hellenics, is warranted by Plutarch, in his life of Ageſilaus, v. 2. p. 1100. ed. H. Steph.

ſome

ſome pauſe, anſwered: 'Nothing is better known, among the cuſtoms of 'the Greeks, than the ſacred reſpect in which the laws of hoſpitality are 'held: yet, when war ariſes between Grecian ſtates, our obligation to 'our country ſo ſuperſedes what we owe to any individual, that we hold it 'a duty even to kill, if we meet them in battle, thoſe to whom we are 'pledged in hoſpitality. Inſtantly therefore as the king of Perſia became 'the enemy of our country, the duty became impoſed upon us to treat as 'enemies whoever owns allegiance to him. With regard to yourſelf as 'an individual, there is nothing we ſhould more value than your friend-'ſhip; but the means of our poſſeſſing it reſt not with us but with you. Far 'be it from me to propoſe to you the change of ſubjection to Perſia for 'ſubjection to Greece. Better things are before you: to own no ſub-'jection, to worſhip no maſter. Nor is it freedom with indigence (tho I 'hold freedom preferable to all riches) that I would recommend; but, on 'the contrary, to hold your preſent large and rich command in indepen-'dency; and, forming alliance with us, to make additions to it by conqueſt, 'not to increaſe the king's but your own dominion.'

Xen. Hel. l. 4. c. 1. ſ. 26.

Pharnabazus replied: 'I will anſwer you candidly. I do not hold my-'ſelf ſo bound to Artaxerxes, but that, were he to ſuperſede me in the com-'mand I hold under him, and require me to obey another, I might be in-'duced to renounce my ſubjection to him and become your ally. But while 'he continues to truſt me, you may depend upon it (and all men of honor 'I am confident will approve my conduct) I ſhall continue to defend the 'charge committed to me to the utmoſt of my ability.' Struck with the ſatrap's generous frankneſs, Ageſilaus took his hand and ſaid, 'With thoſe 'noble ſentiments much I wiſh you could become our friend. Of this 'however be aſſured; my army ſhall quit your territory without delay; 'and while the war laſts, if there is another object for our arms, you and 'yours ſhall remain unmoleſted.'

ſ. 18. The conference here ending, Pharnabazus mounted his horſe. As he rode away, his ſon, running to Ageſilaus, ſaid, 'I pledge myſelf in 'hoſpitality to you.' 'I accept the pledge,' anſwered the king. 'Re-'member then,' replied the youth, and preſented a finely-wrought javelin. Looking around for ſomething to return, Ageſilaus obſerved furniture of ſingular elegance, on a horſe of one of his attendants. This he directed

to

to be put upon the youth's horſe, who immediately mounted and purſued his father.

Such, equally among Perſians and Greeks, were relics yet exiſting of the manners of the heroic ages. The progreſs of civilization and government indeed had not, among either people, ſuperſeded the need of the antient hoſpitality. Not long after, in the abſence of Pharnabazus, his brother uſurped for a time the ſatrapy; and his ſon, compelled to ſeek ſafety in flight, paſſing into Greece, was very kindly entertained by Ageſilaus. Xen. Hel. l. 4. c. 1. ſ. 29.

In conformity to his word given, Ageſilaus immediately led his army out of Bithynia, where indeed, according to his firſt purpoſe, he had ſubſiſted it nearly through the winter, at the ſatrap's expence. Moving weſtward, he incamped in the vale of Thebē; and, ſpring now approaching[24], he ſent requiſitions for new levies, from all the Grecian ſettlements, to join him there. At the head of a very powerful army, he propoſed then to direct his march eaſtward, beyond the ſatrapies both of Tithrauſtes and of Pharnabazus. He had ſeen by how looſe a tie the diſtant members of the empire were connected with the government in the capital. He knew, by the moſt unequivocal proof, from the return of the Cyreian Greeks, how weak the empire was, even at its center: he had already proved the ſuperiority of his military force to anything likely to be oppoſed to him; and he concluded, that the country, in whatever extent he could put it behind him, would be, not indeed probably conquered for Lacedæmon or for Greece, but effectually ſeparated from Perſia. ſ. 20. B. C. 393. Ol. 96. 3.

[24] Σχιδὸν δέ τι καὶ ἔαρ ὑπέφαινεν. Xen Hel. l. 4. c. 1. ſ. 20. The firſt words of the ſame chapter mention the preceding autumn. Yet Dodwell has choſen to conclude his account of the year B. C. 394, with the aſſertion—Ver ergo illud; cujus mentio apud Xen. in Aſia non vidit Ageſilaus. Dodwell's fondneſs for inveſtigation and diſquiſition ſeems to have led him to give more than a juſt attention, upon ſome occaſions, to authors whom, on others, he reviles in very unqualified terms; and, at the ſame time, rather arrogantly to contradict the able cotemporary hiſtorian, who cannot but have known whether it was ſpring or autumn, when he himſelf, accompanying Ageſilaus, left Aſia. But, in the neceſſity under which I find myſelf to declare my diſſatisfaction ſometimes with Dodwell, I deſire always to acknowlege high obligation to him; and, if I ſometimes leave, without complete correction, errors which I have undertaken to point out, I muſt beg leave to refer to a former note for my excuſe, the 15th of the 24th chapter.

CHAPTER

CHAPTER XXV.

Affairs of GREECE, and Tranſactions of the GREEKS in ASIA, from the Eſtabliſhment of the GENERAL CONFEDERACY againſt LACEDÆMON, to the TREATY between LACEDÆMON and PERSIA, and the Reëſtabliſhment of the LACEDÆMONIAN POWER in GREECE, through the General PEACE dictated in the KING of PERSIA's Name, commonly called the PEACE of ANTALCIDAS.

SECTION I.

Confederacy in Greece againſt Lacedæmon: Recall of Ageſilaus from Aſia: Propoſed invaſion of Laconia: Battle of Corinth: March of Ageſilaus to Greece. Summary view of the hiſtory of Cyprus: Evagoras prince of Salamis: Combination in Aſia againſt Lacedæmon: Fleet under Conon: Defeat of the Lacedæmonian Fleet near Cnidus. Victory of Ageſilaus near Coroneia. Succeſſes of Pharnabazus and Conon, and downfal of the Lacedæmonian dominion in Aſia.

B. C. 394. Ol. 96. 3. Xen. Hel. l. 4. c. 2. ſ. 1. Diod. l. 14. c. 83.

WHILE the Lacedæmonian king was thus buſied in preparation for enterprize in Aſia, ſeeming to give fair promiſe of conqueſt the moſt glorious, and a revolution among the greateſt, known in the annals of the world, a ſtorm was gathering within Greece, that threatened to overwhelm Lacedæmon itſelf. The acceſſion of Athens to the Bœotian alliance was but the beginning of a confederacy, more formidable than had yet been formed, of Grecian powers againſt a Grecian power. Athens led Argos into it, and Argos Corinth, now, under ſway of the democratical party, cloſely connected with Argos. The influence of Athens and Corinth together

together then ingaged Acarnania, Ambracia, Leucadia, part of Theſſaly, all Eubœa, and the populous towns of Chalcidicë in Thrace. Body and form, and means of energy were given to the confederacy by the eſtabliſhment of a congreſs, of deputies from every ſtate, at Corinth [1]. Inſtead of allowing, according to the old ſyſtem, the dangerous ſupremacy of any one republic, it ſeems to have been propoſed that ſuch a congreſs of deputies, from all, ſhould regulate the common concerns of the Greek nation. The idea was good, but the detail of the plan was deficient. A connection of numerous republics, not inforced by ſome one power pervading the whole, but dependent upon the varying intereſts of parties in the moment prevailing in each, was far too frail to be laſting; and, not committing even executive government to one perſon, or one ſimply conſtituted council, its energy would be very uncertain. It was nevertheleſs, in the moment, highly formidable to Lacedæmon. The alarm was heightened by the rumors circulated, of Perſian money diſtributed among men of moſt influence in the hoſtile ſtates, and the expectation, that, while Perſia was preſſed by the Lacedæmonian arms, that kind of aſſiſtance, which Perſia could beſt give and the Greeks moſt needed, would not be wanting to the new confederacy. Not only the ſupremacy of Lacedæmon, ſo in appearance eſtabliſhed over Greece by the event of the Peloponneſian war, was preſſingly threatened, but, by the connection of two of the moſt powerful ſtates of Peloponneſus itſelf with the hoſtile confederacy, even the ſecurity of Laconia was indangered. Nor had the ſuperior abilities, which ſuch a criſis required, been anywhere conſpicuous in Sparta, ſince the loſs of Lyſander. Thoſe, who now directed public affairs, tottered in their lofty ſituation; at the head of the politics of Greece, where they ſhould have held the balance of ſurrounding nations, and were unable to hold that of their own. Feeling urgently the need of both ſupport and guidance, they diſpatched a requiſition for Ageſilaus to return, with the utmoſt ſpeed, to relieve his threatened country.

Xen. Hel. l. 4. c. 2. ſ. 1.

[1] Diodorus here has a merit which I have pleaſure in noticing. He has been fortunate in the ſelection of his author, whoever he was, from whom he has given a clear tho ſuccinct account of the forming of this confederacy, which Xenophon's Hellenics, evidently in many reſpects an unfiniſhed work, would not readily furniſh; tho the account of Diodorus not only is in perfect conſonance with Xenophon's, but, in almoſt every particular, ſomewhere confirmed by it.

Ageſilaus was injoying, in Aſia, honors and power, and hope of glory, ſuch as had never fallen to the lot of any Greek. Added to the great authority of a Lacedæmonian king in forein command, his popularity, among the Aſiatic Grecian cities, was beyond anything before known; for, having found them, ſays Xenophon, all miſerably diſtracted by parties, he compoſed the differences of all, and eſtabliſhed everywhere peace, and at leaſt the preſent effect of concord, without executions or expulſions. He was then at the head of an army, ſuch as no Greek had ever before commanded out of Greece; and he had before him a field, the moſt inviting that human ambition could eaſily imagine. Nothing therefore could be more mortifying than the ſummons to quit this ſplendid ſituation, with all the alluring views attending, to return to the condition of a Lacedæmonian king at home, under the immediate controul of the ephors. It is implied, even by his panegyriſt, that all his united patriotiſm and magnanimity were wanting, for the reſolution to obey. Immediately, however, aſſembling the allies, he explained his country's and his own neceſſities, adding aſſurances that he ſhould never forget his obligations to the Aſian Greeks; and that, ſhould the event in Europe be proſperous, he would not fail to return, and uſe his beſt ability in the proſecution of thoſe meaſures, which might moſt conduce to their welfare. Affection for the chief whom they were going to loſe, coöperating with the change from high hopes to the fear of a great reverſe, threw the aſſembly into tears. They proceeded however immediately to a unanimous vote, that ſuccours for Lacedæmon, from all the Aſian Greek cities, ſhould attend Ageſilaus into Europe; and that, ſhould the hoped-for ſucceſs follow, they ſhould return under his command, to proſecute the war in Aſia.

Xen. Ageſ. c. 1. ſ. 37.

Ibid. & Hel. l. 4. c. 2. ſ. 2.

ſ. 3, 4. Two cares principally ingaged Ageſilaus, before his departure; to provide ſecurity for the Aſian Greeks in his abſence, and to have a numerous and well-appointed army to lead into Greece. For the former purpoſe, naming Euxenus to preſide, with the title of harmoſt, he placed a body of four thouſand men under his orders. With the latter view, he propoſed prizes for the cities which ſhould furniſh the beſt troops, and for commanders of mercenaries, horſe, heavy-armed, bowmen, and targeteers, whoſe bands ſhould be the beſt choſen, beſt appointed, and beſt diſciplined. The

prizes

prizes were moſtly arms, elegantly wrought; but, for higher merit, or the merit of thoſe of higher rank, there were ſome golden crowns; and Xenophon mentions it, as a large ſum for the occaſion, that the expence amounted to four talents, ſcarcely a thouſand pounds ſterling. Three Lacedæmonians, with one officer from each Aſiatic city, were named for judges; but the deciſion, or the declaration of it, was judiciouſly referred to the arrival of the army in the Thracian Cherſoneſe.

Unable as the leading men in the Lacedæmonian adminiſtration were, either to conduct a war againſt the powerful confederacy formed againſt them, or, upon any tolerable terms, to prevent it, the recall of Ageſilaus ſeems to have been a neceſſary meaſure. The army, aſſembled by their enemies, was ſuch as had not often been ſeen in wars within Greece. Argos furniſhed ſeven thouſand heavy-armed; Athens had already recovered ſtrength to ſend ſix thouſand, and ſix hundred horſe; Bœotia, Corinth, Eubœa, and Locris, made the whole of the army twenty-four thouſand heavy-armed, with above fifteen hundred cavalry; to which was added a large body of the beſt light-armed of Greece, Acarnanians, Œolian Locrians, and Malians. The fighting men of all deſcriptions muſt have amounted to fifty thouſand. The avowed purpoſe was to invade Laconia. Xen. Hel. l. 4. c. 2. ſ. 10. ſ. 7.

'The Lacedæmonian ſtate,' ſaid the Corinthian Timolaus, in a debate on the plan of operations, 'reſembles a river, which, near the ſource, is 'eaſily forded; but the farther it flows, other ſtreams joining, the depth 'and power of the current increaſes. Thus the Lacedæmonians always 'march from home with their own troops only; but as they proceed, 'being reïnforced from other cities, their army ſwells and grows for-'midable. I hold it therefore adviſcable to attack them, if poſſible, in 'Lacedæmon itſelf; otherwiſe, the nearer to Lacedæmon the better.' ſ. 6.

Againſt ſo powerful a league, the allies, whom the Lacedæmonians could now command, were principally from the ſmaller Grecian cities, and none beyond Peloponneſus. Marching themſelves ſix thouſand foot and ſix hundred horſe, and being joined by the Mantineians and Tegeans, whoſe numbers are not reported, they were farther reïnforced by no more than ſeven thouſand five hundred heavy-armed, from Epidaurus, Hermione, Trœzen, Sicyon, Achaia, and Eleia. Ariſtodemus, of the blood royal, commanded as regent, for the king, Ageſipolis, yet a boy. ſ. 9.

B. C. 394. Ol. 96 3/3.

Circumſtances commonly occur to render confederate armies leſs efficacious, in proportion to their ſtrength, than thoſe under a ſingle authority. A diſpute about the command in chief, with ſome difference of opinion about their order of battle, ſome of the generals being for deeper, others for more extended phalanges, gave opportunity for the Lacedæmonians to collect their forces, and march far beyond their own frontier, ſo as to meet the enemy near Corinth. In the account of the preparatory ſacrifices, there drops from Xenophon a remarkable confeſſion, that thoſe ceremonies were ſometimes engines of policy. While the Bœotians, he ſays, held the left of their army, they were in no haſte to ingage; but, as ſoon as they had prevailed to have their ſituation in the line changed, ſo that the Athenians would be oppoſed to the Lacedæmonians, and themſelves to the Achaians, then they declared that the ſymptoms of the victims were favorable. They ſaved themſelves perhaps ſome ſlaughter by this diſingenuous artifice. In the battle which inſued, the Achaians fled, and all the allies of Lacedæmon equally yielded to thoſe oppoſed to them. But the Athenians were defeated with conſiderable ſlaughter; and the ſuperior diſcipline of the Lacedæmonians ſo prevailed againſt ſuperior numbers, that, with the loſs of only eight of their own body, they remained finally maſters of the field; in which, if we may truſt Xenophon's panegyric of Ageſilaus for what he has omitted to ſtate in his general hiſtory, no leſs than ten thouſand of the confederate army fell. The invaſion of Laconia was prevented, but the victory was no farther deciſive.

Xen. Hel. l. 4. c. 2. ſ. 7.

ſ. 11.

c. 3. ſ. 1.

Dodwell. Chron. Xen.

Ageſilaus, haſtening his march from Aſia, croſſed the Helleſpont about the middle of July, and at Amphipolis met Dercyllidas, who had been ſent to inform him of the victory obtained near Corinth. He immediately forwarded that able and active officer into Aſia, to communicate the grateful news, and to add a repetition of his aſſurances, that, if affairs proſpered, as there was now fair hope, his return would be ſpeedy.

Through Thrace and Macedonia, the country was friendly, or feared to avow hoſtility. Theſſaly, inimically diſpoſed, and powerful through population and wealth, reſulting from the natural productiveneſs of the ſoil, was however too ill-governed to give any ſyſtematical oppoſition. The defiles of the mountains againſt Macedonia, where a ſmall force might efficaciouſly

efficaciouſly oppoſe a large one, ſeem to have been left open. But the influence of the principal towns, Lariſſa, Cranonë, Scotuſa, and Pharſalus, in cloſe alliance with the Bœotians, decided the reſt, and, as the Lacedæmonian army croſſed the plain, a body of horſe, raiſed from the whole province, infeſted the march. It was ſingularly gratifying to Ageſilaus, that, with his cavalry, promiſcuouſly collected, and intirely formed by himſelf, through ſupport judiciouſly given with his infantry, he defeated and diſperſed the Theſſalian, the moſt celebrated of Greece. Xen. Hel. l. 4. c. 3. ſ. 2. ſ. 3, 4.

On the day after this ſucceſs, he reached the highlands of Phthia; and thence the country was friendly, quite to the borders of Bœotia. But on his arrival there, news met him, unwelcome for the public, unwelcome on his private account, and ſuch as inſtantly almoſt to blot out his once bright proſpect, which, as the hiſtorian, his friend and companion of his march, ſhows, he had till this time been fondly cheriſhing, of conqueſt in Aſia, and glory over the world. While the miſconduct of the Lacedæmonian adminiſtration had excited a confederacy within Greece, which propoſed to overwhelm Lacedæmon by ſuperiority of landforce, and, with that view, to carry war directly into Laconia itſelf, a hoſtile navy had ariſen in another quarter, powerful enough to have already deprived her, by one blow, of her new dominion of the ſea. The train of circumſtances which had produced this event, tho memorials fail for a complete inveſtigation of it, will require here ſome notice.

We have ſeen Cyprus, at a very early age, from a Phenician, become a Grecian iland, and Salamis the firſt Grecian city founded there. We have then obſerved the Cyprian Greeks yielding to the Perſian power, which the greateſt kingdoms around them had been reſiſting in vain; and, ſoon after, incited by the revolt of the Greeks of Aſia Minor, and incouraged by the advantage of inſular ſituation and the inexperience of the Perſians in maritime affairs, a petty prince of Salamis rebelling againſt the Perſian dominion, and nearly bringing all Cyprus under his authority. With the reduction of the Aſian Greeks, however, Cyprus fell again under Perſian ſovereinty; and then probably the Phenician intereſt in the iland would receive countenance, in oppoſition to the Greek. Nevertheleſs we find a Grecian prince of Salamis ſending his tributary ſquadron, to ſwell the immenſe armament of Xerxes, intended for the conqueſt of Europe; and his Ch. 5. ſ. 2. of this Hiſt. Ch. 6. ſ. 2. Ch. 7. ſ. 2. Ch. 8. ſ. 4.

his brother among the priſoners made by the confederated Greeks, in their firſt action with the Perſian fleet.

The ruin of the marine, the inertneſs of the court, and the diſtraction in the councils of Perſia, which followed, would afford opportunity and temptation for the Cypriots, beyond other ſubjects of the empire, again to revolt; and the Perſian, and the Greek, and the Phenician, and the tyrannic, and the oligarchal, and the democratical intereſts in the iland, would be likely to fall into various conteſt. Such, as far as may be gathered, was the ſtate of things which firſt invited Athenian ambition to direct its view to Cyprus; when the Athenian navy, riſing on the ruins of the Perſian, was extending dominion for Athens on all ſides, under the firſt adminiſtration of Pericles. This view, quickly diverted to other objects, was, however, after a change in the Athenian adminiſtration, reſumed; and Cimon, as we have ſeen, died in command in Cyprus. The policy of Athens would of courſe propoſe to hold dominion, there as elſewhere, through ſupport given to the democratical intereſt. But, after the death of Cimon, wars in Greece ſo ingaged the Athenian government, as to prevent the extenſion of any conſiderable exertion to ſuch a diſtance; and the Cyprian cities were moſtly governed by their ſeveral princes or tyrants[2], under the paramount ſovereinty of Perſia.

Ch. 12. ſ. 2. of this Hiſt.

ſ. 4.

With the revival of the Perſian authority in Cyprus, the Phenician intereſt would be likely to find favor again; and, early in the Peloponneſian war, or perhaps before it[3], we find a Tyrian reigning in Salamis. The intereſt which he had found means to form, among a mixed population, had inabled him to expel the Grecian prince, and Perſian patronage ſupported his uſurpation. After ſome years, however, a conſpiracy ended his reign and life together; and another Tyrian, the author of the plot, aſſuming his place, propoſed to ſecure himſelf by the ſeverities common in ſuch revolutions. Among others then, Evagoras, a young Greek, who claimed deſcent from the antient princes of Salamis, of the race of Teucer, found ſafety in flight. But, the Tyrian's oppreſſion alienating even the Phenicians, while it diſpoſed the Greeks to unite againſt him, Evagoras formed

Iſocr. Evag. p. 282. t. 2.

p. 284.

[2] Κατὰ πόλεις ἐτυραννεύοντο οἱ Κύπριοι. Strab. l. 14. p. 684.

[3] The time is ſo far decided by the circumſtance, mentioned by Iſocrates, that it was before the birth of Evagoras, afterward prince of Salamis. Iſocr. Evag. p. 282. t. 2.

the

the bold reſolution, with only about fifty fellow-ſufferers in exile, devoted to his cauſe, to attempt the recovery of what he claimed as his paternal principality. From Soli in Cilicia, their place of refuge, they paſſed to the Cyprian ſhore, and proceeded to Salamis by night. Knowing the place well, they forced a ſmall gate, probably, as in peace, unguarded, marched directly to the palace, and, after a ſevere conflict, overcoming the tyrant's guard, while the people moſtly kept aloof, they remained maſters of the city, and Evagoras aſſumed the tyranny [4].

Iſocr. Evag. p. 286, 288, & 290.

This little revolution, in a diſtant iland, became, through a chain of events out of all human foreſight, a principal ſource of great revolutions in Greece. The character of Evagoras is tranſmitted as among the moſt perfect known to hiſtory. But a man ſo acquiring abſolute power, over a people divided by nation and language as well as by party, tho exerciſing it with the utmoſt juſtice and the utmoſt prudence, could not be immediately ſafe in his new exaltation. Evagoras, to ſtrengthen himſelf, held out incouragement for men of character, among the numerous exiles from Grecian cities, to ſettle in Salamis; and we find the Athenian orator Andocides, the companion in youth of Alcibiades, among thoſe who ſought and found advantage there. Still the dominion of a ſingle city, ſurrounded by powerful neighbours, and claimed as a dependency of the Perſian empire, would be but a precarious poſſeſſion; and to give efficacy to the policy of acquiring aſſociates, means muſt be found to remunerate, and to give an intereſt in the ſafety and proſperity of the prince. Evagoras therefore reſolved to extend his dominion, and, in due ſeaſon, to reſiſt the controul of Perſia. In the meantime he formed alliance with Athens; and, in return for ſervices rendered to the Athenian commonwealth, of what kind we are not informed, he received the honor, by a law regularly paſſed, of being admitted among the number of Athenian citizens.

Iſocr. Evag. paſſim. Diod. l. 14. p. 447. Iſocr. Evag. p. 296 & ſeq. p. 302. Ch. 22. ſ. 2. of this Hiſt. Andoc. de myſt. Iſocr. Evag. p. 304.

Such, as far as may be collected, were the circumſtances of the Salaminian principality, which led Conon to ſeek refuge there, on the deſtruction of the Athenian fleet at Aigoſpotami. The offer of ſervice of a commander

Ch. 20. ſ. 4. of this Hiſt.

[4] It is remarkable that Iſocrates, living under a democracy, and the eulogiſt of democracy, mentions it, to the praiſe of Evagoras, that he acquired the TYRANNY, Τύραννον αὐτὸν τῆς πόλεως κατέστησεν, and preſently after he calls it a righteous acquiſition — κτησάμενος ὁσίως.

of

of eminence, with eight triremes completely manned and equipped, was likely to be acceptable to Evagoras. But Conon brought with him more than naval force and military ſcience. He had been accuſtomed to communicate with Perſian ſatraps; and Evagoras wanted, for communication with them, a negotiator of ability, and whoſe character would carry weight. It will thus appear little wonderful that a ready friendſhip, nearly as Iſocrates deſcribes, ſhould grow between two men of characters ſo congenial and wants ſo mutual. Conon conciliated for Evagoras the friendſhip of Pharnabazus; and then the Cyprian prince proceeded in more ſecurity to improve and extend his dominion; gaining ſome towns by force of arms, ſome by negotiation and the credit of his juſt adminiſtration; giving however always particular attention to his capital, forming a port and quays, inviting commerce and population, adding fortifications, extending cultivation around, and at the ſame time increaſing his ſtrength, by building ſhips of war, and eſtabliſhing diſcipline among his people[5].

Iſocr. Evag. p. 300. Diod. l. 14. p. 447.

While Ageſilaus was threatening the conqueſt of Aſia, and Pharnabazus, having obtained, in a manner from his generoſity and mercy, a reſpite from the preſſure upon himſelf, was nevertheleſs apprehenſive that his ſatrapy, ſeparated from the body of the empire, might become dependent upon the Lacedæmonian commonwealth, Conon ſuggeſted that the progreſs of the Lacedæmonian arms, which ſeemed irreſiſtible by land, would be moſt readily and efficaciouſly checked by a diverſion by ſea. A conſiderable fleet of Phenician ſhips was at the ſatrap's orders: Evagoras had a fleet which would coöperate with it; the Athenian intereſt, ſtill conſiderable in the iland and Aſiatic Grecian cities, would favor the purpoſe; and Conon himſelf had conſideration among thoſe cities, and eſpecially among their ſeamen. The project, founded on theſe ſuggeſtions, ſeems to have been in forwardneſs before Ageſilaus left Aſia. Soon after his departure, however, through the combined exertions of Pharnabazus, Evagoras, and Conon, a fleet very ſuperior to the Lacedæmonian was aſſembled; and the generous

Iſocr. Evag. p. 304, 306.

5 Nepos and Diodorus report that Conon went to the Perſian court, where he managed negotiation with great ability and ſucceſs, according to one, for Pharnabazus, according to the other, for Evagoras. The omiſſion of all mention of this in the extant works of the cotemporary writers, Xenophon and Iſocrates, may excite at leaſt ſome reaſonable doubt of the fact.

Pharnabazus

Pharnabazus formed the reſolution, extraordinary for a Perſian ſatrap, to take the nominal command in perſon, having the good ſenſe apparently to leave the effective command to the ſuperior abilities and experience of Conon. Near Cnidus they fell in with the Lacedæmonian fleet, and the brave but inexperienced Peiſander, brother-in-law of Ageſilaus, would not avoid a battle. Conon and Evagoras led the Grecian force againſt him: Pharnabazus took the particular command of the Phenician, forming a ſecond line. The Grecian force alone, according to report, tho Xenophon does not ſpeak of it as certain[6], outnumbered the Lacedæmonian fleet. The allies in the left of the Lacedæmonian line, alarmed at the view of the enemy's great ſuperiority, preſently fled. Peiſander was then quickly overpowered. His galley being driven on the Cnidian ſhore, the crew moſtly eſcaped; but, refuſing himſelf to quit his ſhip, he was killed aboard. The victory of Conon was complete: according to Diodorus fifty ſhips were taken[7].

Xen. Hel. l. 4. c. 3. ſ. 6.

Xen. ut ſup. Iſocr Evag. p. 306.

Diod. l. 14. p. 441.

Such was the diſaſtrous event, the news of which met Ageſilaus on his arrival on the confines of Bœotia. The firſt information ſtruck him with extreme anguiſh and dejection. Preſently however the conſideration occurring, how diſadvantageous, in the exiſting circumſtances, the communication of it might be, he had command enough of himſelf to check all appearance of his feelings. His army conſiſted moſtly of volunteers, attached indeed to his character, but more to his good fortune; and bound, as by no neceſſity, ſo by no very firm principle, to partake in expected diſtreſs. With ſuch an army he was to meet, within a few days, the combined forces of one of the moſt powerful confederacies ever formed in Greece. To ſupport, or, if poſſible, raiſe, the confidence and zeal of his troops, tho by a device whoſe efficacy would be of ſhort duration, might be of great importance. He therefore directed report to be authoritatively circulated, that Peiſander had gained a complete victory, tho at the expence

[6] According to Diodorus, the whole force under Pharnabazus, Evagoras, and Conon, little exceeded ninety triremes, and the Lacedæmonian fleet was of eighty-five. We commonly find cotemporary, and eſpecially military writers, ſpeaking with moſt diffidence of the ſtrength of armies, and even of the ſtrength of fleets, which is far more eaſily aſcertained.

[7] Our copies of Diodorus call the Lacedæmonian commander Periarchus. If they are right, the negligence of tranſcribers muſt have corrupted the copies of Xenophon, who was too much in the way of things to be miſinformed of the commander's name on ſo remarkable an occaſion. But there ſeems reaſon to think that, as books were in their times dear, and, from their form, troubleſome to conſult, both Diodorus and Plutarch ſometimes truſted too much to memory. Plutarch however, on this occaſion, confirms our copies of Xenophon. Vit. Ageſil. p. 1102. t. 2. H. Steph.

of his life; and, to give ſanction to the ſtory, he cauſed the ceremony of the evangelian ſacrifice to be performed, and diſtributed the offered oxen among the ſoldiers.

Xen. Hel. l. 4. c. 3. ſ 9.

Reſuming then his march, in the vale of Coroneia he met the confederate army, conſiſting of the flower of the Bœotian, Athenian, Argian, Corinthian, Eubœan, Locrian, and Ænian forces. Expecting this formidable aſſemblage, he had been attentive to acquire ſuch addition to his own ſtrength as opportunity offered for. He had gained ſome from the Grecian towns on his march through Thrace. On the Bœotian border, he was joined by the ſtrength of Phocis, and of the Bœotian Orchomenus, always inimical to Thebes, with a Lacedæmonian mora ſent from Peloponneſus purpoſely to reïnforce him, and half a mora which had been in garriſon in Orchomenus. The numbers of the two armies were thus nearly equal: but the Aſiatic Grecian troops, which made a large part of that under Ageſilaus, were reckoned very inferior to the European. It was in the ſpirit of the inſtitutions of Lycurgus, that Ageſilaus, otherwiſe ſimple, even as a Spartan, in his dreſs and manner, paid much attention to 'the 'pomp and circumſtance of war,' as our great dramatic poet phraſes it; aware how much it attaches the general mind, gives the ſoldier to be ſatisfied with himſelf, and binds his fancy to the ſervice he is ingaged in. Scarlet or crimſon appears to have been a common uniform of the Greeks, and the army of Ageſilaus appeared, in Xenophon's phraſe, all braſs and ſcarlet.

ſ. 8.

Xen. Ageſ. c. 2. ſ. 9 & 10.

According to the uſual manner of war among the Greeks, when the armies approached, a battle ſoon followed. Both quitted advantageous ground; Ageſilaus moving from the bank of the Cephiſſus, and the confederates from the roots of Helicon, to meet in a plain. Perfect ſilence was obſerved by both armies, till within nearly a furlong of each other, when the confederates gave the military ſhout, and advanced running. At a ſomewhat ſmaller diſtance the oppoſite army ran to meet the charge. The Lacedæmonians, on its right, where Ageſilaus took poſt, inſtantly overthrew the Argians on the left of the confederate army, who, ſcarcely waiting the aſſault, fled toward Helicon. The Cyreians ſupported in Greece the reputation they had acquired in Aſia, and were ſo emulated by the Ionians, Æolians, and Helleſpontines, from whom leſs was expected, that,

Xen. Hel. l. 4. c 3. ſ. 9. ſ. 10.

all

all coming to puſh of ſpear together, they compelled the center of the confederate army to retreat. The victory ſeemed ſo decided, that ſome of the Aſiatics were for paying Ageſilaus the uſual compliment of crowning on the occaſion; when information was brought him, that the Thebans had routed the Orchomenians, who held the extreme of his left wing, and had penetrated to the baggage. Immediately changing his front, he proceeded toward them. The Thebans perceived they were cut off from their allies, who had already fled far from the field. It was a common practice of the Thebans to charge in column, directing their aſſault, not againſt the whole, but a choſen point of the enemy's line. Thus they had gained the battle of Delium againſt the Athenians, in the eighth year of the Peloponneſian war. To ſuch a formation their able leaders had recourſe now; reſolving upon the bold attempt to pierce the line of the conquering Lacedæmonians; not any longer with the hope of victory, but with the view to join their defeated allies in retreat. Xenophon praiſes the bravery, evidently not without meaning ſome reflection on the judgement of Ageſilaus, who choſe to ingage them, he ſays, front to front, when, if he had opened his line and given them paſſage, their flanks and rear would have been expoſed to him [8]. A moſt fierce conflict inſued. Shield preſſed againſt ſhield, ſtroke was returned for ſtroke; amid wounds and death no clamor was heard; neither, ſays the hiſtorian who accompanied the Spartan king, was there complete ſilence, for the mutterings of rage were mixed with the din of weapons [9]. The perſeverance, the diſcipline, and the ſkill in arms of the Thebans were ſuch, and ſuch the force of their ſolid column, that, after many had fallen, a part actually pierced the Lacedæmonian line, and reached the highlands of Helicon; but the greater part, compelled to retreat, were moſtly put to the ſword.

Xen. Hel. l. 3 c. 4. ſ. 11.

Ch. 16. ſ. 3. of this Hiſt.

ſ. 12.

In this obſtinate action Ageſilaus was ſeverely wounded. His attendants were bearing him from the field, when a party of horſe came to aſk orders concerning about eighty Thebans, who, with their arms, had reached a temple. Mindful, amid his ſuffering, of reſpect due to the deity, he

ſ. 13.

[8] So even in his Ageſilaus: c. 2. ſ. 12.

[9] It is implied in the account of Xenophon, that he was preſent, tho, perhaps for political reaſons, he avoids ſpeaking of himſelf. Plutarch expreſſly ſays that he was in the action—αὐτὸς, τῷ Ἀγησιλάῳ συναγωνισάμενος. Ageſil. v. 2. p. 1106.

commanded that liberty ſhould be granted them to paſs unhurt whitherſoever they pleaſed. In the philoſopher-hiſtorian's manner of relating this anecdote is implied, that among the Greeks, in ſuch circumſtances, revenge would have prompted an ordinary mind; and, even in Ageſilaus, the generous action is attributed, not to humanity but to ſuperſtition; not to an opinion of the deity's regard for mercy and charity among men, but to the fear of his reſentment for any want of reſpectful attention to himſelf. When purſuit ended, the victorious army anxiouſly employed itſelf in dragging the enemy's ſlain within its own lines: a remarkable teſtimony, from the fame great writer, to the prevalence ſtill, in a degree that may ſurprize us, of that barbariſm in war, which in Homer's deſcription is ſtriking, tho in his age leſs a matter for wonder.

Xen. Ageſ. c. 2. ſ. 15.

Next morning early, the troops were ordered to parade with arms, all wearing chaplets. Ageſilaus himſelf being unable to attend, the polemarc Gylis commanded at the ceremony of raiſing the trophy; which was performed with all the muſic of the army playing, and every circumſtance of pomp, that might moſt inſpire among the ſoldiery alacrity and ſelf-ſatisfaction. Why then no meaſures were taken to profit from the advantages, which victory apparently ſhould have laid open, we are not informed. The Thebans ſending, in uſual form, for permiſſion to bury their dead, a truce was granted them, evidently for a longer time than, for that purpoſe alone, could be wanted. Meanwhile the Lacedæmonian army withdrew into Phocis, a country either friendly, or, under protection of its ſacred character, neutral, to perform a ceremony, to which Grecian ſuperſtition indeed attached much importance, the dedication of the tenth of the ſpoil, collected by Ageſilaus in his Aſiatic command. It amounted to a hundred talents; perhaps ſomething more than twenty thouſand pounds.

Xen. Hel. l. 4. c. 3. ſ. 14.

After this ſecond triumphal rite, the army, committed to the orders of Gylis, proceeded into the neighboring hoſtile province of Ozolian Locris, where the object however ſeems to have been little more than to collect plunder, which, according to the Grecian manner, might ſerve the ſoldiers inſtead of pay. Corn, goods, whatever the rapacious troops could find in the villages, were taken. The Locrians, unable to prevent the injury, did nevertheleſs what they beſt could to revenge it. Occupying the defiles which,

ſ. 15, 16.

which, in returning into Phocis, were neceſſarily to be repaſſed, they gave ſuch annoyance, that Gylis was provoked to take the command of a ſelect body in purſuit of them. Intangled among the mountains, he was himſelf killed, and the whole party would have been cut off, but for the precaution of the officers left with the command of the main body, who brought ſeaſonable relief. Ageſilaus, ſtill from his wounds unfit for fatigue, paſſed by ſea to Laconia, and the army was diſtributed in quarters. Xen. Hel. l. 4. c. 4. ſ. 1.

If any other writer gave any authority for the ſuppoſition, we might ſuſpect that Xenophon's account of the battle of Coroncia was written under the influence of partiality for his friend and patron, and that the victory was leſs complete than he has deſcribed it [10]. Yet we are not without information of circumſtances which may have given occaſion to the line of conduct which he purſued. The defeat of Cnidus produced a great and rapid revolution in Aſiatic Greece. The ſmall ilands of Cos and Niſyra obeyed the firſt ſummons of the victors. The news alone ſufficed to diffuſe inſtant ferment over the rich and populous iland of Chios. The democratical party took arms; the Lacedæmonian troops were expelled; and a meſſage was ſent to Conon, propoſing a renewal of the old alliance with Athens. In Leſbos, the powerful city of Mitylenë, and, on the continent, Erythræ, with the ſtill more important city of Epheſus, followed the example. Pharnabazus and Conon did not neglect incouragement to a diſpoſition ſo favorable. Coaſting northward, they ſent, as they paſſed, to the Greek cities, both of the continent and the ilands, requiring that the Lacedæmonian governors ſhould be ſent away, but promiſing, at the ſame time, that no citadels ſhould be fortified to awe them, nor any violence put upon their municipal government. The liberal characters of the Perſian ſatrap and the Athenian admiral procuring credit to the promiſes, the requiſition was obeyed with alacrity; and the fabric of the Lacedæmonian empire, ſeemingly ſo eſtabliſhed by the event of the Peloponneſian war, and ſince ſo extended by the ability of the commanding officers in Aſia, was in large proportion almoſt inſtantly overthrown. Moſt of the principal officers, and Diod. l. 14. c. 85. Xen. Hel. l. 4. c. 8. ſ. 1, 2.

[10] Plutarch is warm in zeal for the fame of his fellowcountrymen the Bœotians, yet he admits the victory of Ageſilaus; and indeed it ſeems pretty evident that he had no account to follow but Xenophon's, or none more to his purpoſe, unleſs for ſome circumſtances little important, for which he quotes no authority, and which are of very doubtful aſpect.

many

many inferior men, in the numerous Aſiatic troops under Ageſilaus, would be deeply intereſted in this revolution. The principal ſources of pay for all would ceaſe; and hence the plain of Coroneia ſeems to have been the laſt field of fame for the Cyreians. We find no mention of them afterward from Xenophon: apparent proof that their following fortunes were not brilliant, not ſuch as he could have any ſatisfaction in reporting. Probably they diſperſed, ſome to their homes, ſome to ſeek new ſervice, and never more aſſembled.

Xen. Hel. l. 4. c. 8. ſ. 4, 5.

One ſuperior man, Dercyllidas, preſerved yet a relic of the Lacedæmonian empire in Aſia. He was in Abydus, when Pharnabazus and Conon paſſed along the coaſt; and the Abydenes, attached by his popular manners, and confident in his integrity and ability, were to be ſhaken neither by threats nor promiſes. Abydus became in conſequence the refuge of the expelled governors and their partizans. Strength thus collected, and credit gained, inabled Dercyllidas to prevent a meditated revolt in the neighboring city of Seſtus, on the Europeän ſhore. But he could not preſerve the other towns of the Cherſoneſe, or give ſecurity to the coloniſts, who had ſettled in that fruitful country under the authority of the Lacedæmonian government. All were compelled to abandon their lands; and it was only within the walls of Seſtus and Abydus that he could give preſent ſecurity to their perſons and effects, with ſome

ſ. 6.

faint hope of a ſettlement ſomewhere, at ſome future time, under Lacedæmonian protection. The ſatrap and the Athenian admiral endeavoured, by threats, by waſte of their lands, and by interception of their maritime commerce, to bring the Abydenes to ſubmiſſion; but winter approaching, and the Abydenes continuing firm, they gave up the point, and directed their attention to increaſe their naval force for the operations of the following ſpring.

SECTION

SECTION II.

Sedition of Corinth. Singular union of Corinth with Argos. Succeſſes of the Lacedæmonian general Praxitas, near Corinth.

THE event of the Peloponneſian war, which placed the Lacedæmonian ſtate decidedly at the head of the affairs of Greece, gave alſo, in the moment, a decided ſuperiority to the ariſtocratical cauſe throughout the nation. But in the very eſtabliſhment of that reign of ariſtocracy, the materials of a new revolution ſeem to have been prepared. Almoſt immediately the democratical intereſt gained the ſuperiority in Thebes, where, for a long courſe of years, it had been held in ſubjection. Silent, and unnoticed by hiſtorians, as that revolution in Thebes has been, it was nevertheleſs the leading ſtep to ſome of the moſt important occurrences in Grecian hiſtory. The eſtabliſhment of democracy there, gave the firſt means for the reſtoration of democracy, which quickly followed, in Athens. Corinth had long been cloſely connected with Thebes; and the growing jealouſy of the Lacedæmonian power, not only tightened the bonds of friendſhip, but led both ſtates to a connection with Athens, to which they had lately been ſuch virulent enemies. Argos, always democratical, and the moſt antient, moſt conſtant, and moſt determined of all the enemies of Lacedæmon, had for thoſe very reaſons commonly been the ally of Athens, and had always held communication with the democratical parties in Thebes and Corinth: ſo that, when Thebes and Corinth became democratical, the political connection of Thebes, Corinth, Athens, and Argos was, in a manner, already formed. Thus, within a very ſhort time after the triumph of the ariſtocratical intereſt, which the event of the Peloponneſian war produced, democracy was again approaching to preponderancy among the Grecian republics.

We have already had too many occaſions to obſerve, that, while Greece afforded the moſt ſublime inſtances of virtue in individuals, extenſive patriotiſm, political virtue pervading a people, was not more common there than elſewhere; but, on the contrary, political crimes, moſt atrocious crimes, abounded; the unavoidable conſequences of a political ſyſtem, in which,

which, through want of a juſt gradation of ranks, and amalgamation of intereſts, one portion of the people was, by political neceſſity the enemy of another, and party-ſpirit was ſtimulated by thoſe all-involving intereſts and dangers, which allowed none either to chuſe privacy, or to be, in a public ſituation, ſecure of the next day's fate. Notwithſtanding that well-poized conſtitution and equal law, or, in the expreſſive language of Greece, that eunomy of the Corinthian ſtate, which Pindar has apparently with juſtice celebrated, Corinth was not ſecure againſt thoſe effects of ſedition, under which, during ages of her own proſperity, ſhe had ſeen ſo many other Grecian cities ſuffering the direſt calamities. Indeed no ſmall ſtate, the territory of a ſingle city, can have the ſecurity of a large one, like the modern Europeän kingdoms, againſt ſedition within, any more than againſt war from without. In extenſive territory, diſtance gives leiſure and opportunity for virtue and prudence, in one part, to obviate the meaſures of villainy or madneſs in another. But, in a ſmall ſtate, a ſpark excited, if not extinguiſhed in a moment, will in the next moment involve all in flame. Hence aroſe a ſuppoſed neceſſity, a moſt unfortunate neceſſity could it be real, for not only indulgence, but incouragement, to individuals to aſſume public juſtice into their own hands, and aſſaſſination became dignified with the title of tyrannicide: a reſource in its nature ſo repugnant to all civil ſecurity, that, if it be allowed upon principle, any momentary good which it may poſſibly produce, cannot fail to be followed by far greater and more laſting evil.

The Corinthian conſtitution, tho evidently one of the beſt of Greece, if the eaſe of its ſubjects, and ſecurity of perſon and property be the teſt of merit, neither excited the attention of forciners, like the Lacedæmonian, by its pointed ſingularities, nor was blazoned, like the Athenian, through the ſuperior talents of its own hiſtorians and orators. Corinth figured as an important member of the Grecian political ſyſtem, but its particular hiſtory little ingaged curioſity; and thus we remain uninformed of, what may have deſerved to be known, the circumſtances of that revolution, by which the ſupreme power paſſed from the ariſtocracy, which had held it ſo long, and generally exerciſed it ſo ably. It ſeems very ſoon to have followed the revolution of the ſame kind in Thebes; the particulars of which

are

are equally unknown to us. Poſſibly a general jealouſy of Lacedæmon may have forced the leading men to conſent to a connection of the republic with the democratical ſtates of Argos, Thebes, and Athens; and then that connection itſelf would tend to give the democratical party the ſuperiority againſt them.

Events adverſe for the public are always favorable for the party in oppoſition to the exiſting adminiſtration. The defeat at Coroneia would ſhake the democratical leaders in Corinth. A momentary relief would then come to them from the diſmiſſion of the army of Ageſilaus, which inſued; but preſently after new difficulties occurred. Sicyon remained attached to Lacedæmon; and, at the ſame time to protect the place and its territory, and to keep the war diſtant from Laconia, a Lacedæmonian force was ſtationed there. On the other hand, poſſeſſion of the iſthmus being a great point for both parties, troops were ſent from Athens, Bœotia, and Argos, to aſſiſt the Corinthians in keeping it. Thus the Corinthian territory became the ſeat of a winter war, which not a little preſſed the Corinthian people, while their allies were quiet in their homes. Under theſe circumſtances, it became eaſy for the ariſtocratical chiefs to perſuade the multitude that they had been miſled; that their true intereſt would have kept them ſteddy in their old alliance, the alliance of their forefathers, with Lacedæmon. Such is the nature of confederacies: each member as it becomes preſſed, grows regardleſs of the common good, and attentive only to its own.

Xen. Hel. l. 4. c. 4. ſ. 1.

The democratical leaders were aware of their danger, and not ſcrupulous about means of prevention. Xenophon, upon this occaſion, does not ſpare his fellowcountrymen; he accuſes the Athenian adminiſtration, together with the Bœotian and Argian, of being accomplices in the horrid plot. A time appropriated to religious ſolemnity, when it is eſteemed decent, ſays the hiſtorian, to avoid the execution even of condemned malefactors, the laſt day of the Eucleian feſtival, was choſen for a maſſacre; becauſe then, all the people of all ranks being aſſembled in places of public reſort, the buſineſs might be more readily and completely performed. A

ſ. 2. B.C. 394[11], Ol. 96. 3. End of Autumn, or beginning of Winter.

[11] Xenophon has by no means clearly marked this date. The mention of a Corinthian feſtival has principally furniſhed the clue, for the induſtrious acuteneſs of Dodwell, in the inveſtigation of it.

Xen. Hel. l. 4. c. 4. s. 3. signal was given, and, in the agora, the execution began. Many were put to death before they had the leaſt apprehenſion of danger; ſome in circle converſing, ſome ingaged with the ſpectacles of the theater, ſome even ſitting in the office of judges. The reſt fled to the neareſt altars and images of the gods; but the aſſailing party, regardleſs of thoſe ſalutary laws of ſuperſtition, which even philoſophy would approve as a check upon ruthleſs violence, killed them even in the moſt ſacred places; ſo that, amid the carnage, a ſcene of impiety and ſcandal was exhibited, uncommon even in the fury of Greek ſedition.

s. 4. Thoſe who fell, in this maſſacre, were moſtly elders, of the principal families. Paſimelus, one of the chiefs of the youth, having ſome ſuſpicion of what was intended, had aſſembled the younger of the ariſtocratical party in another part of the city. Surprized there by the outcry, and preſently farther alarmed by the ſight of ſome flying toward them for refuge, all ran to the Acrocorinthus, and overthrowing a body of Argians, who, with a few Corinthians, oppoſed them, got poſſeſſion of the fortreſs. Fortune could ſcarcely have given them a more deſirable poſſeſſion; yet an accident, the moſt inſignificant, induced them

s. 5. preſently to abandon it. While they were conſulting on meaſures to be taken, from a column near them, the capital fell; and, the cauſe of the accident not being obvious, it was taken for a portentous prodigy. Recourſe was immediately had to ſacrifice; and, on conſultation of the entrails, the augurs declared it adviſable to quit the place. Political wiſdom evidently was not upon this occaſion the moving ſpring. A Themiſtocles, a Lyſander, perhaps a Xenophon, would have proved the augurs miſtaken. Utterly at a loſs what to do and where to go, the fugitives, obedient to the expounders of occult ſcience, haſtened down the mountain, without any other hope than to find ſafety in exile. Diſmay had ſped them beyond the Corinthian border, when the lamentations of their mothers, the perſuaſions of their friends, and aſſurances of perſonal ſafety, given upon oath by ſome of the chiefs of the democratical party, induced them to return into the city.

The democratical leaders had now taken meaſures which they thought might ſuffice, without more murder, to eſtabliſh the intereſt of their party. They had united their ſtate in one commonwealth with Argos,

thrown

thrown down the boundary-ſtones which marked the ſeparation of the territories, aboliſhed the Corinthian aſſemblies and every characteriſtic of a diſtinct government, annulled even the name of Corinthians, and declared by law, ſolemnly decreed and proclaimed, that the two people were thenceforward to be all Argians. This is a ſingular phenomenon in Grecian hiſtory. A league between two cities, ſo cloſe as to eſtabliſh a kind of fraternity, we may have obſerved elſewhere [12]: the removal of the people of one town to eſtabliſh them as citizens of another, we have alſo ſeen practiſed; but a union, ſuch that one was loſt in the other, or even that two ſhould form but one ſtate, with one republican government common to both, has not before occurred. To judge of the merit of the plan, our information of particulars is too defective; nor have we the opinion of Xenophon delivered in a manner at all ſatisfactory. Juſtly indignant at the crimes of thoſe who carried the meaſure, feeling perhaps for perſons known to him who periſhed by it, and not totally free from the prejudices of party, as a political project he has altogether ſlighted it; and it was too tranſitory to afford proof of its merit in practice.

The returned fugitives found their perſons indeed ſafe, but their condition very much lowered. Their opponents held the ſoverein power [13]: they were themſelves loſt in a city which, ſays the hiſtorian, was no longer Corinth but Argos. They were indeed allowed the privileges of Argian citizens, or rather they were obliged to become members of the Argian commonwealth; a privilege which they were very far from deſiring; for with it they found themſelves of leſs conſideration in their altered country than many foreiners. In the true ſpirit of Grecian patriotiſm, narrow but ardent, they thought life, continues the hiſtorian, contemptible upon ſuch terms; and they reſolved (for, tho frightened by the falling of a ſtone, they were brave men) that, at any riſk, their country, which had been Corinth from earlieſt times, ſhould ſtill be Corinth [14]. In the true ſpirit

[12] Such a league, we learn, exiſted between the neighboring cities of Chalcis and Eretria, in Eubœa; and ſomething of the ſame kind between towns ſo far diſtant from each other as the Aſiatic and the Italian and Sicilian Greek.

[13] The expreſſion of Xenophon is remarkable, Ὁρῶντες δὲ τοὺς τυραννίνους, κ. τ. ε. and the whole paſſage is in terms not to be exactly rendered in modern language.

[14] —— τὴν πατρίδα, ὥσπερ ἦν καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς Κόρινθον ποιῆσαι, κ. τ. ε. It is difficult, in rendering this paſſage in modern language, to avoid an air of ridicule, which however Xenophon has certainly not intended.

of Grecian love of liberty, they reſolved that Corinth ſhould again be free. Perſonal freedom, as far as appears, themſelves with all Corinthian citizens injoyed; but Xenophon, ſwayed by party-prejudice, ſeems to have thought with them, that aſſociation in civil rights, with the people of another free commonwealth, was a freedom not to be indured. To purify the city from the pollution of murderers, another of their reſolutions, would have been of leſs queſtionable rectitude, had the means by which they propoſed to accompliſh it been unexceptionable. With all theſe ideas together, their minds were highly heated; inſomuch that, in their doubt of being able to accompliſh their purpoſe, they could find gratification in the thought, as the cotemporary hiſtorian aſſures us, that, 'ſhould 'their beſt endeavours fail, yet, in purſuit of the greateſt bleſſings, they 'ſhould obtain the moſt glorious of deaths.'

Xen. Hel. l. 4. c. 4. ſ. 7.

Thus prepared for bold exertion, Paſimelus and Alcimenes, young men of the firſt conſideration in their party, undertook to communicate with Praxitas, the Lacedæmonian commander in Sicyon. To avoid obſervation and inquiry from the guards at the gates, they made their way out of the city by a gully, the courſe of a winter torrent, which interrupted the continuity of the walls; and they propoſed to Praxitas to introduce a body of troops within that fortification, which, like the famous long walls of Athens, ſecured the communication of Corinth with its port of Lechæum. For the execution of their purpoſe, they choſe a night on which they were intruſted, by the exiſting adminiſtration of their country, with the guard of one of the gates of the long walls. Praxitas, at the head of a Lacedæmonian mora, with the whole ſtrength of Sicyon and about a hundred and fifty Corinthian refugees, entered without oppoſition. Expecting however to be quickly attacked by ſuperior numbers, he ſet immediately to raiſe works which might inable him to maintain his ground till reïnforcement could reach him: for, on one ſide, Corinth was filled with a military people, ſtrengthened by a body of mercenaries; and on the other, Lechæum was held by a Bœotian garriſon; and it was not to be doubted but the force of Argos would haſten to relieve the new member of the Argian commonwealth.

That day, however, and the next, Praxitas held his ſituation undiſturbed; but, on the following morning, a body of Argians being arrived, Corinth poured

poured out its force to attack him. We learn from Thucydides, that, in his time, the general reputation of the Peloponnesian troops was superior to that of any others known. This reputation, it appears, was not lost, when Cyrus raised his army to march against Artaxerxes. In the wars however which arose within Greece, after the conclusion of that distinguished by the name of the Peloponnesian, we find very great difference among the Peloponnesian troops; a difference which could arise only from the different attention given to military discipline and military exercises, and the different manner in which such attention was inforced by the political institutions of the several republics. The Sicyonians, long allies of Lacedæmon, and continually serving with the Lacedæmonian forces, could not want means to know the Lacedæmonian discipline; yet their military was nevertheless held in contempt; and in the battle within the long walls of Corinth, they proved the justice of the general opinion. Being attacked by the Argians, they yielded to the first onset; and, flying through their own intrenched camp, excepting those who fell by the swords of the pursuing enemy, they were stopped only by the sea. Pasimachus, who commanded a small force of Lacedæmonian cavalry, was witness to this defeat. Either the nature of the ground forbad, or, through his ignorance of a service less cultivated by the Lacedæmonians, he saw no opportunity for bringing horse into action; and yet, indignant at the defeat of his friends, he resolved to act. Dismounting, he persuaded, for it seems he could not command, some of his cavalry to follow him. The method of our dragoons not being within their practice, they fastened their horses to some trees which happened to be near, and the small shields they carried on horseback not being fit for mgaging with heavy-armed infantry, they supplied themselves with those of the slain and flying Sicyonians. Thus accoutred, they marched against the Argians, who, seeing the Sicyonian mark, an es, on their shields, little regarded their approach. Pasimachus, observing this, is reported to have said, using the common Lacedæmonian oath, 'By the 'twin-gods, Argians, these esses shall deceive you [15].' With the valor of a true

Xen. Hel. l. 4. c. 4. s 10.

[15] This speech, in the original, forces itself the more upon notice by something of a whimsical effect, arising from the Lacedæmonian dialect, in which it is reported: Ναὶ τὼ σιὼ, Αργεῖοι, ψιύσιι ὔμμι τὰ σίγματα ταῦτα. Beside the general peculiarities of the Doric dialect, the Lacedæmonians, as appears fully in the Lysistrata of Aristophanes, commonly pronounced Σ for Θ. The effect, altogether

true Spartan ſoldier, but not with the juſt diſcretion of an officer, ruſhing then to the aſſault of numbers too ſuperior, he was killed with moſt of his band.

Xen. Hel. l. 4. c. 4. ſ. 11. Meanwhile the Lacedæmonian heavy-armed, having defeated the Corinthians and mercenaries, and committed purſuit to the Corinthian refugees, turned to ingage the Argians. Theſe, who ſo deſpiſed the Sicyonians, were ſo alarmed, in the midſt of victory, by the approach of the Lacedæmonians, that to regain communication with the city, as the means of ſupport and ſhelter, they loſt all other conſideration. Haſtening to paſs the Lacedæmonians, they expoſed their right flank; of all things, in the antient practice of war, the moſt dangerous; becauſe the ſhield, ſo important for the ſoldier's protection, became inefficient. The Lacedæmonians did not neglect the advantageous opportunity. The Argians, ſuffering in their defenceleſs flank, ſtill puſhed for the city-gate; but before they could reach it, were met by the Corinthian refugees, returning from purſuit. This checked their way, and completed their conſternation. The Corinthians in the city, fearing to open a gate, afforded them no other refuge than by ladders let down from the walls. The ſlaughter inſuing was ſuch

ſ. 12. that, ſays the hiſtorian, as corn, or billets, or ſtones, are often ſeen, ſo the bodies lay in heaps. Praxitas then led his victorious troops to the aſſault of Lechæum, and added the Bœotian garriſon there to the number ſlain.

ſ. 13. The ſucceſs of the Lacedæmonian arms was thus complete, and the dead, with the uſual ceremonies, already reſtored, when the forces of the Peloponneſian allies of Lacedæmon arrived. Praxitas employed them in making a breach in the Corinthian long walls, ſufficient for the convenient paſſage of an army: he then aſſaulted and took Sidus and Crommyon on the iſthmus, and he fortified Epieicia. Placing garriſons in all thoſe places, by which he ſecured the command of the iſthmus, he diſmiſſed the reſt of his army, and returned himſelf to Lacedæmon.

together would perhaps be moſt nearly imitated Scottiſh dialect, and adding the change of S for an Engliſh, by giving the ſpeech in the Lowland Th: 'By ſe twain-gods, Aurgians, ſeſe eſſes' &c.

SECTION

SECTION III.

Invaſion of Laconia by Pharnabazus and Conon. Reſtoration of the long walls of Athens. Seafight in the Corinthian gulph.

BY the victories of Coroneia and Corinth the force of the formidable confederacy, formed againſt Lacedæmon, was now broken; and, by the ſucceſſes of Praxitas, the command of the iſthmus being recovered, means were again open for carrying war againſt the enemies of Lacedæmon beyond the peninſula. Inſtead therefore of any longer dreading invaſion at home, Lacedæmon ſhould have been again formidable to her enemies. But that policy, by which ſhe had profited in the latter years of the Peloponneſian war, was now turned againſt herſelf; the wealth of Perſia ſupported her foes; the command of the ſea was already gone; and her armies, which ſhould have carried her vengeance againſt her moſt diſtant foes, were neceſſary at home, and yet unequal to the complete protection of her own coaſt.

Whatever perſonal eſteem Pharnabazus might have for Ageſilaus, he was highly exaſperated againſt the Lacedæmonian people. Of a temper to feel the diſgrace of the condition of a fugitive, to which, in the ſight of all his dependants, and to the knowlege of the Perſian court, he had been reduced, he was anxious to recover his honor, not leſs than he had been to vindicate his property. During winter therefore he was diligent in adding to the number of his ſhips, and in raiſing a force of Grecian mercenaries; the only troops that could be effectually oppoſed to Greeks; and he reſolved to carry war, in perſon, to the coaſt of Laconia, where no Perſian had ever yet appeared in arms. Xen. Hel. l. 4. c. 8. ſ. 6, 7.

In purſuance of this reſolution, imbarking, in ſpring, with the Athenian Conon for his vice-admiral, he ſailed among the ilands of the Ægean, and, from the Ionian ſhore to Melos, all ſubmitted to him. Proceeding then directly to the Laconian coaſt, he had the ſatisfaction to make good his landing on it, near Pheræ, and to ravage unreſiſted the country around. B. C. 393. Ol. 96. 3.

Reïmbarking

Reïmbarking before the Lacedæmonians could come in force againſt him, he repeated his debarkations, in various parts, for plunder, and always with ſucceſs. Under the able advice of Conon, he did not loiter on a coaſt where rocks and tempeſts and want were to be apprehended, not leſs than an enemy, whom he well knew to be formidable. He croſſed to the iland of Cythera, which, in the early part of the Peloponneſian war, had been conquered by the unfortunate Nicias. Being without ſtrong places, it yielded without reſiſtance, and, in the idea that it might be made a uſeful acquiſition, a garriſon was placed there, under Nicophebus, an Athenian. The ſatrap then directed his courſe to the Corinthian iſthmus, where the congreſs of the confederacy was aſſembled. There he had opportunity to communicate with the leading men, with whom he concerted meaſures for the proſecution of the war with Lacedæmon, and leaving a ſum of money for its ſupport, returned with his fleet to Aſia.

While the impreſſion of ſatisfaction with his ſucceſsful expedition, in which he had earned a glory ſo new to a Perſian ſatrap, was freſh upon the mind of Pharnabazus, Conon took the favoring opportunity for obtaining ſome moſt important advantages for his country. A man of courage and honor, the ſatrap was no deep politician. He felt keenly the injuries he had ſuffered from the overbearing power of Lacedæmon, commanding at once the naval and military force of Greece. At the ſame time the expence of maintaining the fleet, by which he had delivered, and in ſome degree revenged, himſelf, preſſed upon his treaſury. It was therefore a grateful propoſal, from Conon, to transfer a large ſhare, at leaſt, of that burthen to the Athenian commonwealth. But to inable Athens to bear it, he ſaid, two things were neceſſary; firſt, that the power of the fleet ſhould inforce the raiſing of thoſe contributions among the ilands, by which Athens had formerly maintained her navy; and then, that her long walls, ſo eſſential to her ſecurity againſt the overbearing ambition of Lacedæmon, ſhould be reſtored. Pharnabazus not only allowed Conon to employ the fleet in reëſtabliſhing the claim of Athens to contributions for the ſupport of her navy, but he allowed him afterward to employ the crews in labor upon the long walls; he gave a large ſum of money toward the expence, and he ſent maſons and mechanics to aſſiſt in the work. Neighboring ſtates, which had the democratical intereſt at heart, added

Xen. Hel. l. 4. c. 8. ſ. 9, 10. Diod. l. 14.

added their voluntary aid; and it is remarkable that, among the moſt zealous and liberal of theſe were the Bœotians, lately the moſt vehement enemies of Athens, remorſeleſſly urgent for its deſtruction. But ſo it was, among the warring intereſts of parties, in the little republics of Greece: walls, connecting the capital with its ports, were eſteemed the bulwark of the democratical, and the bane of the oligarchal cauſe: from the moment, therefore, when the revolution in Bœotian politics took place, whereby the democratical became the ruling intereſt, it became moſt the object of the leading men to reſtore, what their predeceſſors in adminiſtration thought they had the greateſt intereſt in deſtroying.

Thus Conon, thirteen years after his flight from his country's ruin, had the ſingular good fortune and glory to return, with the preſent of a fleet and fortifications, in ſhort, of dignity, power, and dominion in his hand. The gratitude of the Athenian people was ſhown in honors, we are told, of the higheſt kind, conferred upon Conon, and his friend and patron the virtuous tyrant of Salamis; of which, however, we find nothing ſpecified but their portraits in marble, placed by the ſide of the ſtatue of the Preſerving Jupiter; in memorial, ſays the cotemporary rhetorician, of the greatneſs of their ſervices, and of their friendſhip for one-another. Of any gratitude ſhown by the Athenian people to the generous ſatrap, we have no information. Poſſibly the prejudices of the age would not allow them, of the ſame kind, to a barbarian, of whatever merit, as to Evagoras; who, tho a tyrant, was a Greek, and an Athenian citizen.

Iſocr. Evag. enc. t. 2. p. 306.

While the ſatrap's money thus laid anew the foundation of naval power for the Athenian commonwealth, it inabled the Corinthians to maintain a fleet for the ſecurity of their own gulph. Meanwhile the Lacedæmonians, utterly unable to oppoſe the fleet which, under Conon, commanded the eaſtern ſeas, equipped however a ſquadron to diſpute the weſtern with the Corinthians, and give protection to the Achaians and others, their allies in thoſe parts. Coming to action with the Corinthian fleet, the Lacedæmonian admiral, Polemarchus, was killed, and Pollis his ſecond in command wounded; but Teleutias, brother of Ageſilaus, arriving with a reïnforcement, the Corinthian avoided farther action, and the Lacedæmonians commanded the gulph.

Xen. Hel. l. 4. c. 8. ſ. 11.

SECTION IV.

Improvement of the Grecian art of war by the Athenian general Iphicrates. Affairs of Phlius. Succeſſes of Iphicrates in Peloponneſus. Antalcidas ambaſſador from Lacedæmon, and Conon from Athens, to the ſatrap of Lydia. Expeditions of Ageſilaus into Argolis and Corinthia. Slaughter of a Lacedæmonian mora. Farther ſucceſſes of Iphicrates.

THE Athenians, tho their forces had ſhared in the loſs of two great battles, and in one of them had ſuffered conſiderably, nevertheleſs held their country ſtill unhurt by the war. But, the Lacedæmonians commanding both the iſthmus and the gulph, the paſſage to Attica was now eaſy to them, and while the reſtoration of the long walls would of courſe excite their jealouſy, the ravage of Laconia by Conon could not but have excited a deſire of revenge. It was therefore much an object for the Athenians to keep the Lacedæmonians employed within their own peninſula. After the victories of Ageſilaus and Praxitas, it might indeed appear raſh to ſend a landforce to make war in Peloponneſus; but Athens, fertile in great talents, had a general formed for the peculiar circumſtances of the exiſting occaſion.

Iphicrates was the author of a ſyſtem of tactics, new among the Greeks. The phalanx, almoſt irreſiſtible where it could exert its force, was cumberſome in evolution, unfit for mountainous or woody countries, incapable of rapid motion, either in purſuit or retreat. Its character is marked in a ſaying reported of Iphicrates. Comparing an army with the human body, the general, he ſaid, was as the head, the light-armed as the hands, the cavalry as the feet, and the phalanx as the cheſt and ſhoulders. Of courſe he conſidered a Peloponneſian army, notwithſtanding the general ſuperiority of the heavy-armed, as extremely defective; for its light-armed were meer untrained or ill-trained ſlaves; and the cavalry generally deficient, both in number and in diſcipline. Indeed, among the Greeks, cavalry

Plut. Pelopid. p. 507.

was

was of little uſe but in purſuit, except againſt the light-armed; no body of horſe daring to charge a phalanx; and hence the cavalry was compared to the feet. Under this view of things, Iphicrates directed his attention to improve what he called the hands of the army. Athens had always had bowmen ſuperior to the Peloponneſian, and the advantage had been frequently experienced. Iphicrates conceived that great advantage might be drawn from an improved diſcipline of the middle-armed, or targeteers, who, to the agility of the light-armed, might unite ſome degree of the force of the phalanx. Indeed how much practice was neceſſary to excellence, in any of the three ſtiles of diſcipline, we may gather in ſome degree from Xenophon; where he obſerves that even a Spartan would not, with target and dart, ingage a Thracian armed in the ſame manner, any more than the Thracian would, with ſhield and ſpear, ingage any Greek practiſed in the diſcipline of the heavy-armed. Xen. Mem. Socr.

The firſt ſucceſs which gave fame to Iphicrates and his ſyſtem, was obtained againſt the Phliaſians, the political circumſtances of whoſe little republic deſerve notice. Phlius was a member of the Lacedæmonian confederacy, when thoſe, eſteemed chiefs of the Lacedæmonian party there, were expelled. According to the general courſe of things in Greece, it was to be expected that Phlius would then renounce the Lacedæmonian alliance, and ingage in the new confederacy of Bœotia, Athens, and Argos. But an inveterate hatred, a kind of horror of the Argians, pervaded all parties in Phlius; inſomuch that it was reſolved, with all the forbidding circumſtances attending, to endeavour to preſerve the connection of the commonwealth with Lacedæmon. In other times probably, ſpurning at the propoſal, the Lacedæmonian government would have commanded thoſe who ruled in Phlius to reſtore the exiles: but, in the exiſting ſituation of affairs, Lacedæmon no longer held her former imperious tone; and, tho the Phliaſians carried their avowal of jealouſy ſo far as to refuſe, in any caſe, to admit Lacedæmonian troops within their walls, their offered friendſhip was not ſlighted. Xen. Hel. l. 4. c. 4. ſ. 15.

The preference, given by a democratical party, to the Lacedæmonian alliance, was a diſappointment to the democratical confederacy, that excited revenge; and the central ſituation of Phlius, between Argolis, Corinthia, Sicyonia, and Arcadia, gave that little ſtate an importance that urged atten-

tion. Accordingly Iphicrates led his targeteers into Phliaſia, and marked his way with ravage. His purpoſe was to provoke purſuit, and lead the Phliaſians into an ambuſcade. He ſucceeded, and ſo large a proportion of their ſmall force of heavy-armed fell, that the ſurvivors thought themſelves unequal, not only to the protection of their fields, but even to the defence of their walls. Preſſed then by diſtreſs and danger, they were induced ſo far to remit their former jealouſy, as to requeſt from Lacedæmon a protecting force, and even to put their citadel into the power of a Spartan governor. The truſt was executed with fidelity, and even with a ſcrupulous delicacy; for, when the Phliaſians, after arranging their affairs, thought themſelves again equal to their own protection, the Lacedæmonian government, in withdrawing the garriſon, avoided even to mention a reſtoration of the exiles. The conduct was liberal and wiſe; worthy of Ageſilaus, if he was the mover; but we cannot give the Lacedæmonian adminiſtration quite ſo much credit for it, as if they had been leſs under the preſſure of difficult circumſtances.

B. C. 393. Ol. 96, 4.

Xen. Hel. l. 4. c. 4. ſ. 16.

After his ſucceſs in Phliaſia, Iphicrates overran great part of Arcadia; and, ſuch was the new terror of his targeteers, that even the Arcadian heavy-armed feared to quit their towns. The Lacedæmonians however were not to be ſo daunted: Iphicrates fell in with a body of them; and the targeteers, according to their uſual method, after throwing their javelins, retreated to avoid ſtationary action. The Lacedæmonians purſued, and ſuch was the practiſed vigor of ſome of their younger men, that, with their full armour, they overtook and killed ſome of the targeteers, and made ſome priſoners. After this experience, it was with difficulty that the targeteers could be led within dart's throw of any Lacedæmonian forces. Iphicrates nevertheleſs taught them ſtill to ſupport their reputation againſt other troops; inſomuch that, near Lechæum, he defeated a body of Mantineian heavy-armed. Thus, ſays the cotemporary hiſtorian, the Lacedæmonians, who held the targeteers in contempt, found reaſon to hold their own allies in ſtill greater contempt; and in fact it became a common ſarcaſm among them, that the allies were afraid of the targeteers, as children of hobgoblins.

ſ. 17.

Notwithſtanding the employment thus found for the Lacedæmonians by Iphicrates, the Athenians were ſtill uneaſy under the apprehenſion of a renewal

ſ. 18.

newal of thoſe evils, which had been experienced in the frequent invaſions of their country, during the Peloponneſian war. They were therefore anxious to deprive the Lacedæmonians of the command of the iſthmus, and with this view it was reſolved to reſtore the long walls of Corinth. Accordingly the whole force of the commonwealth marched to ſupport a body of workmen, ſo numerous that the reſtoration of the weſtern wall was completed in a few days. A good defence being thus gained on the ſide of Sicyon, the enemy's principal garriſon in thoſe parts, they proceeded with the eaſtern wall more leiſurely.

In tracing, with the able cotemporary hiſtorian, the events which followed the return of Ageſilaus from Aſia and his victory in Bœotia, ſome wonder is apt to ariſe at the little exertion or little means, at the confined action and narrow views, of that ſeemingly formidable commonwealth, which, after the Peloponneſian war, completely commanded Greece, and not only threatened Perſia, but was actually carrying conqueſt far into Aſia. To her landforce no misfortune had happened. On the contrary, a victory had checked the exertions of her enemies in Greece, before Ageſilaus returned. He brought to her aſſiſtance a powerful army of veterans, formed in various ſervice, and gained a victory on his arrival. This was followed by ſucceſs under Praxitas, which ſecured the way for carrying invaſion into the territories of any of the hoſtile republics. No uſe appears to have been made of theſe advantages. One defeat at ſea had deprived Lacedæmon of her tranſmarine dominion, and three victories by land did not give her quiet within her own peninſula. From the courſe of Xenophon's narrative, however, may be gathered that, for this apparent inertneſs and real inefficiency, two powerful cauſes exiſted; the ſcantineſs of pecuniary reſources, after the loſs of the Aſiatic dominion, and the diſaffection of the Laconian ſubjects to the Spartan government. It was owing to the former that the Aſiatic army could no more be put in action, and the latter could not fail to cramp all the meaſures of government for external exertion. On both ſubjects, Xenophon, on account of his connection with the Spartan government, has ſpoken always with delicacy and reſerve.

Humbled then and diſtreſſed, preſſed by land and by ſea, abroad and at home, and at a loſs for meaſures, while the Athenians were recovering extenſive dominion, the Lacedæmonians turned their thoughts to a reconciliation

ation with Perſia. They had experienced the advantage of the Perſian alliance, when they poſſeſſed it; they now felt its preſſure againſt them; and they perceived that, contemptible as the military of the empire was become, yet, in the divided ſtate of Greece, the Perſian king, or even a ſatrap, by the force of money alone, employing Greeks againſt Greeks, could decide the balance between their republics. They had moreover had large opportunity to know, that the councils of the Perſian empire had ſcarcely more energy than its arms; ſo that, in the looſeneſs of the connection of the diſtant members with the head and with one-another, means for negotiation and intrigue were almoſt always open. In the preſent moment, Pharnabazus was highly incenſed againſt them, and his reſentment had afforded opportunity for the able admiral and miniſter of Athens to attach him to the Athenian intereſt. But the new ſatrap of Lydia, Teribazus, had no cauſe of perſonal animoſity, perhaps no principle of political enmity toward them; and, to judge from paſt experience, the very attachment of one ſatrap to the Athenian, might incline the other to the Lacedæmonian cauſe.

B. C. 393. Ol. 96 ¾. Xen. Hel. l. 4. c. 8. ſ. 12, 14. ſ. 13.

Theſe conſiderations urging, Antalcidas was ſent ambaſſador to Sardis. The Athenians, early informed of this, were alarmed at it, and ſent alſo an embaſſy, at the head of which was Conon, accompanied by miniſters from Bœotia, Corinth and Argos. Antalcidas repreſented 'that the ſupport given 'by Pharnabazus to the Athenians went far beyond what a juſt conſideration 'of the intereſt of the Perſian empire would allow: that, on the contrary, the 'terms of peace which, on the part of Lacedæmon, he was himſelf com-'miſſioned to propoſe, could not fail of being agreeable to the king. The 'Lacedæmonians would no longer diſpute the king's ſovereinty over 'the Grecian cities in Aſia; and for the ilands and the Europeän Greek 'cities, they only deſired complete independency. If then no ſovereinty 'of one Grecian city over another were allowed, it would be impoſſible 'for any to carry hoſtilities with any efficacy againſt the king; ſo that 'the expence of maintaining a fleet for the Athenians, and of making war 'upon the Lacedæmonians might be equally ſpared.'

ſ. 15.

Teribazus was pleaſed with this propoſal, but he could not bring the Athenian, Bœotian, and Argian miniſters to conſent to a peace upon ſuch terms. Under the ſtipulation for the independency of all Grecian ſtates, the Athenians feared to loſe the ilands of Lemnos, Imbrus, and Scirus, their

their antient poſſeſſion; the Thebans their command over the Bœotian cities; and the Argians their new connection with Corinth. As far therefore as peace was the object, the negotiation was fruitleſs; but Antalcidas nevertheleſs carried a great point for his country, for he gained Teribazus. The ſatrap indeed ſcrupled to conclude an alliance with Lacedæmon, without expreſs authority from his court; but he ſecretly furniſhed Antalcidas with money for the equipment of a fleet; he impriſoned Conon on pretence of injurious conduct toward the king; and he went himſelf to Suſa, to ſolicit authority for the meaſures he deſired to purſue.

While Antalcidas was thus ſucceſsfully negotiating at Sardis, the Lacedæmonian adminiſtration, ſtimulated by the depredations of Iphicrates in various parts of Peloponneſus, and alarmed by the reſtoration of the long walls of Corinth, reſolved at length to put Ageſilaus again at the head of an army, with his brother Teleutias to coöperate with him in naval command. All Argolis was ravaged; and while the attention of the confederates was directed to that country, Ageſilaus ſuddenly croſſed the mountains; Teleutias conducted a ſquadron of twelve ſhips up the Saronic gulph; and the unfiniſhed long walls and the Corinthian naval arſenal were taken. The expedition was ably conducted, and the ſucceſs important: but the blow was not followed: the forces of the allies were diſmiſſed, and Ageſilaus led the Lacedæmonians home to celebrate the Hyacinthian feſtival.

Xen. Hel. l. 4 c. 8. ſ. 19.

Xen. ibid. & Ageſil. c. 2. ſ. 17.

In the whole conduct of this war we find nothing like that greatneſs of deſign, which might have been expected if Ageſilaus could have directed meaſures. It was evidently a war of the ephors, and the king was meerly the general, acting under their orders. In the inſuing ſpring he was directed again to put himſelf at the head of the army [16]. The refugee Corinthians had communicated information, that Corinth was principally ſubſiſted from a ſtock of cattle, collected at an obſcure port within the Corinthian territory, on the Saronic gulph, of the ſame name with the celebrated port of Athens, Peiræus. To deprive the enemy of that ſupply, was thought an object for an expedition, which the king ſhould command. After events

B. C. 392. Ol. 96. 4. Xen. Hel. l. 4. c. 5. ſ. 1.

[16] Neither ſeaſon nor year is ſpecified here by Xenophon; but the induſtrious acuteneſs of Dodwell, indignant at the evident confuſion of Diodorus, has endeavoured to aſcertain the dates from the mention of the Iſthmian feſtival in the Hellenics of Xenophon, and of the Hyacinthian in the Ageſilaus.

more

more adapted to ingage and fill the mind, theſe little tranſactions are apt to appear unintereſting. They are nevertheleſs important, as they are connected with great revolutions that followed, links in the great chain of events; and ſometimes as they afford information, the cleareſt and the moſt impreſſive, of the religion, politics, warfare, or manners, of this intereſting age.

Ch. 19. ſ. 2. of this Hiſt.

The time ſelected for the expedition was that of the Iſthmian games; which, in the Peloponneſian war, we have ſeen, diffuſed a temporary peace around them; inſomuch that amid deſigns and preparations on both ſides avowedly the moſt hoſtile, the Athenians could ſafely truſt their perſons in the power of the Corinthians, then the moſt virulent of their enemies. But the ſame ſuperſtition, which at that time inſured the obſervation of the armiſtice, now provoked to interrupt the ſacred ſeaſon with hoſtility. Corinth, by fiction of policy being now Argos, Corinthians and Argians indifferently, but all with the name of Argians, preſided at the ceremony, and performed the preſcribed ſacrifice to Neptune. This the Corinthian refugees held to be a portentous pollution. They claimed themſelves to be the Corinthian commonwealth, the excluſive privilege and excluſive duty of whoſe members it was to officiate in that ſolemnity. The Lacedæmonians approving their claim, Ageſilaus led his army directly to the iſthmus. The Argians were not prepared againſt attack, nor even againſt ſurprize. They fled on the firſt alarm; yet not ſo timely, but, as they hurried along the road by Cenchrea, they were ſeen by the Lacedæmonians from the heights above, and might have been overtaken, but Ageſilaus would not allow purſuit. So little indeed was the approach of an enemy apprehended, that the victim was left ready ſlain, and the preparations complete, for the feaſt which ſhould have followed. Ageſilaus put his Corinthian friends in poſſeſſion of theſe, and remained three days, while the ſacrifices and games were performed under their preſidency. Xenophon mentions, as a circumſtance intereſting to the Greeks, that after his departure the Argians cauſed the ſolemnity to be repeated in all its parts; ſo that ſome of the games were twice performed, and the ſame conquerors in ſome of them were twice proclaimed.

Xen. Hel. l. 4. c. 5. ſ. 2.

ſ. 3. On the fourth day, Ageſilaus led his army to Peiræus. There he found a large force, ſo ſtrongly poſted, with Iphicrates commanding, that in doubt of

of the ſucceſs of an aſſault, he recurred to ſtratagem. Spreading a report that Corinth was to be betrayed to him, he decamped ſuddenly and directed his march thither. The Corinthian adminiſtration were ſo little ſecure of their own people that, in great alarm, they ſent for Iphicrates to come and ſave Corinth; and that active general, ready at the call, with his light targeteers, paſſed the Lacedæmonian heavy-armed in the night. Ageſilaus, informed of this, returned at daybreak to Peiræus, and occupied the commanding heights; upon which the troops remaining there, together with all the men, women, and ſlaves of the place, took ſanctuary in a neighboring temple of Juno, and ſoon after ſurrendered themſelves to the mercy of Ageſilaus. His generoſity was not conſpicuous upon the occaſion: thoſe who were accuſed as accomplices in the maſſacre at Corinth were given up to the refugees; the reſt, men, women, goods, everything included in the capture, were ſold. Xen. Hel. l. 4. c. 5. ſ. 9. ſ. 5.

The terror of the arms of Ageſilaus, probably however not unaſſiſted by ſome intelligence or ſome apprehenſion of the ſucceſs of Antalcidas in negotiation, brought miniſters to the Lacedæmonian camp from ſeveral of the hoſtile ſtates, and particularly the Bœotian, to know upon what terms peace might be expected. Theſe miniſters were waiting the king's leiſure, while, with deſigned oſtentation, he was reviewing his captives and other booty, when a meſſenger arrived, with intelligence of a misfortune to the Lacedæmonian arms, which unfortunately checked both their deſire of peace and his means to command it. ſ. 6.

It was a cuſtom from very early ages, and ſuppoſed of divine origin, that the Laconians of the town of Amyclæa, on whatſoever public ſervice employed abroad, ſhould return home to ſing the pæan at the Hyacinthian feſtival. The ſeaſon being at hand, Ageſilaus, in marching for Peiræus, had left all the Amyclæans of the army in Lechæum; directing the polemarc, who commanded the garriſon there, to provide for the ſecurity of their return to Laconia. The polemarc, zealous in the execution of what was eſteemed a ſacred duty, committed the defence of Lechæum to the troops of the allies, while, with a mora of Lacedæmonian infantry, conſiſting of about ſix hundred men, and another of cavalry, probably a much ſmaller number, he marched to eſcort the Amyclæans. He took the road to Sicyon, not as the direct way to Lacedæmon, but as the rea- ſ. 11.

dieſt to get beyond danger from the enemy in Corinth, and to have a friendly line of country afterward to traverſe, with a freſh eſcort, if it ſhould be neceſſary. Having paſſed Corinth without moleſtation, and proceeded within four miles of Sicyon, he committed the Amyclæans to the charge of the cavalry, directing the commanding officer [17] to eſcort them as far as they ſhould themſelves deſire, and then preſs their way back to overtake the infantry in their return to Lechæum. He knew that the force in Corinth was large; but the late ſucceſſes of the Lacedæmonian arms had inſpired confidence, and he thought none would dare to attack a body of Lacedæmonian heavy-armed.

Xen. Hel. l. 4 c. 5. ſ. 12.

Unfortunately that very ſtratagem which gave Ageſilaus eaſy poſſeſſion of Peiræus, had conſiderably increaſed the force in Corinth, and at the ſame time ſent thither a general not likely to miſs an opportunity for ſtriking a blow. Iphicrates was there with his targeteers, and Callias ſon of Hipponicus, chief of the Daduchian family [18], commanded a body of Athenian heavy-armed. They obſerved the polemarc returning, without cavalry and without light troops, and they led out their forces. Having preconcerted meaſures, Callias kept aloof, while the targeteers hung on the flanks and rear of the Lacedæmonian column, directing their miſſile weapons at the undefended parts of the heavy-armed ſoldier's body. The polemarc continued his march under this annoyance, till ſeveral were wounded
375 and ſome fell. He then ordered thoſe within ten years after boyhood, perhaps thoſe under four and twenty, to aſſault and purſue [19]. This, a common expedient of the Grecian heavy-armed, when unſupported by cavalry or light troops, had ſucceeded, as we have ſeen, once, even againſt Iphicrates: but, to ſuch an officer, every loſs was a profitable leſſon, and the expedient ſucceeded no more. His targeteers, ſuperior both in arms and diſcipline to any before known, evaded the purſuit of the Spartan youth, incumbered with their heavy armour, turned upon them if they ſcattered, over-

17 His Athenian title would have been *Hipparc*; but the Lacedæmonian was *Hipparmoſt*; which aſſiſts to prove that *Harmoſt* may properly be rendered *Commander*, or *Governor*.

18 See Ch. 22. ſ. 2. of this Hiſt.

19 Τὰ δίκα ἀφ' ἥβης. The exact value of this expreſſion, which occurs more than once in Xenophon, is not ſatisfactorily aſcertained. According to Plutarch, the Lacedæmonian ἥβη, boyhood, ſeems to have ended at the age of twelve years, after which, to the age of nineteen, the Lacedæmonian youths were called Eirens. Thus the purſuers would have been thoſe only between the ages of nineteen and twenty-two.

took

took them when they retreated, wounded many, killed ſome, and compelled the reſt to rejoin the main body, upon which then, more daringly than before, they renewed their annoyance. The polemarc was thus provoked to order all under thirty to aſſault. In retreating again, more fell than after the former charge. Already the moſt active and daring ſoldiers were moſtly killed or wounded, when the horſe joined. Theſe were ordered to charge, and the younger men of the infantry with them. The cavalry ſervice appears to have been ill-cultivated among the Lacedæmonians. Xenophon blames the conduct of their horſe on this day. Inſtead of puſhing the purſuit of the retreating targeteers, they carefully kept even front with their infantry, halted when they halted, and retreated when they retreated. Immediately as they turned the targeteers turned, and horſe and foot together ſuffered from their miſſile weapons. Another charge was then made; but in the ſame manner, and with no better ſucceſs. As their numbers were thus reduced, their efforts ſlackened, and thoſe of the enemy grew more ſpirited. Diſtreſſed and at a loſs, at length, for meaſures, they halted on a ſmall eminence, about two furlongs from the ſea, and two miles from Lechæum. Thence, while ſuffering from miſſile weapons, and unable to return a blow, they ſaw, on one ſide, boats from Lechæum intended to relieve them, on the other, the Athenian heavy-armed approaching to attack them. Upon this they took to flight. The horſe eſcaped to Lechæum. Of the infantry, who moſtly made for the ſea, ſcarcely any ſurvived [20].

Xen. Hel. l. 4. c. 5. ſ. 17.

Ageſilaus, upon being informed of this diſaſter, inſtantly ſeized his ſpear, and, not waiting to communicate with the miniſters of the confederates, who were attending, aſſembled all his officers. Having given his orders, he marched immediately, with a choſen body, leaving the reſt to follow, after refreſhment taken. He had already entered the vale of Lechæum, when meſſengers met him, with information that the bodies of the ſlain were in the poſſeſſion of their friends. Upon this he returned to Peiræus, and

[20] Xenophon here ſays the killed, in all, were about two hundred and fifty. He had before ſaid that the infantry were, in all, ſix hundred, and that thoſe carried off by the ſhield-bearers (ὑπασπισταὶ) before the firſt aſſault upon the targeteers, were all that were *really* ſaved, μόνοι τῆς μόρας τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ἐσώθησαν. It looks as if two hundred and fifty were the number admitted by the Lacedæmonians, but that the hiſtorian knew the real number to have been greater.

next day, ſays the hiſtorian, with a ſimplicity which excites a ſmile, he ſold the priſoners.

This misfortune to the Lacedæmonian arms had an effect approaching to that of the capture of Sphacteria in the Peloponneſian war. It did not indeed give an equal advantage to the enemy, becauſe no priſoners were made. The loſs in ſlain was very inferior even to what many of the little Grecian republics had often ſuffered; but it made great impreſſion upon the Lacedæmonians, becauſe, ſays the hiſtorian, they were unaccuſtomed to ſuch blows; and, as Plutarch well remarks, for readers leſs familiar with the ideas of the times, it was an unheard-of diſaſter, and eſteemed a portentous event, that heavy-armed ſhould be defeated by targeteers, and Lacedæmonians by mercenaries. Accordingly, as the cotemporary hiſtorian proceeds to inform us, a deep grief pervaded the army: only, according to their great lawgiver's precept, the ſons, fathers, and brothers of the ſlain, as ſharers in glory earned through their family misfortune, oſtentatiouſly exhibited a joy, which, among other people, might have been eſteemed indecent on the occaſion. Enterprize however, if any had been intended, was checked, and the enemy were incouraged. The Bœotian miniſters, who were ſtill attending, being ſent for to declare the object of their miſſion, did not even mention peace, but only requeſted free paſſage to communicate with their troops in Corinth. Ageſilaus knew that what they now wanted was to get information of the amount of the late ſucceſs. Next day therefore, marching toward Corinth, he took them in his train, and allowed them to ſee the trophy raiſed by their friends, which he would not permit his own troops to remove; but if olive, vine, or other valuable tree had eſcaped former ravage, he now ordered it to be deſtroyed. Having made them ſpectators of this inſult, to ſhow that he could ſtill command the country, he ſent them, not into Corinth, but acroſs the ſea to Creuſis, to relate in Bœotia all they had ſeen.

Xen. Hel. l. 4. c. 5. ſ. 10. Plut. Ageſ.

Xen. Hel. l. 4. c. 5. ſ. 9.

ſ. 10.

ſ. 18

Here however ended his exertion. Placing a complete mora in Lechæum, and taking with him the ſmall relics of the mora which had ſuffered, he marched for Lacedæmon. His anxiety to conceal from the friendly towns, in which he was to take quarters by the way, the amount of a loſs apparently ſo little conſiderable, is remarkable. He was careful to enter them all as late in the evening, and quit them as early in the morning, as with

any

any convenience might be; and, finding the ſoldiers hurt with expectation that the Mantineians would take a malignant joy in their diſaſter, tho he moved from Orchomenus at daybreak, and did not reach Mantineia till dark, he would not halt there, but ſtill proceeded to the next town.

Xenophon has not informed us whether this retreat of the army was a meaſure of the king's, or of the ephors, or what neceſſity induced it. If not neceſſary, it appears an imprudent meaſure. Iphicrates preſently took Sidus, Crommyon, and Œnoë; the two former garriſoned by Praxitas, the latter by Ageſilaus himſelf. Thus all the territory northward and eaſtward was recovered for the Corinthians of the city, and command of the iſthmus no longer remained to the Lacedæmonians. For the reſt of the year operations were reduced to excurſions for plunder, chiefly by the Corinthian fugitives from Sicyon. Not daring, ſince the misfortune of the Lacedæmonian mora, to move far by land, they directed their little expeditions by water, whitherſoever, on the territory of their city, they had beſt hope of ſeizing, with leaſt danger, any ſmall booty that might contribute to their ſubſiſtence. Xen. Hel. l. 4. c. 5. ſ. 19.

SECTION V.

Unſteddineſs of the Perſian government: War renewed by Lacedæmon againſt Perſia: Thimbron commander-in-chief. Expedition into Acarnania under Ageſilaus; into Argolis under Ageſipolis.

DURING all this year the great fleet collected by Pharnabazus and Conon ſeems to have remained inactive. Poſſibly ſince the negotiation of Antalcidas, the impriſonment of Conon, and the reſolution of Teribazus to apply in perſon to the court of Suſa, the Helleſpontine ſatrap may have been cautious of taking a decided part: perhaps he may have been without an officer to whoſe ability or fidelity he would truſt ſuch a command. There was however evidently no ſteddy policy in the Perſian councils: nothing of B. C. 392. Ol. 98. 1.

that

that great deſign for eſtabliſhing a commanding influence in Greece, which later writers have fancied in them. Struthas, who, in the abſence of Teribazus, was appointed to the Lydian ſatrapy, inſtigated by conſideration of the injuries the king's territories had borne from the Lacedæmonians (poſſibly his own property had ſuffered, or his family had been inſulted) warmly favored the confederacy now at war with them.

Xen. Hel. l. 4. c. 8. ſ. 17.

Xen. Hel. ut ſup. & Diod. l. 14. c. 100.

The Lacedæmonian adminiſtration, in conſequence, renewed hoſtilities againſt Perſia; by what good policy prompted it is difficult to diſcover. The reäppointment of Thimbron, to a command in which he had already ſhown himſelf deficient, ſtrengthens the probability that the Lacedæmonian councils were at this time ill-directed; and the ſlighting manner in which Xenophon repeatedly mentions that officer, ſeems enough to mark that he was not choſen by Ageſilaus. Thimbron had ſome ſucceſs in plundering the Perſian poſſeſſions in the rich vale of Mæander; but he did not eſtabliſh a better reputation for military ability than in his former command. Courage he poſſeſſed: but, tho a Spartan, he was a man of pleaſure; indulgent to his ſoldiers, careleſs of thoſe for whoſe protection he and his ſoldiers were ſent. Courage may be even miſchievous in a general with deficient abilities. It led Thimbron to an extravagant contempt of an enemy not incapable of profiting from his error. Struthas, having obſerved the haſty and careleſs manner in which he often led ſmall bodies of troops to action or purſuit, ſent a few horſe to plunder the Grecian poſſeſſions in the neighbourhood. Thimbron was ſitting at table, with the celebrated muſician Therſander, when intelligence came, that the enemy he deſpiſed was thus inſulting him. Immediately he roſe, and Therſander, expert in martial exerciſes, and an emulator of Spartan proweſs, followed him. In his uſual manner, without any previous care to have troops in readineſs, he haſtened, with the firſt he could collect, to chaſtize the plunderers. Struthas preſently appeared, with a large body of horſe in good order: the Greeks were overpowered, and Thimbron and Therſander killed. The reſt of the army, advancing too late to ſupport their improvident general, were then charged and broken. A few ſaved themſelves in the neighboring friendly towns, but the greater part fell by the ſwords of the conquering Perſians.

Xen. Hel. l. 3. c. 1. ſ. 8. & c. 2. ſ. 6. & l. 4. c. 5. ſ 22. l. 4. c. 8. ſ. 17.

ſ. 12.

This

This ſerious check ſtopped, for a time, the apparently ill-judged exertion of the Lacedæmonians in Aſia. Meanwhile, in Europe, ſome accidental circumſtances, and not any great deſign, led, or rather forced them, to exertion beyond Peloponneſus.

Such was the unfortunate implication of intereſts in the Grecian political ſyſtem, that, unable ever or anywhere to give peace, which was its object, that ſyſtem had a conſtant tendency to ſpread the flames of war. Calydon, a principal town of Ætolia, had renounced its connection with the body of the Ætolian people, and made itſelf a member of the Achaian people, on the other ſide of the Corinthian gulph. We find here again ſomething like that fiction of policy, by which we have lately obſerved Corinth become a part of Argos. The Achaians however found the acquiſition inconvenient; for, to preſerve it, they were obliged to keep a body of forces in Calydon, and ſuſtain a war with the Ætolians. Xen. Hel. l. 4. c. 6. ſ. 1.

We have formerly ſeen the Acarnanians, after a courſe of ſucceſsful warfare, generous at the ſame time and prudent in granting terms of peace to their defeated neighbours. From that period they had paſſed more than fifty years in ſo fortunate an obſcurity, as to offer, for the hiſtorian's notice, neither crime nor misfortune. They were now led again to ſtep forward on the field of fame. The Ætolians, anxious to recover Calydon, and unable with their own force, ſolicited and obtained the good offices of their allies of Acarnania. The Acarnanians had alliance with the Athenians and Bœotians, who readily contributed aſſiſtance againſt allies of Lacedæmon. Thus the Achaians became ſo preſſed, as to be unable to preſerve Calydon, unleſs they alſo could obtain aſſiſtance. They applied of courſe to Lacedæmon; but they found the Lacedæmonian adminiſtration little diſpoſed to ſend a force beyond Peloponneſus. Thinking themſelves ill-uſed, they remonſtrated warmly. 'Wherever the Lacedæmonians re- 'quired their ſervices,' they ſaid, 'they always marched on the firſt ſum- 'mons; and, without reciprocal aſſiſtance in need, they could no longer 'abide by a confederacy the terms of which were ſo unequal. Inſtead of 'any more ſending forces to ſerve in the Lacedæmonian armies, they muſt 'neceſſarily employ their whole ſtrength againſt their own particular ene- 'mies, or make a ſeparate peace upon the beſt terms they could obtain.' Ch. 15. ſ. 6. of this Hiſt. Xen. Hel. l. 4. c. 6. ſ. 2.

This

Xen. Hel. l. 4. c. 6. s. 3. 4.

This remonſtrance had the deſired effect, and the abilities of Ageſilaus were in conſequence to be employed in a war, whoſe object was, that the people of the obſcure town of Calydon ſhould be members of that branch of the Greek nation called Achaians, and no longer of that called Ætolians. He led into Acarnania two moras of Lacedæmonians, with the whole ſtrength of Achaia, and the contingents of all the other allies. No force that the Acarnanians could raiſe, was able to oppoſe him in the field. Terms of peace, which he offered, being refuſed, he made complete deſtruction of the country as he went, but he advanced only ten or twelve furlongs a day. The Acarnanians were thus incouraged to bring their cattle, which had been driven far among the mountains, back again toward their beſt paſtures, and to return themſelves to the tillage of great

s. 6. part of their lands. Ageſilaus obtaining intelligence that almoſt the whole ſtock of the country, with numerous attending ſlaves, was collected on the borders of a lake about twenty miles from his camp, by a haſty march, came upon it by ſurprize, and took almoſt all.

The propoſed buſineſs of the next day was to give reſt to his troops,

s. 7. while he ſold his captives to the ſlave-merchants, the common attendants of a Grecian army. Meanwhile the Acarnanians aſſembled in great numbers on the heights around his camp. Leſs practiſed than the Peloponneſians, in the diſcipline of the heavy-armed, the Acarnanians were remarkable, through Greece, for their expertneſs in the uſe of miſſile weapons; and they ſo annoyed the army of Ageſilaus, within its lines, that

s. 11. they compelled him, when evening was already approaching, to move his camp to ground leſs commanded. After this experience, he was anxious, on the following day, to regain the plain. But he found the heights commanding his way occupied; and the activity of his younger ſoldiers was in vain exerted to repel or deter the aſſaults made or threatened from them. His ſmall body of cavalry was equally inefficient, on ground ſo hilly and rough. Thus, through the uſual deficiency of a Peloponneſian army in light troops, he was in no ſmall danger from an enemy, who, in any number, would not ſtand the aſſault of almoſt the ſmalleſt detachment that he could ſend againſt them. Fortunately he diſcovered a better paſſage, which, tho guarded by the Acarnanian heavy-armed, he

reſolved

reſolved to force; and, not without difficulty, principally ariſing from the annoyance given with miſſile weapons, he ſucceeded.

Regaining thus, at length, the plain, he extended ravage on all ſides. To gratify the Achaians he aſſaulted ſome towns, but without ſucceſs. Autumn then advancing, he propoſed to quit the country. The Achaians, diſſatisfied that not a ſingle town had been gained, either by force or perſuaſion, urged him to ſtay, ſo long at leaſt as to prevent the Acarnanians from ſowing their winter grain. Such, in the deficiency of means for the attack of walls, was, yet in that age, among the modes of reducing an enemy to terms. Ageſilaus however replied, 'that they miſtook their intereſt; for he intended to return next ſummer; and the enemy's ſolicitude 'for peace would be exactly proportioned to their fear of the deſtruction of 'a plentiful harveſt.'

To regain Peloponneſus then for winter quarters, was a buſineſs not without difficulty and danger. The command of the iſthmus was loſt, as we have ſeen, by the retreat of Ageſilaus himſelf, in the autumn of the former year, after his ſucceſs at the Corinthian Peiræus, and the unfortunate action which took place at the ſame time near Lechæum. An Athenian ſquadron, commanding the weſtern ſeas, watched the paſſage from Calydon to Peloponneſus. No alternative remained but to march through the hoſtile country of Ætolia; a country ſo ſtrong by nature, that, ſays the hiſtorian, neither a great nor a ſmall force can traverſe it, againſt the goodwill of the warlike inhabitants. Ageſilaus was ſkilful and fortunate enough to induce them to acquieſce, by holding out the hope of recovering Naupactus, ſo long held by the Meſſenians. Xen. Hel. l. 4. c. 6. ſ. 14.

In the following ſpring the army was reäſſembled. The Acarnanians, informed of this, began to conſider, ſays the hiſtorian, that as they had no ſeaports, through which to obtain ſupplies, the deſtruction of their harveſt would produce all the evils of a blockade of their towns. They ſent therefore miniſters to Lacedæmon, and a treaty was concluded, which eſtabliſhed peace for them with the Achaians, and, with the Lacedæmonians, that kind of alliance, familiar among the Greeks, by which the forces of the inferior people were to march at the command of the ſuperior. The Acarnanians, however, being not likely to be zealous allies, the principal B. C. 390. Ol. 97 2/3. Xen. Hel. l. 4. c. 7. ſ. 1.

point gained, by ſucceſs in this little war, was the prevention of the ſeceſſion of Achaia from the Lacedæmonian confederacy.

This however was the more important, as an enemy already exiſted, within Peloponneſus, ſo powerful as to make it dangerous for the Lacedæmonians to ſend any large proportion of their forces beyond the peninſula: Attica and Bœotia had been ſecure through their alliance with Argos. It was reſolved therefore now to carry an expedition into Argolis itſelf; and the young king Ageſipolis, ſon of Pauſanias, juſt of age, and highly ambitious of diſtinction, was appointed to the command.

Xen. Hel. l. 4. c. 7. ſ. 2, 5.

The army was ready to march, and the border-paſſing ſacrifice had been declared propitious, when a herald arrived from Argos with a propoſal of truce. The ſuperſtition of the young king, or of his council, was alarmed; inſomuch that he went to Olympia, to learn, from the oracle of Jupiter, if he might religiouſly refuſe a truce inſidiouſly propoſed; for it was notorious that no ſincere deſire of peace had prompted the Argians, but the meer deſire to avert an invaſion which, with their ſingle ſtrength, they could not oppoſe, and of which intelligence had reached them too late to call in their allies. The god ſignified that the truce, iniquitouſly offered, might be religiouſly refuſed. Not even thus ſatisfied, Ageſipolis proceeded to Delphi, and inquired of Apollo, 'If he was of the ſame 'opinion with his father?' Such, preciſely, is the philoſopher-hiſtorian's expreſſion. But this tranſaction, whatever may appear ridiculous in it, ſhows the value of that union in religion, which obtained through the Greek nation. It was a beneficent ſuperſtition that could occaſion but a pauſe about proſecuting the ravages of war, and generally inſure opportunity for treating about peace.

ſ. 3.

Apollo however confirmed the opinion of Jupiter. Ageſipolis then haſtened to Phlius, where he found his army aſſembled, and he marched immediately, by the way of Nemea, into the vale of Argos. On the firſt evening, during the uſual libations after ſupper, an earthquake was felt. The Lacedæmonians, taking it as a favorable omen, ſang the pæan to Neptune, the ſuppoſed author of earthquakes; but the allies were alarmed; and, in juſtification of their fears, they obſerved that Agis, upon a ſimilar occaſion, had withdrawn his army from Eleia. Ageſipolis, however, ably refuted their conſtruction of the omen: 'Had they been but about to enter

Ch. 24. ſ. 2. of this Hiſt.

'the

'the enemy's territory,' he ſaid, 'the earthquake would have indicated 'the god's prohibition of the meaſure: being already entered, it declared 'his approbation.'

The terrors of the army being thus quieted, a ſacrifice was performed to Neptune, and then ravage was carried to the very gates of Argos; which the Argians feared to open even to admit a body of Bœotian horſe coming to their aſſiſtance; who would have been deſtroyed, as they ſtuck, in the hiſtorian's phraſe, like bats under the battlements, had not the Cretan bowmen of the Lacedæmonian army been accidentally abſent. After plunder and deſtruction widely ſpred, the ſymptoms in a ſacrifice deterred the propoſed fortifying of a poſt in the country, and Ageſipolis, returning home with his booty, diſmiſſed his army.

SECTION VI.

Affairs of Rhodes. Diphridas commander-in-chief of the Lacedæmonians in Aſia; ſucceeded by Teleutias. An Athenian fleet ſent to Aſia under Thraſybulus: Aſiatic and Thracian dominion recovered to Athens. Death of Thraſybulus and Conon. Anaxibius commander-in-chief of the Lacedæmonians in Aſia, Iphicrates of the Athenians: Defeat and death of Anaxibius.

THE deſtruction of the army under Thimbron, while the abilities of Ageſilaus were confined to the Acarnanian war, had checked the apparently ill-judged exertion of the Lacedæmonians in Aſia. Sedition, ariſing from the incompatibility of intereſt of the wealthy and the poor, that great mover of Grecian politics, again drew the attention of the government thither, and Aſia was an inviting field for thoſe who could obtain commands.

That civil order, or, in one word of his own cloſe and expreſſive language, better painting his object, that eunomy, which Strabo admired in the iland of Rhodes, when, in common with all ſurrounding countries, it held its government under patronage of the Roman empire, was not yet eſtabliſhed

there. The rich and the poor could not agree upon a form of government which might inable them to hold their fine iland in independency, tho no forein power offered them violence. Incapable of coaleſcing, and each beyond all things decided againſt ſubmiſſion to the other, each ſolicited ſubjection to a forein authority. After the concluſion of the Peloponneſian war, the Many had for ſome time reſted under the government of the Few, everywhere patronized by the conquering people. But, when the Lacedæmonian intereſt in Aſia was ſuddenly overthrown, when Athens again became a name among the Grecian powers, and an Athenian admiral commanded the ſeas, whether from ambition of chiefs or ſufferings of the people, or both together, the democratical party was rouſed to exertion, a connection was formed with Athens; and all the men of higher rank were expelled. Theſe addreſſed themſelves to Lacedæmon, and it was there thought important to prevent ſuch an acceſſion as that of all Rhodes to the Athenian dominion. So little was now apprehended from the fleet lately ſo formidable under Conon, that eight triremes were ſuppoſed ſufficient for the purpoſe. It appears, however, that the adminiſtration had very defective intelligence; for the Rhodians themſelves poſſeſſed twice the number of ſhips of war; ſo that the commander, Ecdicus, incapable of any effective exertion, ſcarcely ſtirred from the port of Cnidus.

Xen. Hel. l. 4. c. 8. ſ. 20.

B. C. 391. Ol. 97, 1/2. ſ. 21.

When it was reſolved, at Lacedæmon, to keep a ſquadron on the Aſiatic ſtation, it was reſolved alſo to ſend an officer to take the command by land in Aſia Minor, to collect the broken relics of Thimbron's army, to preſerve the towns yet diſpoſed to the Lacedæmonian intereſt, and to make war upon Struthas. This command was committed to Diphridas; who, tho unſupported by any force from Peloponneſus, yet by his activity in buſineſs, civil and military, aſſiſted by the pleaſantneſs of his manners, reſtored, in a conſiderable degree, the Lacedæmonian affairs in Aſia. In ſeveral towns the Lacedæmonian intereſt was revived or confirmed, and a fortunate incident gave means for raiſing an efficient military force; Tigranes, with his wife, the daughter of Struthas, was made priſoner; and a large ſum being raiſed by their ranſom, Diphridas ingaged a body of mercenaries, which he was thus inabled to maintain.

ſ. 22.

In

In the following year, the Lacedæmonian adminiſtration, earneſt to recover Rhodes, ordered Teleutias, brother of Ageſilaus, to paſs, with his ſquadron, from the Corinthian gulph to Aſia, and take the command-in-chief. Thus reïnforced, the Aſiatic fleet conſiſted of twenty-ſeven ſhips, with which Teleutias was proceeding from the ſtation at Cnidus to Rhodes, when he fell in with an Athenian ſquadron of ten, and took all. Xenophon remarks an inconſiſtency in the meaſures of both parties, on this occaſion. The Athenians, in actual alliance with Perſia, or, at leaſt, with the weſtern ſatraps, had ſent that ſquadron to aſſiſt Evagoras king of Cyprus, againſt Perſia; and the Lacedæmonians, at actual war with Perſia, intercepted that ſquadron going to fight againſt their enemies. But what ſeems principally to deſerve notice, is the evidence afforded of the weakneſs and diſtraction of the Perſian councils, in conſequence of which that vaſt empire ſubmitted to inſults, on all ſides, from the little Grecian republics. If they ſought its alliance, they ſought it through inſults and injuries; and in the actual injoyment of great advantages from its alliance obtained, ſtill they did not refrain from inſults and injuries.

B.C. 390[20]. Ol. 97 3/3. Xen. Hel. l. 4. c. 8. ſ. 23.

ſ. 24.

The uſual activity of the Athenians was excited by the loſs of their ſhips, and by the apprehenſion that the Lacedæmonians might recover the dominion of the ſea. A fleet of forty triremes was committed to the orders of Thraſybulus. That able and experienced officer, preſſing his way to Rhodes, found Teleutias there, and the refugees fixed in a poſt in the iland, which he had fortified for them, but the democratical party nevertheleſs ſo ſtrong, that they had gained the advantage in a battle with their opponents, aſſiſted by the Lacedæmonian admiral, ſo that they commanded the country. Under theſe circumſtances, the Rhodians not wanting his protection, and Teleutias avoiding action with him, he reſolved to paſs to the Helleſpont, where a fairer field was open for ſervice to his country. Hoſtilities had ariſen between Amadocus, or Medocus[21], paramount ſovereïn of the Odryſian Thracians, and Seuthes, the prince reſtored, through

ſ. 25.

[20] This and the preceding are Dodwell's dates, made out from circumſtances in Xenophon's narrative.

[21] In the Hellenics we find the name written Amadocus, in the Anabaſis always Medocus, which is the orthography that Diodorus has followed, l. 4. c. 95.

the

the aſſiſtance of the Cyrcian Greeks, to the command of the country bordering on the Propontis. He effected a reconciliation between them, and, by forming an alliance with both for the Athenian commonwealth, he added conſiderably to the importance of the Athenian patronage for the Grecian towns on the Thracian coaſt. He proceeded then to Byzantium, and reſtored the collection of the toll, formerly impoſed by the Athenians, on a tenth of the cargo of all veſſels paſſing the Boſporus [22]. Seemingly this ſhould not have been a meaſure very agreeable to the Byzantines, who might naturally enough think themſelves beſt intitled to ſuch a tax collected there; but, among the Greeks, when party-views interfered, the general intereſt of the commonwealth was little conſidered. Thraſybulus aboliſhed the oligarchal government, eſtabliſhed in Byzantium by the Lacedæmonians, and reſtored democracy. With the democratical party therefore, thus become the ruling party, the Athenian name was highly popular, and in the firſt moments of joy, anything was borne from their benefactors. If indeed a general judgement is to be formed from the accounts given even by Xenophon, the friend and admirer of Lacedæmon, of the conduct of ſome of the Lacedæmonian governors upon ſome occaſions, it was not wonderful if popularity attached in the moment to any change [23]. Thraſybulus had ſimilar ſucceſs at Chalcedon. The other Grecian towns, on the Aſiatic ſhore, were already in the intereſt of Athens, as the ally of Perſia, or of the ſatrap in whoſe province they lay, excepting only Abydus, where at preſent nothing invited his endeavours.

Xen. Hel. l. 4. c. 8. ſ. 27.

His next attention therefore was given to the large and rich iland of Leſbos; large among the ilands of the Ægean, but ſcanty to form a ſtate

[22] Ἀπέδοτο τὴν δεκάτην τῶν ἐκ τοῦ Πόντου πλεόντων. —Decumam, e Ponto navigantibus impoſitam, publicanis vendit. —Decimas eorum quæ e Ponto veherentur, ἀπέδοτο, locavit, ſcilicet, publicanis. Heſychius: ἀπέδοτο, ἐκδέδωκε. Ἐκδιδόναι, autem, apud Herodotum, idem quod μισθῶσαι. Tho I have not on all occaſions perfect faith in Heſychius, for explanations relating to the age of Xenophon, yet I believe theſe may be nearly right. I ſhould however have been glad of more explanation on the ſubject from Xenophon himſelf. He indeed mentions the thing again in other words, rather confirming theſe interpretations, preſently after. —— ἡ δεκάτη τῶν ἐκ τοῦ Πόντου πεπραμένη εἴη ἐκ Βυζαντίων ὑπ' Ἀθηναίων. ſ 31.—venditam ab Athenienſibus eſſe rerum e Ponto vectarum decumam.

[23] Plutarch mentions it as a popular ſaying in Greece, (vit. Ageſil. v. 2. p. 1107.) that the Lacedæmonians collectively, (δημοσίᾳ) were the better men, but the Athenians individually (ἰδίᾳ.) It was with individuals in command that the colonies had moſtly to do.

ſufficing

ſufficing for its own protection. The Leſbians nevertheleſs had no notion of coaleſcing under one government. Every town affected its ſeparate ſovereinty. A Lacedæmonian governor however reſided in Methymnē, and all were attached to the Lacedæmonian intereſt, except Mitylenē. But Mitylenē was the moſt populous and powerful of the iland; and refugees from all the other towns were watching opportunities for reſtoring themſelves, by overthrowing the exiſting government of their reſpective cities, while refugees from Mitylenē bore equal enmity to thoſe who held the power there. On theſe circumſtances Thraſybulus founded the project of bringing the whole iland into the intereſt, and, in effect, under the dominion of Athens. He was well received in Mitylenē; and, by holding out the hope that all Leſbos might be brought under their authority, he ingaged the Mitylenæans to march with him againſt Methymnē. The refugees from the other towns were induced to join him, by the hope, otherwiſe deſperate, of reſtoration to their country. The Lacedæmonian governor, venturing an action with him, was defeated and killed; ſome of the towns then ſurrendered, and the plunder of the lands of the reſt ſerved for preſent pay to the victorious army. Xen. Hel. l. 4. c. 8. ſ. 30.

The dominion, or the influence, which Athens formerly held over that part of the Greek nation which was ſettled in the ilands, on the Aſiatic coaſt, and on the Helleſpontine ſhores as far as the Euxine, was now in large proportion recovered. Abydus, yet held by Dercyllidas, and the few Ionian towns that Diphridas had been able to preſerve to the Lacedæmonian intereſt, were the principal exceptions. After theſe great ſervices done, it remained ſtill for Thraſybulus to accompliſh what was the particular object of his inſtructions, in leading the armament from Athens. Having therefore paſſed the winter in Leſbos [24], he was anxious in ſpring B. C. 389. Ol. 97. 1/4. to get to Rhodes as early as poſſible, but to get there prepared in the moſt effectual manner to meet ſuch a commander as Teleutias. Money, which the treaſury of his republic could not ſupply, muſt be obtained to ſupport his armament. On that curious ſubject, the collection of tax or tribute

[24] We find Xenophon ſtill deficient in marking dates; but the laborious ingenuity of Dodwell has again here I think been ſucceſsful. Contrary to Diodorus, he has aſſigned the departure of Thraſybulus from Athens to about midſummer of the year B. C. 390; his departure from Leſbos, in which he agrees with Diodorus, to ſpring B. C. 389.

from

from thoſe numerous ſelf-governed towns, over which the patronage of Athens extended, or the fear of its arms operated, tho it frequently occurs to mention, we do not find, among antient writers, the explanation that might be wiſhed. Thraſybulus, after receiving money from many other towns, proceeded to Aſpendus on the river Eurymedon, the ſcene of the celebrated double victory of Cimon over the Perſians. The Aſpendians had already paid a contribution, when ſome irregularities, committed by the troops, ſo exaſperated them, that they attacked the Athenian naval camp by night, and Thraſybulus was killed in his tent.

Xen. Hel. l. 4. c. 8. Diod. l. 14. c. 100.

Such was the end of a man of no common merit, tried on various occaſions; in ſeditions among fellowcitizens, in commands againſt common enemies, and proved, in them all, for honeſty and true patriotiſm, at leaſt after Ariſteides and Cimon, the moſt unequivocal character among the numerous ſuperior men that Athens had to that time produced. But, in Athens, no character could eſcape the licentious calumny of thoſe who made accuſation a trade; and, among the remaining orations of Lyſias, we find Thraſybulus involved in a charge of peculation. Certainly the mode uſed by the Athenians, of extorting revenue with an armed force, gave the tax-gathering generals great opportunity for ſiniſter practices: but then it opened unbounded opportunity for calumnious imputation, difficult for the cleareſt probity to refute; becauſe, to prove honeſty, a negative muſt be proved. Xenophon appears to have had no partiality for Thraſybulus; in party indeed they were rather oppoſite; but, in relating his death, he ſpeaks his panegyric: 'Such,' he ſays, 'was the end of Thraſybulus, a 'man of the higheſt eſtimation[25];' a conciſe, yet perhaps a completer eulogy than, in all his remaining works, we find beſtowed upon any other political character, excepting only his particular friend and patron Ageſilaus.

To the loſs of this great man was added that of Conon, of whoſe fate we have nothing certain after his impriſonment by Teribazus; but it ſeems

[25] So I think the import of the Greek phraſe may moſt fairly be given in our language, —— μάλα δοκῶν ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς εἶναι — which the Latin tranſlator has rendered perhaps as nearly as the Latin language would admit; — maximâ virtute viri. Cornelius Nepos's eulogy of Thraſybulus ſeems the ſame expreſſion amplified in tranſlation: Si per ſe virtus fine fortuna ponderanda ſit, dubito an hunc (Thraſybulum) primum omnium ponam. Illi fine dubio, neminem præfero; fide, conſtantia, magnitudine animi, in patriam amore.

moſt

moſt probable that he eſcaped from confinement, reached the iland of Cyprus, where he had large property, and died there [26]. Iſocr. Paneg. p. 270. t. 1. Lyſ. pro bon. Ariſtoph. p 155 vel 638.

As no others perhaps could have raiſed Athens, from ruin, to that degree of ſtrength and ſplendor, which ſhe had already recovered, ſo none poſſeſſed the means of Thraſybulus and Conon, whether by abilities and experience, or by intereſt and influence among Grecian ſtates and forein powers, ſtill to promote her progreſs to empire. The Lacedæmonians nevertheleſs were alarmed at what had been already done, and eſpecially at the recovery of the command of the Boſporus, and of the toll collected there. Dercyllidas, who had remained in his government of Abydus, without a force ſufficient for effectual operation againſt Thraſybulus, was, perhaps, while the affairs of Greece required the preſence of Ageſilaus, the fitteſt man that Sparta could furniſh for the Aſiatic command. The intereſt of Anaxibius however prevailing with the ephors, he obtained the appointment. He ſailed with only three triremes and no troops; but mercenaries being now always to be readily had for Aſiatic ſervice, and the Spartan government having long been attentive to its revenue, he was furniſhed with levy-money for a thouſand men. Xen. Hel. l. 4. c. 8. ſ. 31. ſ. 32. ſ. 33.

To ſupply the loſt abilities of Thraſybulus and Conon, Iphicrates now ſtood foremoſt among the Athenian officers. It is an important, tho, for the modern reader, an over conciſe paſſage of Xenophon, in which he mentions that Iphicrates, while commanding in Peloponneſus, put to death ſome Corinthians, for their zeal for the connection with Argos; a violence

[26] The biographer Nepos ſays that, according to ſome reports, Conon was carried into the king's preſence, and was put to death, or died, in Upper Aſia; but that, according to the hiſtorian Dinon, in his opinion the beſt authority for Perſian affairs, he eſcaped from confinement. It is ſomething remarkable that none of the extant cotemporary writers mention the death of ſo illuſtrious a man. Xenophon relates his impriſonment, and there leaves him. A licentious Latin tranſlation ſeems to have led ſome to quote Iſocrates as aſſerting that he was put to death by the Perſians — Κόωνα μὲν — ἐπὶ θανατου συλλαβεῖν ἐτόλμησαν. (Paneg. p. 268. t. 1.) which apparently for the ſake of a rounder period than an exact verſion would readily have allowed, is rendered by Auger, *Cononem comprehenſum interficere auſi ſunt*. The meaning appears to me to be no more than that they ſeized him with the purpoſe of putting him to death; and as the completion of the purpoſe is not expreſſed, it ſeems implied that it did not follow. From Lyſias we learn that the large property of Conon in Cyprus was diſpoſed of, after his death, in conformity to a written will which he left (Lyſ. pro bon. Ariſtoph. p. 155, vel 638.) and it ſeems in ſome degree implied, in the ſame paſſage, that he died there. The omiſſion of all mention of his death, after noticing his impriſonment, ſeems to mark that Xenophon knew nothing of his having been put to death by the Perſians, and it is not likely that he would have remained uninformed of ſuch a circumſtance.

of which the united republics took no farther notice than to diſmiſs him and his troops, with the pretence of having no farther need of them.

Xen. Hel. l. 4. c. 8. ſ. 34. The appointment of a new commander from Lacedæmon, with an increaſed force, to act in the Helleſpont, induced the Athenians to ſend Iphicrates thither, with eight triremes and twelve hundred targeteers. Meer deſultory expeditions, for the collection of booty, for ſome time employed both generals. A propoſal to revolt at length coming to Anaxibius from a party in Antandrus, he led thither the greater part of his force, conſiſting of Abydenes, mercenaries, and the Lacedæmonian governors, with their followers, who had taken refuge in Abydus with Dercyllidas. Iphicrates, informed of this movement, croſſed the Helleſpont in the night, landed on the Aſiatic ſhore, and directing his march toward Cremaſtë, on the high-

ſ. 37. lands of Ida, where, ſays Xenophon, were the goldmines of the Antandrians, he took a ſtation commodious for intercepting the Lacedæmonians on their return. His ſquadron haſtened back to Seſtus, and, at daybreak, according to orders given, moved up the Helleſpont toward the Propontis. It was ſeen, from the Aſiatic ſhore, holding that courſe, and the feint com-

ſ. 38. pletely deceived Anaxibius; who, in the perſuaſion that Iphicrates was gone on ſome expedition to the northward, marched in full ſecurity. He no ſooner ſaw the Athenian infantry, ſo well was the ambuſcade planned, than he ſaw his own defeat inevitable. With the ready and firm conciſeneſs of a Spartan, addreſſing his people, he ſaid, 'It will be proper for me 'to die here: haſten you to ſave yourſelves, before the enemy is upon you.' Taking then his ſhield from his ſhieldbearer, and, being joined by twelve of the expelled Lacedæmonian governors, they fought on the ſpot till all were killed. This teſtimony, to the remaining vigor of the inſtitutions of Lycurgus, is the more remarkable, as Xenophon, in doing juſtice to the bravery of Anaxibius, appears to have been very far from having had either perſonal regard for him, or eſteem for his character[27]. The reſt of the army, flying, was purſued, with conſiderable ſlaughter, to the very walls of Abydus.

[27] Dercyllidas appears to have been much the friend of Xenophon, who ſeems to have thought him ill uſed by the appointment of Anaxibius to ſuperſede him. By Anaxibius himſelf, when he had before the command in the Helleſpont, Xenophon had been, as we have ſeen, extremely ill-treated. It is obſervable that he mentions the impiety of Anaxibius, ſhown in his contempt of augury, as among the cauſes of his cataſtrophë.

SECTION

SECTION VII.

Freebooting war of the Æginetans againſt Attica: Siege of Ægina. Teleutias commander on the Grecian coaſt: Antalcidas commander in Aſia, and again ambaſſador from Lacedæmon to the ſatrap of Lydia. Able conduct of Antalcidas, in military command and in negotiation. Treaty concluded between Lacedæmon and Perſia, and Peace dictated to Greece by the Lacedæmonian government, in the king of Perſia's name, commonly called the Peace of Antalcidas.

WHILE Athens was recovering empire beyond the Ægean, ſhe was ſuffering at home thoſe evils of predatory war, to which, in the ſcantineſs of their territories, the moſt powerful of the Grecian republics were always liable. Hitherto commercial intercourſe between Athens and Ægina, tho Ægina was of the Lacedæmonian alliance, had not been interrupted; the Lacedæmonians themſelves, in the deſire of finding opportunity to divide the formidable confederacy that oppoſed them, having been cautious of carrying hoſtility directly againſt Attica. But ſince a naval war was begun, in which the Athenians of courſe took the lead, ſuch caution was laid aſide, the Æginetans were incouraged to infeſt the Attic trade and pillage the coaſt, and Ægina became again 'the eyeſore of Peiræus.' Xen. Hel. l. 5. c. 1. ſ. 1.

Diſtreſſed by this annoyance, the Athenians ſent Pamphilus, with ten triremes and a body of heavy-armed, to beſiege Ægina. Teleutias happened to be in the neighbourhood, collecting tribute among the ilands. For, notwithſtanding their profeſſions of total diſintereſtedneſs during the Peloponneſian war, the Lacedæmonians had now avowedly, and indeed not without neceſſity, abandoned that ſyſtem, and followed the example of Athens in raiſing a public revenue. According to Diodorus, after the Peloponneſian war, they collected a thouſand talents, perhaps near two hundred and fifty thouſand pounds, yearly, which he ſeems to have conſidered as a great exaction. On the approach of the Lacedæmonian fleet the Athenian ſquadron retired, but the ſiege of Ægina by land was ſtill ſ. 2. Diod. l. 14. p. 400.

continued. The ſeaſon of the annual change of commanders occurring ſoon after, Hierax, the ſucceſſor of Teleutias in the command-in-chief, led the greater part of the fleet to Rhodes, leaving only twelve triremes under Gorgopas, who, with that ſmall force, ſo blockaded the Athenian troops, that they ſuffered and riſked more than the Æginetans, whom they were beſieging. An exertion of the Athenian government relieved them, by reconveying them to Attica; but, immediately as the Æginetans were thus ſet at liberty, depredation was renewed on the Attic ſhores, with increaſed ſedulity and vigor. A ſquadron of thirteen triremes was therefore appointed, under the command of Eunomus, to guard the coaſt. By a ſurprize in the night, ably conducted, Gorgopas took four, and compelled the reſt to ſeek ſhelter in the harbour of Peiræus.

Xen. Hel. l. 5. c. 1. ſ. 3.

ſ. 5.

ſ. 8, 9.

We cannot refuſe our admiration to the activity and ſpirit of enterprize of the Athenian government, which, amid theſe diſtreſſes at home, could direct its attention to the eaſtern end of the Mediterranean, and, while Attica was ſo preſſed, could reſolve to ſend ſuccours to a diſtant ally, a meritorious ally indeed, Evagoras, tyrant of Salamis in Cyprus. We find, among antient and modern writers (tho the cotemporary hiſtorian is not in the number) lofty eulogy on the mutual friendſhip, the magnanimous friendſhip, of the Athenian people and Evagoras, uninterrupted in various fortune, and in a length of years. Declamation, rather than reaſon, ſeems to have been thought fitteſt to give credit to ſuch mutual ſentiments, tho the connection certainly ſubſiſted, between a deſpot and a multitude [28]. But political connections have commonly their real ſource in mutual wants; and we are not wholly without information of thoſe which produced, and maintained, the friendſhip between the Athenian democracy and the tyrant of Salamis. Athens had a population which the ſcanty produce of its own barren and narrow territory could not feed. Its neareſt reſource was Eubœa; its greateſt the ſhores of the Euxine. But, in wars, ſo frequent and almoſt continual among the Greeks, the hazard for heavy

[28] Valuable information no doubt may be gathered from that oration of Iſocrates, intitled The Encomium of Evagoras, which is ſaid to have been written for the funeral of the Salaminian prince. It is however not by taking ingenious panegyric in the lump, but by ſifting it, by comparing it with information remaining from other, eſpecially cotemporary, writers, by obſerving its connection with the courſe of events, and its conſiſtency with known facts, and with the temper of mankind and of the age, that the truly valuable is to be diſcovered and aſcertained.

trading

trading ſhips, of threading the Boſporus and the Helleſpont, and then winding their way among the ilands of the Ægean, was ſo great, that ſupplies from that plentiful country would be precarious, and of courſe other reſources deſirable. From Cyprus the navigation to Athens might be open, when that from the Euxine was precluded; and a cotemporary orator informs us of one occaſion, when Athens, preſſed by dearth and apprehenſion of famine, looked principally to Cyprus for relief. Probably the ſervice to the Athenian people, which procured Evagoras the honor of being admitted to the freedom of the city, conſiſted in ſupplying them with corn, in the laſt years of the Peloponneſian war. Such a benefit would be likely to make impreſſion on the Many, to win their favor, and ingage their attachment, even to a tyrant; while their leaders, more particularly connected with him, would know how to value the connection which inabled them to miniſter to the wants of the Many, their tools and maſters. On the other hand, for Salamis, Athens was a valuable market; and to Evagoras, preſſed by the controul of Perſia, at the diſcretion of its ſatraps, ſometimes threatening his ſafety, always checking his ambition, every alliance, founded on mutual intereſt, and eſpecially that of a maritime power like Athens, would be highly valuable.

Ch. 22. ſ. 2. of this Hiſt. Andoc. de reditu.

Induced by ſuch conſiderations, with perhaps others leſs indicated by antient writers, the Athenian government reſolved that a conſiderable force ſhould paſs to Cyprus, under the able Chabrias. But they did not neglect the ſafety of Attica. The armament, deſtined for the Cyprian war, was directed firſt to the repreſſion of the annoyance ſuffered from Ægina. Chabrias landed on that iland, and, in an action which inſued, Gorgopas was killed, and ſuch ſlaughter was made of his troops and ſeamen, that, for ſome time, the Attic coaſt and navigation, in the cotemporary hiſtorian's expreſſion, were unmoleſted as in peace.

Xen. Hel. l. 5. c. 1. ſ. 10—13.

The Lacedæmonian revenue, notwithſtanding the tribute collected, was evidently ſcanty for the expence of a naval war; a deficiency to which, apparently in a great degree, muſt be attributed the narrow and deſultory exertion by land. After the blow in Ægina, the ſurviving crews refuſed to obey the orders of Eteonicus, who ſucceeded Gorgopas in the command, becauſe he had no pay for them. The reſource of the Lacedæmonian government was in

ſ. 13.

the

the perſonal character of Teleutias. Not raiſed to fame by any atchieve-
Xen. Hel. l. 5. c. 1. ſ. 3, 4. ment of extraordinary ſplendor, Teleutias had the merit of attaching, in a ſingular degree, the affection and eſteem of thoſe who ſerved under him. On his arrival to take the command from Eteonicus, joy pervaded the armament. Aſſembling the ſoldiers and ſeamen, 'I bring no pay with 'me,' he ſaid, 'but, God willing, and you aſſiſting, I will endeavour that 'you ſhall not want. You know that, when I commanded before, my 'door was always open to any who deſired to ſpeak with me, and ſo it 'ſhall be now. When you have plenty, you ſhall find me well ſupplied; 'but when you ſee me bearing cold and heat and watching, you muſt ex-'pect in theſe alſo to have your ſhare. You have, I know, deſerved the 'reputation of brave men. It will be your buſineſs now to increaſe that 'reputation. We muſt labor together that we may injoy together; and 'what is more gratifying than to procure our ſubſiſtence by our arms, 'without flattering any man, Greek or barbarian, for pay? Plenty at the 'enemy's expence is at the ſame time wealth and glory.' He was an-ſwered with a univerſal ſhout, 'Command and we will obey.'

ſ. 16, 17, 18. Teleutias reſolved immediately to uſe this ready zeal. He ordered all aboard in the evening, with one day's proviſion; and croſſing the gulph, to within a mile of the harbour of Peiræus, waited for daybreak. With his ſmall ſquadron, only twelve triremes, he then puſhed into the port. A force more than ſufficient to overwhelm him was there, but not a ſhip in a ſtate for action. The ſurprize was as complete as he had foreſeen or could wiſh. Such triremes as fell readily within his reach he rendered unſer viceable; many laden merchant-ſhips he towed away; and ſome of his crews, leaping aſhore, ſurrounded ſome ſeafaring and mercantile men, and
ſ. 19. forced them aboard, priſoners. Alarm ſpred rapidly among the inhabi-tants: thoſe within doors ran out to inquire what the diſturbance was; thoſe without, as where defence (not the buſineſs meerly of a garriſon) was the near intereſt of all, haſted in for their arms; while ſome ran to the city to communicate the intelligence; and ſhortly all Athens, horſe and foot, came down, in the apprehenſion that the port was already in the enemy's poſſeſſion.

ſ. 20. Meanwhile Teleutias, ſending away his prizes for Ægina, under convoy of four triremes, with the reſt of his ſquadron coaſted Attica ſouthward; and

and numerous fiſhing-veſſels, with ſome paſſage-boats, from the ilands, concluding that a ſquadron from Peiræus muſt be Athenian, fell into his hands, without attempting flight. Proceeding as far as Sunium, he there captured ſeveral trading ſhips, ſome laden with corn, ſome with other merchandize, and then he directed his courſe to Ægina. From the ſale of his prizes, he gave his crews a month's pay in advance, and quickly his complements, which he had found deficient, were completed; and he had a ſquadron as orderly and as zealous in the ſervice, as it had lately been backward and mutinous. Xen. Hel. l. 5. c. 1. ſ. 21.

But when a naval force, without which their own territory muſt always be inſecure, could not be maintained and brought into action without the ſingular ability and popularity, and perhaps too the good fortune, of a Teleutias; when even after great victories by land, they had ſcarcely advanced a ſtep againſt their enemies in Greece; and, in Aſia and the ilands; the extenſive command which devolved to them by the extinction of the empire of Athens, were nearly paſſed away; the Lacedæmonians were aware that their reſources were unequal to break a league of half Greece againſt them, aſſiſted with money from Perſia: they found that a war to pull down the power of Athens, which had become univerſally dreadful, and a war to maintain their own power, which was little leſs invidious, were very differently conſidered by thoſe whoſe ſupport was neceſſary to them; and that, after recalling their able and ſucceſsful commander from Aſia, not only their authority among the Grecian ſtates of their alliance, but even the ſafety of their own territory, was precarious.

Under this preſſure, looking around for means of relief, there were circumſtances which gave to ſuppoſe that negotiation with Perſia might be attempted with advantage, and the reſolution was taken to make the trial. Teribazus, who had ſhown a diſpoſition ſo friendly to them, was now returned to the chief command, under the great king, in Aſia Minor, and the hoſtile Pharnabazus, honored with the gift of the king's daughter in marriage, was gone from his ſatrapy to the capital. At the ſame time, in conſequence of ſucceſsful negotiation at Syracuſe and among the Italian ſtates, a powerful reïnforcement to the fleet was expected, which might inable Lacedæmon to treat with Perſia upon more equal terms, ſ. 25.

than

than if excluded from the ſeas, and ſinking under her enemies arms. Antalcidas, who had ſucceſsfully conducted the former negotiation with Teribazus, was the perſon who ſtood forward for the management of the buſineſs, or whom the adminiſtration, and, apparently, the public voice called for. Beſide his intereſt in Lacedæmon, which appears to have been powerful, not only the favor he had acquired with Teribazus, but his connection of hoſpitality with Ariobarzanes, who governed the Helleſpontine ſatrapy in the abſence of Pharnabazus, ſtrongly recommended him; and he was appointed, at the ſame time, commander-in-chief in Aſia, and ambaſſador to the Perſian government.

Xen. Hel. l. 5. c. 1. ſ. 6 & 22. B C. 388. Ol. $\frac{97}{98}$. 1.

B C. 388. Ol. 98. 1. Xen. Hel. l. 5. c. 1. ſ. 6 & 22.

Arriving at Epheſus in autumn, Antalcidas ſent the fleet, conſiſting of twenty-five triremes, under his vice-admiral Nicolochus, to oppoſe Iphicrates in the Helleſpont, and went himſelf immediately to wait upon Teribazus. He found the ſatrap not only diſpoſed to Lacedæmon and to himſelf, in the ſame friendly manner as before, but furniſhed with authority from his court to ingage in offenſive alliance, for the purpoſe of compelling the confederated republics to accede to terms of peace, which had been ſettled in the Perſian cabinet [29]. The various ſubjects of negotiation being ſettled, Antalcidas returned to Epheſus, and Teribazus accompanied him [30].

ſ. 7 & 22.

There intelligence came to them that Iphicrates, having collected all the ſcattered naval force of the Athenians in the neighbourhood of the Helleſpont, to the number of thirty-two triremes, blockaded Nicolochus in the harbour of Abydus; and it was to be feared that the ſquadron, daily expected from Syracuſe and Italy to aſſiſt the Lacedæmonians, would be intercepted. Upon this Antalcidas haſtened by land to Abydus. By a ſtratagem he took eight triremes, coming from the Thracian coaſt to reïnforce Iphicrates. He was ſoon after joined by twenty from Sicily and Italy. Collecting then the naval force of all the Ionian towns, over which

[29] ——— ξυμμαχεῖν βασιλέα, ἢν μὴ ἐθέλωσιν Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι χρῆσθαι τῇ εἰρήνῃ ᾗ αὐτὸς ἤλεγεν. Upon a compariſon of this paſſage with that where Teribazus was laſt before mentioned, the meaning of the hiſtorian appears I think clearly that given in the text: but the incomplete connection and deficient explanation in many parts of the Grecian annals, ſhow that the work never had the author's finiſhing hand.

[30] Ὁ δὲ Ἀνταλκίδας καλέσας μὲν μετὰ Τηριβάζου. The hiſtorian has omitted to mention whither Antalcidas went to wait upon Teribazus. The Latin tranſlator ſeems to have underſtood it to be in Upper Aſia; but I rather think the word καλέσας means no more than that Teribazus *came down* to the coaſt with Antalcidas, probably from Sardis.

the

the influence of Teribazus extended, and, through the friendſhip of Ariobarzanes, receiving ſome even from the Æolian, which would rather have gone to reïnforce the enemy, had Pharnabazus been in the command of the ſatrapy, he was at the head of a fleet of above eighty triremes. The Athenians were utterly unable to contend with this force: the Lacedæmonians commanded the ſeas; and the Athenian authority, trade, and revenue, in the Helleſpontine countries, ceaſed.

Antalcidas, with the means thus for conqueſt, perſevered nevertheleſs in his purpoſe of making peace; and the temper of the principal belligerent republics, which had felt ſeverely the preſſure of war, was at this time favorable to his purpoſe. The Athenians, ſeeing the command of the ſea decidedly gone from them, and the king, from theirs, become the enemy's ally, fearing a ſecond ſiege of Athens itſelf, and in the mean time unable to protect their territory againſt the ravage even of Æginetan privateers, were earneſt for peace. Even the Lacedæmonians, tired of continual calls to garriſon duty, guarding ſome towns againſt the danger of forein aſſault, employed in others in the more irkſome ſervice of obviating ſedition and preventing revolt, a whole mora in Lechæum and another in Orchomenus, while Corinth was a conſtant and moſt harraſſing object of conteſt, were little allured by the proſpect of conqueſt beyond the Ægean. Still more the Argians, diſtreſſed by repeated ravage of their rich territory, more expoſed than any others of the confederacy to a repetition of the evil, and without a fleet to revenge, or tranſmarine poſſeſſions whence to ſupply themſelves, had more than others occaſion for peace. The Bœotians only remained, leſs ſolicitous to put an end to a war, from which latterly they had leſs ſuffered, but which they could not ſupport alone.

Xen. Hel. l. 5. c. 1. ſ. 26.

The propoſal however for peace was not made in a manner the moſt creditable to Lacedæmon, or likely to be very gratifying to the Greek nation. It came from Teribazus, in the form of a requiſition, for a congreſs of miniſters from all the belligerent republics, diſpoſed to accede to terms of peace which the king would offer. Nevertheleſs all ſent their miniſters. The con-

ſ. 27.

B.C. 386[31]. Ol. 98. 2. Spring.

[31] Polybius (l. 1. p. 7.) and Strabo (l. 6. p. 287.) ſay, that the peace of Antalcidas was made in the 29th year after the battle of Aigoſpotami; and this has been the canon to which Dodwell has accommodated his dates.

greſs being opened, Teribazus produced a reſcript from the king, ſhowed the royal ſignet, and then red thus: 'Artaxerxes the king holds it juſt, That 'all cities on the continent of Aſia belong to his dominion, together 'with the ilands of Clazomenæ and Cyprus; and that all other Grecian 'cities, little and great, be independent, except that the ilands of Lem-'nus, Imbrus and Scirus remain, as of old, under the dominion of Athens. 'If any refuſe theſe terms, againſt ſuch I will join in war with thoſe who 'accept them, and give my aſſiſtance, by land and by ſea, with ſhips and 'with money[32].'

Xen. Hel. l. 5. c. 1. ſ. 28.

However ſtrange this dictatorial addreſs, from a Perſian governor to the Greek nation, may appear to thoſe who have drawn their ideas of the Grecian ſpirit of independency from declaimers under the Roman empire, yet, from cotemporary writers, it does not ſeem that the minds of the Greek nation, except as perſonal or party intereſt ſuffered, were greatly ſhocked by it. Evidently however the Greeks had no reaſon to fear, and did not fear, the Perſian military power. Perſia was incomparably weaker than in the reign of Xerxes, and Greece united would have been ſtronger. Perhaps indeed there never exiſted, at any period, a nation ſo ſuperior in military force to the reſt of the world, as that aſſemblage of little military commonwealths at this time was, could they have been firmly united. But, tho incapable of ſteddy union, they had felt ſeverely the inconveniencies of diſcord, and of that unfailing ſource of diſcord, the ſeparate independency of every city. Nothing but the fear of greater, and indeed of the greateſt evils, could have produced the ſubmiſſive attachment of the ſmaller republics to Athens or Lacedæmon; while even thoſe commanding cities found perpetual uneaſineſs, from an authority which they could neither quietly hold nor ſafely ſurrender. When the military power of Perſia then ceaſed to be feared; when, on the contrary, the Grecian military were ſought by the Perſian ſatraps, and employment in the Perſian ſervice became familiar to Grecian troops; when friendly intercourſe and the pledge of hoſpitality became common between Greeks of rank and the Perſian great; but eſpecially after

[32] Poſſibly the change from the third to the firſt perſon, here copied from the Greek, may have been preſerved from the Perſian.

Clazomenæ was ſeparated by ſo very narrow a ſtrait, that it was generally conſidered as a city of the Ionic main: it has been ſpecified here apparently to obviate cavilling.

the high favor with which Cyrus had diſtinguiſhed the Greeks, and when the event of his expedition had ſo clearly ſhown that the Perſian king was to be feared only on account of his wealth, which inabled Greeks to ſubdue Greeks, but no longer inabled Perſia, without Grecian aſſiſtance, to be formidable to Greece, the Perſian king might be conſidered as no unnatural mediator in the deſtructive quarrels of the Greeks among themſelves. Accuſtomed to the authority of men nearer their own level, officers of the Lacedæmonian or Athenian governments, they little felt the indignity of ſubmiſſion to the mandate of the great potentate of Aſia.

Thus prepared then, all the belligerent republics, upon being applied to by their reſpective miniſters at the congreſs, immediately acceded to the terms propoſed. Even the Thebans did not, as far as appears, profeſs to make any difficulty. Their great object was, not the freedom of Greece, but the eſtabliſhment of their own power over all the Bœotian towns. They required, therefore, that the oath of the Theban miniſters ſhould be taken as the complete repreſentatives of Bœotia. A remarkable controverſy inſued. Ageſilaus, ſays the hiſtorian his friend, declared he would not accept their oath, unleſs made in exact conformity to the king's reſcript, which required the independency of every Grecian city, little and great. The Theban miniſters ſaid 'that no ſuch requiſition had been 'received at Thebes.' 'Go then,' ſaid Ageſilaus, 'and aſk. But at the 'ſame time tell your employers that, unleſs they comply, Thebes will be 'excluded from the benefit of the peace.' The miniſters went accordingly: but Ageſilaus, in his animoſity againſt the Thebans, would immediately employ coërcive meaſures, and his influence decided the ephors. Orders were iſſued for the army to aſſemble, Lacedæmonians and allies, at Tegea; and the king himſelf, after a propitious border-paſſing ſacrifice, haſtened thither. Before, however, he was ready to march, the Theban miniſters returned, with a declaration of the acquieſcence of their commonwealth; and accordingly Thebes was admitted to the general terms of peace, and the Bœotian towns were reſtored to independency.

Xen. Hel. l. 5. c. 1. ſ. 29.

ſ. 30.

The Corinthians and Argians, after having ſeparately ſworn to the peace [33], ſ. 31.

[33] This is not directly ſaid, but ſeems clearly enough implied in the conciſe expreſſion of Xenophon.

were ſtill for preſerving the union of the two republics; but this could not be done, ſo powerful ſtill was the adverſe party in Corinth, without keeping a body of Argian troops there. Ageſilaus threatened immediate hoſtility, againſt both Corinth and Argos, if theſe were not withdrawn. A reluctant obedience was paid to his requiſition thus inforced: the Argian troops marched; and then all thoſe Corinthians, who, ſince the Argian connection, had been living in baniſhment, returned to their country, while thoſe who had been moſt active in promoting that connection, together with the more notorious of thoſe who had been concerned in the maſſacre which preceded it, aware that Corinth was no longer a place of ſafety for them, emigrated; and Corinth and Argos became, as formerly, diſtinct republics. Thus peace was eſtabliſhed throughout Greece; armies were diſmiſſed, fleets laid up, and, as far as the political ſtate of the country, with ſo many exiles from ſo many governments, would allow, friendly and commercial intercourſe became open, among all the republics of the nation.

Ageſilaus, it is evident, approved the treaty of Antalcidas, and it ſhould ſeem that Xenophon ſaw nothing diſgraceful in his concurrence in the meaſure[34]. Certainly it would be difficult for thoſe who have declaimed moſt vehemently againſt it, to ſhow how peace could have been given to Greece in any other manner. The abandoning of the Aſian Greeks to ſubjection under Perſia, is indeed a ſpecious ground of reproach. It was unqueſtionably a ſurrender of the proudeſt and faireſt claim of glory that Lacedæmon perhaps ever acquired[35]. But this ſeems not juſtly imputed as a peculiar crime or diſhonor to Antalcidas. A ſimilar, or rather a more diſgraceful dereliction of the cauſe of the Aſian Greeks, occurred on the concluſion of the Peloponneſian war. They were found by the Lacedæmonians under the protection (ſo half Greece would

[34] It is however remarkable that not a ſyllable about the treaty, or its conſequences, occurs in the panegyric of Ageſilaus. Plutarch is very futile upon the ſubject. Artax. t. 3. p. 1868. In his life of Ageſilaus (t. 2. p. 1121.) he ſays that Antalcidas was the political enemy of Ageſilaus; but the contrary appears ſufficiently evident from Xenophon, and, were confirmation wanting, we have it from Plutarch himſelf; for, according even to his account, Ageſilaus juſtified the treaty in argument, and ſupported it by deed. P. 1112. ed. H. Steph.

[35] This is the only ground that Iſocrates has ſpecified, for his vehement invective againſt the peace of Antalcidas, in his Panathenaic, p. 496. v. 2. ed. Auger.

have

have termed it, but at worſt under the dominion) of a Grecian people; they were left by them to the mercy of barbarians, in ſubjection to the Perſian empire. But, on the preſent occaſion, the Lacedæmonians had to alledge, that not they, but their enemies, had betrayed the common cauſe of the nation, by producing the neceſſity for recalling Ageſilaus from his glorious exertions, which had reſtored the Aſian Greeks to independency[36].

A deep policy has, by ſome writers, without any apparent foundation, been attributed to the Perſian court in this tranſaction. Conſidering the intereſt of Lacedæmon as diſtinct from the common intereſt of Greece, Antalcidas certainly ſerved his country very ably. Simple and conciſe as the terms of the peace are, not only they appear directly calculated to promote the intereſt of Lacedæmon, but (except as far as dominion in Aſia may have been an object of ambition) they anſwered the principal purpoſes of Lacedæmon completely. To break the growing power of Thebes by emancipating the Bœotian towns, and to divide Corinth from Argos, had been the great objects of the war, and were the immediate effects of the peace; for the more ready and quiet production of which Athens was bribed with the permiſſion, contrary to the general ſpirit of the treaty, to retain the dominion of its three ilands. Accordingly it is obſerved by Xenophon, that the Lacedæmonians eſtabliſhed their credit and influence in Greece much more completely, and put their commonwealth altogether in a much more ſplendid ſituation, by the peace which had its name from Antalcidas, than by that which had concluded the Peloponneſian war; and it is remarkable that he attributes the advantage, on the firſt-mentioned occaſion, to their having preſided in the buſineſs (modern language will ſcarcely render his expreſſion more exactly) under a commiſſion from the Perſian king[37]. So much, however, if we

Xen. Hel. l. 5 c. 1. §. 33.

[36] One cannot but ſmile at the grave aſſertion of Diodorus, that the abandoning of the Aſian Greeks was what hurt the Athenians and Thebans on this occaſion. Diod. l. 14. c. 111. The Aſian, like the Europeän, Greeks were divided between the ariſtocratical party and the democratical. Perhaps both would do as well under Perſian as Lacedæmonian ſupremacy. The ariſtocratical would have been ſure to ſuffer under Theban or Athenian.

[37] ——— οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι πολὺ ἐπικυδέστεροι ἐγίνοντο ἐκ τῆς ἐπ' Ἀνταλκίδου εἰρήνης καλουμένης· προστάται γὰρ γιγόμενοι τῆς ὑπὸ βασιλέως καλαπεμφθείσης εἰρήνης, κ. τ. ε.

may

Plut. Ageſil. t. 2. p. 1112.

may truſt Plutarch for the anecdote, was Ageſilaus perſuaded that the intereſt of Lacedæmon was well conſidered in the treaty, that, when ſomebody, reviling the peace of Antalcidas, ſaid that Lacedæmon was gone over to the Perſian intereſt: 'Rather,' he anſwered, 'Perſia to the Lace-'dæmonian;' and ſo, in truth, it ſeems to have been.

CHAPTER

CHAPTER XXVI.

Affairs of GREECE, from the PEACE of ANTALCIDAS till the Depreſſion of the LACEDÆMONIAN POWER, and the Elevation of THEBES to Supremacy among the GRECIAN REPUBLICS, by the Battle of LEUCTRA.

SECTION I.

Deſpotiſm of Lacedæmon: Puniſhment of Mantineia: Reſtoration of Phliaſian exiles.

THE real diſgrace of the peace of Antalcidas, and apparently too the clamor againſt it, aroſe principally from the inſuing conduct of the Lacedæmonians. Trouble and misfortune had not yet taught them moderation. No thought was entertained of attaching the Greek nation by a juſt and generous conduct; by any fair communication of rights and privileges; by any eſtabliſhment, pervading all the republics, that might inſure juſtice to the ſubjects of each againſt their reſpective adminiſtrations, or to the ſubordinate againſt the imperial ſtate. Xenophon mentions it as a maxim of Ageſilaus, that Lacedæmon always would be powerful enough if the Greeks were prudent; that is, if they duly regarded their own intereſt [1]. Perhaps the maxim might be inverted: Greece might have been powerful had Lacedæmon been prudent. But the very firſt meaſure of its government, remarkable enough to claim the notice of hiſtory, was even impudently arbitrary. Having inforced the acceptance of peace, among all the republics of the nation, according to their own conſtruction of the king of Perſia's reſcript, they proceeded to take into conſideration the ſtate of their confederacy. Some of thoſe called

Xen. Hel. l. 5. c. 2. ſ. 1.

[1] —— ἰσχυρὰν δὲ τότε, ὅταν οἱ Ἕλληνες σωφρονῶσιν. Xen. Ageſil. c. 7. ſ. 3.

their

B. C. 386. Ol. 98. 3.

their allies had been held to their ingagements by fear only: it was well known that their wiſhes were rather for the ſucceſs of the enemy. Theſe, after deliberation on the ſubject, it was reſolved to puniſh, and, by ſtrong meaſures of coërcion, to prevent future defection.

They began then with ſhowing, in the inſtance of Mantineia, that it might ſometimes be ſafer to be the enemy than the ally of Lacedæmon. It was imputed to the Mantineians, that, during the war, they had ſent ſupplies of corn to the Argians; that, on pretence of a truce, they had ſometimes omitted to ſend their proportion of troops to the army; that their troops, when with the army, ſerved ill: that, in ſhort, it was well known the Mantineians always repined at the ſucceſs, and rejoiced in the misfortunes of the Lacedæmonian arms. On all theſe accounts it was required that the Mantineians ſhould themſelves deſtroy the fortifications of their city; and declaration was formally made to them, that nothing leſs would be accepted, in proof that the various acts of treaſon, in the war, were not acts of the commonwealth; with admonition added, that, in the current year, the Thirty-years truce, between Mantineia and Lacedæmon, would expire. The value of this admonition we can only gather from what we find ſcattered, among the early Greek writers, concerning Grecian ideas of natural juſtice; by which we learn that the condition of the Eſpondi, thoſe to whom we are bound by no expreſs compact, if they were the weaker party, was indeed terrible.

Xen. Hel. l. 5. c. 2. ſ. 2.

ſ. 1, 2. Diod. l. 15. c. 5.

Ch. 15. ſ. 4. of this Hiſt.

The Mantineians refuſing obedience to the deſpotic injunction, war was immediately denounced againſt them. But Ageſilaus, tho unable apparently to prevent the meaſure, was ſo little ſatisfied with it, that, on pretence of his perſonal obligation to the Mantineians, for ſervices done to the king his father, Archidamus, in the Meſſenian rebellion, he requeſted of the general aſſembly [2] to excuſe him from the command. Thoſe ſervices to the king apparently muſt have been equally ſervices to the commonwealth; but, while the excuſe was admitted, the reſolution againſt Mantincia was proſecuted. Ageſipolis alſo was not without cauſe of forbearance toward Mantineia, for ſervices to his father, Pauſanias; who was ſtill living there, and indebted particularly to the chiefs of the

Xen. Hel. l. 5. c. 2. ſ 3.

[2] Βουλὴν τῆς πόλεως.

democratical

democratical party, which now governed the city, for his beſt comforts in baniſhment. It was probably ſome confidence in their intereſt with the reigning kings of Lacedæmon, that imboldened the Mantineians to reſiſt the mandates of thoſe, whom Thebes and Argos had not dared to reſiſt. Ageſipolis, however, obeyed the decree which directed him to take the command of the expedition againſt them.

The uſual ravage of Grecian armies was ſpred over the Mantineian territory, without producing the obedience required. Ageſipolis therefore proceeded to incompaſs the town with a contravallation. The work was already far advanced, when he was informed that the town was ſo provided, through the uncommon abundance of the preceding harveſt, that there could be no hope of quickly reducing it by famine. Fearing therefore the various inconveniencies, both to Lacedæmon and the allies, of a protracted blockade, he recurred to a mode of ſiege, for which the peculiar circumſtances of the place offered opportunity. A very plentiful ſtream, the Ophis, flowed through it. Stopping the current below, he flooded the town, and the foundations, not of the houſes only, but of the fortifications alſo, formed of unburnt bricks, were ſhortly ſapped. Every effort of the Mantineians was inefficacious to check the threatened ruin. They propoſed to capitulate, but the offer to demoliſh their already tottering fortifications, was not now accepted. It was required that the city ſhould be abandoned, and that the people ſhould ſeparate to their ſeveral boroughs, whence their foreſathers had aſſembled, to make Mantinea the common capital of their little territory. The expected horrors of a ſtorm, or of the lot, ſo dreadful among the Greeks, of priſoners at diſcretion, inforced the acceptance of this ſevere condition.

Xen. Hel. l. 5. c. 2. ſ. 4.

Xen. ibid. & Pauſan. l. 8. c. 8.

Ch. 4. ſ. 2. of this Hiſt.

The chiefs of the democratical party, and eſpecially thoſe whoſe diſpoſition to the Argian connection was moſt notorious, dreading the ſanguinary animoſity of their fellowcitizens of the oppoſite party, ſtill more than the vengeance of the Lacedæmonians, were apprehenſive that the ſanctity of the capitulation, inforced only by ſacrifice and oath, would be but a weak protection for them, and the hiſtorian has evidently thought that their fear was not unfounded. The influence, however, of the baniſhed king, Pauſanias, was ſo exerted with his ſon, that the deſired tho wretched reſource of exile was ſecured to them. In taking poſſeſſion of the town,

Xen. Hel. l. 5. c. 2. ſ. 6.

the Lacedæmonian troops lined the ſtreet leading to the gate, while ſixty of the moſt obnoxious paſſed out: 'and tho,' ſays the hiſtorian, 'they had 'ſpears in their hands and enmity enough in their hearts, yet they were 'reſtrained from offering injury, much more eaſily than the beſt of the 'Mantineians:' meaning the nobility, or oligarchal leaders: 'a great in-'ſtance of ſubordination,' he continues, 'and which ought not to paſs un-'noticed.' When Xenophon could ſpeak ſo, it is evident that the Greeks were as incapable of coaleſcing in a juſt and well-regulated free government, as the French at this day.

Xen. Hel. l. 5. c. 2. ſ. 7.

Not the fortifications only, but the houſes of Mantineia were then demoliſhed. The removal was at firſt very grievous to the people, as moſt were under the neceſſity of building new habitations. Thoſe, however, who had any landed property, ſoon became ſatisfied with the change: finding, as Xenophon obſerves, convenience in living near their eſtates, and being delivered, by the eſtabliſhment of ariſtocracy, from the vexation of demagogues. The Mantineian commonwealth became thus, under the name of alliance, completely a province to Lacedæmon. The men of property, depending upon Lacedæmonian protection, both for their authority and for the beſt ſecurity to their poſſeſſions, were of courſe attached to the Lacedæmonian cauſe; while the lower people, the power of intriguing orators to direct their paſſions in one overbearing current, being checked by their ſeparation, and their minds being in conſequence leſs occupied by politics, obeyed more readily and cheerfully the requiſitions of the Lacedæmonian officers, whenever their military ſervice was required.

ſ. 8, 9, 10.

The affairs of Mantineia being ſo ſettled, thoſe of Phlius were taken into conſideration. A petition had been preſented, from the exiles of that little republic, who ſeem to have had a fair claim to attention and protection from the Lacedæmonian government. A repreſentation was accordingly ſent to Phlius, ſtating, that the exiles were not only friends of Lacedæmon, but guiltleſs toward their own commonwealth; and it was therefore hoped that coërcive meaſures would not be neceſſary, to procure their reſtoration. Thoſe who ruled Phlius were ſtrongly diſpoſed to reſiſt; but the numerous friends of the exiles, together with ſome men (ſuch, ſays Xenophon, as are found in moſt cities) ready for any change, deterred them. It was therefore decreed, 'That the exiles ſhould be readmitted;

'that

'that their property ſhould be reſtored to them; that thoſe who had 'bought any part of it, from the public, ſhould be reïmburſed by the pub-'lic; that any diſpute, ariſing about anything claimed, ſhould be decided 'by due courſe of law.' B. C. 385. Ol. 98. 3.

SECTION II.

Uncommon tranquility in Greece. New political phenomenon in Greece: Inconvenience of the Grecian political ſyſtem: Growing power of Olynthus: War reſolved againſt Olynthus by the Congreſs of the Lacedæmonian Confederacy.

AFTER the diſperſion of the Mantineians, and the compoſure of the affairs of Phlius, there followed an uncommon ſuſpenſion of crimes and misfortunes in Greece; inſomuch that, during more than two years, nothing occurred for the hiſtorian's notice. This quiet was at length interrupted by the arrival of miniſters at Lacedæmon from the Grecian towns of Acanthus and Apollonia in Thrace; whoſe buſineſs the ephors deemed ſo important, as to require that it ſhould be laid before the aſſembled Lacedæmonian people, and the congreſs of the confederacy. B. C. 382[1]. Ol. 99. 2. Spring. Xen. Hel. l. 5. c. 2. ſ. 11.

The circumſtances were indeed new in Grecian politics. Olynthus, the largeſt of the Grecian cities in Thrace, had aſſociated ſome ſmall towns of the neighbourhood, admitting the people to all the rights of Olynthian citizens. The advantage of this wiſe and liberal policy being ſoon experienced by all parties, ſome of the larger towns were led to the ſame aſſociation. Advanced thus in ſtrength and credit, the Olynthians endeavoured to draw the Macedonian cities from allegiance to their king Amyntas. In the weakneſs and inſtability of the Macedonian government, worn by a long ſeries of civil broils, and now preſſed in war by the Illyrians, they quickly gained ſome in their neighbourhood: example induced others, ſ. 12. Xen. ibid. Diod. l. 14. c. 93.

[1] This is Dodwell's date. But he ſeems to have crowded too many tranſactions into the latter part of this year B. C. 382. Apparently the embaſſy from Thrace muſt have taken place very early in 382, if not rather before the cloſe of 383.

more diſtant, to accede; and, when the Acanthians ſet out on their miſſion, Pella, the largeſt town of Macedonia, had joined the growing commonwealth, and Amyntas was nearly expelled from his kingdom.

In the whole courſe of Grecian hiſtory, unleſs exception ſhould be made for the apparent good principle of ſome governments of the heroïc ages, nothing in politics had occurred ſo worthy of imitation throughout Greece. What preciſely was the form of the Olynthian government, we have no information. From circumſtances only we gather that it was a mixed republic; conſtituted on a more liberal plan, and better balanced than any other noticed in Grecian hiſtory. Throughout the Grecian ſtates, an exceſſive jealouſy, prevailing for centuries, had produced a ſtrange alienation of Greeks from Greeks. In Homer's age, intermarriage was common, from one end of the country to the other. But the narrow diſtruſtful ſpirit, equally of oligarchy and democracy, which had ſuperſeded the tempered monarchies of elder times, had by degrees inſulated almoſt every townſhip; inſomuch that each was a diſtinct little nation, ſeparated from all others by legal interdictions, not common among great nations, even of different race and different language. Intermarriage was forbidden, and none were allowed to poſſeſs lands within the territory of another ſtate. Thus, excepting ſome communion in religious rites, the ſame formalities of hoſpitality, which might bind a Greek with a barbarian, almoſt alone could connect him with Greeks of the next town or village.

Xen. Hel. ut ſup. p. 301.

But ſuch is the force of habit, that, among the Greeks, there was found prejudice in favor of this ſullen, unſocial, illiberal, unprofitable independency, originating from the low paſſions of jealouſy and fear, yet rendered in ſome degree perhaps neceſſary, by the moral impoſſibility of uniting, in an unmixed conſtitution, ſtrength of government with ſecurity for freedom. The liberal and beneficial policy of the Olynthians, aſſociating townſhips into one conſiderable republic, and allowing intermarriage and intermixed poſſeſſions, was mentioned by the Acanthians, and conſidered by the Lacedæmonians, as a portentous innovation [4]. Unfortunately the Lacedæmonians, by thoſe very inſtitutions which had made them great, were denied the advantage of the liberal policy of Olynthus. They muſt give up

[4] Πρᾶγμα φυόμενον ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι. Xen. Hel. l. 5. c. 2. ſ. 12.

what

what had moſt contributed to make their ſtate the moſt powerful in Greece, and their name one of the moſt glorious in the world, or remain for ever diſtinct from all other people. This, if anything, muſt be their excuſe for the apparent excluſion of every idea of a liberal and extended policy, in their conduct after the peace of Antalcidas. The profeſſed baſis of that peace was the independency of every Grecian ſtate; yet the ſeparate treaty of alliance between Lacedæmon and every city of its confederacy overthrew that independency; for the antient compact that the allies ſhould follow in arms wherever the Lacedæmonians ſhould lead, was required of all. The narrow policy of holding the body of the people in ſubjection, by ſupport given to a favored party, ſource of immoderate tyranny and innumerable crimes, was followed with regard to all. Of the larger commonwealths, Thebes, Argos, and Athens, which were not eaſily to be ſo held in ſubjection, ſuſpicion and jealouſy were endleſs and little diſguiſed; and as, with them, in the actual ſtate of things, no connection truly friendly could exiſt, ſo none was thought of.

Xen. Hel. l. 6. c. 3. ſ. 5.

Under theſe circumſtances, the people of thoſe larger commonwealths, of courſe, conſidered the reſtored and increaſed preponderancy of Lacedæmon with diſſatisfaction and apprehenſion, from which, equally of courſe, it would be their endeavour to relieve themſelves. Accordingly, the new power of the Olynthian commonwealth attracting their attention, as its government was in ſome degree congenial with theirs, the ſpeculation of their politicians was directed to draw it to their party. With this view the Athenians and Bœotians had ſent miniſters to Olynthus; and, before the Acanthian miniſters left Thrace, a decree of the Olynthian people was already paſſed for ſending miniſters to Thebes and Athens.

l. 5. c. 2. ſ. 12.

Proſperity commonly excites arrogance, and the conduct of the Olynthians, in general ably directed, may nevertheleſs not always have been kept within the bounds of a wiſe and juſt moderation. While they were ſtill proſecuting their views in Macedonia, they invited the Apolloniats and Acanthians to join their confederacy; but they inforced the invitation with the threat of war, in caſe of refuſal. Yet it is poſſible that the known inclination of the body of the Apolloniat and Acanthian people to their cauſe, and the hoſtile diſpoſition of the oligarchal, which was the ruling party there, may have given occaſion to the meaſure; which thus may have

have been neither unjuſt, unwiſe, or unneceſſary, tho it was unfortunate. It drove the men in power, in Acanthus and Apollonia, to make that application to Lacedæmon, which has been mentioned; foreſeeing that, unleſs they could obtain ſupport, ſuch as Lacedæmon alone, among the Grecian ſtates likely to befriend them, could give, it would be impoſſible for them to hold their power. Their miniſters were therefore inſtructed to ſhow, that Lacedæmon was nearly intereſted in the preſervation of the independency of their cities. 'It is a great point 'with you,' they ſaid to the congreſs of the Lacedæmonian confederacy, 'that the Bœotians ſhould not coaleſce into one ſtate. It cannot therefore be indifferent to you, that a much more powerful ſtate 'than Bœotia is forming. Beſide a large force of heavy-armed [3], and 'targeteers yet more numerous, the cavalry of the Olynthians, ſhould 'we join them, would be more than a thouſand. They are maſters 'of Potidæa, which commands Pallenë, ſo that the whole force of that 'rich and populous peninſula muſt ſhortly fall under their power. The 'independent Thracians of their neighbourhood already court them, and, 'if completely brought under their authority, will add not a little to their 'ſtrength. They have then but to ſtretch their hands, and the goldmines 'of mount Pangæus will be theirs. The fruitfulneſs of their territory 'nouriſhes a great and increaſing population; timber abounds in it; their 'ports are numerous, and their flouriſhing commerce already furniſhes a 'conſiderable revenue; ſo that nothing is wanting for the creation of a 'powerful marine. It is with this ſtate then that the Athenians and The-'bans are going to form alliance. Nevertheleſs its ſtrength, great as it 'already is, may yet eaſily be broken; becauſe ſome of the towns, un-'willing aſſociates, will readily revolt when they ſee ſupport ready. But

Xen. ut ſup.

[3] According to our copies, the text of Xenophon ſtates the Olynthian heavy-armed at eight hundred only; and editors and commentators, as far as I have ſeen, mention no ſuſpicion of error in tranſcription. It will however be evident to any who will conſider the circumſtances, that eight hundred cannot have been the number intended by the author. The manner in which he ſpeaks in general terms of the power of the Olynthians, compared with other Grecian people, particularly the Bœotians, (Hel. l. 5. c. 2. ſ. 12) might alone prove ſo much. But we find (ſ. 17.) that two thouſand Lacedæmonians, with the added people of Potidæa, could wage war againſt them, according to the hiſtorian's expreſſion, only as an inferior force againſt a ſuperior; and afterward (ſ. 27 & ſeq.) that the Olynthians could oppoſe in the field ten thouſand Peloponneſians, with perhaps a larger number of their allies. It appears therefore ſcarcely to be doubted but that for ὀκταχοσίων ſhould be red ὀκταχισχιλίων.

'when

'when intermarriages and intermixt poſſeſſions, allowed by decrees already
'paſſed, ſhall have confirmed the connection between the various parts,
'and all have not only learned to confide in their united ſtrength, but
'experienced its advantages, it may then indeed be difficult to diſſolve this
'formidable coalition.'

The Acanthian miniſter having thus ſtated the circumſtances, the Lacedæmonians paid the compliment to the deputies of the allies, to deſire that they would firſt give their opinions, what, in the exiſting emergency, the welfare of Peloponneſus and of the confederacy required. A majority, inſtigated by thoſe who ſought favor with the Lacedæmonian adminiſtration, declared for ſending an army into Thrace. Accordingly ten thouſand men were voted. It was then propoſed and carried, that any ſtate of the confederacy might compound for the perſonal ſervice of its citizens, at the rate of an Æginetan triobolus (nearly a groat ſterling) daily for every heavy-armed foot-ſoldier, and four times that ſum for every trooper; and that if any ſtate of the confederacy refuſed or neglected to ſend troops or money, according to its apportionment, it ſhould be lawful for the Lacedæmonians to levy on it a fine, to the amount of a ſtater (a pound ſterling) daily, for every man deficient. We have ſeen the uſe of mercenary troops, or, in the modern phraſe, ſtanding armies, gradually gaining among the Greeks. This is the firſt mention we meet with of a regular compoſition for perſonal ſervice, ſo extenſively and ſo formally allowed. But, whether for raiſing troops or money, a power of coërcion, however in itſelf neceſſary, committed to the diſcretion of the Lacedæmonian government, without controul, ſhows a ſtrange deficiency in the political connection of the republics, which formed the confederacy over which Lacedæmon preſided, and ſtrongly marks how much ſome better order of things, ſuch as the Olynthians ſeem to have been endeavoring to eſtabliſh, was wanted throughout Greece.

Xen. Hel. l. 5. c. 2. ſ. 13.

ſ. 14.

Theſe matters however being ſo decided, the Acanthians declared their opinion, that the force propoſed would be equal to the object: but as the aſſembling of the troops of the allies, and the levies of mercenaries, would require time, it would tend much, they ſaid, to forward the purpoſe of the confederacy, if a Lacedæmonian general were immediately ſent, with ſuch troops as might march with the leaſt delay. The fear of a connection

ſ. 15.

between

between Athens, Thebes, and Olynthus, ſeems to have inſtigated the Lacedæmonian adminiſtration, and Eudamidas was ordered immediately to proceed for Thrace, with two thouſand Laconians; while his brother, Phœbidas, remained to collect and conduct the troops which were to follow. The arrival of Eudamidas was critical. In the field indeed he could not face the enemy; but the ſmall force he brought, and the credit of the Lacedæmonian name, inabled him ſo to ſupport the party adverſe to the Olynthian connection, that he preſerved ſeveral towns, upon the point of acceding to the growing republic; and Potidæa, which immediately opened its gates to him, was a moſt important acquiſition.

Xen. Hel. l. 5. c. 2. ſ. 16.

SECTION III.

Iniquitous conduct of Lacedæmon toward Thebes. Complete ſubjection of Thebes to Lacedæmon. Trial of Iſmenias, polemarc of Thebes. Teleutias commander-in-chief againſt Olynthus. Defeat and death of Teleutias.

B. C. 382. Ol. 99. 2/3. WHILE Eudamidas, by his ſucceſsful activity in the duty impoſed upon him by his country, began the ruin of a political project which all Greece ſhould have emulated, Phœbidas, with miſtaken zeal, quitting the line of his inſtructions, gave fire to a train of evils, of a length and complicacy beyond human foreſight to trace, and which ended only in the overthrow of Grecian independency. In his march toward Thrace, he incamped under the walls of Thebes. The Theban military had been, for ſome time, advancing toward a perfection that might vie with the Lacedæmonian; but the civil government was ſtill as ill conſtituted as moſt in Greece. Faction was at this time violent, and the parties ſo nearly balanced, that Iſmenias and Leontiades, contending chiefs, were together in the office of polemarc, the principal magiſtracy. Iſmenias, vehement in averſion to the Lacedæmonians, avoided communication with Phœbidas. On the contrary Leontiades, whoſe party, long oppreſſed, emerging only ſince the peace, and ſtill hopeleſs of ſuperiority but through connection with Lacedæmon, was aſſiduouſly attentive to him. Some advantage was expected, ſome influence on the minds of the people, from the neighbourhood of the

Xen. Hel. l. 5. c. 2. ſ. 17.

the Peloponneſian army: but the party of Iſmenias ſtill ſo ſwayed the general aſſembly, that a decree was carried, forbidding any Theban to ingage in the expedition againſt the Olynthians. Xen. Hel. l. 5. c. 2. ſ. 18.

In ſtruggles of faction, among Grecian republics, the preciſe line of conduct for virtue to hold, and the preciſe time at which to ſtop, were often difficult to determine; becauſe, as we have ſeen among the French republicans of the preſent day, civil juſtice was little to be hoped for but through the poſſeſſion of political power; ſelf-defence was ſeldom complete, till the oppoſing party was proſtrate. So unfortunately ſituated, the Grecian party-leaders may often demand our pity, while they incur our blame. Leontiades was in danger of loſing, with his own power, all ſecurity of perſon and property for his adherents; the exile of many was the leaſt among the evils to be apprehended. Under this preſſure, he propoſed to Phœbidas to introduce a Lacedæmonian garriſon into the Cadmeia, the citadel of Thebes. Thus his party might be inabled to overbear their opponents, and Phœbidas might command what proportion of the Theban forces ſhould march with him into Thrace.

Phœbidas was a man of ardent temper and weak underſtanding. The acquiſition of Thebes appeared an object ſo much greater than that for which, with ſuch ſolicitude, the Lacedæmonian adminiſtration had intruſted him with ſo great a command, that he was dazzled by the traitorous propoſal; and, for the imagined importance of the end, he overlooked the iniquity of the means. Meaſures being concerted, he broke up his camp, and began his march northward. It was the ſeaſon of one of the feſtivals of Ceres, in which, according to antient cuſtom, the Cadmeia was given up to the women, for the celebration of the ceremony called Theſmophoria, and the council ſat in the portico of the agora. In the noontide heat, when, in ſummer, the ſtreets were moſt unfrequented, having ſeen that everything favored his purpoſe, Leontiades urged his horſe's ſpeed to overtake Phœbidas; and conducting him, with a ſelect body, directly into the citadel, put the key into his hands. Going then himſelf to the council, 'The Lacedæmonians,' he ſaid, 'were in poſſeſſion of the citadel; but 'no alarm need be taken, for they diſavowed all intention of hoſtility. 'his own office of polemarc however authorizing him to apprehend all 'perſons ſuſpected of treaſon, he commanded the attending guards to take 'Iſmenias into cuſtody.' ſ. 19. ſ. 20. ſ. 21.

Xen. Hel. l. 5. c. 2. s. 22.

A ſufficient number of counſellors of the party of Leontiades were preſent, the guard was picked for the purpoſe, and the ſurprize was complete. Some of the oppoſite party, fearing immediate death, inſtantly quitted the city: ſome ventured home to prepare for departure; but, when it was known that Iſmenias was actually impriſoned in the Cadmeia, four hundred fled for Athens [6].

s. 23.

All power in Thebes thus devolving to the party of Leontiades, a new polemarc was choſen in the room of Iſmenias, and then Leontiades haſtened to Lacedæmon. He found there the ephors and people indignant at the preſumption of Phœbidas, in taking a meaſure of ſuch importance, beyond the line of his commiſſion: but he found a friend to Phœbidas and to his own cauſe in Ageſilaus, whoſe magnanimity and probity ſeem, on this occaſion, to have been in ſome degree overborne by his hatred toward the democratical party in Thebes. 'If the conduct of your gene-'ral,' ſaid the king, 'has been injurious to the commonwealth, let him be 'puniſhed; but, if beneficial, it will ſtand juſtified by your antient conſti-'tution, which, for ſuch purpoſes, allows men in command a diſcretionary 'power.'

[6] My valuable guide Dodwell, with whom I am always ſorry to differ, has been induced to diſpute Xenophon's accuracy in marking the ſeaſon of this remarkable event. Θέρους δὲ ὄντος καὶ μεσημβρίας, πλείστη ἦν ἐρημία ἐν ταῖς ὁδοῖς. This expreſſion, as Dodwell juſtly obſerves, marks midſummer; but, he continues, the Theſmophoria, mentioned juſt before, mark midwinter, or however a ſeaſon not earlier than the beginning of November; and Plutarch, in his Life of Pelopidas, bears teſtimony to the coincidence of the ſeizure of the Cadmeia with the Theſmophoria. Therefore he concludes, 'De viarum in meridie 'ſolitudinem, propter æſtatem, vel interpreta-'tione aliqua leniendus eſt, Xenophon, *vel plane* 'non credendus. Fieri poteſt ut alia aliqua cauſa 'viæ fuerint infrequentes, quam ille de θέρει 'intellexerit.'

Many parts of the Hellenics bear marks of haſty writing, of having wanted the finiſhing hand of the author; but no deficiency appears in the narrative of this tranſaction, in which the honor of his friend Ageſilaus, and his own quiet and ſafety, became implicated. Here only he has related it: in his panegyric of that prince, all mention of it has been ſtudiouſly omitted. For myſelf therefore I cannot, in compliment to Diodorus and Plutarch, or in reſpect for the poſſibly miſtaken ſeaſon of the Theſmophoria, ſuppoſe that Xenophon has miſtated the ſeaſon of a tranſaction in which he was ſo much intereſted, and which paſſed almoſt under his eye. The ſequel of the narrative moreover is perfectly conſiſtent with what he has ſaid about the ſeaſon, and utterly inconſiſtent with Dodwell's ſuppoſition. For various important tranſactions paſſed, after the ſeizure of the Cadmeia, before Teleutias marched for Thrace: the hiſtorian expreſſly ſays that Teleutias did not hurry his march; and yet he arrived time enough to execute many military operations, before, in the hiſtorian's phraſe, the ſummer was over; the ſummer, according to Dodwell himſelf, of the ſame year in which the Cadmeia was ſeized.

The way being thus advantageouſly prepared for him, Leontiades addreſſed the aſſembled Lacedæmonian people [7]. He touched upon various circumſtances, marking the inveterate enmity which the democratical party in Thebes bore toward Lacedæmon, and concluded with the alliance lately made with the Olynthians, at the moment when it was known the Lacedæmonians were marching againſt them. He mentioned the ſolicitude with which the Lacedæmonians had always obſerved, and endeavoured to thwart, the meaſures of Thebes for holding Bœotia in ſubjection; 'and in regard 'to this,' he ſaid, 'your buſineſs is now done for you: Thebes need no 'longer be an object of your jealouſy. Give that attention only to our 'intereſt, which we ſhall give to yours, and a ſmall ſcytalë will ſuffice to 'inſure obedience to all your commands.' Xen. Hel. l. 5. c. 2. ſ. 24.

This allurement was too powerful for Lacedæmonian virtue. It was decreed, that the Theban citadel ſhould continue to be held by a Lacedæmonian garriſon, and that, not Phœbidas, but Iſmenias ſhould be brought to trial. Three judges appointed by Lacedæmon, and one by every other city of the confederacy, formed the partial tribunal. Iſmenias was accuſed of 'ſeeking forein connections; pledging himſelf, with views 'injurious to Greece, in hoſpitality to the Perſian king; being a principal 'author of the late troubles in Greece;' and to theſe general charges was added one of a ſpecific nature, 'that he had partaken of the money ſent 'by the Perſian king.' He refuted all; but being nevertheleſs unable, ſays Xenophon, to perſuade his judges that he had not entertained great and pernicious deſigns, he was condemned and executed [8]. ſ. 25.

[7] Τοὺς ἐκκλήτους, Conſilii publici cœtum. Probably it ſhould be, as we find it in other places, ἐκκλήτους, thoſe who formed the ἐκκλησία.

[8] Ὁ δὲ ἀπελογεῖτο μὲν πρὸς πάντα ταῦτα· οὐ μέντοι ἔπειθε γε τὸ μὴ οὐ μεγαλοπράγμων τε καὶ κακοπράγμων εἶναι. Purgabat ille quidem ſe de his omnibus, verum perſuadere non poterat ut non res arduas et pernicioſas tentaſſe exiſtimaretur. The Latin *purgabat* is perhaps ſtronger than the phraſe in the original, ſtanding ſingly, would juſtify; but the context ſeems to warrant it.

Plutarch ſays (vit. Pelopid.) that, not contented with this formal murder of Iſmenias, the Lacedæmonians ridded themſelves of another chief of the ſame party by aſſaſſination. Plutarch is ſeldom anxious for conſiſtency, and it ſeems not likely that the ſame adminiſtration ſhould, at the ſame time, have proceeded againſt one chief with ſo much formality, and againſt the other with ſo little, when apparently they might equally have choſen their method againſt either. But Xenophon's account, which appears candid throughout, virtually contradicts the fact, and Grecian hiſtory is but too full of crimes related on leſs queſtionable authority.

That Xenophon, as an honeſt man, altogether diſapproved theſe proceedings is evident. In his panegyric of Ageſilaus, he has avoided all mention of them. In his Grecian Annals, while he has clearly felt for the honor of his friend and patron, the impartiality of his conciſe narrative is highly creditable to himſelf. Yet if we compare this revolution with others, innumerable among the Grecian republics, we ſhall find in it the merit at leaſt of being remarkably bloodleſs. Its diſgrace was, that it gave Lacedæmon influence, amounting to dominion, over Thebes, tho ſcarcely dominion ſo abſolute as the Theban people had before exerciſed over the other Bœotians, or as France at this moment exerciſes over the Dutch; who, with a French general commanding a French army in Amſterdam, amuſe themſelves with the names of republic and liberty. Even in the trial of Iſmenias there ſeems to have been more attention to preſerve the appearance of a regard for juſtice, and a reſpect for the Grecian people, than was always obſerved upon ſimilar occaſions. It is our familiarity with the peculiar advantages of the law and the practice of our own country, that makes deficiencies, elſewhere ordinary, appear to us ſtrange irregularities. If we compare the law of treaſon in England, when moſt ſevere, or the whole of the law for the ſecurity of perſon and property, when, under the Plantagenet reigns, our conſtitution was leaſt defined, with what we learn of the ſame law in thoſe called the beſt times of Greece, the difference will appear truly prodigious. It will ſeem as if, like philoſophy and the fine arts in one country, equal law and wholeſome polity were of indigenous growth in the other, healthy and vigorous without cultivation, and flouriſhing among all ſorts of weeds, in ſpite of tempeſts and adverſe ſeaſons.

Thebes then being reduced to a ſtate of complete dependency, nothing ſeemed wanting to the laſting firmneſs of the Lacedæmonian ſupremacy over Greece, but to cruſh the growing commonwealth of Olynthus; and to this point, now with increaſed earneſtneſs, the adminiſtration directed its attention. It might poſſibly be in contemplation next, to reſume the proſecution of that plan of conqueſt in Aſia, which had been interrupted principally by the meaſures of the party in Thebes, of which Iſmenias had been chief. Xenophon has not expreſſly ſaid that the conduct of Age-

Xen. Hel. l. 5. c. 2. § 27.

ſilaus

ſilaus was influenced by ſuch a view; but he mentions, as to his honor, that his enmity to Perſia was maintained through life, and that he refuſed with diſdain the philanthropic connection of hoſpitality, offered him, apparently through a proxy, by the Perſian king. What were the meaſures which he directed, what thoſe to which he ſimply conſented, and what, if any ſuch there were, thoſe which he could not prevent, we are not preciſely informed; but the tenor of Xenophon's narrative, as well as a variety of the circumſtances reported, mark that he had large influence at this time in the Lacedæmonian councils. As ſoon as the fate of Iſmenias, and the conduct to be purſued toward Thebes were decided, Teleutias, brother of Ageſilaus, was appointed to the command-in-chief in Thrace. The ſlowneſs and negligence of the allies in obeying the requiſition for troops for the Thracian war, tho inforced by a vote of the congreſs of the confederacy, may have given the Lacedæmonians to apprehend the decay of their authority, and thus may have contributed to inſtigate the unjuſt meaſures taken in the Theban buſineſs. Several cities had not yet ſent the full number aſſeſſed upon them. The popular name of Teleutias aſſiſted the exertions of the ephors, whoſe ſcytalës were ſent around; and the new Theban adminiſtration, zealous in ſhowing their reſpect to the brother of Ageſilaus, were diligent in preparing their apportionment, horſe and foot.

Xen. Ageſ. c. 7. ſ. 7.

c. 8. ſ. 3.

The precaution of Teleutias affords ground for eſtimating the ſtrength of the Olynthian commonwealth. Tho the ſeaſon was far advanced, he would not haſten his march; leſs anxious to arrive early, than with an army the moſt powerful that could be collected. Meanwhile he ſent to Amyntas king of Macedonia, and Derdas prince of Elymia; urging the former, if he would recover his kingdom, to raiſe mercenary troops, and ſubſidize neighbouring princes; and admoniſhing the latter, that the ſame growing power, which had nearly overwhelmed the greater Macedonian realm, would not long leave the ſmaller in peace and independency, if meaſures were not taken to check its ambition. His care and diligence thus ſeconding his influence, he aſſembled in Potidæa a very powerful army, which he led directly to Olynthus.

Xen. Hel. l. 5. c. 2. ſ. 28. B. C. 382. Ol. 99. 3. Autumn.

ſ. 29.

Without conqueſt, without a battle noticed in hiſtory, the Olynthians, by the wiſdom and liberality of their policy, had formed a commonwealth

ſo

ſo powerful, that they did not fear to meet in the field the greateſt army ever ſent by the Peloponneſian confederacy ſo far from their peninſula, reïnforced by troops, ſtill much more numerous, of the moſt warlike nations of the continent north of Greece. The only cavalry, which Teleutias appears to have led from the ſouthern provinces, were Laconian and Bœotian. In his order of battle he placed theſe, together with ſome received from Amyntas, in the right wing of his army. Derdas brought him a body of only four hundred, but of ſuperior reputation in the northern countries. Teleutias ſeems to have propoſed a compliment to that prince in placing his cavalry alone in the left wing, of which he took himſelf the immediate command.

Xen. Hel. l. 5. c. 2. ſ. 30.

ſ. 31. A battle quickly inſued; and the cavalry of the right wing being firſt charged by the Olynthians, the Lacedæmonian commander was preſently diſmounted and ſeverely wounded, numbers killed, and at length the whole body put to flight. The confuſion ſpred among the neareſt infantry, and there was imminent danger that a complete defeat would have followed, when Derdas, arriving with his cavalry, incouraged the diſmayed phalanx to ſtand. Teleutias at the ſame time making a movement with the Peloponneſian infantry to ſupport him, the Olynthians, in danger

ſ. 32. of being ſurrounded, retired in haſte, and ſuffered in their retreat. Their infantry then alſo withdrew within their walls. Teleutias erected his tro-

ſ. 33. phy, for a victory juſt ſufficing to deter the enemy from moleſting his retreat from their territory, which he waſted as he went. The advanced ſeaſon forbad any farther enterprize; and it was neceſſary to find quarters for the Peloponneſian army in the friendly towns, while the Macedonian, and other troops of the country, were diſmiſſed to their ſeveral homes.

During winter the Olynthians made frequent, and often ſucceſsful incurſions upon the lands of the towns in alliance with Lacedæmon. In the

B. C. 381. Ol. 99. 3. Xen. Hel. l. 5. c. 3. ſ. 1, 2. beginning of ſpring, a body of their cavalry, after plunder of the territory, approaching, with improvident careleſſneſs, the town of Apollonia, received a ſevere check from the activity and bravery of Derdas, who, unknown to them, had arrived there, that very day, with his Macedonian horſe. Thenceforward they confined themſelves more within their walls, and ventured upon the cultivation but of a very ſmall part of their lands.

According

According to the uſual mode of war among the Greeks, Teleutias waited for the ſeaſon when ravage, being moſt injurious, would be moſt likely to provoke the enemy to a general ingagement, or would beſt forward the effect of a blockade of their towns. While, with theſe views, he lay incamped near the walls of Olynthus, he obſerved a body of cavalry, from the town, croſſing the river which ran by it, and very leiſurely approaching his camp. Indignant at their boldneſs, he ordered his targeteers to attack them. The horſe, turning, very quietly repaſſed the river: the targeteers followed confidently, as if purſuing a broken enemy. The horſe, when ſo many only had croſſed the river as they might readily overpower, turned, charged and routed them, and killed, among many others, Tlemonidas, the general commanding. Xen. Hel. l. 5 c. 3. ſ. 3. ſ. 4.

Teleutias, with manners ſo popular, and generally ſo amiable, was nevertheleſs of a temper too haſty to preſerve, on all occaſions, the cool recollection ſo important in military command. Irritated by what he ſaw, he ſeized his ſpear, put himſelf at the head of his heavy-armed, and, with ſome paſſion, ordered the targeteers and the cavalry to purſue the enemy without remiſſion. The incautious order was zealouſly obeyed. The Olynthians, retiring within their walls, the Peloponneſians did not ſtop, till, from the towers, they received a ſhower of miſſile weapons. In the neceſſity of warding off theſe with their ſhields as they haſtily retreated, confuſion aroſe. The able leaders of the Olynthians uſed the critical moment. Their horſe again ruſhed out of the gates; the targeteers and then the heavy-armed followed. The impreſſion was ſuch, that the Peloponneſian phalanx was already in diſorder when it was attacked. Teleutias himſelf was killed; thoſe about him then gave way, and preſently the whole army fled. Purſued, as they divided, toward Potidæa, Spartolus, Acanthus, Apollonia, a large proportion, and almoſt the whole effective force of ſo great an army was deſtroyed[9]. ſ. 5 & 7. ſ. 5. ſ. 6.

[9] —— ὅ τι σφιν ὄφελος ἦν τοῦ τοιούτου στρατεύματος.

SECTION

SECTION IV.

Ageſipolis commander-in-chief againſt Olynthus. Rebellion in Phlius againſt Lacedæmon: Ageſilaus commander againſt Phlius: Delphion demagogue of Phlius: Surrender of Phlius. Death of Ageſipolis: Polybiades commander-in-chief againſt Olynthus: Reduction of Olynthus.

IT now ſeemed as if the political phenomenon, ariſing on the frontiers of Thrace and Macedonia, might, by the terror of arms, have ſpred political wiſdom over the ſouthern provinces of Greece. Had the Lacedæmonian government in the leaſt yielded under the ſevere blow it had received, had it been without able men to promote energy and direct exertion, the conſequence of its unfitneſs to coaleſce with other ſtates might have been a rapid downfall, and perhaps complete ruin. But the neceſſity for exertion was ſeen by the adminiſtration, and able men were not wanting to direct it. The command-in-chief was committed to the king, Ageſipolis; a youth, of little experience, but of great expectation. Thirty Spartans were appointed to attend him, as formerly Ageſilaus in Aſia. The character of Ageſipolis being popular, many volunteers offered. We gather from Xenophon, that, in this age, the few remaining families, diſtinguiſhed by the name of Spartans, went on foreign ſervice only in the rank of officers. The volunteers, he ſays, conſiſted of men of the beſt families in the Laconian towns, ſtrangers, or men neither of Spartan nor Laconian origin, diſtinguiſhed by a name apparently implying that they received their maintenance from the public ſtock, and baſtards of Spartan families, remarkable for their fine figures, and educated in the beſt diſcipline of the city[10]. Volunteers from the allies moreover were numerous, and the Theſſalian cavalry, ambitious of being known to the

Xen. Hel. l. 5. c. 3. ſ. 8.

ſ. 9.

[10] Τῶν περιοίκων καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ, καὶ ξένοι τῶν Τροφίμων καλουμένων, καὶ νόθοι τῶν Σπαρτιατῶν, μάλα ἐνειδῆς τι καὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει καλῶν οὐκ ἄπειροι.

In the ſcantineſs of our information concerning the political economy of Lacedæmon, we muſt glean as we can. I am unable to give any better explanation of this remarkable paſſage than that ventured in the text.

Spartan

Spartan king, were particularly forward in their zeal. The rank of the new commander-in-chief alſo, warranting the earneſtneſs of the Lacedæmonian government in the cauſe, inſpirited the exertions of the Macedonian princes. It is not mentioned that any troops were furniſhed by the cities of the confederacy, to ſupply the loſs in the battle of Olynthus; but it is implied that moſt, if not all of them, paid compoſitions in money; and that the new levies were intirely of volunteers. Phlius received the thanks of Ageſipolis for the largeneſs and readineſs of its contribution. Xen. Hel. l. 5. c. 3. ſ. 10.

The apparent zeal however of thoſe who ruled Phlius was found to have a ſiniſter motive. They propoſed to earn the connivance of Lacedæmon at groſs injuſtice toward their fellowcitizens. All the anecdotes of Plutarch, who red and ſpeculated when Trajan ruled half a hemiſphere, do not paint the internal ſtate of divided and independent Greece, like a few ſmall touches, from the life, by the cotemporary hiſtorians. With a view therefore to the acquiſition of a juſt idea of that ſtate, the affairs of Phlius will deſerve that we ſhould interrupt, for a moment, the narrative of the war in Thrace.

The tyranny of that ſuperintending power, which the Greeks had imagined as the beſt reſource for holding together a confederacy of republics, too ſmall to ſubſiſt each by its own ſtrength, we have ſeen remarkably exhibited in the affair of Thebes. Phlius affords an inſtance, not leſs remarkable, of oppreſſion from a republican government to its own citizens, in defiance of the ſuperintending power. The Phliaſian exiles, reſtored, as we have ſeen, at the requiſition of Lacedæmon, and intitled, by a decree of their own general aſſembly, to recover all their property, in vain ſought juſtice from Phliaſian tribunals; for the Phliaſian tribunals were compoſed of perſons holding that property, or connected with thoſe who held it. Among the Greek republics it was not unuſual to refer a caſe of ſuch a kind to the tribunal of ſome neighboring republic; but the Phliaſian government would liſten to no propoſal for an impartial deciſion. This imprudent iniquity impelled the injured perſons to ſeek redreſs from Lacedæmon. But it was contrary to all known practice for both kings to be at the ſame time abſent from Sparta. Ageſipolis was now far advanced on his march toward Thrace; and in the confidence that Ageſilaus would not move, and of courſe no vigorous meaſures would be taken, the Phliaſian ſ. 11. B. C. 381. Ol. 99. 4. Autumn.

chiefs reſolved that, to thoſe from whom they differed in party, it was unneceſſary to be juſt. Inſtead therefore of being diſpoſed to yield to Lacedæmonian interference, they procured a decree, impoſing the penalty of a fine on all who, without warrant from the Phliaſian government, had made application to Lacedæmon.

We ſhould admire the ſpirit of this decree, if it was not ſo immediately connected with groſs injuſtice: we ſhould approve its wiſdom, had it been founded upon any practicable plan of liberal policy. But it appears to have been the reſult only of daring profligacy, illiberal and improvident. The hope even that Lacedæmon would not inſtantly interfere with vigor, was ill-conceived. The ephors reſolved, that the injurious inſolence of the Phliaſians ſhould be reſtrained by arms; and Ageſilaus undertook the command. Among thoſe who had recurred to Lacedæmon for redreſs, were two families which had particular claim to his protection; that of the venerable Podanemus, who had been connected in hoſpitality with the revered king Archidamus, his father, and that of Procles, who had the ſame connection with Ageſilaus himſelf.

Xen. Hel. l. 5. c. 3. ſ. 13.

ſ. 14. B. C. 381. Ol. 99. 4. Autumn. No delay was made: the border-paſſing ſacrifice was not likely to be unpropitious; Ageſilaus was ready to enter Phliaſia, when an embaſſy met him, deprecating hoſtilities, and offering money. He anſwered 'that he 'was not coming to injure any, but only to relieve the injured.' 'They ſ. 15. 'profeſſed themſelves ready to do whatever could be required.' 'Profeſſions,' he told them, 'could find no credit, when deceit had already 'been practiſed.' Upon being aſked then what pledge he required, he anſwered, 'the ſame with which Lacedæmon had formerly been truſted, 'without injury to Phlius: they muſt give him poſſeſſion of their citadel.' ſ. 16. This being refuſed, he proſecuted his march, and without delay ſurrounded Phlius with a contravallation.

All the Lacedæmonians, however, were not ſatisfied with theſe meaſures. It was obſerved by many, even in the army, that, however thoſe who ruled Phlius might be tyrannical ſovereins, they had been valuable allies; and whatever might be the plea of generoſity or juſtice, it was no good policy, for the ſake of comparatively a few families, to make Lacedæmon eternally odious to a city, which had five thouſand men, able, and, till now, ready, to bear arms in its ſervice. Ageſilaus ably obviated this

growing diſcontent. The Phliaſian refugees were not without friends in the city. Such incouragement was held out for deſertion, that, in a ſhort time, thoſe ſerving in the beſieging army were more than a thouſand, diſtinguiſhed among the troops for being well-armed, able-bodied, exact in ſubordination, and zealous in ſervice; inſomuch that the late murmurs were changed for the obſervation, that theſe were ſuch allies as Lacedæmon wanted. Xen. Hel. l. 5. c. 3. ſ. 17.

But, in Phlius, a ſyſtem of order, economy, and forbearance, uſual where due military ſubordination is eſtabliſhed, but contrary to all common experience among the turbulence of the Greek democracies, diſappointed the expectation of the beſiegers. The blockade had already exceeded the time calculated for the conſumption of the proviſions, reported to be in the place. But one of thoſe extraordinary characters, of which Greece was fruitful, and which its political circumſtances were peculiarly calculated to bring forward, had at this time the lead among the Phliaſians. In the inſtance of Delphion, ſays Xenophon, was ſeen the aſcendant which daring courage may obtain over the minds of the multitude. He was a man of high rank in his city, but his dependence was upon about three hundred followers. With theſe at his devotion, he ſo awed the whole people, that a clear majority in the general aſſembly, deſirous of capitulating, dared not come to a vote upon it. Under a government called a democracy, he impriſoned at his pleaſure, on ſuſpicion, or pretended ſuſpicion, of diſaffection to the popular cauſe. His deſpotiſm, however, was not wanton or uſeleſs. He alone could inforce a ſtrict military diſcipline; and by an unwearied perſonal activity he did inforce it. Conſtantly attending himſelf, he compelled the citizens to regular attendance in their turn for guard; never failing to go the rounds, he inſured watchfulneſs and fidelity on guard. Nor was he thus daring only toward the multitude, his ſoverein; he ſhowed himſelf worthy of command, by daring againſt the enemy. In many ſallies at the head of his three hundred, he was ſucceſsful againſt the poſts of the beſiegers. When, notwithſtanding the ſhort allowance, which had been eſtabliſhed by a vote of the general aſſembly, famine began to preſs, his warrant ſufficed for ſearching every houſe for corn. All reſources at length failing, he gave the word, and a herald was ſent to Ageſilaus, requeſting a truce, that miniſters ſ. 21. ſ. 22. ſ. 23.

might carry to Lacedæmon a decree of the Phliaſian people, for ſurrendering the city to the pleaſure of the Lacedæmonian government [11].

Xen. Hel. l. 5. c. 3. ſ. 24.

Ageſilaus ſeems to have felt that, by this meſſage, it was intended to put a ſlight upon him. He nevertheleſs immediately granted the truce, and his influence at Lacedæmon ſufficed to procure that the Phliaſian miniſters ſhould be ſent back to treat with him, as plenipotentiary for the Lacedæmonian commonwealth. It does not appear that Delphion was a man of great views, or that, from the firſt, he had any well-founded hope of final ſucceſs. He ſeems rather to have been a man fond of action and enterprize, with daring courage and moderate abilities; ready in emergencies, but incapable of extenſive conceptions; fitter to command Phlius, and Phlius beſieged, than to direct the affairs of a great nation, or of any but in time of turbulence. For daring enterprize, upon a narrow ſcale, his talents were extraordinary. After the granting of the truce, the guards were ſtrengthened, and a ſtricter watch was kept to prevent egreſs from the town. Nevertheleſs, attended by one faithful ſlave, who had given frequent proof of his courage and addreſs in pilfering the beſiegers' arms [12], Delphion eſcaped by night.

The conditions which Ageſilaus impoſed may ſeem, in modern times, not mild; but, due regard being had to the manners and circumſtances of his age, and to the reſponſible ſituation in which he ſtood, they will be found ſtrongly marked with that ſpirit of liberality which was generally conſpicuous in him. If precedents had been deſired, they might have been found, for ſending commiſſioners from Lacedæmon, to decide arbitrarily between the two parties of the Phliaſian people; to baniſh, and even condemn to death at diſcretion. Ageſilaus committed the buſineſs to a

ſ. 25.

tribunal compoſed of a hundred Phliaſians; fifty only of thoſe who had been driven into exile, and an equal number ſo far at leaſt friendly to the oppoſite party, that they had remained in the city. After deciding who ſhould ſuffer death as authors of the late civil war, and who ſhould live to compoſe the future Phliaſian commonwealth, they were to model at

[11] Τοῖς τέλεσι τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων.

[12] Στιγματίας τις—ὃς πολλὰ ὑφείλετο ὅπλα τῶν πολιορκούντων. The fact, if related by an author, not a military man, might be doubted: from Xenophon it cannot. The explanation I leave to military men who have given their attention to the antient art and practice of war.

their

their diſcretion the conſtitution and the laws by which that commonwealth ſhould be governed. The town being ſurrendered, a Lacedæmonian garriſon was placed there, to inforce order till the new conſtitution ſhould be ſettled; and then, in the twentieth month from the beginning of the blockade, Ageſilaus withdrew and diſmiſſed the reſt of his army.

While Ageſilaus was employed in this petty kind of domeſtic war, within Peloponneſus, Ageſipolis had begun to ſhow the vigor and ability expected of him in his forein command. He waſted the Olynthian territory, he took Toroné by ſtorm; but, in the middle of the ſummer heats, he was ſeized with an inflammatory fever, which preſently threatened to be fatal. The ſcience of medicine, notwithſtanding the deſerved fame of Hippocrates, appears not yet to have been generally diffuſed among the Grecian republics. A little before his ilneſs, Ageſipolis had viſited the temple of Bacchus, at Aphyteus, famous for the beauty and coolneſs of its ſhady bowers and limpid waters. A ſtrong deſire ſeized him to reviſit them, in the imagination that they would afford a relief which his medical attendants could not give. He was accordingly conveyed to Aphyteus, but died ſoon after, without the temple; the ſuperſtition, which taught the Greeks to fear the anger of the deïty, for permitting the pollution of death within the hallowed building, apparently denying to the ſuffering prince the repoſe and ſhelter which he ſo much wanted. Neither attention nor expence, however, was ſpared, after his deceaſe, to honor his memory, and ſhow reſpect to his rank. His body, according to the Spartan ceremonial, was preſerved in honey, and in that ſtate carried the long and difficult journey to Lacedæmon, there to have the funeral rites performed, which cuſtom had eſtabliſhed for the burial of the kings.

Xen. Hel. l. 5. c. 3. ſ. 18—20.

Ageſipolis ſeems to have been a real loſs to his country. Tho aiming, and with fair proſpect of ſucceſs, to rival Ageſilaus in military fame, no jealouſy ſubſiſted between them. He treated his elder collegue, on all occaſions, with the reſpect due to ſuperior age and high character. He received in return unfeigned friendſhip from Ageſilaus; whoſe liberal mind conſidered him leſs as a rival, than, in public affairs, a valuable aſſiſtant, and in private a deſirable companion.

The ſucceſſor of Ageſipolis in the Thracian command, Polybiades, was but too ſucceſsful in reſtraining the liberal and beneficent policy of Olyn-

ſ. 26. Diod. l. 15. c. 23.

thus

thus within the narrow limits of a ſingle city. In undertaking to withſtand the power of Lacedæmon, the Olynthians had depended upon the ſupport of Athens and Bœotia. But the unexpected revolution in Thebes, had given the force of Bœotia to their enemies, and deterred the interference of Athens. Poſſibly, after their great ſucceſs againſt Teleutias, their affairs may have been conducted with leſs prudence than when they were but riſing to power. They may have loſt ſome of their ableſt leaders; or proſperity, inflating the popular mind, may have given advantage to turbulent demagogues; and intereſted intrigue or popular caprice may have overborne wiſe counſel. Xenophon has left us no particulars: he has not even named one of their leading men. We hear of no battle fought, no town taken; Polybiades was maſter of the country; the Olynthians could receive no relief by ſea; famine preſſed, and they ſent ambaſſadors to Lacedæmon to ſue for peace. It was granted upon the uſual terms of ſubordinate alliance; that the friends and enemies of Lacedæmon ſhould reſpectively be ſuch to Olynthus, and that the Olynthians ſhould ſerve in arms, wherever the Lacedæmonians ſhould lead.

B. C. 379. Ol. 100. 1. Spring.

SECTION V.

Apparent confirmation and real inſtability of the Lacedæmonian authority in Greece. Conſpiracy and revolution in Thebes.

THUS Lacedæmon acquired the glory of cruſhing finally the wiſeſt and nobleſt project, for a free government upon a broad foundation, perhaps ever attempted in Greece. Such at leaſt the Olynthian union appears, in the ſlight ſketch, a meer ſhadow, without a decided outline, which remains to us from Xenophon. Poſſibly it may have had great defects with which we are not made acquainted; and indeed if a government had ever been ſeen in Greece, with all the merit which his account, not intended for a panegyric, ſeems to mark, unbalanced by very groſs defects, we ſhould ſtill more wonder at, and ſtill leſs excuſe, the exceſſive deficiency of

of the political ideas tranſmitted to poſterity in the writings of ſuch men as Xenophon, Plato, Iſocrates, and Ariſtotle. It is indeed remarkable, that the celebrated panegyrical oration of Iſocrates, in which, while his great object was to perſuade the Greeks to peace among themſelves, he could propoſe no means but union in war againſt Perſia, then at peace with them, was ſpoken or publiſhed while the Lacedæmonian arms were employed in the deſtruction of the Olynthian conſtitution. Could Lacedæmon have adopted a policy ſo liberal as, in its general outline, the Olynthian appears to have been, could ſhe have united herſelf with ſuch a republic, and uſed her extenſive influence to promote the ſcheme, a ſtate might have been formed, of a firmneſs to reſiſt all external violence, and capable of diſſolution only from that internal corruption to which the Author of nature has willed that everything human ſhall be liable. But, as we have already obſerved, thoſe very inſtitutions, by which Lacedæmon had now flouriſhed for centuries, and for the ſmalneſs of her means, was become wonderfully great, thoſe very inſtitutions made it impoſſible for her to become ſo great. To coäleſce was beyond her nature: her great lawgiver's ſyſtem, admirable for its purpoſe, had no ſuch purpoſe in view: ſhe could be great, and even ſafe, only by keeping thoſe around her divided. This was now done. The reviving empire of Athens was broken: Bœotia was ſplit into many ſtates; Corinth and Argos were ſeparated; the Olynthian union was diſſolved; the renovation of exiſtence given to the obſcure kingdom of Macedonia, harmonized with the plan of diviſion; thoſe of the allies who had dared to ſhow an adverſe diſpoſition had been puniſhed; and thus, as the cotemporary hiſtorian has obſerved, the authority of Lacedæmon over Greece ſeemed more firmly eſtabliſhed than at any former period.

Iſocr. paneg. p. 250. t. 2.

Xen. Hel. l. 5. c. 3. ſ. 27.

But the Lacedæmonian authority over Greece, was not of a nature to be permanent: too weak for command; too proud for influence. We have ſeen, in the authentic teſtimony of Xenophon to what the Cyreian army experienced, the haughty deſpotiſm of the Lacedæmonian commanders, at a diſtance from home. Tho we find ſuch conduct ſometimes ſeverely puniſhed, proof that the Lacedæmonian adminiſtration was aware of evils likely to ariſe from it, yet that the reſtraint

ſtraint and puniſhment were very uncertain, is ſufficiently evident. Within Greece the adminiſtration was better able to check the indiſcreet or intereſted tyranny of its officers. But it could not equally reſtrain the chiefs of the Lacedæmonian party in the dependent republics, by whom thoſe republics were held in ſubmiſſion to Lacedæmon. To men ſo neceſſary, great indulgence would be indiſpenſable: to ſupport them without inquiry, or even notoriouſly againſt right, might appear ſometimes of political neceſſity. Hence diſcontent, vehement diſcontent, was ceaſeleſs, ſedition ever working, and revolt ready.

Evident however as it is that the foundation of the Lacedæmonian power was ſlippery in extreme, ſtill when we conſider the value of the advantage it poſſeſſed in the abilities and virtues of Ageſilaus, we cannot behold, without aſtoniſhment, the minuteneſs of the force, and the trivial character of the circumſtances, which began its overthrow, in the very moment when it appeared moſt eſtabliſhed. Xenophon aſcribes all to the juſt vengeance of the deïty; honeſtly declaring the infamy of the conduct of Lacedæmon, tho his friend and patron was implicated, in holding the citadel of Thebes by violence, in direct violation of the moſt ſolemn oaths, under the ſanction of which, among the articles of confederation, the independency of every Grecian city was warranted. Under the exiſting circumſtances, it was impoſſible but the new government of Thebes muſt be odious to the great body of the Theban people, and indeed to every honeſt Theban citizen. But fear, which reſtrained action, taught alſo to conceal ſentiments; and thus a government of violence, whether the form of the tyranny be monarchal, oligarchal, or democratical, is always riſking to defeat its own purpoſes.

Xen. Hel. l. 5. c. 4. ſ. 1.

Among the revolutions of the Theban commonwealth, that part of the conſtitution ſeems to have remained unaltered, by which the principal executive power, civil and military, that power which had formerly been held by hereditary princes, was committed to annual magiſtrates intitled polemarcs, chief-warriors. Archias and Philippus held the high office, when Phyllidas, their ſecretary and confidential miniſter, was called on ſome buſineſs to Athens. Phyllidas there found a Theban of rank, named Mellon, with whom he had formerly been intimate, living in exile, to which the revolution had driven him. Their oppoſition in politics did

ſ. 2.

not

not prevent Mellon and Phyllidas from communicating again as private friends; and Mellon's curiosity leading him to inquire about men and things in Thebes, to his surprize he found the secretary highly dissatisfied with the existing government there. More explanation thence taking place, the result was a plot for overthrowing the existing government, and restoring democracy. Phyllidas then returning to Thebes, and measures being prepared, Mellon, with only six associates, passed by night from Attica into the Theban territory; and, lying concealed during the following day, approached the city as evening closed, and entered with the last of that crowd of husbandmen, returning from their daily toil, who, in a country politically constituted like the greater part of Greece, dared not inhabit detached cottages or open villages. Proceeding unmolested, they were received in the house of Charon, a party to the plot, where they staid the night, and the following day.

Xen. Hel. l. 5. c. 4. s. 3. B. C. 379. Ol. 100. 2. Nov. or Dec.

A festival of Venus was, according to antient custom, always celebrated at Thebes, just before the expiration of the annual magistracies. The polemarcs, Archias and Philippus, were men of pleasure. Their secretary, Phyllidas, possibly a warm patriot, was certainly not a man of nice honor or strict honesty. According to report, which Xenophon thought worthy of notice, he was trusted by the polemarcs as a confidential minister to their private pleasures: that he was trusted by them as a friend, all accounts agree. Through his privilege of unlimited access, when the polemarcs and their company were far gone in intoxication, he introduced the conspirators, three habited as ladies, the others as their female attendants; having previously promised, that, under favor of the licence of the festival, he would bring the most beautiful women of the best families of Thebes. The dismission of attendants was procured, on pretence that the ladies would not otherwise come in. As far, at least, as this story tends to reveal the manners of the age, we may give it credit, as it is told by Xenophon; tho, he says, according to some the conspirators were introduced as ordinary visitors [13]. What we learn with certainty is, that the polemarcs were on that night assassinated.

Xen. Hel. l. 5. c. 4. s. 4. Plut. Pelopid.

s. 5, 6.

s. 7.

[13] Concerning a matter in which private history was so much involved with public, and party interest with both, various stories, some true, some false, and some partly true partly false, were likely to be circulated. Xenophon, who lived at the time, yet long outlived the time, and was in a situation to be better informed than almost any other could be, has related some things with

This important beginning being ſucceſsfully made, Leontiades, author of the late revolution, was the next object of the conſpirators. Phyllidas, in whom Leontiades, as well as the polemarcs, fully confided, conducted them to his houſe. Pretence of buſineſs from the polemarcs gained him immediate admiſſion to an inner apartment, whither Leontiades had retired from ſupper, and where his wife was ſitting by him, buſied in thoſe works of the diſtaff or needle, in which the Grecian ladies principally employed themſelves. Leontiades was killed upon the ſpot, and ſilence was impoſed upon the lady, with the threat of death to every perſon in the houſe, unleſs, as ſoon as the aſſaſſins went out, the doors were locked, and afterward kept cloſe.

Xen. Hel. l. 5. c. 4. ſ. 8.

The leaders of their opponents being thus diſpatched, the conſpirators proceeded to the ſtate-priſon, where ſome of their friends were confined. Phyllidas, pretending an order from the polemarcs, obtained admiſſion there alſo. The keeper was inſtantly put to death; and the priſoners, being releaſed, were directed where to find arms, and whither to repair with them.

ſ. 9.

The conſpirators ſo confided in the general hatred of the exiſting government, that, without farther preparation, they cauſed ſummons to be proclaimed, for all the citizens, equally the knights, and thoſe inrolled in the heavy-armed, to aſſemble in arms; adding the information, 'that the tyrants were no more!' Diffidence however kept all within during night. Meanwhile meſſengers were diſpatched to the refugees on the Attic borders, and to Athens itſelf; for it was known that two of the annual generals of Athens were warm in the cauſe. When day broke, what had paſſed becoming notorious, the citizens, horſe and foot, aſſembled in arms, and arranged themſelves with the conſpirators.

ſ. 10.

The firſt alarm, which reached the Lacedæmonian governor in the citadel, was from the nightly proclamation. Immediately he ſent to Platæa and Theſpiæ for reïnforcement to his ſcanty garriſon. A detachment marched from Platæa; but the Theban horſe met and routed it. As the victorious cavalry reëntered the city, the refugees from the borders, and a

with confidence; others as leſs certain. Plutarch, who wrote ſome centuries after, has differed from Xenophon in regard to ſome particulars, added to him many, declared no authority, except Xenophon's, and expreſſed no doubt. His purpoſe was to tell a good ſtory, of which Pelopidas was to be the hero.

body

body of Athenian auxiliaries, arrived. With this addition of ſtrength, it was reſolved, without delay, to aſſail the citadel. The Lacedæmonians ſaw the preparation, and heard large reward proclaimed for who ſhould firſt mount. Thinking then their numbers unequal to reſiſt all Thebes, apparently united and zealous, they propoſed to ſurrender the fortreſs, upon condition that they might depart in ſafety, with their arms. To this the Thebans gladly conſented, and the capitulation was ratified with libations and oaths. Their march out of the place was watched, with a jealouſy juſtified by preceding circumſtances. But when there were ſeen among them ſome of thoſe Thebans who had been active in the late government, then the virulence of Greek ſedition broke forth: the victims were dragged from their protection, and none ſo taken eſcaped death [14]. But the ſtate of Greece, a kind of hotbed of crimes, gave occaſion alſo for the exerciſe of virtues. The Athenian auxiliaries, who looked upon the Thebans of the Lacedæmonian intereſt, not with the rancorous hatred of party opponents, but with the more liberal enmity of forein foes, exerted themſelves generouſly for them; and by favoring their concealment, ſaved many. They could not however ſave ſome more helpleſs and innocent objects of the horrid revenge and baſe fear of the Thebans: the children of thoſe who had been executed were put to death.

Xen. Hiſt. l. 5. c. 4. ſ. 12.

ſ. 12.

Among the revolutions, of which Greece was ſo fruitful, for juſtneſs of cauſe, boldneſs of undertaking, ability of plot and arrangement, and daring vigor in execution, the delivery of Thebes has been juſtly celebrated.

[14] Ἐξιόντων μέντοι, ὅσους ἐπέγνωσαν τῶν ἐχθρῶν ὄντας συλλαμβάνοντες ἀπέκτειναν. Xenophon has not ſpecified them by any name but that of enemies; but what he mentions afterward of the treatment of their families, were it otherwiſe dubious, would aſcertain that the executed were Thebans, and not Lacedæmonians.

It has been owing apparently to the general irregularity and uncertainty of Grecian criminal law, that the Greek language, ſo ſuperior to all others in accuracy for moſt purpoſes, is ſo inferior to our own, in words for diſtinguiſhing the various degrees of criminality, which may attend the act of putting a man to death. Hence we have ſometimes difficulty to gather, from the expreſſions of hiſtorians, what degree of turpitude we ſhould impute to the actions which they relate. Ἀποκτείνω, the common word for *to kill*, is equally uſed to expreſs the fouleſt murder, or putting to death after juſt trial, in the moſt legal manner, by the hands of the public executioner (as in this chapter of Xenophon ſ. 13.) The additions δικαίως, ἀδίκως, βιαίως, ἀκρίτως, ἐκ προνοίας, and perhaps others, are ſometimes uſed to mark a diſtinction, but often omitted. Xenophon's expreſſion on this occaſion, συλλαμβάνοντες ἀπέκτειναν, rather, I think, implies that ſome legal forms were obſerved; and yet we have difficulty to reconcile this with the treatment of the children of the ſufferers.

Perhaps moderation in aſſaſſination ſhould be added to its eulogy; for the execution of thoſe who were at mercy, and the murder of the children, who could have deſerved no ill, did not take place till the revolution was completed; and, we may hope, ſhould be aſcribed, not to deliberate deſign in the leaders, but to the wild fury of popular paſſion, which they could not reſtrain. The better-taught judgement, however, of modern times will not, with the philoſophic Plutarch, give its unmixed applauſe to the means employed, and extol the revolution of Thebes as a model, to be juſtly compared with that effected at Athens, by Thraſybulus, through open war, unſullied by aſſaſſination and perfidy [15]. Xenophon, in his Ageſilaus, has not ill defined that deception which may be allowable in politics and war. Ageſilaus, he ſays, held, that 'to deceive thoſe who 'miſtruſt us is wiſe; thoſe who truſt us, wicked [16].

Xen. Ageſ. c. 11. ſ. 4.

SECTION

[15] He calls the two revolutions, of Athens and Thebes, μέγιστα καὶ κάλλιστα τῶν πράξεων. Plut. Pelop. p. 513, 514.

[16] The neceſſity has frequently occurred, by no means a pleaſant neceſſity, to ſpeak ſlightingly of Plutarch's authority. If any reader, ſwayed by the merit, altogether, of Plutarch's works, or by the reſpect extenſively paid by learned men to his name, ſhould think I have been extreme in depreciating his judgement or his accuracy as an hiſtorian, I ſhould wiſh that his account of the Theban revolution might be compared with Xenophon's. The life of Pelopidas, as his fellow-countryman, was evidently a favorite ſubject with Plutarch, and the exploit, by which Thebes was delivered from the Lacedæmonian dominion, a favorite part of it. On this favorite ſubject, an ill-judging zeal, the zeal of a cloſet-philoſopher, unverſed in active life, to make his hero keep the ſtage with effect, has led him, I muſt own it appears to me, into ſtrange puerilities. He exhibits Pelopidas babbling publicly, when evidently the moſt cautious ſecrecy was requiſite. He deſcribes him ingaged in furious combat; under circumſtances tending ſtrongly to confirm Xenophon's account, according to which the buſineſs was ſo much better managed, that nothing more was neceſſary than to poniard an unarmed man, furprized in the ſecurity of domeſtic privacy. He attributes then to the ſage Epameinondas an indiſcretion truly wonderful. While, according to his account, the eloquence of Pelopidas incited the exiles, Epameinondas, by an ingenious device, prepared the minds of the citizens at home to join in the propoſed ſcheme of revolution. In the places of public exerciſe, he incouraged the Theban youth to venture upon wreſtling and boxing with the Lacedæmonians of the garriſon. To their ſurprize, they found themſelves far ſuperior to their antagoniſts: they were of courſe elated with unexpected ſucceſs, and thence Epameinondas took occaſion to reproach them with the baſeneſs of their ſubmiſſion to a people ſo inferior. It might be ſuppoſed, from this ſtory, that Epameinondas meant to admoniſh the Lacedæmonians to ſtrengthen their garriſon, and keep ſtricter watch.

It is among the real merits of Plutarch, which I have before taken occaſion to obſerve, that he not unfrequently names his authors. Now it is remarkable that, in his account of the Theban revolution, the only author he quotes is Xenophon; from whom, indeed, evidently the beſt part of his account has been taken. As a cotemporary hiſtorian, much intereſted in the political events of the time, Xenophon had his partialities, and they

SECTION VI.

Motives, at Lacedæmon, for lenient conduct toward Thebes. Command in war againſt Thebes, declined by Ageſilaus, committed to Cleombrotus. Uncommon ſtorm. Change in Athenian politics, adverſe to Thebes.

IT was incumbent upon the Lacedæmonian government to puniſh the Theban rebellion and ſupport its authority over Greece, or at once to reſign that invidious authority, which perhaps could not be reſigned with ſafety. Tho midwinter, therefore, it was reſolved that an army ſhould immediately march. In the ſame ſpirit, ſeverity was exerted againſt the late governor of the Cadmeia, who ſuffered death for ſurrendering his truſt.

There is ſomething of myſtery in the conduct of Ageſilaus toward the Thebans, and not leſs of the Thebans toward Ageſilaus, which the philoſopher-hiſtorian, who acted in the military and political tranſactions of the time, ſeems to have left ſtudiouſly veiled. The groſs affront put upon Ageſilaus, previouſly to his ſailing for Aſia, when ſacrificing in the Theban territory, is not accounted for. The cauſe of that deeplaid ſcheme of enmity to Lacedæmon, which occaſioned the recall of Ageſilaus, is equally unexplained. Why Ageſilaus, when he had gained a great victory over the Thebans near Coroneia, did not purſue the advantage, but on the contrary led his army immediately out of their territory, remains an enigma. After this, that Ageſilaus bore a hatred to the Thebans, which he ſuffered ſometimes to ſway his political conduct, the candor of Xenophon

they were not in favor of Pelopidas or Epameinondas. On the contrary the Lacedæmonians were his friends, and very particularly Ageſilaus. Nevertheleſs his ſimple conciſe narrative does far more honor to the authors of the Theban revolution than Plutarch's ſtudied panegyric. Without any mention of ſecrecy, he ſhows that extraordinary ſecrecy was obſerved. Without any mention of courage or magnanimity, he exhibits, in the conduct of the conſpirators, the daring prudence of ſo many Cæſars or Cromwells. While he thus does juſtice to thoſe who, as public men, were his enemies, he acknowleges ſo candidly the faults of his friends, that even Plutarch could accuſe them of nothing more. Among the advantages then, of Xenophon in the compariſon, the reader of taſte will admire that elegant ſimplicity, that perſpicuous conciſeneſs, which modern writers cannot too diligently emulate, but which, were Xenophon the writer, no modern language could equal.

has led him to declare. The partiality of Plutarch, himſelf a Bœotian, would countenance an imputation, which ſeems however to have had no better origin than the ordinary malice of party-ſpirit in Greece, that Ageſilaus inſtigated the ſeizing of the Cadmeia. That, however, he ſupported the meaſure, when taken, in a manner not creditable to his character, Xenophon himſelf has ſhown. Yet when, in conſequence of the revolution which followed, war was denounced againſt Thebes, and an army ordered to march, he declined the command.

But what hiſtorians have not expreſſly declared, may be gathered from what they have made known: the pointed enmity of Thebes, toward Ageſilaus and Lacedæmon, aroſe from a revolution, by which the power paſſed, from the oligarchal party, to the democratical. The new leaders could not hope to hold their power, unleſs they could ingage their commonwealth to break the Lacedæmonian connection; and a groſs affront to a popular king might be very efficacious for their purpoſe. But as the other party was ſtill conſiderable, and the principal landowners were among its members, Ageſilaus, after the battle gained on his return from Aſia, might withdraw his army from the Theban territory to favor the lands, not of his enemies, but of his friends; and he might hope that his moderation, after victory, might ſoften the enmity of one party, while the credit of that victory would promote the influence of the other. If the oligarchy could be quietly reſtored in Thebes, his purpoſe would be better anſwered than by any ſucceſs in arms; and means might thus, more than by any other meaſures, be promoted, for his return, with his army, to proſecute his favorite plan of conqueſt in Aſia.

Patriotiſm upon a narrow ſcale, or attachment to a particular commonwealth, (tho it was oftener only to a party in that commonwealth) was common among the Greeks; but even the pretenſion to patriotiſm including all Greece, was rare [17]. Xenophon aſcribes to Ageſilaus that nobler patriotiſm: which ſeems indeed to have been an inheritance from his father Archidamus, communicated to both the kings his ſons; tho the inferior abilities of Agis gave leſs brilliancy to the fair

Xen. Ageſ. c. 7. ſ. 4, 5, 6.

[17] The Greek term φιλόπατρις was nearly ſynonymous with φιλόπολις. To expreſs the more liberal patriotiſm, extending to the whole nation, the Greeks uſed the term φιλέλλην.

portion.

portion. If we add the Athenian Cimon, it will be difficult to find another Grecian commander who has any clear claim to the eulogy. Theſe however ſeem intitled to it, and we muſt therefore confine to the time when Ageſilaus reigned, the praiſe which Xenophon makes peculiarly his. What other general, he aſks, has been known to decline taking a town, when he thought the plunder in his power, or to hold it a misfortune to conquer, when Greeks were his enemies? But Ageſilaus, when, on his march from Aſia, intelligence met him of the great victory obtained near Corinth, where, with the loſs of only eight Lacedæmonians, more than ten thouſand of the Theban confederacy were ſlain, without marking any ſatisfaction, 'Unhappy 'Greece!' he exclaimed; 'your children thus deſtroyed, in quarrels 'among themſelves, were enough to have obtained glorious victory over 'any number of barbarians.' When afterward, as he lay near Corinth, the refugees pointed out a plan for eaſily ſtorming the city, he would not allow the attempt: 'To chaſtize a Grecian people,' he ſaid, 'may be 'neceſſary; to extirpate or inſlave them cannot be.'

Xen. ut ſup. & Plut. Ageſ.

But the great purpoſe of Ageſilaus, univerſal peace in Greece, and a union of the whole nation againſt the barbarians, was ſingularly thwarted by the prevalence of the democratical party in Thebes; and this conſideration, with perhaps ſome added ſtimulation from perſonal affronts, appears ſo far to have warped the general rectitude of his mind, as to have led him to ſupport the treachery of Phœbidas, in ſeizing the Theban citadel. When however he found that thoſe Thebans who, through the inſuing revolution, acquired the lead in the government of their city, conducted themſelves with no moderation [19]; when, on the contrary, after the counter-revolution effected by Mellon and Pelopidas, the whole Theban people ſeemed united in the oppoſite intereſt, he would no longer ſtand forward in a cauſe which he ſaw was ſo odious, and which a conſiderable party in Lacedæmon itſelf reprobated. He avoided taking any part in the debate on meaſures to be purſued; and when it was reſolved that an army

Xen. Hel. l. 5. c. 4. ſ. 13.

[18] Xenophon has himſelf reported that Agis would not take Elis when in his power. Xen. Hel. l. 3. c. 2. ſ. 19. & Ch. 24. ſ. 2. of this Hiſt.) Hence it is clear that the peculiarity of the eulogy muſt be confined to the time when Ageſilaus reigned.

[19] Τύραννος is a title which Xenophon more than once gives them (ſ. 9 & 13.)

ſhould

ſhould immediately march, he claimed the privilege of his age for declining the command [20].

Cleombrotus, who had ſucceeded Ageſipolis in the throne of the Euryſthenoid family, ſeems, with the ephors, and the whole adminiſtration of Lacedæmon, to have imbibed a ſhare of the moderation of Ageſilaus. But had no ſtep been taken in favor of the Lacedæmonian, or oligarchal party, throughout the Bœotian towns, its complete ruin, with the ſevereſt ſufferings to individuals, to many individuals who deſerved highly of Lacedæmon, muſt have followed. Already in Thebes, the return of the refugees of one party had been the ſignal for the leading men of the other to ſeek perſonal ſafety, by quitting whatever elſe was moſt dear to them [21]. Tho midwinter, therefore, and very ſevere weather, the reſolution for the immediate march of an army for Bœotia was perſiſted in, and Cleombrotus was directed to take the command. The readieſt paſſage of the mountains north of the iſthmus [22], was occupied by the Athenian general Chabrias, with a body of targeteers. Cleombrotus however found the Platæan road open, by which he paſſed into the Theban territory and incamped at Cynoſcephalæ. There he remained ſixteen days, and then withdrew to Theſpiæ. The purpoſe of the expedition ſeems to have been meerly to give that protection which the Lacedæmonians owed to the Bœotian towns againſt the new government of Thebes; and for this it was thought ſufficient now to leave a third of the army under the command of Sphodrias, with a ſum of money for raiſing a body of mercenaries. Cleombrotus therefore led the reſt back toward Peloponneſus; all, ſays the hiſtorian, while they reflected how carefully every injury to the Theban territory had been avoided, wholly doubting whether it was to be war or peace.

B. C. 378. Ol. 100. 2. January. Dodw.

Xen. Hel. l. 5. c. 4. ſ. 15.

ſ. 16.

[20] Ὑπὲρ τεσσαράκοντα ἀφ' ἥβης. The uncertain value of this expreſſion has been already noticed. Dodwell (Chron. Xen. ad ann. A. C. 378. p. 55.) ſuppoſes τεσσαράκοντα ἀφ' ἥβης fifty-ſeven or fifty-eight, and that Ageſilaus was already ſixty-three. At that rate he muſt have been forty-five at his acceſſion to the throne, when he was, according to Xenophon, (Ageſil. c. 1. ſ. 6.) ἔτι μὲν νέος, ſtill a youth. I ſhould rather ſuppoſe him under thirty five at his acceſſion, and between fifty-two and fifty-five when his age excuſed him from forein ſervice. The excuſe was common to the king and the private ſoldier.

[21] This familiar circumſtance among the Greeks it was ſufficient for Xenophon to expreſs by the ſingle word ἐκπεπτοκότων.

[22] The way by Eleutheræ, for which Dodwell propoſes, apparently with reaſon, to read Erythræ.

In

In paſſing the mountain-barrier againſt the iſthmus, the army was aſſailed by an uncommon ſtorm. Between the town of Creuſis and the Corinthian gulph, its violence was ſuch, that many aſſes laden with the baggage were tumbled down the precipices; ſhields were blown into the ſea, and, in the impoſſibility, with their complete armour, to withſtand its fury, moſt of the ſoldiers reſorted to the expedient of depoſiting their ſhields among the crags, and loading them with ſtones. With difficulty, each making his way as he could, they arrived in the evening at Aigoſtheni in the Megaric territory. Tho this was no ordinary tempeſt, yet the account of it given by Xenophon may aſſiſt us to the cauſe why, in a climate whoſe ſummer heats we are apt to ſuppoſe more intolerable than the roughneſs of the waining or early year, winter operations were ſo generally avoided. Such an event never failed to alarm Grecian ſuperſtition. Some thought the diſpleaſure of the gods announced at the conduct of Lacedæmon toward Thebes: others ſuppoſed ill-fortune to the youthful general portended. Following events, with the recollection of the omen, brought, it was imagined, its explanation. As ſoon as the weather became moderate, the abandoned arms were collected; and the march being then proſecuted into Peloponneſus, the troops were, as uſual, diſmiſſed. Xen. Hel. l. 5. c. 4. ſ. 17. ſ. 18.

Altho, in this expedition, ſo little was done to the vulgar eye, its conſequences were important. Thoſe in Athens, deſirous of peace, or averſe to the Theban connection, repreſented with effect to the people, that the Corinthian territory was no longer the ſeat of war: already they had ſeen the Peloponneſian army paſs by Attica into Bœotia; and before next harveſt they might expect the ravage of Attica itſelf. The ungenerous fear of the tyrannous multitude was ſo excited, that, of the two generals who had favored the delivery of Thebes from the Lacedæmonian yoke, one was condemned and executed; the other ſaved his life by flight. ſ. 19.

SECTION VII.

Motives of the Theban leaders for perſevering in oppoſition to Lacedæmon: Pelopidas, Epameinondas. Corruption of the Lacedæmonian general Sphodrias: Weak conceſſion of Ageſilaus: Renewal of connection between Athens and Thebes. Ageſilaus commander againſt Thebes. State of the ſmaller Republics of Greece. The Thebaïd ravaged: Winter campain. Second invaſion of the Thebaïd under Ageſilaus: Sedition at Theſpiæ.

B. C. 378. Ol. 100 2/3.

THE great change, which had taken place in the politics of Athens, was highly alarming to the ruling party in Thebes. Unſupported they could not hope long to reſiſt the power of Lacedæmon; and whatever indications might have appeared of moderation in the Lacedæmonian government, and a diſpoſition to peace, yet no peace with Lacedæmon could come unattended with the ruin of the chiefs of the party, aſſaſſins of the late polemarcs, and objects of the revenge of living numbers, whom they had driven into baniſhment. But among them were men of talents, ſuch as Thebes had not before offered to the world's notice. Of theſe Pelopidas and Epameinondas were becoming eminent. Both of diſtinguiſhed families, both of the democratical party, they contracted an early friendſhip, tho otherwiſe their circumſtances and their diſpoſitions differed. Pelopidas was rich, Epameinondas poor; Pelopidas delighted to paſs his time in action, war, hunting, and the palæſtra; Epameinondas in ſtudy and the ſchools of the philoſophers[23]. The warm temper of Pelopidas urged him to put himſelf forward in public buſineſs; Epameinondas thought it a duty to qualify himſelf for his country's ſervice, but then claimed indulgence for his inclination to retirement and ſtudy, till circumſtances might require his exertion. The activity of Pelopidas made it impoſſible that he could be an indifferent character in any public commotion. When therefore the party of Leontiades, with the aſſiſtance of the Lacedæmonian army under Phœbidas, obtained the ſupreme power in the commonwealth, Pelopidas had

Diod. l. 15. Corn. Nep. vit. Epam. & Pelop. Plut. vit. Pelop. & Ageſ.

[23] Pythagoreus ille Lyſis Thebanum Epaminondam (inſtituit) haud ſcio an ſummum virum unum omnis Græciæ. Cic. de Orat. 3. 34.

been

been among thoſe who were driven to ſeek their ſafety by flight; while Epameinondas, conſidered only as a philoſopher, remained undiſturbed in Thebes. Pelopidas was, according to Plutarch, both in council and in action, foremoſt among the aſſociates of Mellon, in the inſuing revolution; Epameinondas joined in it only with the body of the Theban people. When the revolution was effected, Pelopidas was raiſed, with Mellon and Charon, to the office of Bœotarc; a title now aſſumed by the firſt magiſtrates of Thebes, in aſſertion of the claim of the Theban people to a ſuperintending authority over all the cities of Bœotia, which the Lacedæmonians, under the pretence of vindicating the freedom of thoſe cities, but really to inſure their own command over them, had always ſtrenuouſly oppoſed.

The intrigue which ſet Athens again at variance with Lacedæmon, was, according to Plutarch, deviſed and managed by Pelopidas. Xenophon gives it to Theban policy, without ſpecifying the author. Bribery was the inducement, at leaſt ſuſpected, for Sphodrias, the Lacedæmonian general in Theſpiæ, to take meaſures not to be otherwiſe eaſily accounted for. Marching in the afternoon, he entered Attica by night, with the purpoſe, or the pretended purpoſe, to be before dawn at Peiræus, which had then no gates, and to take it by ſurprize. At Thria day broke upon him, and he returned; but inſtead of endeavoring to conceal his hoſtile intention, he plundered houſes, and drove off cattle.

Plut vit. Pelopid.

Xen. Hel. l. 5. c. 4. ſ. 20.

ſ. 21.

Before day intelligence reached Athens that a large army was approaching. Alarm ſpred rapidly, and the whole people took arms. Three Lacedæmonian miniſters, then in the city, were arreſted. Aſtoniſhed, themſelves, at the fact related to them, they however ſoon convinced the principal Athenians, that, whatever the plot might be, they could be no parties to it; and, declaring their confidence that Sphodrias not only could have no authority for his injurious conduct, but that his high rank and great connections would not ſcreen him from due puniſhment for it, they were preſently releaſed. So far their aſſertions were ſoon confirmed, that Sphodrias was ſummoned home, and a capital proſecution was inſtituted againſt him.

ſ. 22, 23.

Xenophon has labored, not to juſtify the inſuing conduct of Ageſilaus, but to win excuſe for it. Cleonymus, ſon of Sphodrias, a youth of great

ſ. 24—33.

merit, was the intimate friend of Archidamus ſon of Ageſilaus, a youth alſo of great merit. Archidamus was diſtreſſed by his friend's diſtreſs; and Ageſilaus, feeling for both of them, allowed his feeling to overbear his judgement. Againſt his own opinion of what was juſt and honorable, and againſt his country's cleareſt intereſt, he exerted himſelf in favor of Sphodrias. It appears that trials of men in high public ſituations, at Sparta equally as at Athens, were before either the aſſembled people, or a court nearly as numerous as the ordinary popular aſſemblies. Of courſe opportunity was open for intrigue, and intereſt decided the judgement. Sphodrias nevertheleſs feared to return home; yet his trial, according to the general practice of Grecian courts, proceeded as if he were preſent. It was apparently in conſequence of the notoriety of his guilt, that his friends choſe to reſt his defence principally on the plea of his former merits; but the influence of Ageſilaus gave ſuch efficacy to this plea that he was acquitted. Xenophon, anxious for the credit of his friend and patron, has nevertheleſs evinced his ſuperior regard for truth, by avowing that the deciſion was very generally conſidered as ſingularly iniquitous.

The remoter conſequences of this diſreputable tranſaction were beyond human foreſight, but the ſtrong probability, amounting almoſt to certain neceſſity, of what immediately followed, ſhould not have eſcaped ſo experienced a politician as Ageſilaus. Indignation pervaded the Athenian people; and it was no longer poſſible for thoſe leading men in Athens, who deſired to maintain the Lacedæmonian connection, to refute the orators of the Bœotian party, who aſſerted that the Lacedæmonians not leſs evidently approved and had incouraged the treacherous project againſt Peiræus, than the not leſs abominable, but more ſucceſsful treachery, by which Thebes, not long ſince, had been actually ſubjected to Lacedæmon. After the manner of democracies, not underſtanding convinced, but paſſion excited, like the reflux of a ſtrong ſurf, bore all violently the way contrary to that which it had lately impelled; and the ſame raſh multitude which, a little before, had condemned its generals to death for promoting the delivery of Thebes from the Lacedæmonian yoke, now, with equally haſty and unreaſonable zeal, ingaged in war with Lacedæmon to ſupport the meaſure.

War

War defenſive and offenſive became the popular care. Peiræus was ſecured with gates, ſhips were built, and want of zeal in the Bœotian cauſe was conſidered as want of fidelity to the Athenian commonwealth.

Having thus, by partiality for a guilty individual, brought a formidable addition to the before preſſing weight of war againſt his country, Ageſilaus could no longer deny himſelf to the public voice, which loudly called for his known ability and large experience to command the army, in preference to the untried talents of his youthful collegue. Thebes remained the great object of hoſtility; but, with Athens now adverſe, it was no longer eaſy for an army to paſs from Peloponneſus into Bœotia: command of the road over the intervening mountains muſt by ſome means be ſecured. Xen. Hel. l. 5. c. 4. ſ. 35.

It is only incidentally that we get any information concerning thoſe numerous inferior republics which compoſed the far larger portion of the Greek nation; and when it occurs, it is of courſe valuable. To the citizens of Lacedæmon and Athens great objects of ambition offered; and if numbers ſuffered in the conteſt ſo excited, numbers would participate in the joyful hope, at leaſt, of one time finding large recompence. Meanwhile the body of the Lacedæmonian people might live in ſecurity and a dignified eaſe, after the manner preſcribed by the peculiar inſtitutions under which they were bred; and for the Athenian, all the arts and every ſcience combined to produce gratifications; for the wealthy every kind of gratification at their own expence, except ſecurity of perſon, property, and character; and for the pooreſt, luxuries at the public expence, ſuch as no others injoyed, with quiet and peace of mind, if not always in their power, yet leſs liable to arbitrary violation than with thoſe whoſe private riches might draw popular envy. But, for the bulk of the Greek nation, the citizens of thoſe numerous little republics, to whom the higher rewards of ambition were totally denied, our information hitherto has not repreſented their lot as generally enviable; and what we proceed to learn will be gratifying, only as it may teach us to bleſs Providence for our own.

A war, unconnected with the greater concerns of the Lacedæmonian confederacy, already exiſted within Bœotia. In that empire, which ſome of the Grecian republics exerciſed over others, and the Lacedæmonian, for ſ. 36, 37.

for a long time, over all, we ſee ſomething of the principle of ſome deſpotic governments now exiſting in Europe; allowing the people, as a recompence for deprivation of other liberty, that of aſſaſſinating one-another. The little, almoſt unheard-of, municipality of the Cleitorians had been waging war with their neighbours the Orchomenians; unregarded by any ſuperintending authority, till the particular intereſt of Lacedæmon required that their broils ſhould ceaſe; and then a mandate from Sparta ſtilled the ſtorm. The Cleitorians, unequal to their enemies in native military force, had pecuniary reſources which inabled them to ſupply the deficiency. They had in their pay a body of thoſe troops, the uſe of which had, as we have ſeen, long been increaſing in Greece; vagabonds from various republics, who made war a trade, and were ready to ingage in any ſervice for the beſt hire. Informed of the circumſtances, Ageſilaus ſaw, in this little war, the means of ſecuring for his army the paſſage from Peloponneſus over the mountains into the Bœotian plain. He demanded the ſervice of the Cleitorian mercenaries for the purpoſe. The Cleitorians, deſirous to gratify the king and people of Lacedæmon, were only anxious that, while their mercenaries were employed in the Lacedæmonian ſervice, their lands, which they were themſelves unable to protect, might not be ravaged. Againſt this Ageſilaus undertook to provide; and he did it effectually by ſending his orders to the Orchomenians to abſtain from hoſtility, while Lacedæmon might have occaſion for the Cleitorian troops. It ſeems there was an exiſting decree of the congreſs of the confederacy, forbidding war between the confederated republics, while an expedition in the common cauſe was going forward; and, under the ſanction of this decree, Ageſilaus threatened the Orchomenians with the firſt vengeance of the arms of that confederacy, of which their city was a member, if they diſobeyed his order. The Orchomenians prudently acquieſced, and the Cleitorian mercenaries occupied the paſſes.

Xen. Hel. l. 5. c. 4. ſ. 38—41.

Bœotia being thus laid open to the Lacedæmonian arms, it remained for thoſe able men who led the Theban councils, to deviſe how, with unequal forces, they might beſt protect the ſmall but rich territory of their city. They fortified the whole frontier; and ſtill their numbers were unequal to the defence always and everywhere. Ageſilaus, able and indefatigable, penetrating their lines, plundered, burnt, and waſted to the city-

walls.

walls. The conſummate ſkill of the Athenian general Chabrias, to whom the Thebans deferred on that occaſion, baffled his endeavours to force a general action. The common object of a Grecian campain was nevertheleſs accompliſhed. Ageſilaus then placed a force in Theſpiæ, under the command of Phœbidas, to protect the allies of Lacedæmon in northern Greece, during the winter, and, returning into Peloponneſus, diſmiſſed the reſt of his army.

Diod. l. 15. c. 32, 33. p. 474. Corn. Nep. vit. Chab.

The patronage of a man diſtinguiſhed, like Phœbidas, by that treachery which had reduced Thebes under ſubjection to Lacedæmon, we ſhould not conſider as creditable; but we are ſo little informed of Spartan domeſtic politics, that ground fails us even for conjecture, how far the appointment of Phœbidas was the work of Ageſilaus. However, tho an unprincipled politician, Phœbidas ſeems to have been an active and able officer. The Thebans, like the Dorian Peloponneſians, deſcended from the ſame Æolian ſtock, valuing themſelves upon their heavy-armed phalanx, diſdained the miſſile weapons and deſultory action of moſt of the northern Greeks; whom they conſidered as, in their warfare, little above barbarians. But the Lacedæmonians, by ſevere experience in their wars with Athens, had at length learnt the uſe of light infantry; and tho the force left under Phœbidas conſiſted moſtly of targeteers, he did not content himſelf with defenſive war, but ſo harraſſed the enemy's territory with predatory inroads, that the whole force of Thebes was collected to repreſs the troubleſome and deſtructive intruſion. The Theban army invaded the Theſpian territory. Phœbidas, avoiding general action, gave nevertheleſs ſuch annoyance by deſultory attacks with his light troops on the enemy's flanks and rear, that he made both phalanx and cavalry retire in diſorderly haſte; and this was done ſo without previous circumſpection and deciſion, that the cavalry were ſtopped by a deep glen croſſing the way. This however, which, in the ordinary courſe of events, ſhould have been the ruin of the defeated, proved, in the chance of war, that of the victorious party. The Theban cavalry being forced into action again, it happened that, in the firſt charge, Phœbidas was killed, and immediately it appeared of what conſequence the life of one man might be. The mercenaries all fled; the few Lacedæmonians of the army were overpowered; approaching night prevented great ſlaughter, but the conſequences were thoſe of a complete

Xen. ut ſup. Diod. l. 15. ſ. 34.

victory.

Xen. Hel. l. 5. c. 4. s. 46.

victory. The Thebans thenceforward commanded the country: their allies and partizans were incouraged, their adverſaries dejected: inſtead of any longer ſuffering in their own territory, they plundered the lands of all around them: they were indeed unable to take a ſingle town; but the lower people of many deſerted to them in numbers, and the Lacedæmonian party was ſo weakened, throughout Bœotia, that, almoſt everywhere ſupport was wanting to check ſedition and prevent revolt. Theſe circumſtances being reported to Lacedæmon, a mora was ſent, under the orders of a polemarc, who took his head-quarters in Theſpiæ.

B. C. 377. Ol. 100. 3.

In ſpring the Peloponneſian army was again aſſembled, reïnforced by a body of horſe from that diſtant new member of the confederacy Olynthus, and Ageſilaus again took the command. By early precaution he ſecured the paſſes of Cithæron, and entered, without oppoſition, the Bœotian plain. The Thebans remained on the defenſive within their lines; but even thoſe lines, by movements ably planned and rapidly executed, Ageſilaus paſſed unoppoſed. Fearful of a battle, the enemy attended his motions, with little effect, while he extended ravage beyond Thebes, as far as the Tanagræan lands. Not till all the inimical Bœotian territory had been waſted, he re-

s. 47—54.

s. 55.

turned to Theſpiæ. That little city he found torn by the common rancor of faction in Greece. One party, claiming to be more eminently the Lacedæmonian party, urged the moderate petition that their opponents, tho profeſſing themſelves friends alſo of Lacedæmon, yet, for their leſs ardent zeal in the cauſe, might be put to death. It could not be eaſy to bring men, ſo violent in variance, to live within the ſame town in cordial friendſhip. Ageſilaus however effected, at leaſt, the ſemblance of a reconciliation; and, for better ſecurity, required ſolemn oaths from both ſides for, what the intereſt of both ſtrongly demanded, but paſſion, more imperious, had oppoſed, the preſervation of the peace of their little commonwealth. After this good-deed, he returned into Peloponneſus, and the army was diſmiſſed.

SECTION

SECTION VIII.

Diſtreſs and exertions of Thebes: Naval aſſiſtance obtained from Athens; Timotheus commander. Preſſure upon Lacedæmon, and ſucceſſes of Thebes. Accommodation and breach again between Lacedæmon and Athens: Siege of Corcyra by the Lacedæmonians: Succeſſes of the Athenians under Iphicrates.

THAT mode of offenſive war, which had compelled the flouriſhing and formidable commonwealth of Olynthus to receive laws from Lacedæmon, now began ſeverely to preſs upon Thebes. For two ſucceſſive years neither harveſt, nor thoſe fruits which, in the hotter climates, are ſcarcely leſs important than harveſt, had been gathered by the Thebans from their territory; and the ſurrounding ſtates, beſt able to afford ſupplies, acknowleged the Lacedæmonian empire. Bœotia, tho its extent, from the Eubœan channel to the Corinthian gulph, gave it the advantage of two ſeas, nevertheleſs was low in the ſcale of Grecian maritime power. The ſupremacy of Thebes was unfavorable to maritime exertion, its proper territory being wholly inland; yet Thebes, whether through juſt or uſurped dominion, at this time commanded ports and poſſeſſed ſhips of war. In the diſtreſs, therefore, ariſing from the preſſure of the Lacedæmonian arms, it was reſolved, before any conceſſion ſhould be made, to endeavour to procure ſupplies by ſea.

B. C. 377. Ol. 100. 4. Winter. Xen. Hel. l. 5. c. 4. ſ. 58.

l. 6. c. 4. ſ. 3.

Two triremes were accordingly appointed to attend commiſſioners, to whom ten talents, about two thouſand pounds ſterling, were intruſted, to purchaſe corn at Oreum in Eubœa. The people of Oreum were known to be friendly, but they were reſtrained by a Lacedæmonian garriſon in their citadel. The Theban commiſſioners therefore went to Pagaſæ, on the oppoſite Theſſalian coaſt; hoping thence to manage their buſineſs with the requiſite ſecrecy. The Lacedæmonian governor nevertheleſs receiving information of their meaſures, allowed them quietly to complete their purchaſe, and then, watching their departure, intercepted both ſhips, at ſuch a diſtance from ſhore that none of the crews eſcaped. The reſult how-

ever was far more beneficial to the Thebans than if their commiſſioners had met with unchecked ſucceſs. For the priſoners, being placed in the citadel of Oreum, were ſo deficiently guarded, that they found opportunity to riſe and overpower the garriſon. The townſpeople, relieved thus from the terror of the commanding fortreſs, diſclaimed ſubjection to Lacedæmon; and, through the reſt of autumn, and all the following winter, Thebes was abundantly ſupplied from Eubœa.

B. C. 376. Ol. 100. 4. Spring.

The diſpoſition to yield, which want had begun to excite among the Thebans, being thus done away, it remained for the Lacedæmonians, with the returning ſeaſon, to repeat the invaſion of Bœotia. An accidental injury to a blood-veſſel, ill-treated by an unſkilful ſurgeon, had brought upon Ageſilaus a ſevere ilneſs, which diſabled him for military command. Cleombrotus was therefore again placed at the head of the army. With the uſual deficiency of our information, concerning the domeſtic politics of Lacedæmon, it remains unexplained to us why that inexperienced prince profited, neither from the advice nor the example of his able collegue, to ſecure the paſſes into Bœotia. Not till he arrived at the foot of the mountains, he ſent forward his targeteers; but they were repulſed by the Athenian and Theban troops, which had preöccupied the commanding heights. Without another effort he returned then into Peloponneſus, and diſmiſſed his army.

Xen. Hel. l. 5. c. 4. s. 58.

f. 60. Impatience and diſcontent pervaded the congreſs of the confederacy, which ſoon after met in Lacedæmon. It was obſerved, that the yearly calls for forein ſervice bore hard upon the citizens of the allied republics, and yet no progreſs was made. Management and exertion were certainly deficient, or ſo great a force would have produced greater effects. A proper uſe of the unemployed navy, far ſuperior in ſtrength to the enemy's, might have contributed to ſhorten the duration of the evil. Not only troops might have been ſecurely tranſported into Bœotia, and the diſgrace of an unſucceſsful attempt to force the paſſage of the mountains avoided, but Athens, dependent upon tranſmarine ſupplies for ſo large a part of her ſubſiſtence, might have been reduced by famine. In conſequence of ſuch

f. 61. remonſtrances, a fleet of ſixty triremes was equipped, and, under the command of Pollis, took ſtations at Ægina, Ceos, and Andrus. This meaſure had the propoſed effect. The corn-ſhips, bound for Athens, commonly

monly made Geræſtus in Eubœa. There they got information of the diſpoſition of the enemy's fleet, and thence they dared not proceed; ſo that, in Athens, want began to be apprehended.

But the race of great men in Athens was not yet extinct. Chabrias, eſteemed the moſt ſcientific officer of the age, was placed at the head of the fleet. He met and defeated Pollis, and thus again the ſeas were open for the Athenian trade. Preparation meanwhile was making for tranſporting a powerful army, from Peloponneſus acroſs the Corinthian gulph, to carry war into Bœotia. But the conſequence of the weak compliance of Ageſilaus, in compaſſion for a deſerving ſon and a guilty friend, the compaſſion amiable in the individual, but the compliance highly blameable in the public man, fell now ſeverely upon Lacedæmon. Thebes applied to Athens, its ally, for naval protection, and a fleet of ſixty triremes was ſent, under the command of Timotheus ſon of Conon, to circumnavigate Peloponneſus, and alarm the coaſt. The Peloponneſian forces were in conſequence detained at home, for the defence of their reſpective territories, and the Thebans, on the contrary, had leiſure for offenſive meaſures; whence their able leaders profited ſo well, that the great object of their party, what might beſt inable them, in all events, to reſiſt Lacedæmon, what, of courſe, it had been the great purpoſe of the Lacedæmonians to prevent, was completely accompliſhed. With the coöperation, everywhere, of the democratical party, every town of Bœotia was brought, with the name of alliance, under real ſubjection to Thebes.

Xen. Hel. l. 5. c. 4. ſ. 61. Diod. l. 15. c. 34. Corn. Nep. vit. Chab. Xen. Hel. l. 5. c. 4. ſ. 62, 63. ſ. 63. & l. 6. c. 2. ſ. 6.

The Athenian fleet, meanwhile, commanding the ſea, when it had ſaved Bœotia from invaſion, itſelf invaded Corcyra, and, a friendly party there aſſiſting, the whole iland was brought over to the Athenian cauſe. Timotheus however would allow none of the uſual ſeverities againſt the overpowered party; no ſelling into ſlavery, no baniſhment; but by his liberal conduct compoſing differences, he produced a general attachment to himſelf, and to the Athenian name [24].

l. 5. c. 4. ſ. 64.

[24] The circumſtance that Timotheus was a pupil of Iſocrates, has led to a ſhort but pithy panegyric of him from Cicero: 'Iſocrates clariſſimum virum Timotheum, Cononis, præſtantiſſimi, imperatoris filium, ſummum ipſum imperatorem, hominemque doctiſſimum (inſtituit.)' M. T. Cic. de Orat. l. 3. ſ. 34. To the ſame general purpoſe Diodorus, (b. 15. c. 36.) Ταῦτα δὲ πάντα ταχέως καὶ ῥᾳδίως ἐπιτέλεσε, πείθων μὲν διὰ τοῦ λόγου δυνάμενος, νικῶν δὲ δι' ἀνδρείαν καὶ σῳα-

Xen. Hel. l. 5 c. 4. f. 65, 66.

The Lacedæmonians always ſaw with particular jealouſy any interference of Athens in the weſtern ſeas. Immediately therefore they exerted themſelves to aſſert their command there, and a fleet of fifty-five triremes was put under the orders of Nicolochus. More diſtinguiſhed for daring courage, than for talents or naval experience, Nicolochus ſcorned, in fleets ſo numerous, to weigh the difference of five ſhips. Without waiting for a reïnforcement, expected from Ambracia, he haſtened to meet Timotheus, and he was defeated. Nevertheleſs, the Ambraciot ſquadron ſoon after joining him, he again put to ſea. Timotheus, however, being joined by a ſquadron from Corcyra, which made his fleet more than ſeventy triremes, even the raſhneſs of Nicolochus then avoided to renew the trial of arms.

l. 6. c. 2. f. 1.

During this unſucceſsful exertion of Lacedæmon at ſea, new emergencies aroſe, preſſingly requiring new exertion by land. The Thebans, after reducing all Bœotia under their obedience or influence, carried their arms into Phocis, and miniſters arrived from that country, repreſenting, that it muſt be loſt to the Lacedæmonian alliance, unleſs ſpeedily and powerfully relieved. Thoſe who held the ſway in Lacedæmon deemed it, and apparently with reaſon, of great importance not to allow the new power of Thebes thus to ſpread. It was therefore reſolved to ſend an army, larger than the former, for the protection of the northern allies. But, while the Peloponneſian ſhores were everywhere threatened, it was judged prudent to avoid requiring the uſual proportion of the confederates; whoſe governments and people would naturally be anxious to keep their utmoſt force at home, for the protection of their own lands. At the riſk of Laconia itſelf, therefore, it was determined to ſend a larger proportion of Lacedæmonians; with the hope, by this attention to the wiſhes and feelings of the allies, and mark of confidence in their bravery and fidelity, to conciliate attachment. Unfortunately Ageſilaus was ſtill unable to take the command, which was therefore committed to Cleombrotus. The army

στρατηγίαν· διότι οὐ μόνον παρὰ τοῖς πολίταις, ἀλλὰ καὶ παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις Ἕλλησι μεγάλης ἐτύγχανεν ἀποδοχῆς. It ſeems to have been through careleſſneſs, or the temptation ariſing from the difficulty and trouble of conſulting books in his age, to truſt too much to memory, that he has named Cephallenia as the iland gained by Timotheus, inſtead of Corcyra. So informed a cotemporary as Xenophon would ſcarcely be liable to miſtake in ſuch a matter.

paſſed

passed without opposition across the Corinthian gulph, and the Thebans presently evacuated Phocis; but they occupied the strong posts on the border, apparently determined to dispute the entrance of the Lacedæmonians into Bœotia. Xen. Hel. l. 6. c. 2. l. 1.

While things were thus critically situated, the Athenian fleet threatening the whole circuit of the Peloponnesian coast, relief came to Lacedæmon from a quarter whence it was not expected. Dissatisfaction with their new political connection had spred among the Athenians. While they were consuming their public treasure, burthening themselves with imposts, and suffering depredation from Æginetan corsairs, the Thebans had refused, possibly being little able, to contribute to the expence of that fleet, which had given the great turn in their favor; which had saved Bœotia from invasion, perhaps Thebes from ruin, and afforded the opportunity through which Thebes was now mistress of Bœotia. Those leading men in Athens, who were desirous of peace, took advantage from this turn in the public mind, and ministers were sent to Lacedæmon. No complex interests occurring for discussion, peace was quickly concluded; and orders were sent from Athens, for Timotheus to stop the operations of his victorious fleet, and return home. s. 2.

Unfortunately a matter, in a great degree accidental, and of which the modern eye with difficulty discovers the importance, presently unsettled all that appeared so happily accommodated. Timotheus, in his way home, put some Zacynthian exiles ashore on their iland; of which the Zacynthians in power complained to Lacedæmon, as a gross injury. This concise statement, from the cotemporary historian, will not be wholly unintelligible to those who have thus far followed Grecian history. The Athenians, conscious of offence or not, so little expected that it would occasion a renewal of hostilities, that they had already laid up their fleet and dismissed their crews, when a vote passed the Lacedæmonian assembly, declaring, that the Athenians had acted injuriously, and that reparation should be sought by arms. It seems as if an interchange of character had taken place between the Athenian and Lacedæmonian governments. Great certainly was the merit of those leaders of the Athenian counsels, who could make circumspection and moderation distinguish the proceedings of a democracy, while, notwithstanding the general authority and general prudence of Age- s. 7, 8. s. 2.

silaus,

ſilaus, the meaſures of the elderhood of Sparta were ſubject to the influence of paſſion. An earneſtneſs appeared, as if the deareſt intereſts of Lacedæmon were threatened. Requiſitions were ſent to all the maritime allies; and from Corinth, with its colonies, Leucas and Ambracia, Elis, the Achaian cities, Zacynthus, and the independent Argolic ſtates Epidaurus, Trœzen, Hermionë, and Haliæ, a fleet was collected of ſixty triremes. In doubt, ſtill, of the ſufficiency of the force to be obtained within Greece, miniſters were ſent to Dionyſius, who had raiſed himſelf to the tyranny of Syracuſe and the greater part of Sicily, repreſenting how incompatible it was with his intereſt that the Athenians ſhould command Corcyra, and requeſting aſſiſtance againſt them.

Xen. Hel. l. 6. c. 2. l. 3.

Here the cotemporary hiſtorian diſcovers to us a motive for the conduct of the Lacedæmonian government, ſuperior to the meer conſideration of the intereſt of a friendly party in Zacynthus. The means which the connection with Corcyra gave to Athens, for maintaining a fleet and holding a commanding influence in the weſtern ſeas, always an object of the higheſt jealouſy to Lacedæmon, made any attempt to extend the Athenian intereſt there, at the expence of the Lacedæmonian, peculiarly offenſive and alarming. But, if, in the ſilence of Xenophon, the probable report of Diodorus may be taken, there was a farther allurement and incentive. The oligarchal party in Corcyra, at a criſis with the democratical, then in power, applied to Lacedæmon for aſſiſtance; and the recent tranſaction of Timotheus in Cephallenia, might ſeem in ſome degree to juſtify the interference of Lacedæmon in the affairs of Corcyra. Meaſures however were taken with a haſte, and in a ſtile of violence, preventing and forbidding friendly diſcuſſion. Immediately againſt Athens, indeed, war was not declared, nor any hoſtility directed; but Mnaſippus, appointed to command the fleet, was inſtructed, generally, 'to take care of the Lacedæ-'monian intereſt in the weſtern ſea,' and particularly, 'to reduce Cor-'cyra.'

Diod. l. 15. c. 46. p. 480.

Xen. Hel. ut ſup.

We have ſeen that unfortunate iland, toward the beginning of the Peloponneſian war, ſingularly a ſcene of bloodſhed and deſolation, from the rage of its own citizens againſt one-another. Taught by their ſufferings, the ſurvivors had ſettled into orderly government; and their experience ſeems to have been tranſmitted, by report, as an advantageous

l. 6. c. 2. ſ. 4.

inheritance

inheritance to their children; for Corcyra was at this time remarkable for its high cultivation, and the ſplendor of its country houſes; the ſecurity of an inſular commonwealth allowing and incouraging improvements there, which, on the continent, and in moſt even of the larger ilands, the conſtant danger of hoſtile neighbours forbad. While the Corcyræans were yet unaware of the purpoſe of Lacedæmon, all the fury of Grecian war was let looſe upon their devoted land; for Mnaſippus was not of a temper to go beyond the ordinary practice of his age in mercy to an enemy. The cattle in the fields, the numerous ſlaves employed in huſbandry, and, beſide the common plunder of the crops, large ſtore of wine in vaſt cellars, here appendages of the farms, tho on the continent only found in towns, became the prey of the invaders. The troops, in conſequence, moſtly mercenaries, elſewhere accuſtomed to coarſe fare, here, ſays the hiſtorian, learnt to be faſtidious; inſomuch that for their common drink they required old and flavored wines. Plunder and waſte having been extended over the iland, Mnaſippus formed the blockade of the city, by land and ſea. Xen. Hel. l. 6. c. 2. ſ. 5.

The Athenian government, in the ſame ſpirit of moderation in which it had ſtopped the courſe of ſucceſsful hoſtilities for the ſake of an equitable peace, appears now to have remained calm under provocation, and ſlow to reſent the ill-judged aggreſſion of Lacedæmon. Nothing had been done in conſequence of the affronting decree of the Lacedæmonian government, and the hoſtile meaſures following, when deputies arrived from the beſieged Corcyræans, imploring the Athenian people, with every added argument that could urge them to relieve their injured, diſtreſſed, and highly valuable allies. 'What a loſs,' they ſaid, 'would Corcyra be to 'the Athenians, what an acquiſition to their enemies! No republic of the 'confederacy could furniſh equal naval force, or equal pecuniary contri-'bution. How important then the ſituation of Corcyra, for awing the 'weſtern Greeks, for commanding the Corinthian gulph, for attacking 'the Laconian ſhores, and, above all, for interrupting the communication 'of Peloponneſus with Sicily and Italy!' Theſe in truth were the conſiderations which had excited the jealouſy of the Lacedæmonians, and given ſpring to their meaſures againſt Corcyra; and theſe, thus ſeaſonably put forward, excited the ſolicitude of the Athenians for its preſervation. ſ. 6. ſ. 7.

A body

A body of ſix hundred targeteers was immediately ſent, which, eluding the vigilance of the beſiegers, entered the city of Corcyra by night, to reïnforce its garriſon; and a fleet of ſixty triremes was to follow, under the orders of Timotheus, to raiſe the ſiege.

But the fleet remained to be manned; and Timotheus, knowing the enemy's fleet to be of equal or ſuperior force, and already practiſed in ſervice, was ſolicitous for crews of the beſt ſeamen. With a ſquadron therefore he went among the ilands to collect them. But the uſual impatience of the Athenian people was now excited; the dilatory caution of Timotheus was condemned; and, before he could complete his levies, Iphicrates was appointed to ſuperſede him in the command.

Xen Hel. l. 6. c. 2. ſ. 8.

In compliance with the manifeſt inclination of an abſolute ſoverein, no meaſures could be too ſtrong. Iphicrates profited from circumſtances ſo adapted to the promotion of his immediate object. He acted as the favorite vicegerent of a deſpot. He preſſed men; he was ſtrict in compelling thoſe, the wealthieſt of the Athenians, on whom popular ſovereinty impoſed the burdenſome duty of fitting out triremes, to be diligent in their part of the buſineſs; he obtained a decree for adding to his force any ſhips of the republic cruizing near the Attic coaſt[25], and particularly the ſacred ſhips Paralus and Salaminia. Thus he increaſed his fleet to ſeventy triremes, with which he haſtened his departure; and, in the paſſage itſelf round Peloponneſus, a paſſage requiring time, with the rowing and coaſting navigation of the antients, he found or made opportunity to give the requiſite practice to his crews, and inſtruct them in whatever was moſt neceſſary for action.

ſ. 15—17.

The haſte of the Athenian people had not been wholly unreaſonable, for the Corcyræans were ſeverely preſſed by famine; inſomuch that, when Mnaſippus had declared, by proclamation, that he would ſell for ſlaves any who in future, on pretence of deſertion, ſhould come from the town, ſtill they deſerted. Mnaſippus cauſed them to be ſcourged and ſent back again;

ſ. 9.

[25] Μάλα ὀξέως τὰς ναῦς ἐπληροῦτο, καὶ τοὺς τριηράρχας ἠνάγκαζε· προσέλαβε δὲ παρὰ τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ εἴ που τὰς ναῦς περὶ τὴν Ἀττικὴν ἔπλει. —— *Celeriter admodum naves complebat, ac triremium præfectos vel invitos cogebat: præterea ſumebat ſecum naves omnes quæcunque oram Atticæ legebant.* I have endeavoured to render this paſſage as nearly as in modern language may be. The Latin tranſlator has, I think, miſſed the meaning throughout, and particularly of the phraſe προσέλαβε δὲ παρὰ τῶν Ἀθηναίων, &c.

and

and many, of ſervile condition, whom the Corcyræans would not reïdmit, periſhed of hunger.

Whatever public benefits may ariſe from private vices, it may be doubted if any vice was ever ultimately beneficial to the individual, unleſs ſometimes, among things that happen againſt all calculation, prodigality; but no vice is equally apt to defeat its own purpoſe as avarice. When the extreme diſtreſs of the beſieged became clearly proved to Mnaſippus, he conſidered the public buſineſs, intruſted to him, as done, and the ſeaſon come for putting the finiſhing ſtroke to a ſcheme of private gain. His army was compoſed, in large proportion, of mercenaries; for the cities of the confederacy, averſe to a tranſmarine ſervice, had moſtly paid the compenſation for avoiding it. Two months pay was now due, when he diſmiſſed ſome of his mercenaries unpaid, and ſtill procraſtinated ſettlement with the others [26]. Diſcontent pervaded the army: the guards were negligent and diſorderly; the ſoldiers off duty wandered about the country.

The change was obſerved by the Corcyræans. They ſallied, killed ſome of the beſiegers, and made ſome priſoners. Mnaſippus, alarmed at this new boldneſs, called all to arms, but was ill obeyed. Illiberal ſeverity, then exercifed toward his officers, produced zealous obedience neither among them nor among the ſoldiers. With his troops, however, at length collected, he drove the Corcyræans back to their walls: but there they made a ſtand; while, from the tombs, which Greek as well as Roman cuſtom placed by the road-ſide without their towns, the light-armed diſcharged miſſile weapons with advantage. Meantime, under direction of the able Athenian general Steſicles, more troops ruſhing from the town by another gate, advanced toward the beſiegers' flank. Theſe attempting an evolution, to form a face of ſufficient extent for receiving the new attack, were thrown into confuſion by the ſupervening enemy; and being unable to recover their order, fled. No relief could come from the right, ingaged toward its own front. Progreſſively therefore from the left, the line joined in the flight, and Mnaſippus, among whoſe vices was no want of Spartan courage, left

Xen. Hel. l. 6. c. 2. ſ. 10—12. Diod. l. 15. c. 47.

[26] Καὶ τοὺς μέν τινας ἀυλῶν ἀτομίσθους ἐποιήνει, τοις δ' ὄυσι και δυοῖν ἤδη μηνοῖν ὤφειλε τὸν μισθόν. *Quippe nonnullis eorum adimebat ſtipendia, nonnullis, quos ſecum retinebat, duum menſium ſtipendium debebat.* That the Latin tranſlator has given the right ſenſe appears not dubious, tho the Greek phraſes ſeem either military of the day, or perhaps corrupted in tranſcription.

at laſt with a very few, was overpowered and killed. The conquerors then purſued; and, but for the apprehenſion of a military force among the ſervants, ſutlers, and others, whoſe numbers appeared formidable, the camp might have been taken. Report then arriving of an Athenian force approaching under Iphicrates, the remainder of the beſieging army imbarked and withdrew to Leucas; ſo precipitately, that not only large ſtores of corn and wine were left to ſupply the preſſing wants of the Corcyræans, together with numerous ſlaves, to repair the loſs by deſertion and famine, but even the ſick of the army were abandoned to their mercy.

Xen. Hel. l. 6. c. 2. l. 13, 14.

ſ. 19. Iphicrates was yet on the Laconian coaſt, when report of the fate of Mnaſippus met him[27]. According to the common manner of the coaſting navigation of the time, when the progreſs of a fleet of ſhips of war reſembled an army's march, he halted and landed, even on the Laconian ſhore, for meals. Trading veſſels, loftier and deeper, and navigated, in proportion to their burthen, by far fewer hands, could far better keep the open ſea. Expecting action immediately on reaching his deſtination, Iphicrates would not be incumbered with the mainſails[28] of his triremes, but left them in the arſenal at Peiræus. For practice to his crews, he choſe to make his way moſtly with oars, the ready uſe of which was ſo important in the antient manner of action. With a fair breeze, however, he allowed his crews to reſt: in adverſe winds, not too violent, he made them row by reliefs. How little indeed the antient triremes were adapted for ſailing, may be gathered from the circumſtance that, tho large enough to carry from two to three hundred men, the maſt was not fixed, but ſet only when the ſail was to be ſet. Iphicrates ſet his maſts, while his crews were aſhore, for advantage to the look-out of his ſcouts. In ſerene weather, inſtead of lying incamped aſhore, which was the common practice, he proceeded by night. Coaſting and halting, thus, he made as quick a paſſage as, with the navigation of the time, was common. His laſt halt, on the Peloponneſian ſhore, was in the mouth of the

ſ. 17, 18.

ſ. 20.

ſ. 19.

[27] In that age Meſſenia was commonly included under the name of Laconia, or the Laconic territory.

[28] Τὰ μεγάλα ἱστία, *vela magna*, which might be the mainſails, in contradiſtinction to the foreſails; or larger ſails, in contradiſtinction to ſmaller, uſed on the ſame maſt; as now is uſual with the latteen-ſail veſſels of the Mediterranean, and our luggers; and our cutters have their great, middle, and ſtorm jibs. The information remaining to us concerning the antient ſhips of war, is, in almoſt every point, very defective.

Alpheius,

Alpheius, where he paſſed a night. Thence he croſſed to Cephallenia; and, getting there ſatisfactory information of tranſactions in Corcyra, he remitted ſomewhat of that fatiguing preparation for action, in which he had hitherto, with ſo little remiſſion, required the exertion of his crews.

His own attention to his country's ſervice, however, was not remitted. The original object of the expedition no longer preſſing, he employed his leiſure ſo well, that he brought Cephallenia, divided, as we have ſeen, once, and probably ſtill, between four republics, under obedience to Athens. Then he proceeded to Corcyra, and there he received intelligence of the approach of ten triremes ſent by Dionyſius of Syracuſe, to join the Lacedæmonian fleet. Anxious to intercept theſe, he went himſelf to examine the heights, where a look-out might be moſt advantageouſly kept; and ſelecting twenty triremes, he gave ſtrict orders for the crews to be ready at a moment's warning. His not requiring them, on ſuch an occaſion, to remain aboard, marks, perhaps beyond anything that has even yet occurred, the deficient accommodation of the antient ſhips of war. This deficiency ſeems to have put nine ſhips of the Syracuſan ſquadron into his hands. Eager for relief, after the long run, as, with the antient navigation, it was reckoned, from Sicily, the Syracuſans landed on the firſt ſhore they approached. One ſhip only, commanded by a Rhodian, who, apprehenſive of attack, had haſtened his people aboard, eſcaped. The other nine were taken; the veſſels on the beach, the crews aſhore. Xen. Hel. l. 6. c. 2. ſ. 21—23.

The numerous priſoners, made on this occaſion, were ranſomed; ſureties for payment being found among the Corcyræans themſelves; who, political enemies, as they now were, did not forget their derivation from one common origin, and their long connection, in religious rites, in commercial intercourſe, and in hereditary friendſhip with the Syracuſans. This ray of liberality pleaſingly inlivens the gloom which Grecian morals generally caſt over Grecian hiſtory. But the gleam does not come unmixed; and the cloud to darken the cheerful proſpect ariſes from a quarter whence it ſhould be leaſt expected. Every other priſoner was redeemed at a ſtipulated price; but for the commander of the ſquadron, Anippus, ſo immoderate a ſum was demanded, in failure of which he was threatened with

ſale into ſlavery [29], that, in deſpair, diſappointing the avarice which oppreſſed him, he killed himſelf.

Xenophon, however, from whom we have the account, thought very highly of Iphicrates, at leaſt as an officer. 'Among the many occaſions,' he ſays, 'on which Iphicrates commanded, I admire not leaſt his conduct 'in the expedition to Corcyra; and, among other things, for this, that, on 'his firſt appointment, he deſired, for collegues, two men of ſuperior 'talents, not his political friends [30]; Calliſtratus, the moſt popular ſpeaker, 'and Chabrias, the moſt renowned general of the age. If he had reaſon-'able hope of faithful aſſiſtance from ſuch men, there can be no doubt 'but he did wiſely. If, on the contrary, he expected from them the ma-'lignity of party opponents, it ſurely marked a magnanimous confidence 'in himſelf, that he could be detected in want neither of courage, nor of 'ability [31], nor of diligence.'

Xen. Hel. l. 6. c. 2. ſ. 27.

Under the Athenian government it was, indeed, difficult to ſay what conduct would beſt give ſecurity to men in high office, except that flattery to the people and the bribery of public entertainments were always indiſpenſable. The expence of the fleet under Iphicrates was heavy. The force was greater than had been firſt voted for the ſervice. Whatever might obviate demands upon the treaſury would be in his favor. If there is an excuſe, or a pailiation, for the conduct of Iphicrates to the unfortunate Syracuſan, we muſt find it here. The illiberality of the ſoverein people of Athens, the ſhame of which was loſt among the multitude of partakers, would ſometimes impoſe ſevere duties upon their officers. If then ſuch men as Chabrias and Calliſtratus could not adviſe how to carry on the public ſervice, without ſeverity to an individual priſoner, their inability would certainly tell toward the juſtification of Iphicrates. On the other hand, if they could not but ſay that he had taken every meaſure to ſup-

[29] Τοῦτον δ' ἐφύλαττεν (ὁ Ἰφικράτης) ὡς ἢ πραξάμενος πάμπολλα χρήματα, ἢ ὡς πωλήσων. *Illum enim cuſtodiebat, ut vel ab eo ingentem auri ſummam exigeret, vel hominem venderet.* The Latin tranſlator, according to the too common method of tranſlators, has very carefully imitated, inſtead of explaining, all that is dubious in the original. I am inclined to ſuppoſe ſome ſmall error in the copy, yet the context, I think, pretty ſufficiently warrants the verſion I have given.

[30] Οὐ μάλα ἐπιτήδειον ὄντα, is Xenophon's phraſe, ſpeaking of Calliſtratus, which the tranſlator has rendered, I think in complete miſtake, *hominem gerendis rebus non admodum idoneum.*

[31] Καταῤῥαθυμῶν ſeems to mark the weakneſs of the mind including want of courage with want of ability.

ply

ply the armament, without calling upon the treaſury, ſuch teſtimony would go farto juſtify the demand, when it became unavoidable. For the ſubſiſtence of his rowers, in the intermiſſion of naval operation, a reſource was uſed, for which he and his adviſers will have credit; tho it is not the firſt occaſion on which we find mention of it in Grecian hiſtory: they were employed in huſbandry for the Corcyræans; who were glad of hired labor, to aſſiſt their diminiſhed ſtocks of ſlaves, in reſtoring their waſted farms and vineyards.

Ch 20. ſ. 4. of this Hiſt. Xen. Hel. l. 6. c. 2. ſ 25.

Meanwhile Iphicrates uſed his ſmall force of heavy-armed, with his larger body of targeteers, to put forward the great object of his expedition, the extenſion of the Athenian command. In Acarnania, the peacefulneſs of paſt times had given way to the political diviſions, ſo prevalent throughout Greece. By aſſiſting the friendly party, in thoſe towns where it was preſſed by its opponents, and uſing actual hoſtilities againſt one only, he confirmed or reſtored the Athenian intereſt in that province. Aſſembling then his fleet again, and adding to it the naval ſtrength of Corcyra, he ſailed with ninety triremes; a force that no fleet in the power of the Lacedæmonian confederacy to raiſe, could reſiſt. His purpoſe was to direct operations againſt Peloponneſus itſelf; not without hope that ſome cities there, only upon ſeeing the means he poſſeſſed to protect them in revolt, would deſert the Lacedæmonian cauſe; while others, more ſteddy to their ingagements, might be forced to ſubmiſſion.

ſ. 26.

SECTION

SECTION IX.

Tyranny of Thebes in ſucceſs: Diſſatisfaction of Athens: General Peace negotiated by Athens: Refuſal of Thebes to accede to the Terms of the Treaty.

THE ordinary temper of mankind, it has been of old obſerved, is more formed to bear adverſity with dignity than proſperity with moderation; and it ſeems not leſs true, tho ſeldomer ſaid, that power and glory, but eſpecially the ſudden change from humiliation and miſery to power and glory, too much for moſt individuals to ſupport with propriety, ſtill more certainly intoxicates a community. Later writers have celebrated the magnanimous diſintereſtedneſs of Pelopidas, and the philoſophical ſelf-denial and clear integrity of Epameinondas. Unfortunately, the able cotemporary hiſtorian, intimately connected with their adverſaries, and of courſe not their friend, has been careleſs of informing us what part they took in the Theban counſels. Nevertheleſs the independent ſpirit and daring courage of the Theban people, even in his account, we admire; but liberality, moderation, juſtice, wherever we ſearch, are as little to be found in their proceedings as in thoſe of either the Lacedæmonian ariſtocracy, or the Athenian democracy, when their tyranny has been moſt complained of by cotemporaries and reprobated by poſterity. The ſupremacy aſſerted by the Theban people over all Bœotia, everywhere abhorred by the ariſtocratical party, carried oppreſſion ſometimes to exceſs even againſt the democratical, by which it had riſen. The whole people of the little ſtates of Platæa and Theſpiæ were expelled. Numerous as the diſtreſſing circumſtances unavoidably attending baniſhment muſt be, yet, through the diviſion of Greece into parties, if ſubſiſtence did not fail, perſonal ſecurity could generally be found ſomewhere. But the unhappy Platæans and Theſpians whither could they go? oppreſſed by that party to which they had always been among the firmeſt adherents. Lacedæmon, the enemy of their oppreſſors, was their hereditary enemy. With Athens indeed they had friendly connection; old and inherited connection; but Athens was now allied with Thebes, whence their perſecution came.

M. T. Cic. Corn. Nep. v. Epam. Plut. vit. Pelopid.

Xen. Hel. l. 6. c. 3. ſ. 1. Iſocr. Archid. p. 28. t. 2. Diod. l. 15. c. 46.

came. Their beſt hope nevertheleſs was in Athens, and thither, as ſuppliants, they directed their ſteps [32].

It is in the nature of democracy to be both tyrannical and ambitious; but, like ſingle deſpots, democracies will not always approve the tyranny, and ſtill leſs the ambition, of other democracies. The overbearing haughtineſs of Thebes, in her new proſperity, had already diſguſted the Athenians. The invaſion of Phocis, the antient ally of Athens, they much reſented. The exceſſive violence uſed toward the Theſpians and Platæans, the Platæans among their oldeſt and moſt conſtant confederates, at one time almoſt incorporated among the Athenian people, gave ſtill more offence. Both Platæans and Theſpians, therefore, found at Athens a ready and kind attention. With their ſituation, that of all Greece was taken into ſerious conſideration by the Athenian government. The conduct of the Lacedæmonians had been provoking: the proſpect of ſucceſs againſt them, while the Athenian fleet, triumphant, commanded the ſeas, was alluring: but the very ſucceſſes of that fleet had tended to raiſe Thebes to the power, which now was becoming an object of jealouſy at Athens, the more, as Thebes was a nearer neighbour than Lacedæmon.

It is often extremely difficult to aſcertain the real ſprings of political meaſures in a free government, becauſe of the variety of jarring intereſts influencing the individuals who compoſe the political body, and of the dependency of public meaſures upon the accidental preponderance of this or that private intereſt. There is much appearance of a wiſe moderation in the Athenian government on this occaſion; and indeed it ſeems unqueſtionable that the affairs of Athens were at this time generally directed by able men. Among them Iphicrates certainly was eminent; but Iphicrates did not carry the princely influence of a Pericles. At the head of a triumphant armament, he found his ſituation uneaſy and perilous. When oppoſition from enemies was nearly overborne, that from fellowcitizens only became more alarming. The conduct of Iphicrates was wiſe; but his moderation, his ready conceſſion to the wiſhes of thoſe who deſired to

[32] Diodorus, in this part of the hiſtory, has mentioned ſeveral circumſtances not noticed by Xenophon; but his narrative is ſo confuſed, and ſo continually marks deficient judgement, that little ſatisfactory can be gathered from him.

check

check the progreſs of his glory, is accounted for by circumſtances reported by the cotemporary hiſtorian. A ſupply of money was becoming indiſpenſable for the maintenance of his fleet; the application for which at Athens, when the treaſury could not furniſh it, was always highly hazardous. If it was granted, which could not be depended upon, oppreſſion of the rich, and diſcontent, more or leſs of all ranks, was liable to follow. This gave of courſe opportunity for a ſtrong oppoſition from intereſted men, who coveted the leading ſituations in the commonwealth. It was at the ſame time known that Lacedæmon was negotiating with Perſia, by its able and formerly ſucceſsful miniſter Antalcidas. A view to ſome, at leaſt, among theſe circumſtances, had probably induced Iphicrates to deſire the orator Calliſtratus for his collegue in command. Calliſtratus thus became jointly reſponſible with him for the ſucceſs of meaſures. When the armament was in want, it was incumbent upon Calliſtratus, not leſs than upon Iphicrates, to provide for its ſupply. If new emergencies aroſe, it was incumbent upon Calliſtratus to deviſe means of warding the danger inſuing. The liberality of Iphicrates ſeems then to have led Calliſtratus, before his opponent, to become his partizan. When want of money began to preſs, Calliſtratus offered himſelf for negotiator with the Athenian people; pledging himſelf, if his collegues would be ſatisfied with the alternative, either to procure a vote for the money wanted, or to put forward negotiation for a peace, which would obviate the want. Iphicrates approved, and Calliſtratus went to Athens.

Xen. Hel. l. 6. c. 3. ſ. 3.

ſ. 6.

The commander-in-chief of the armament being thus induced to concede to the wiſh, which at home began to prevail extenſively, for peace, it was decreed, in an aſſembly of the people, according to the hiſtorian's phraſe, 'that peace ſhould be made.' On firſt view, ſuch a decree muſt always appear the produce of wildneſs in the people, or of faction miſleading their voice. The inferior party in a war certainly cannot chuſe when peace ſhall be made. But Athens was at this time fortunately in a ſituation to hold the balance of Greece; and it was therefore wiſely reſolved there to open negotiations, for the purpoſe of producing a peace beneficial to the nation. In the conduct of the buſineſs, a juſt attention to the rights of allies was obſerved. Miniſters were firſt ſent to Thebes, to invite a concurrence in negotiation, and then an embaſſy was ſent to Sparta.

ſ. 2.

Whatever

Whatever hope was entertained of ſucceſs, from the pending negotiation with Perſia, the Lacedæmonians were, in the moment, too ſeverely preſſed, not to be deſirous of peace upon any moderate terms. At the requiſition of Athens, therefore, miniſters from all the belligerent republics were aſſembled in Lacedæmon. The congreſs being met, the Athenian miniſters firſt addreſſed it: 'No laſting ſatisfaction, they ſaid, 'no 'confidence could obtain among the Greeks, if the former terms of alli- 'ance with Lacedæmon continued to be required, and if the former mea- 'ſures of its government were ſtill purſued. The pretended object was 'univerſal independency; yet it was ſtipulated, that the citizens of the 'allied ſtates ſhould march whitherſoever the Lacedæmonians ſhould lead; 'and thus often they were compelled to make war upon their beſt friends. 'Nor was this, however inconſiſtent with independency, the worſt circum- 'ſtance of their lot; for the Lacedæmonians, arbitrarily interfering in the 'internal government of the republics, committed the ſupreme power to 'what hands they thought proper; and, giving it here to a council of ten, 'there to a council of thirty, it was always evidently their care, leſs that 'theſe ſhould govern juſtly, than that they ſhould hold their reſpective ſtates 'in the moſt complete ſubſerviency to Lacedæmon;' 'ſo that,' ſaid the orator, 'you ſeem to delight in tyrannies rather than in free governments.' Xen. Hel. l. 6. c. 3. ſ. 5.

The exiſting circumſtances gave weight to this remonſtrance, and the Lacedæmonians agreed, that univerſal independency for Grecian cities ſ. 7. ſhould be the baſis of the treaty to be negotiated. It followed of courſe that all thoſe Lacedæmonian ſuperintendants or governors, placed in ſo many cities with the title of harmoſt, were to be withdrawn. It was then covenanted, that armies ſhould be diſbanded and fleets laid up; and that, if any Grecian ſtate acted contrary to theſe ſtipulations, it ſhould be lawful for all to aſſiſt thoſe on whom any injury fell from the breach of them; but that the univerſal independency, which formed the fundamental article of the treaty, ſhould not be infringed, by any compulſion to join in hoſtilities.

The ready acceſſion of the Lacedæmonians, to terms by which they gave up that ſupremacy which they had ſo long, not only affected, but injoyed, and which had ſo extenſively been allowed as their preſcriptive right, ſeems to have ſurprized the Theban miniſters; and, with the general

 ſatisfaction

ſatisfaction which it was ſo well adapted to produce, in ſome degree forced them into a concurrence which they had not intended, and which their inſtructions did not warrant. For the ruling party in Thebes, aware that, not their power only, but perhaps their exiſtence depended on it, were reſolved not to give up that command, which they had acquired over the other cities of Bœotia. Borne away, nevertheleſs, by the torrent of united opinions and wiſhes, the Theban miniſters joined in the ſacrifice, and in the ſolemn oath, which bound all to the treaty.

That breach, however, of their inſtructions which, in the moment, perhaps, they were ſcarcely able to avoid, on the very next day they endeavoured to remedy; and a privilege, which the Lacedæmonians, amid their apparent moderation and real conceſſions, had reſerved to themſelves, afforded the pretence. The Athenians and their allies, by their reſpective miniſters, had ſeverally ſworn to the obſervance of the treaty: but the Lacedæmonian repreſentatives alone took the oath, expreſſly for themſelves and their allies. No allies of the Thebans apparently had miniſters there, and the miniſters of Thebes had taken the oath in the name of the Thebans only. They now demanded that, for the Theban name, the Bœotian might be ſubſtituted. Ageſilaus oppoſed this: he would allow no ſuch alteration, he ſaid; but if the Thebans deſired to be intirely excluded from the treaty, their name might be erazed.

Xen. Hel. l. 6. c. 3. ſ. 8.

In this diſpute was involved the cataſtrophe of Grecian independency; which Xenophon did not live to ſee diſplayed, but which, tho indiſtinctly, as yet under many folds, his anxious and penetrating eye evidently diſcerned. Unfortunately for ſo intereſting a period of the hiſtory, his connection with Ageſilaus, and the dependency, in which circumſtances had placed him, upon the Lacedæmonian government, made him unavoidably a party-man: not however ſo far that we find any reaſon to ſuppoſe he has related any untruth, but ſo as often to give cauſe for wiſhing that he had more related the whole truth; for the accounts of later writers, panegyriſts of the illuſtrious Thebans who oppoſed Ageſilaus, are utterly unſatisfactory. Xenophon has not named the Theban ambaſſadors at the congreſs. Diodorus, Cornelius Nepos, and Plutarch, concur in reporting that Epameinondas was at the head of them, and by his eloquence, inveſtive againſt the Lacedæmonians, ſhook the attachment of their allies.

Corn. Nep. vit. Epam. Diod. l. 15. c. 38. Plut. Ageſil. Ol. 101. 2. id.

It

It is however commonly by private communication, rather than by public harangue, except where negotiation muſt be managed with a popular aſſembly, that ſuch points are carried. We may indeed gather from Xenophon, that the able conductors of the Theban affairs had probable ground for depending on a diſpoſition, in ſome of the republics, ſo far at leaſt favorable to Thebes, as a jealouſy ſtill entertained of Lacedæmon might make them ſo. But in the moment nothing of the kind ſeems to have appeared openly. The congreſs declared its approbation of the opinion of Ageſilaus; and when the Theban miniſters, whether hampered by their inſtructions, or decided by their own party-views, perſevered in renunciation of the treaty, unleſs the alteration of names were admitted, the Athenians, as Xenophon aſſures us, conſidered Thebes as undone, and the Theban miniſters, aware of the magnitude of danger to their country from its oppoſition to united Greece, departed in much dejection[33].

Xen. Hel. l. 6. c. 4. ſ. 15.

l. 6. c. 3. ſ. 9. Diod. l. 15. c. 50.

[33] Plutarch, when he has a mind to tell the truth, generally gives his authority: when he paints from his own fancy, which ſeems to have been very frequent with him, he is honeſt enough not to pretend that he has any name to vouch for the truth of his picture. I do not recollect that he has ever quoted authority for any of his numerous and direct contradictions of Xenophon, nor that he ever, on ſuch an occaſion, has mentioned the name of Xenophon, whom, on the contrary, on many occaſions, he has commended highly. He has painted this embaſſy in colors apparently quite his own. His ſtile of hiſtorical painting has that facility for the painter, that it impoſes no neceſſity for the picture to harmonize with the general courſe of hiſtory, and of this he has abundantly availed himſelf.

SECTION X.

Independency of the Bœotian towns, aſſerted by the Lacedæmonians, reſiſted by the Thebans: Battle of Leuctra.

IN Athens, at this time, the general wiſh was for peace; and, no leading influence of an ambitious demagogue oppoſing, the conditions of the treaty concluded were readily and even ſcrupulouſly executed. Athenian garriſons were everywhere withdrawn: orders were diſpatched for the immediate return of Iphicrates, with that fleet which nothing in the Grecian ſeas could oppoſe; and whatever had been taken, after the ceremony of ſwearing to the treaty, was punctually reſtored. The Lacedæmonians were

B. C. 371. Ol. 102. 4.

Xen. Hel. l. 6. c. 4. ſ. 1.

not leſs exact in recalling all thoſe ſuperintending officers who, with the title of harmoſt, had governed Grecian cities; and they withdrew all their troops from the territories of thoſe called their allies, except the army under Cleombrotus in Phocis, which they left without orders. Cleombrotus, fearful of cenſure, for acting or not acting, ſent home for inſtructions. The Lacedæmonian aſſembly was convened; and, in reſult, orders were ſent, for the king to puſh hoſtilities againſt Thebes, unleſs the independency of the Bœotian towns were immediately admitted.

Xen Hel. l 6. c. 4. ſ. 2.

Thoſe who guided the Theban councils had taken their reſolution, and they perſevered in it. Pelopidas, and ſtill more Epameinondas, who at this time principally directed thoſe councils, were unqueſtionably ſuperior men; and perhaps it ſhould be imputed to unfortunate neceſſity, to the circumſtances of Thebes, and to the vices in the political ſyſtem of Greece, if they did not fairly earn the praiſe of pure political virtue and inlarged patriotiſm, which their panegyriſts, antient and modern, have been fond of attributing to them. They were ingaged with a party. On the ſupport of that party depended the means for themſelves and their friends to exiſt in Thebes. The ſubjection of the Bœotian towns was neceſſary, as we have obſerved, to the power, and perhaps to the exiſtence of that party; at leaſt to its exiſtence in Bœotia; and poſſibly the extermination of the unfortunate Platæans and Theſpians (a fact uncontradicted, and little palliated, by their panegyriſts) may have been neceſſary to the ſecurity of that ſovereinty of Thebes over Bœotia, on which the welfare and ſafety, not of themſelves only, but of all their party, ſo much depended. Evidently, however, not that Greece ſhould be free, but that Thebes ſhould be powerful, and that they ſhould lead in Thebes, and give law to Greece, were the objects to which all their meaſures directly tended.

M. T. Cic. Corn. Nep. Plut.

Preſſed, nevertheleſs, as they certainly were, by unfortunate neceſſities, theſe able men did not ingage their country in the unequal conteſt, in which the peace made by Lacedæmon with the reſt of Greece left it implicated, without reaſonable ground of hope that, by diligent exertion of their talents, they might ſo profit from exiſting circumſtances, as to make the balance equal, or even bring the preponderancy in their favor. Tho, Thebes alone excepted, all the republics of the nation were now in league with Lacedæmon, yet neither the late enemies, nor even the antient allies

of

of that ſtate, they knew, were cordially attached to it. In every city there was a party more or leſs friendly to the Theban cauſe, if for no other reaſon than becauſe it was adverſe to the Lacedæmonian. This ſpirit of party pervaded, to a conſiderable extent, even the army now upon the point of invading Bœotia. The king, moreover, who commanded that army, they knew was little reſpected in it. That, in former campains, he had ſhown no vigor, was notorious; and, among thoſe under him, moſt zealous for the proſecution of the meaſures which he was commiſſioned to promote, there were ſome who did not ſcruple to aſſert, what the example of former kings of Lacedæmon might render credible, that he treacherouſly favored the Thebans. Xen. Hel. l. 6. c. 4. ſ. 5.

Decided then by theſe complex conſiderations, the Theban leaders held the force of Bœotia together, and occupied the defile by which it was ſuppoſed the Lacedæmonian king would propoſe to enter their country. But, by a conduct apparently able, Cleombrotus rendered their meaſure vain. Inſtead of marching eaſtward, directly for the Bœotian plain, he moved ſouthward; and, by an unfrequented mountain-road, coming unexpectedly upon Creuſis, a Bœotian port on the Corinthian gulph, he took the town, with twelve triremes lying in the harbour. The paſſage hence acroſs the mountains into the Bœotian plain being open, he proceeded then unoppoſed into the Theſpian territory, and incamped near Leuctra. ſ. 3.

Diſappointed thus in the hope of balancing their inferiority of force by advantage of ground for defence, the Thebans had to apprehend all the preſſure of war upon their country, which had been experienced in the invaſions under Ageſilaus. For the fidelity of the Bœotian towns, they knew, was precarious: to prevent the ravage of their fields, any of them would ſurrender without ſiege, and the firſt blockade to be formed would be that of Thebes itſelf. With the preſſure of want then, which muſt ſooner or later follow, a turn in the diſpoſition even of the Theban people would be to be apprehended; the opponents of the ruling party might regain an overbearing influence; and moſt of the preſent leaders, as the cotemporary hiſtorian ſays, having tried the evils of baniſhment, thought it better to die fighting, than again become fugitives. ſ. 6.

Urged

Urged by ſuch motives, Epameinondas and Pelopidas reſolved upon the bold meaſure, which, for ages, had been held among the Greeks as a forlorn hope, to ingage the Lacedæmonians in the field, with inferior forces. But, having taken their reſolution, they were ingenious and indefatigable in deviſing and practiſing whatever might promote its ſucceſs. That powerful engine, ſuperſtition, was not neglected. A ſaying, whether already popular, or invented for the occaſion, was circulated in rumor as antient and oracular, 'that a Lacedæmonian army ſhould be defeated at 'the virgins' tomb;' a monument near the Theban camp, where, according to old report, ſome virgins, violated by Lacedæmonians, had deſtroyed themſelves. To increaſe the effect for the popular mind, the monument was ornamented with ceremonious ſolemnity. Intelligence was then carried to the army, that all the temple-doors in Thebes had opened ſpontaneouſly, and that the prieſteſſes had declared the omen to portend victory to the Thebans. This was followed by information, that the arms in the temple of Hercules had diſappeared; whence it was affirmed to be evident that the god would aſſiſt the Thebans in the approaching battle.

Xen. Hel. l. 6. c. 4. §. 7.

While the Theban leaders were thus employing all means to animate their people, the deficient activity, or deficient courage, of the Lacedæmonian king, wanted incitement from thoſe under his command. His friends, and thoſe, not all perhaps properly his friends, who were leading men among his party in the army, uneaſy at the reports circulating againſt him, anxiouſly urged him to refute the calumny by a vigorous conduct, and they adviſed him immediately to ſeek and fight the enemy. In no proper ſeaſon or circumſtances, then, the council of war was held, which finally determined on the battle and its order: it was after the mid-day meal, when the free circulation of wine had excited that animation, which ſeems to have been otherwiſe deficient. Hence, without juſt conſideration of the inferiority of their cavalry, never of reputation like the infantry, becauſe the ground between the two armies was a plain, it was placed in front of the phalanx. At this time it was particularly ill-conditioned. The purchaſe and maintenance of the horſes, impoſed as a tax upon the wealthy, had been a duty ill-executed; for the method even invited negligence. Not till the moment of exigency, when the men, whoſe turn it was for ſervice, were already aſſembled, the horſes were called for.

§. 8.

July 8. Dodw.

§. 11.

The

The men leaſt able in body, and leaſt deſirous of diſtinguiſhing themſelves, were generally ſelected, or procured themſelves to be named, for the cavalry; and ſuch horſes, with ſuch arms, accoutrements, and furniture, as were in the moment produced by thoſe required to provide them, they were to take and immediately proceed on ſervice.

To theſe defective troops every circumſtance invited the Theban generals immediately to oppoſe their cavalry; always of reputation among the Grecian horſe, and, at this time, not only carefully appointed and highly trained, but of conſiderable practice in ſervice. Accordingly they, like the Lacedæmonians, placed their cavalry in front of their phalanx. With the cavalry therefore the action began. The Lacedæmonian horſe were quickly routed, and in their flight diſturbed the order of their own infantry. The Theban phalanx, formed in column fifty deep, then, according to the preconcerted plan, charged the Lacedæmonian line, formed only twelve deep, in that part where the king had his ſtation. The aſſault was repelled, but Cleombrotus received a mortal wound. He was carried alive out of the action, but died ſoon after.

Xen. Hel. l. 6. c. 4. ſ. 10. 12. ſ. 13.

The able generals of the Thebans quickly reſtored order and animation to their troops; the impulſe of the column was renewed, and one of the bloodieſt actions ever known in Greece followed. Generally the numbers killed in battle, while conteſt laſted, were few: defenſive armour prevented rapid ſlaughter, till, an impreſſion being made, and flight inſuing, the ſhield and the breaſtplate loſt their efficacy. But here equality of ſkill, force, and perſeverance, made the conteſt doubtful while numbers fell. On the Lacedæmonian ſide, Deinon, one of the polemarcs commanding next under the king, Sphodrias, whoſe corruption had brought the enmity of Athens upon his country, and his worthier ſon Cleonymus, the friend of Archidamus ſon of Ageſilaus, were killed. Then the whole right wing, unable any longer to withſtand the preſſure of the Theban column, retired; and ſhortly, as the Theban generals had foreſeen, the left, leſs preſſed, retired nevertheleſs alſo, to avoid attack in flank. Without total loſs of order, but not wholly without the carnage incident to flight, both reached their camp, and formed behind its intrenchment.

ſ. 14. ſ. 18.

This, and the advantage of the ſituation, a riſing ground, ſtopped the purſuing victors; and then, the Lacedæmonians, reſting on their arms, and

and looking on one-another with aſtoniſhment, would, many of them, ſcarcely believe the tranſaction in which they had been partakers; for, within the reach of tradition, and, as it was believed, ſince the days of Lycurgus, a Lacedæmonian army had never before been defeated by inferior numbers; inſomuch that throughout Greece it was generally reckoned next to impoſſible. Some therefore inſiſted that ſtill the enemy ſhould not be permitted to raiſe their trophy; that no truce ſhould be ſolicited for the burial of the dead; that the bodies ſhould be recovered arms in hand. But the ſurviving polemarcs, having learnt that, of ſeven hundred Spartans, ſcarcely three hundred remained alive; that, of thoſe Lacedæmonians who had not the honor of the Spartan name, near a thouſand had been killed [35]; that the allies, who had ſuffered leſs, were nevertheleſs totally averſe to freſh action, and ſome of them ſo diſaffected, as even to rejoice in the diſaſter, juſtly thought the moſt careful circumſpection requiſite, and raſhneſs in enterprize to be utterly avoided. They called therefore a council of war; and upon a deliberate review of circumſtances, the neceſſity of ſoliciting a truce for the burial of the ſlain was admitted by all. The herald therefore was ſent, and the truce was obtained.

Xen. Hel. l. 6. c. 4. ſ. 15.

Then the Thebans erected their trophy; a trophy eſteemed, under all its circumſtances, the moſt glorious, and likely to be, in its conſequences, among the moſt important, ever won in a battle of Greeks with Greeks. The Lacedæmonian commanders ſeem to have had no view to anything better than to defend themſelves, in their preſent ſtation, till ſuccour might arrive from home. But the Theban generals, circumſpect as enterprizing, would not venture aſſault upon their numbers and diſcipline, in a ſituation giving ſuch advantage againſt the weapons of antiquity. They

35 It is not, I will own, to me very clear from the text of Xenophon, whether the four hundred Spartans killed were or were not intended to be included in the expreſſion τῶν συμπάντων Λακεδαιμονίων, and I have not been fortunate enough to find any aſſiſtance from traſſlators and commentators. The phraſe altogether would lead one to ſuppoſe they were intended to be included, if that conſtruction was not rendered improbable by the moſt authentic accounts of the proportion of Spartans to the other Lacedæmonians, on all other occaſions, in the Lacedæmonian armies. In the Ageſilaus (c. 3. ſ. 24) Xenophon ſeems to aſſert that the number of Spartans killed at Leuctra was equal to that of the ſurvivors, not in the army only, but all the ſurvivors.

According to Diodorus the Bœotians were only ſix thouſand, and he ſays they were joined by fifteen hundred foot and five hundred horſe from Theſſaly. It ſeems not very conſiſtent with the far more authoritative account of Xenophon, that any ſuch Theſſalian force ſhould have been at Leuctra, but the Bœotian may probably have been greater than he has ſtated.

looked

looked around to the opportunities opened by an event ſo out of the expectation of all Greece, as that of the late battle. They hoped for extenſive ſucceſs in negotiation, through the credit ſo commonly following unlooked-for ſucceſs in arms. They truſted that they might prevent the approach of relief from Peloponneſus; and, by meerly intercepting ſupplies, they thought to compel the Lacedæmonian army to unconditional ſurrender.

CHAPTER XXVII.

Affairs of GREECE, from the Elevation of THEBES, by the Battle of LEUCTRA, to the Failure of the Attempt to extend the THEBAN SUPREMACY over GREECE, through Support from PERSIA.

SECTION I.

Reception of news of the Battle of Leuctra, at Lacedæmon, at Athens. Jaſon of Pheræ in Theſſaly; Polydamas of Pharſalus: Jaſon elected Tagus of Theſſaly: Power and great views of Jaſon: Mediation of Jaſon between the Lacedæmonians and Thebans: Magnificent preparation of Jaſon for the Pythian feſtival: Death and ſucceſſors of Jaſon: Fall of the Theſſalian power.

Xen. Hel. l. 6. c. 4. ſ. 16.

B. C. 371. Ol. 102. ½. 10 July. Dodw.

INTELLIGENCE of the fatal blow at Leuctra, carried to Lacedæmon, was borne with much real magnanimity, and with all that affectation of unconcern which the inſtitutions of Lycurgus required. It happened to be the laſt day of the feſtival called the Naked Games; and the chorus of men was on the ſtage, before the aſſembled people, when the officer charged with the diſpatches arrived. The ephors, as a part of the duty of their office, were preſent, and to them the diſpatches were delivered. Without interrupting the entertainment, they communicated the names of the ſlain to their relations, with an added admonition, that the women ſhould avoid that clamorous lamentation which was uſual, and bear the calamity in ſilence. On the morrow all the relations of the ſlain appeared as uſual in public, with a deportment of feſtivity and triumph, while the few kinſmen of the ſurvivors, who ſhowed themſelves abroad, carefully marked, in their appearance, humiliation and dejection.

It was a large proportion of the beſt ſtrength of the commonwealth that, after ſo great a loſs in the battle, remained in a danger not in the moment to

to be calculated. Every exertion therefore was to be made to ſave it. Of ſix moras, into which, for military purpoſes, the Lacedæmonian people were divided, the men of four, within thirty years after boyhood (ſuch was the term, meaning perhaps the age of about fourteen [1]), had marched under Cleombrotus; thoſe however being excepted who bore at the time any public office. The ephors now ordered the remaining two moras to march, together with thoſe of the abſent moras, to the fortieth year from boyhood, and no longer allowing exception for thoſe in office. The command, Ageſilaus being not yet ſufficiently recovered to take it, was committed to his ſon Archidamus. Requiſitions were at the ſame time haſtened off for the aſſiſtance of the allies; and the Lacedæmonian intereſt, or the intereſt adverſe to the pretenſions or to the apprehended views of Thebes, ſo prevailed in Tegea, Mantineia, Phlius, Corinth, Sicyon, and throughout the Achaian towns, that the contingent of troops, from all thoſe places, was forwarded with alacrity.

Xen. Hel. l. 6. c. 4. ſ. 17.

ſ. 18.

Meanwhile the leading Thebans, meaning to ſhow a compliment that might promote their intereſt in Athens, had haſtened thither information of their ſplendid ſucceſs. But the impreſſion made by this communication was not favorable to their views; on the contrary, it ſhowed that the jealouſy formerly entertained ſo generally among the Athenians toward Lacedæmon, was already transferred to Thebes. Thus the inceſſant quarrels among the Grecian republics, ſource indeed of laſting glory to ſome, brought however, with their deciſion, neither laſting power nor laſting quiet to any; but, proving ever fertile in new diſcord, had a conſtant tendency to weaken the body of the nation. The Grecian ſtateſmen, quick, penetrating, and every way able, but circumſcribed in means, and led by circumſtances to take a deep intereſt in petty politics, and give their minds eagerly to narrow views, appear not to have had leiſure to look abroad, ſo as to advert to the ready poſſibility of ſome potentate ariſing, capable of cruſhing all their divided republics together. The cotemporary hiſtorian indeed, in the quiet of his baniſhment, ſpeculating, not with view confined by little and local intereſts, nor with the crude ideas of a cloſet-politician, but with the extended ken of one who, in the poet's phraſe,

Hom. Odyſſ. imit.

[1] This expreſſion has been already noticed in Note [19] Ch. 25. Sect. 4. of this Hiſtory.

'had ſeen the cities, and obſerved the manners and the policy, of many 'men,' was aware, not only that this might be, but that the formidable phenomenon had already exiſted.

Relief to Lacedæmon, in its preſſing danger, came, not from its own exertion, not from the intereſt which all the Grecian republics had in preventing Thebes from acquiring that overbearing dominion, with which Lacedæmon had oppreſſed them, but from a power newly riſen, in a corner of the country, whence Greece had not been accuſtomed to apprehend anything formidable. JASON, of Pheræ in Theſſaly, was one of thoſe extraordinary men, in whom ſuperior powers of body and mind ſometimes meet. He was formed to be a hero, had he lived with Achilles; and, as a politician, he could have contended with Themiſtocles or Pericles. He had the advantage of being born to eminence in his own city, one of the principal of Theſſaly. In the conteſts of faction in that country, it had become common to employ mercenary troops. Little informed of the early part of Jaſon's life, or of the manner in which he raiſed himſelf to be the firſt man in Pheræ, we gather that it was upon his ability and diligence in levying, training, and attaching to himſelf a ſuperior force of mercenaries, that he principally depended for the eſtabliſhment of his power.

Xen. Hel. l. 6. c. 1. ſ. 4. Diod. l. 15.

Xen Anab. l. 1. c. 6.

Of the ſtate of Theſſaly, at this time, altogether, we may form ſome judgement from what is related, by the cotemporary hiſtorian, of Pharſalus, one of its moſt conſiderable cities. The leaders of the factions, by which Pharſalus was torn, at length, weary of ruinous conteſt, came to an extraordinary agreement. Fortunately they had a fellowcitizen, Polydamas, eminent throughout Theſſaly for high birth, large poſſeſſions, and that ſplendid hoſpitality for which the Theſſalians were diſtinguiſhed, but more ſingularly eminent for integrity. To this man the Pharſalians committed the command of their citadel, and the excluſive management of their public revenue, giving him altogether a princely authority. In ſo extraordinary and invidious an office, Polydamas had the talents and the good-fortune to ſucceed in everything, except in oppoſing the ambition of the too politic and powerful Jaſon. Tyrant, according to one party, chief of the patriots, as the other would call him, in his own city, Pheræ, Jaſon had proceeded to bring moſt of the Theſſalian cities under that kind of ſubjection,

Xen. Hel. l 6. c. 1. ſ. 2.

ſ. 4.

jection, which ſo commonly in Greece was intitled confederacy; tho the ſtrength of Pharſalus, directed by the abilities of Polydamas, had been exerted to protect them. Pharſalus itſelf was threatened, when Jaſon ſent a propoſal for a conference with the chief, which was accepted. In this conference the Pheræan avowed his 'intention to reduce Pharſalus, 'and the towns dependent upon Pharſalus, to dependency upon himſelf; 'but declared that it was his wiſh to effect this rather by negotiation than 'by violence, and with benefit to Polydamas, rather than to his injury. 'It was in the power of Polydamas,' he ſaid, 'to perſuade the Pharſa-'lians; but that it was not in his power to defend them the reſult of all 'his recent efforts ſufficiently ſhowed. For himſelf, he was reſolved to 'hold the firſt ſituation in Greece; the ſecond he offered to Polydamas. 'What their advantages would be, if a political union took place, Poly-'damas as well as himſelf could eſtimate. The cavalry of all Theſſaly, 'which would be united under them, was not leſs than ſix thouſand ſtrong: 'the heavy-armed infantry exceeded ten thouſand; the numerous inhabitants 'of the ſurrounding mountains, ſubjects of the Theſſalian cities, were ex-'cellent targeteers. In addition to this force then, he had ſix thouſand 'mercenaries in his pay; a body ſuch as, for choice of men, and perfec-'tion of diſcipline, no commonwealth of Greece poſſeſſed. Beſide his 'ſucceſs among the Theſſalian cities patronized by Pharſalus, what his 'military force was equal to might be gathered from the reduction of the 'Maracs, the Dolopians, and the powerful Alectas, chief of Epirus, who 'all owned ſubjection to him. The Bœotians, with all the ſtates of their 'confederacy, were his allies, and ready to admit him for their leader in 'the war againſt Lacedæmon, from whoſe overbearing power they appre-'hended oppreſſion; and the Athenians, it was well known, were deſirous 'of his alliance. But connection with Athens did not ſuit his views; for 'the Athenians affected to be the firſt maritime power of Greece, and he 'meant to make Theſſaly the firſt maritime power of Greece; which he 'thought even eaſier than to acquire the imperial authority, which he ne-'verthelefs meant to acquire, by land. The three neceſſaries to naval 'power were timber, hands, and revenue. With the former, Athens was 'ſupplied from Macedonia, which lay much more conveniently for the 'ſupply of Theſſaly. With the ſecond their Peneſtian ſubjects,' whoſe condition,

condition, tho lefs degrading, much reſembled that of the Helots of Laconia, 'were a reſource to which Athens had nothing equal: and, for the third, 'not only their country was incomparably richer, but, inſtead of deriving 'a forein revenue from a few little ſcattered ilands, whenever Theſſaly 'was united under one chief, all the ſurrounding tribes of their continent 'had paid tribute to them.'

It had been a practice of the Theſſalian republics, always acknowleging ſome common bonds of union, to appoint, for extraordinary occaſions, a common military commander, a captain-general of the Theſſalian nation, with the title of Tagus[a]. To this high rank and great command Jaſon aſpired, and the approbation of the Pharſalian government, it appears, was neceſſary. But he was far from ſo confining his views. Even the command of all Greece did not ſuffice for his ambition. 'That 'all Greece might be reduced under their dominion,' he obſerved to Polydamas, 'appeared probable from what he had already ſtated; but he 'conceived the conqueſt of the Perſian empire to be a ſtill eaſier atchieve-'ment; the practical proof afforded by the return of the Cyreian Greeks, 'and by the great progreſs made, with a very ſmall force, by Ageſilaus, 'leaving this no longer a matter of meer ſpeculation.'

Polydamas, in reply, admitted the juſtneſs of Jaſon's reaſoning; but alledged his own connection with Lacedæmon, which he would at no rate betray, as an object that appeared to him inſuperable. Jaſon, commending his fidelity to his ingagements, freely conſented that he ſhould go to Lacedæmon, and ſtate his circumſtances; and, if he could not obtain ſuccour which might give him reaſonable hope of ſucceſsful reſiſtance, then he would ſtand clearly excuſed, both to his allies and to his fellowcitizens, in accepting the propoſal made to him. The communication of this extraordinary tranſaction, by Polydamas, to the Lacedæmonian government, afforded the cotemporary hiſtorian the means of becoming acquainted with it. The Lacedæmonians, preſſed at that time by a land war againſt which they could ſcarcely protect their allies, while the Athenian fleet commanded

Xen. Hel. l. 6. c. 1. ſ. 5.

[a] The Theſſalian title Tagus ſeems to have been the ſame word with the Teutonic *Toga*, *a Leader*; and perhaps the Latin *Dux* has been only another variety of it; whence the verb *duco*, as, in the Greek, ταγεύω from ταγὸς. *Heretoga*, literally *Army-leader*, was the Angloſaxon word for *a General*, and, in the coarſer language of modern Germany, our title of *Duke* is expreſſed by the word *Hertog*.

the

the ſeas, after three days debate on the difficult propoſition, liberally acknowleged their inability to give certain protection to Polydamas and the Pharſalians againſt Jaſon, and therefore left it to them to conſult their own intereſt.

Returning then into Theſſaly, Polydamas requeſted, and obtained from Jaſon, that he ſhould hold, under his own peculiar command, the citadel of Pharſalus, which had been, in a manner ſo honorable to him, intruſted to his charge. For ſecurity of his own fidelity to his new ingagements, he ſurrendered his children as hoſtages; and, the Pharſalians being perſuaded to acquieſce, were admitted to terms of peace and friendſhip by Jaſon, who was then elected, without oppoſition, tagus of Theſſaly. Xen. Hel. l. 6. c. 4. ſ. 6.

The firſt object of Jaſon, in his high office, was to inquire concerning the force which the whole country, now acknowleging him its conſtitutional military commander, could furniſh; and it was found to amount to more than eight thouſand horſe, full twenty thouſand heavy-armed foot, and targeteers, enough, in the cotemporary hiſtorian's phraſe, for war with all the world. His next care was the revenue, which might inable him to give energy to this force. Jaſon was ambitious, but not avaricious, and he deſired to have willing ſubjects. He required therefore from the dependent ſtates, around Theſſaly, only that tribute which had been formerly aſſeſſed under the tagus Scopas. ſ. 7.

At the time of the battle of Leuctra, Jaſon was already this formidable potentate, and he was then in alliance with Thebes. When therefore the Thebans ſent to the Athenian people an account of that ſplendid action, they did not fail to communicate the intelligence alſo to the tagus of Theſſaly; and they added a requeſt for his coöperation, toward the complete overthrow of the tyranny, ſo long exerciſed by the Lacedæmonians, over the Greek nation. The circumſtances were altogether ſuch as Jaſon was not likely to look upon with indifference. Having ordered a fleet to be equipped, he put himſelf at the head of his mercenaries, who were his ſtanding army, and, taking the cavalry in the moment about him, he began his march. A war then exiſted between the Theſſalians and Phocians, of that extreme enmity, ſometimes regularly declared among the Greeks, in which all communication, even by heralds, was interdicted; and of courſe no quarter was regularly allowed, nor could any ſtep toward c. 4. ſ. 20. ſ. 21.

an

an accommodation eaſily be taken. Nevertheleſs, with his eſcort ſo haſtily aſſembled, he ventured to traverſe their country; and entering ſome of the towns before even intelligence of his approach had reached them, and getting far forward before anywhere numbers could be collected capable of oppoſing him, he reached Bœotia without loſs; ſhowing, as the cotemporary hiſtorian obſerves, how much diſpatch may often do more than force.

Xen. Hel. l. 6. c. 4. § 24.

Jaſon, the ally of Thebes, was connected, not indeed by political alliance, but by public and hereditary hoſpitality with Lacedæmon. Pleaſed with the humiliation of his hoſts, he was not deſirous that his allies ſhould become too powerful. On reaching the Theban camp, therefore, demurring to the propoſal of the Theban generals, for an immediate attack upon the Lacedæmonians, he became the counſellor of peace; and, acting as mediator, he quickly ſucceeded ſo far as to procure a truce. The Lacedæmonians haſtened to uſe the opportunity for reaching a place of ſafety. They decamped in the evening; and truſting more, ſays Xenophon, to concealment and ſpeed than to Theban faith, for their ſecure march acroſs the plain, they reached Cithæron before dawn; and, ſtill not free from alarm, in preſſing their rugged way acroſs the mountains, they did not halt till they came to Aigoſthena in the Megaric territory. There they were joined by Archidamus with the troops ſent from Lacedæmon for their relief. By their ſafe arrival, however, in a friendly territory, the great object of the expedition being accompliſhed, Archidamus returned to Corinth, diſmiſſed the allies, and led the Lacedæmonians home[3].

§ 21—25.

§ 27.

Jaſon, after having thus acted as arbitrator of Greece, haſtened his return to Theſſaly. In his way through the hoſtile province of Phocis, with leiſure to exerciſe his vengeance, for which he had not before wanted ſtrength, he confined it to the little town of Hyampolis, whſe ſuburbs and territory he waſted, killing many of the people. The Lacedæmonian colony of Heracleia was then to be paſſed. He had ſerved Lacedæmon at Leuctra, becauſe he thought it for his intereſt, and he would, without

3 This ſimple narrative of Xenophon, certainly not flattering to his friends, would earn credit, without the authority of his name. The account, given by Diodorus, of the junction of the force under Archidamus with the retreating army, and of their ſeparation afterward for ſhame, is among the ſtories to be found in his celebrated work, which are beneath ſerious criticiſm.

ſcruple

ſcruple or fear, injure Lacedæmon, in its colony of Heracleia, becauſe the proſperity of that colony would obſtruct his views. Heracleia was moſt critically ſituated, for commanding the only eaſily practicable communication between the countries northward and ſouthward of it. He therefore demoliſhed the fortifications; evidently not fearing, ſays Xenophon, that, by laying the paſſage open, he ſhould indanger his own country, but providing that none, by holding the command of the paſs, ſhould prevent him from marching into the ſouthern provinces, whenever he might deſire it.

Decidedly now the greateſt potentate of Greece; powerful, not by his own ſtrength alone, but by his numerous alliances, while on all ſides his alliance was courted, Jaſon propoſed to diſplay his magnificence at the approaching Pythian games. He had commanded all republics, owning the authority of the tagus of Theſſaly, to feed oxen, ſheep, goats, and ſwine, for the ſacrifices; and he propoſed the reward of a golden crown for the ſtate which ſhould produce the fineſt ox, to lead the herd for the god. By a very eaſy impoſt on them ſeverally, he collected more than a thouſand oxen, and ten thouſand ſmaller cattle. He appointed a day a little before the feſtival, for the aſſembly of the military force of Theſſaly, prepared for marching; and the expectation in Greece was, that he would aſſume to himſelf the preſidency. Apprehenſion aroſe that he might ſeize the treaſure of Delphi; inſomuch that the Delphians conſulted their oracle, for directions from the god for their own conduct on the occaſion. According to report, the anſwer they received was ſimilar to what had been given to their forefathers, when Xerxes invaded Greece, 'that the care of 'the treaſure would be the god's own concern.'

Xen. Hel. l. 6 c. 4. ſ. 28.
ſ. 29.
ſ. 30.
Ch. 8. ſ. 4. of this Hiſt.

Before the period for the ſplendid diſplay arrived, this extraordinary man, after a review of the Pheræan cavalry, ſitting to give audience to any who might have occaſion to ſpeak to him, was aſſaſſinated by ſeven youths, who approached with the pretence of ſtating a matter in diſpute among them. The attending guards, or friends of the tagus, killed one of them on the ſpot, and another as he was mounting his horſe; but the reſt ſo profited from the confuſion of the moment, and the opportunities which circumſtances throughout Greece commonly afforded, that they effected their eſcape. What was the provocation to this murder, or the advantage propoſed from it, we are

Xen. Hel. l. 6. c. 4. ſ. 31, 32. Diod. l. 15. c. 60.

not informed. No ſymptom appears of any political view: no attempt at a revolution is noticed by the hiſtorian; but what he mentions to have followed, marks, at the ſame time, the popularity of Jaſon among the Theſſalians, and the deficient ideas, equally of morality and true policy, generally prevailing through Greece. The brothers of the deceaſed, Polydorus and Polyphron, were appointed jointly to ſucceed to the dignity of tagus: the aſſaſſins could find no refuge in Theſſaly; but in various cities of other parts of Greece they were received with honor: proof, ſays the cotemporary hiſtorian, how vehemently it was apprehended, that Jaſon would ſucceed in his purpoſe of making himſelf ſoverein of the country. Such was the unfortunate ſtate of Greece: in the weakneſs of its little republics, men were compelled to approve means the moſt nefarious, where other proſpect failed, by which their fears were relieved, and preſent ſafety procured. Thus aſſaſſination became ſo generally creditable, or at leaſt ſo little uncreditable, that hope of ſafety, through ſpeed in flight, was always afforded to the perpetrators.

Xen. Hel. l. 6. c. 1. ſ. 4.

Theſſaly was always moſt flouriſhing, as, on high authority, we are told, when the principal branches of the executive power were veſted in a ſingle perſon. But on the death of Jaſon was experienced the danger of ſo committing power, without a well-balanced and well eſtabliſhed conſtitution. Preſently after the elevation of his two brothers, Polydorus died ſuddenly at Lariſſa, and the general belief was that Polyphron procured his death. Polyphron, however, remaining ſole tagus of Theſſaly, carried his authority, not with that able and juſt firmneſs, with which Jaſon had rather commanded than repelled popularity, but with the mean and cruel ſeverity of a tyrant, in the modern ſenſe of the title. The worthy Polydamas, whoſe friendſhip Jaſon had carefully cultivated, was put to death, with eight other principal men of Pharſalus, and many more were baniſhed. But aſſaſſination is a crime that ſeldom fails, under any government, in legal or illegal way, to induce its own puniſhment. Polyphron had ſcarcely injoyed his high ſituation a year, when he was aſſaſſinated by his kinſman Alexander; who avowed the deed, as the juſt puniſhment of the tyrant for the murder of Polydorus; and the Theſſalian people ſo far admitted the juſtification, and approved the new crime, that he attained

c. 4. ſ. 34.

the

the object which had been the real inſtigation to it, his elevation to the dignity of tagus.

Jaſon, tho commanding a dependent army, which legal authority would with difficulty have reſiſted, nevertheleſs exerciſed his power in all legal form [4]. But Polyphron, ſupported by the ſame army, but unſupported by the good opinion of men, and ſtill more Alexander, conſtituted to be the ſcourge of mankind, able and wicked, were careleſs of the forms of the conſtitution. Tyrannical over the Theſſalians, Alexander was formidable to the Thebans and Athenians, by land and by ſea. Jaſon's great views however had died with him: troubles, the reſult of crimes, ſome of which will occur for future notice, principally mark the hiſtory of Alexander. The political greatneſs, the civil order, the domeſtic quiet of Theſſaly, all ſunk together with Jaſon.

Xen. Hel. l. 6. c. 4. ſ. 35. Diod. l. 15. c. 60. p. 489.

[4] This is marked by Xenophon's account of the different conduct of Polyphron, who, he ſays, κατεσκευάσατο τὴν ταγείαν τυραννίδι ὁμοίαν. l. 6. c. 4. ſ. 34.

SECTION II.

Partiality, among the Peloponneſians, for the Lacedæmonian ſupremacy. Congreſs at Athens: Ceſſation of jealouſy of Perſia: Oppoſition of Elis to the propoſal for the univerſal independency of Grecian cities. Irritating conduct of the democratical party in Mantineia toward Lacedæmon. Evils reſulting from the ſeparate independency of cities. Liberal project of the Tegeans for a union of the Arcadian cities illiberally executed: Violent interference of the Mantineians: Arbitrary aſſumption of authority by the Lacedæmonians: Union of Arcadia accompliſhed, and Megalopolis founded.

THE event of the battle of Leuctra made a great impreſſion throughout Greece. In many republics joy prevailed, at the glorious ſucceſs of a riſing, lately an oppreſſed, people, againſt thoſe who had long been looked upon, by one party, at leaſt, through the nation, as common oppreſſors; and many individuals, and ſome ſtates, before cautious of avowing friendlineſs to the Theban cauſe, were now ready to join in war againſt Lacedæmon. But others, of more circumſpection and better foreſight, were aware that, under the political circumſtances of Greece, in raiſing a new ſtate to preëminence, they were only raiſing new oppreſſors; in the Peloponneſian cities a more general jealouſy aroſe, of the acquiſition of imperial ſway by a ſtate beyond their peninſula; and wherever the ariſtocratical intereſt prevailed, an apprehenſion of democratical tyranny ſtruck with horror. Under Lacedæmonian ſupremacy, the Peloponneſian ſtates, collectively, had held a ſuperiority among thoſe of the Grecian name; which muſt be loſt, if Thebes became the leading power of Greece. Under influence, therefore, of ſuch conſiderations, communication being held among the Peloponneſian cities, it was reſolved, that the ſupremacy of Lacedæmon ſhould be ſupported; and that the troops of all the confederated republics ſhould be bound, as formerly, to attend the call of the Lacedæmonian government, and march wherever the Lacedæmonians ſhould lead.

In

In the conteſt of Thebes with Lacedæmon, the leaders of the Athenian councils, generally able and moderate men, ſeem always to have had in view to hold the balance between them, and to avoid a decided connection with either. When, after the battle of Leuctra, the Thebans urged the utter overthrow of Lacedæmon, with the pretence that the common welfare of Greece required it, the Athenians, juſtly jealous of the growing power of Thebes, refuſed to concur; but when advantage was taken of the pauſe of hoſtility, which the mediation of Jaſon procured, to renew, among the Peloponneſian ſtates, that union of military force under Lacedæmonian authority, which would reſtore to Lacedæmon its former means of oppreſſion, a jealouſy, no leſs juſt, aroſe, of the revival of Lacedæmonian empire. The Athenian government then reſolved upon a meaſure becoming the dignity of their city, and, as thoſe judging with the ordinary meaſure of human foreſight might not unreaſonably ſuppoſe, moſt likely to promote the quiet and welfare of Greece: they invited a congreſs of deputies, from all the ſtates, which had been parties to the peace of Antalcidas, to aſſemble in Athens.

We can however ſcarcely, without ſome wonder, obſerve the eaſy manner in which the able hiſtorian of theſe times repeatedly mentions the peace of Antalcidas, by the deſcription of 'the peace which the KING preſcribed,' or 'the terms which the KING commanded[5].' Not only he ſo ſpeaks of it in his own perſon, but the ſame deſcription is attributed by him to ſpeakers before the congreſs of the Grecian ſtates; and it occurs even in a decree of the Athenian people, which he has reported. In vain then ſhall we look for explanation of this phenomenon from later antient authors. Of whatever concerns the politics of the republican times, the writers under the Roman empire, Greek as well as Latin, have perverted much, and elucidated very little. A collation however of the ſurviving cotemporaries, orators, philoſophers, and ſometimes the comic poet, with the hiſtorian, will often furniſh light, and always the ſureſt, wherever it may be wanting, for the generally very perſpicuous narrative, which Xenophon, writing for thoſe familiar with the circumſtances of the times, has, in ſome few parts, left obſcure for late poſterity.

Xen. Hel. l. 6. c. 3. ſ. 5, 6. c. 5. ſ. 2.

[5] Βασιλεὺς ἀρέσκοντες. Xen. Hel. l. 6. c. 3. ſ. 5. Βασιλεὺς ἔγραψε. ſ. 6. Βασιλεὺς κατέκρινε. c. 5. ſ. 1. & ſ. 2.

It is evident that all dread of the Perſian power, any farther than as Perſian wealth might inable one party, in a divided nation, to overbear another [6], had long ceaſed among the Greeks; and that, ſince the return of the Cyreians, but, ſtill more, ſince the expedition of Ageſilaus, the hope of conquering Perſia had ſuperſeded the fear of conqueſt from that decaying empire. But the want of a mediator in the endleſs differences of their numerous little republics, was conſtantly and preſſingly felt; and when the king of Perſia, who, from his ſuperiority in wealth and extent of dominion, was commonly called the great king, or often ſimply the king, ceaſed to repel as an object of terror, none would be ſo likely to attract, as an object of reſpect. It is remarkable that the peace of Antalcidas, ſo reprobated by declaimers of after times, as the reproach of Greece, the firſt great ſymptom of her degeneracy, was received by a large majority of the republics, as a kind of charter of Grecian freedom, and as ſuch is mentioned by Xenophon, a charter to ſecure them againſt oppreſſion, not from the Perſian king, but from their fellowcountrymen. The congreſs, deſired by the Athenians, met: no officer of the great king's attended: no ſymptom of Perſian influence appeared: but the Athenians propoſed, and the congreſs approved, an oath to be taken by the ſeveral deputies, in the name of their reſpective republics, which remains reported by Xenophon, thus: 'I will abide by the terms of the 'peace which the king ſent, and by the decrees of the Athenians and 'their allies; and if any ſtate, partaking in this oath, ſhall be attacked, I 'will aſſiſt it with all my ſtrength.' This congreſs ſeems to have been compoſed of deputies from nearly every ſtate of Greece; and, among them, the Eleian alone, inſiſting that Elis ſhould retain its ſovereinty over the people of Marganeæ, Scillus, and Triphylia, objected to the Athenian propoſal: the reſt, even the Lacedæmonians, acceded to it, with expreſſion of much ſatisfaction.

Xen. Hel. l. 6. c. 1. ſ. 4. Iſocr. ad Phil. or. t. 1. p. 386 & Panath. t. 2. p. 496. Polyb. l. 3. p. 162.

Xen Hel. l. 6. c. 5. ſ. 2.

ſ. 3.

It is obvious that, under that ſupremacy of Lacedæmon, which a ſtrong party through the Peloponneſian cities was deſirous of ſupporting, Greece could not be truly free. Yet events immediately following the formal

[6] Μὴ Ἀνταλκίδας ἄλθῃ ἔχων χρήματα παρὰ βασιλέως—(Xen. Hel. l. 6. c. 3. ſ. 6.) was the fear of the opponents of Lacedæmon.

abolition

abolition of that ſupremacy, by the treaty of Athens, ſufficiently account for the politics of that party, as they evince that, when freed from the ſovereinty of one ſtate over the reſt, Greece was ſtill incapable of ſupporting freedom. The detail, as it is reported by the ſame able writer from whom we have the account of the expedition of Cyrus, if it ſhould not, like the detail of that expedition, intereſt the imagination, will however offer political leſſons of ſuperior value; and the circumſtances will require the more attention, as they were the leading ſteps to the final overthrow of Grecian independency.

We have ſeen that, very ſoon after the concluſion of the treaty called the king's peace, or the peace of Antalcidas, the Lacedæmonians, whoſe meaſure that treaty really was, by a violence very contrary to its tenor, compelled the Mantineians to abandon their town, and ſeparate themſelves in villages. To thoſe of higher rank, in general, this was not totally diſagreeable; becauſe, whatever inconveniencies it might bring, and whatever obſtruction to a ſoaring ambition, it ſecured them againſt an odious ſubjection to the capricious deſpotiſm of the aſſembled multitude, and made that political power, which the Lacedæmonians allowed them, ſafe in their hands. But, the treaty of Athens again declaring, for every Grecian ſtate, its right of ſeparate independency, and warranting that right, the leaders of the democratical party, among the Mantineians, thought the moment favorable for attempting to regain their former ſuperiority. With this view they propoſed the reëſtabliſhment of the capital of their little ſtate, with the reſtoration of their common aſſembly; and they incouraged their adherents, by obſerving, that the late treaty would ſecure them againſt the imperious interference of Lacedæmon, which was a party to that treaty. The propoſal became extenſively popular; and, in general aſſembly, it was decreed, that the families from the old capital ſhould reäſſemble there, and that the place ſhould be immediately fortified. Xen. Hel. l. 6. c. 5. ſ. 3.

This gave great uneaſineſs in Lacedæmon. The party adverſe to the Lacedæmonian intereſt would command in Mantineia; the friends of Lacedæmon would be oppreſſed; and the meaſure would appear, in the eyes of all Greece, to be taken in contempt of Lacedæmon: but, by the treaty juſt concluded, any forcible interference was too directly forbidden, to be, without offence to all Greece, attempted. It happened ſ. 4.

that

that Ageſilaus had extenſive perſonal intereſt, and family intereſt, in Mantineia[7]. Under the exiſting difficulties, therefore, it appeared the beſt reſource, that the king himſelf ſhould go to Mantineia, and manage negotiation with its people.

For a prince who, at the head of armies, had been the avenger of his country againſt the Perſian empire, had not only ſecured European Greece, but had extended protection to all the Greeks of Aſia, and ſpred terror among the enemies of the Grecian name, even to the great king upon his diſtant throne, it muſt have been a humiliating office to go, as miniſter from the government of his country, to ſolicit the people of a little neighboring ſtate, accuſtomed to receive his commands. Probably, in the exiſting ſituation of his country and of Greece, he ſaw the importance of the object too ſtrongly to deſire to avoid the miſſion; but the expreſſion of the hiſtorian, his friend and panegyriſt, implies that he was liable to be commanded on it: the Lacedæmonians, ſays Xenophon, ſent Ageſilaus as their ambaſſador to the Mantineians.

The republicans of Greece, like ſome in modern times, we find were liable to be ſtrangely deceived by the names of liberty and ſovereinty. The leaders of that party which now ruled Mantineia, fearing the popularity of Ageſilaus, would not allow the people, nominally their ſoverein, to receive him in general aſſembly, and hear his propoſals. They compelled him to confine his communication to themſelves. Any very ſatisfactory reſult he could little expect; but, in the hope of ſaving appearances for Lacedæmon, without having recourſe to arms, he promiſed that, if the Mantineians would only ſtop the immediate proſecution of their fortifications, he would ingage for the conſent of the Lacedæmonian government to all they deſired. Tho they muſt have ſeen urgent danger to the commonwealth in the refuſal, yet the Mantineian leaders, incouraged by ſupport from ſome neighboring ſtates, and perhaps foreſeeing injury to the cauſe of their party from any conceſſion, gave, for their final anſwer, 'that 'the decree paſſed by the Mantineian people could not be reſcinded.' Already, from ſome of the Arcadian ſtates, workmen were arrived to aſſiſt them, and the Eleians had ſent three talents in ſilver, toward defraying the

Xen. Hel. l 6. c. 5. ſ. 5.

[7] He was πατρικὸς φίλος there, a friend by inheritance.

expence.

expence. Completely therefore diſappointed of the object of his humiliating miſſion, Ageſilaus left Mantinea; highly irritated, as the hiſtorian his friend confeſſes; but nevertheleſs holding his opinion, that, to reſort to arms would be to violate the treaty, ſo lately concluded, warranting independency to every Grecian ſtate, and muſt therefore be avoided.

The evils of a general war thus yet but hovered over Greece; tho, after what had paſſed, they were little likely to remain long ſuſpended. But in a country ſo conſtituted, the ſuſpenſion of general war did not bring general tranquillity. On the contrary, the prohibition of external interference, by the late treaty, to which the Lacedæmonian king and government ſo ſcrupulouſly deferred, was as the word for ſedition to begin action, within each little republic. It was under the ſanction of a general peace, warranting univerſal independency, that confiſcations, expulſions, the ruin of families, and the horrors of aſſaſſination and maſſacre, moſt abounded. In Argos, Megara, Corinth, Sicyon, Phlius, Phialeia, Tegea, the circumſtances were remarkable enough to demand the hiſtorian's notice. In Tegea principally they became implicated with the thread of Grecian hiſtory, which it will be advantageous at preſent to purſue.

Xen. Hel. l. 6. c. 5. ſ. 28.

Diod. l. 15. c. 40 & 58.

The ſucceſs of the democratical chiefs of Mantineia, in recovering preponderance to their party and the principal power to themſelves, by a meaſure which had the credit of reſtoring vigor and importance to their little country, excited the attention of thoſe of Tegea[s]. But the Tegeans were already united, under an ariſtocratical adminiſtration; and no propoſal of innovation, confined to the narrow bounds of the Tegean dominion, ſeemed likely to anſwer their purpoſe. They put forward therefore the bold project of uniting all Arcadia: 'Thus alone,' they ſaid, 'the peace of Arcadia could be eſtabliſhed, and thus alone Arcadia could 'have its juſt weight and reſpect among the Grecian powers.'

This propoſal, in itſelf teeming with public and private benefits, could be objectionable only in regard to the manner of carrying it into execution. But it was the meaſure of a party; whoſe object would be very incompletely attained, if it did not raiſe the intereſt of that party upon the

[s] The party is not here ſpecified by Xenophon, but circumſtances clearly ſhow it to have been the democratical, and this is afterward directly indicated:—δημόσιοι, ſays the hiſtorian, ſpeaking of that party, εἰ συνέλθοι ὁ δῆμος, πολὺ ἂν τῷ πλήθει κρατῆσαι. Xen. Hel. l. 6. c. 5. ſ. 7.

main of thoſe actually holding the power in Tegea. By theſe therefore was oppoſed; and Staſippus, a man of ſuperior character, at the head of them, exerted himſelf ſo effectually, that the ſoverein aſſembly rejected the innovation, and determined that the antient conſtitution of Arcadia ſhould be preſerved unaltered.

In the uſual violence of Grecian faction, the ſtep was generally ready from civil controverſy to civil war: for the former ſo commonly involved baniſhment, and even death, that the ſtep beyond was often thought ſcarcely a ſtep toward greater danger. Proxenus, therefore, and Callibius, leaders of the democratical party, did not ſcruple to reſolve upon conteſt in arms, rather than yield their purpoſe. Their hope was in force of numbers; the people, they thought, would be with them: and they had moreover confidence that the democratical party, now ruling Mantineia, would not be ſcrupulous, like Ageſilaus and the Lacedæmonian adminiſtration, but would ſupport, againſt any treaty, a meaſure in a neighboring ſtate, in which their own party-intereſt was implicated. In their former hope they were deceived; for being driven, through diſcovery of their purpoſe, to take arms prematurely, the adherents which the liberal adminiſtration of Staſippus had conciliated, were found equally numerous with their followers; and in a conflict which followed, within the town, they were ſuperior, and Proxenus was killed. Staſippus, according to the honorable teſtimony of the cotemporary hiſtorian, averſe to the ſlaughter of fellow-citizens, checked purſuit. What followed unfortunately proved the imprudence of this liberality and humanity; and would of courſe prompt, on another ſuch occaſion, conduct that would be groſſly illiberal and inhuman, where better manners are eſtabliſhed, and yet, among the Greeks, was ſo often neceſſary to ſelf-preſervation, that it might hardly deſerve to be called inhuman or even illiberal. The defeated fled to the gate leading toward Mantineia; and there, finding themſelves not purſued as they had expected, they halted, and entered into conference with the victors. Their chiefs, as ſoon as they had found their meaſures for taking arms diſcovered, had ſent to Mantineia, only twelve miles off, for aſſiſtance, and they now ſent again to haſten that aſſiſtance. Managing then to prolong the conference, till the Mantinean forces arrived, they opened the gate to receive them. Staſippus perceived the treachery, in time only to withdraw

Xen. Hel. l. 6. c. 5. ſ. 7.

withdraw by the oppoſite gate; ſo cloſely purſued, that he ſtopped at a temple of Diana, from whoſe ſacredneſs he hoped for perſonal ſecurity. His enemies however, diſpoſed to reſpect neither real nor imaginary duties, mounted on the walls, unroofed the building, and aſſailed thoſe within with miſſile weapons. Unable to defend themſelves, Staſippus and thoſe with him ſurrendered at diſcretion. They were immediately bound, put into waggons, and ſo carried to Tegea; and being quickly brought before a tribunal created for the occaſion, in which Mantineians of the oppoſite party were allowed to ſit, they were condemned, and preſently executed. About eight hundred Tegeans then, thinking themſelves unſafe in their own city, fled to Lacedæmon. Such, within a few months after the eſtabliſhment of a general peace, upon the ground of univerſal independency, was the inauſpicious beginning of a new war, which quickly involved all Greece. Xen. Hel. l. 6. c. 5. ſ. 9. ſ. 10.

The Mantineians had now clearly put themſelves in the wrong: they had broken the treaty of Athens, by their interference in the affairs of the Tegeans; and it was not reaſonably to be expected of the Lacedæmonians, it would have been neither becoming nor right, to leave the atrocious crime, by which their friends in Tegea had ſuffered, unnoticed, and the ſurvivors of thoſe friends, who had taken refuge in Lacedæmon, unaſſiſted. But the preciſe line of conduct, proper and prudent for Lacedæmon, under the exiſting circumſtances, to hold, was perhaps not eaſy to determine; and that which the Lacedæmonian government took, ſeems to have been neither right nor prudent. Unable yet to reſolve upon parting with that imperial authority, which they had ſo long exerciſed among the Grecian ſtates, they did not make it ſo much their object to protect and reïnſtate the oppreſſed Tegeans, as to uſe the pretence for revenging themſelves on the Mantineians. Apparently a congreſs of all Greece ought to have been called, ſuch as that lately held in Athens; but they choſe rather to take the law into their own hands. Without conſulting, as far as appears, any other ſtate, they decreed an expedition, aſſembled the force of Laconia, and appointed Ageſilaus to command.

Meanwhile the democratical Tegean leaders, profiting diligently and ably from their ſucceſs ſo nefariouſly obtained, and warmly ſupported by Mantineia, had accompliſhed their great and valuable project for a union

Xen. Hel. l. 6. c. 5. s. 11. Diod. l. 15. Pauſan. l. 8. c. 27 & 33.

of the Arcadian people*. The meaſure became extenſively popular. Orchomenus only of the Arcadian cities, inſtigated by inveterate enmity to Mantineia, and probably fearful of oppreſſion from the influence which Mantineia would acquire, perſevered in refuſal to accede to it. The other towns, or at leaſt the democratical, which was the prepondérant party in them, concurred, with warm zeal, in founding a new city; to be, with the name of Megalopolis, Great town, a common capital, the place of aſſembly for the general council of the Arcadian people.

The Orchomenians, in thus ſeparating themſelves from their nation, did not hope to be allowed the quiet injoyment of that independency, which they claimed as their right, tranſmitted from earlieſt times, and ſpecially warranted by the late treaty. To ſupport themſelves therefore in the reſolution they had taken, they ingaged a body of mercenaries which had been in the ſervice of Corinth. This alarmed the Mantineians, who ſuſpected the purpoſe of Orchomenus to be no longer defence but attack. While therefore the force of the reſt of the confederated Arcadians aſſembled at Aſea, to protect the country at large againſt the attack threatened from Lacedæmon, the Mantineians remained at home, for the particular defence of their own territory, againſt the apprehended malice of the Orchomenians. Such was the uncaſy ſtate of jealouſy in which the Greeks, in their days of liberty, moſtly lived, even in the ſhort intervals of reſt from internal ſedition; every townſhip fearful of violence from the next.

This miſerable reſtleſſneſs, being rendered, by the political circumſtances of Greece, habitual through the nation, would inhance the difficulty of, what in no circumſtances could be eaſy, bringing a number of ſtates to concur in a wiſe, liberal, and generally beneficial plan of union. We are little informed of the conſtitution of united Arcadia; but we find party-purpoſes much, and perhaps unavoidably, conſidered in forming it; for the union, probably, could not otherwiſe have been effected at all. The federal congreſſes, which we have ſeen already familiar in Greece,

* According to Pauſanias, whom Barthelemi, little, apparently, in the habit of weighing hiſtorical evidence, has implicitly followed, Epameinondas was the projector and patron, both of the reſtoration of Mantineia and of the foundation of Megalopolis. If he was ſo, it will appear, from the ſequel, that his political foreſight failed him on thoſe occaſions. We may however better take the cotemporary hiſtorian's account; who, political opponent as he was to Epameinondas, is really his beſt panegyriſt. Ill-judging or careleſs zeal will often injure the cauſe it means to favor.

offered

offered an example of ſomething approaching to that principle of repreſentation, which the merit and fame of the Engliſh conſtitution have brought into univerſal eſtimation, among the politicians of modern Europe. But that valuable principle would have ill ſuited the means, however it might accord with the wiſhes, of thoſe whoſe ſupport was from a democratical party. Their ſoverein aſſembly therefore (judging, in the deficiency of accounts of it, from its title, which may be tranſlated either the Ten-thouſand or the Numberleſs [10]) was compoſed of the whole free population of Arcadia, or as much of it as could be brought together. The ſituation choſen for the new capital was not central, to give the greateſt facility for meeting from all parts, but on the ſouthern border, where, according to Diodorus, the leading men had the ſureſt intereſt, and could moſt readily collect thoſe whom they might influence in the deciſion of public meaſures. Otherwiſe, being in the vale through which the Alpheius runs, and not far from that river, it may perhaps have united more conveniencies than could be readily found elſewhere, in ſo mountainous a country. Its neighbourhood to the borders of Meſſenia and Laconia, ready for ſupporting the one and attacking the other, was among the reaſons given to the public for the choice. The office of this numerous aſſembly was to direct in chief the military and political concerns of all Arcadia, while apparently every town, for its civil government, retained its former ſeparate ſovereinty.

[10] Leunclavius tranſlates the title of the general aſſembly of united Arcadia, *Decies mille*, Ten-thouſand. (Xen. Hel. l. 7. c. 4. ſ. 2.) Amaſæus, whoſe verſion of Pauſanias Kuhnius has adopted, evidently embarraſſed on the occaſion, calls the place of its meeting, *Curia infinitæ propè Arcadum multitudini deſtinata*. Pauſan. l. 8. c. 32. The Greek is ἀπύριον.

SECTION

SECTION III.

Invaſion of Arcadia under Ageſilaus: Superior conduct of the Theban leaders: Invaſion of Laconia by the army of the Theban confederacy, under Epameinondas: Reſolution of the Athenians to ſupport Lacedæmon: Retreat of Epameinondas from Peloponneſus; Reſtoration of the Meſſenians: Diſtreſs of Sparta.

B. C. 370. Ol. 102. 3. Xen. Hel. l. 6. c. 5. ſ. 12 & 20.

IT was already winter when Ageſilaus entered Arcadia, with the Lacedæmonian army, reïnforced only by the contingents of the little towns of Lepreum and Heræa. The combined forces of Arcadia and Elis avoided a battle with him. Part of the Mantineian territory was plundered; and, in the ſkirmiſhing, attempted for its protection, the Lacedæmonian troops had generally the advantage. But Ageſilaus in vain endeavored to force the enemy to a general action. Preſſed, therefore, by the ſeaſon, and, in ſome degree, ſatisfied with having a little raiſed the ſpirits of the Lacedæmonians, by a diſplay of their ſuperiority in the enemy's country, he returned ſ. 22. into Laconia, and diſmiſſed his forces.

The leaders of the Theban councils were politicians far ſuperior to thoſe who conducted the Lacedæmonian government. They had not neglected opportunities for extending the influence of Thebes among neighboring ſtates: they had made diligent uſe of that which the interference of Lacedæmon in the affairs of Arcadia, or which the ready means open to them, through the deficiency of communication in Greece, to miſrepreſent that interference, afforded, for animating the long exiſting jea- ſ. 23. louſy againſt Lacedæmon. Phocis owned ſubjection to Thebes; a circumſtance which the general weakneſs only of the ſurrounding ſtates, together with the general violence of party-ſpirit, could have brought them to indure. Aſſembling then the Bœotian and Phocian forces by their own authority, they ſo well managed negotiation as to obtain the willing aſſiſtance of the Locrians, of both provinces of the name, of the Acarnanians, the Heracleots, the Malians, and of all the Eubœan towns. Deficient in funds for ſupplying thoſe wants, to which ſo large an army as they

they collected, tho conſiſting of troops accuſtomed to ſupply themſelves, would be liable in a winter campain, they borrowed from the Eleians ten talents, perhaps ſomething more than two thouſand pounds. Epameinondas was appointed to the command-in-chief. Xen. Hel. l. 6. c. 5. ſ. 19.

The Lacedæmonian government, it appears, had either no intelligence of theſe great preparations, or no ſuſpicion that anything important could follow during winter. Even the Arcadians did not expect it. Their forces were kept together only for the purpoſe of revenge againſt the little commonwealth of Heræa, whoſe territory they plundered and waſted. The Eleians alone had had that confidential communication with the Theban leaders, which induced them to wait in arms, in firm reliance on the approach of the Theban army. ſ. 22.

Epameinondas did not diſappoint their opinion of his activity and perſeverance in enterprize. But, in entering Peloponneſus by Corinthia, he ſhowed a want, either of that wiſe moderation and ſtrict juſtice, which his general character, as delivered from antiquity, would give us to expect, or perhaps rather of that authority, which a man truly of ſuch a character would have exerted, had he poſſeſſed it, to reſtrain the wickedneſs and folly of thoſe committed to his command. The Corinthians, profeſſing neutrality, had conducted themſelves with cautious inoffenſiveneſs toward all the belligerent commonwealths; yet, becauſe they would not take arms againſt Lacedæmon, their antient ally, to ſupport the aggreſſion of Mantineia againſt Tegea, the army under Epameinondas exerted its power in vengeance. Lands waſted, trees felled, and houſes burnt, marked its deſtructive march. ſ. 37.

The Arcadians were ſtill buſied in ſimilar exertion againſt the Heræan territory, when intelligence reached them of the arrival of Epameinondas at Mantineia. Immediately they quitted the buſineſs of devaſtation, and haſtened to join him. The Theban leaders, learning that the Lacedæmonian army had evacuated Arcadia, and was diſmiſſed, in the uſual way of the Greeks, for the winter, conſidered the purpoſe of their own winter-expedition as accompliſhed. The independency of Mantineia on Lacedæmonian command being, for the preſent, ſecured, the friendly party in Tegea eſtabliſhed in power, the diſaffection of the little republic of Heræa puniſhed, and the Theban intereſt in Peloponneſus ſ. 22. ſ. 23.

altogether

altogether upon a good footing, they propoſed to return home, and allow the uſual ſeaſon of reſt alſo for their forces. But the internal weakneſs of Lacedæmon, leſs perceived by the more diſtant, began already to be juſtly eſtimated by the bordering ſtates. The Eleians and Arcadians repreſented to the Thebans, 'that the ſedition of Cinadon, which, without forein aſſiſt-'ance, had threatened the overthrow of the Spartan government, was ſmo-'thered, not extinguiſhed, by his puniſhment; that, even if all the ſub-'jects of Sparta were faithful, ſtill the excellent diſcipline of the Thebans, 'with the numbers of their allies, would make their army clearly ſuperior 'to any force the Lacedæmonians could bring into the field: but that, in 'fact, the ſpirit of revolt in Laconia wanted only the promiſe of protec-'tion; extreme diſcontent pervaded all under the higheſt rank of Lace-'dæmonian ſubjects; and if they marched immediately into the country, 'the Lacedæmonian government would be unable to collect a force that 'could attempt oppoſition to them.'

Xen. Hel. l. 6. c. 5. l. 23. 25.

The numbers now aſſembled, ready to join in the invaſion of Laconia (if late writers may be believed for ſuch a matter, where cotemporaries are ſilent, were no leſs than ſeventy thouſand, of whom, according to Plutarch, forty thouſand were heavy-armed. Nevertheleſs the Theban generals objected the natural ſtrength of the Lacedæmonian border, the principal paſſes of which they knew were guarded, and the uſual advantages of thoſe who fight within their own territory againſt ſtrangers. They were ſtill heſitating, when deſerters ſucceſſively came in from different parts; all urging the invaſion of their country, offering themſelves for conductors, and agreeing in the aſſertion that, not only a diſpoſition to revolt pervaded Laconia, but a large part of the people had already refuſed obedience to the ſummons for military ſervice.

Diod. l. 15. p. 499. Plut. vit. Pelopid. p. 529. t. 1. & Ageſil. p. 1120. t. 2. Xen. Hel. l. 6. c. 5. ſ. 24, 25.

B. C. 369. Ol. 102. 3. January. Dodw.

Theſe repreſentations at length induced the Theban generals to accede to the wiſhes of their allies. The frontier of Laconia, againſt Arcadia and Argolis, is of that kind of rugged mountainous country, in which roads can ſcarcely be formed, but where ſtreams have firſt found a courſe, and then, in the line they have taken, gradually ſoftened its roughneſs. The beſt way from Arcadia was by Ion, in the diſtrict called Skiritis, near one of the ſources of the Eurotas. Another, but more difficult paſs, led to Caryæ,

Caryæ, on the brook Œnus, whoſe waters ſoon join that river. It was reſolved to penetrate at once by both theſe paſſes. The Peloponneſians undertook to force that by Ion, tho known to be guarded by a conſiderable body, conſiſting of Lacedæmonian neodamodes and refugee Tegeans, under the command of Iſcholaus, a Spartan. The road by Caryæ was aſſigned to the Thebans; more difficult in itſelf, but unguarded. The Arcadians were ſucceſsful againſt Iſcholaus; who, with more courage than judgement, chuſing ill his ground for oppoſing ſuperior numbers, was ſurrounded, overpowered, and killed, with moſt of thoſe under him. The Thebans, conducted by ſome deſerters of the country, zealous in revolt, met the Arcadians near Caryæ. Deſcending then the mountains together, they burnt Sellaſia, in the vale of the Eurotas, remarkable as the place where the haughty interdictions of the Lacedæmonian government, in its proſperity, had ſometimes met the miniſters of other ſtates. The invading army now found nothing to forbid its progreſs; which it held along the left bank of the river, plundering and burning as it went. On the ſecond day from Caryæ, it arrived at the bridge conducting immediately to Sparta. That city ſtood at a ſmall diſtance from the river, on the right bank. The paſſage was ſtrongly guarded, and the generals avoided the hazardous attempt to force it. Pillage and flames were ſpred among the numerous houſes on the ſide where nothing oppoſed; to the booty from which Xenophon attributes a value, marking a deviation from the antient Spartan ſimplicity, the ready conſequence of the Spartan conqueſts, foreign commands, and the circulation of a public revenue.

Xen. Hel. l. 6. c. 5. ſ. 26.

ſ. 27.

Ch. 20. ſ. 5. of this Hiſt.

Nor was it now any longer the time when the Spartan ladies could take and uſe arms like the men. Among the ſmaller Grecian ſtates, the ſight of an enemy, often recurring, became leſs terrible through familiarity. But, at Lacedæmon, for centuries, it had almoſt ceaſed to be ſuppoſed that an enemy could ever be ſeen there. To the Spartan ladies now, the ſight even of the ſmoke, ſays the cotemporary hiſtorian, from the buildings fired by the invaders, was intolerable. Not only however the conſternation of the fearful and inconſiderate, but the reaſonable apprehenſion of the beſt informed and firmeſt, was very great. When thoſe diſtinguiſhed by the name of Spartans, who had arrogated all the powers of government, diſtruſtful of others, endeavored to occupy the moſt acceſſible parts

Xen. Hel. l. 6. c. 5. ſ. 28.

of the unwalled city, they found themſelves in a manner loſt in its extent. Diſtreſſed by the defection of ſome of their ſubjects, and uncertain of the fidelity of others, they had recourſe to their ſlaves. Proclamation was made, that able-bodied Helots, who would take arms, and faithfully exert themſelves in defence of the country, ſhould be rewarded with freedom. More than ſix thouſand were inrolled; and then the adminiſtration became fearful of the ſtrength which itſelf had thus created. Soon however auxiliaries arrived, from Corinth, Sicyon, Pellenë, Phlius, Epidaurus, Trœzen, Hermionë, and Haliæ. The intereſt which bound theſe to the Lacedæmonian cauſe being thought ſecure, the firſt vehemence of alarm ſubſided.

Xen Hel. l. 6. c. 5. ſ. 29

l. 7. c. 2. ſ. 2.

Meanwhile at Amyclæ, ſome way below Sparta, the enemy had croſſed the Eurotas, and turned their march toward that city, ſtill marking the way with plunder and devaſtation. Their cavalry, compoſed of the united force of Elis, Thebes, Phocis, and Locris, with ſome Theſſalian, powerful for a Grecian army, advanced as far as the hippodrome, or horſecourſe, and the temple of Neptune, cloſe to the city. The Lacedæmonian horſe, advancing againſt it, were comparatively ſo ſmall a force as to appear contemptible; but a body of infantry, which had been concealed in the temple of the Tyndarids, iſſuing, and ſhowing itſelf prepared to ſupport the horſe, the confederate cavalry retired, and the very ſuperior numbers of the confederate infantry (ſo far the force of the Lacedæmonian fame prevailed) in ſome alarm, at the ſame time retreated. Ageſilaus however would not allow purſuit. Ably diſpoſing his troops in commanding ſituations, which the neighborhood of the city afforded, he always threatened, but always avoided action. The confederates withdrew, but to no great diſtance, and incamped.

l. 6. c. 5. ſ. 30.

ſ. 31.

It ſeems implied, in the account of Xenophon, that reputation, rather than ſtrength, at this time ſaved Sparta. All accounts indeed mark that the numbers of the invaders far exceeded any ordinary force of Grecian armies. But that flood and hurricane of war, as another cotemporary author has called it, which the abilities of Epameinondas had been able to excite, and direct to a certain point, the abilities even of Epameinondas could not always duly command. Among his Bœotians he had never allowed any irregularity. He fortified his camp, and placed his guards and outpoſts,

ſ. 32.

Xen. ut ſup. & vit. Ageſ. Theopomp. apud Plut. vit. Ageſ. Xen. Hel. l. 6. c. 5. ſ. 30.

poſts, always as if he was in preſence of a ſuperior enemy. But he could inforce no ſuch order among the Arcadians: their practice was, when they had taken their ground, to lodge their arms, and wander for pillage. Unable directly to reſtrain their paſſion for plunder, Epaminondas was reduced to endeavour to give it the beſt direction. It was reſolved, in a council of war, that to attempt anything farther againſt the city would be too hazardous. The march was therefore turned again down the courſe of the Eurotas; and, through the whole length of the vale to the ſea, the unfortified towns and villages were pillaged and burnt. The army arrived, unreſiſted, at Gythium, the principal, or perhaps only naval arſenal of Lacedæmon, and that important place was inveſted. Numerous Laconian revolters, who had joined by the way, aſſiſted in the aſſaults which, for three days, were repeated againſt it, but without ſucceſs. Xen. Hel. l. 6. c. 5. ſ. 32.

Intelligence of the extreme danger of Lacedæmon, quickly conveyed to Athens, excited a ſtrong ſenſation there; not from any popular friendſhip for Lacedæmon, but from apprehenſion for the common independency of Athens and of Greece, threatened by the growing predominance of Thebes. The council deemed the criſis important, and ſummoned the general aſſembly. Party-ſtrife ſeems to have been at this time more than commonly moderate among the Athenians; and no man had that commanding influence, which could deciſively guide the public mind; in the way of wiſdom, like Pericles, or in the way of raſhneſs and folly, like Cleon. Five miniſters from Lacedæmon, apparently ſome of them at leaſt ſent on the occaſion, were allowed to ſpeak firſt. Their purpoſe being to gain the utmoſt aſſiſtance from Athens, they endeavored to demonſtrate, that the friendly connection between Athens and Lacedæmon, which the Lacedæmonians were deſirous to cultivate, would produce great advantages to both parties. The Athenians ſaw the advantages, but they doubted the friendly diſpoſition. A murmur went through the aſſembly: 'In the 'preſent preſſure of circumſtances, proſeſſions,' it was obſerved, 'would 'of courſe be fair; but, in a return of proſperity, the conduct of the 'Lacedæmonians would be the ſame as formerly.' 'Yet,' it was ſaid on the other ſide, 'at the concluſion of the Peloponneſian war, when the 'Thebans would have ſubverted Athens, the better diſpoſition of Lace- ſ. 33. Iſocr. Archid. p. 54. Xen. Hel. l. 6. c. 5. ſ. 34.

'dæmon ſaved it.' This circumſtance, urged to recollection by the Lacedæmonian miniſters, made a powerful impreſſion; and jealouſy of Thebes went far to ſupply the want of confidence in Lacedæmon. Nevertheleſs the aſſembly was ſtill divided; ſome inſiſting that, 'the Mantineians being 'aggreſſors, the Athenians could do no otherwiſe than aſſiſt Lacedæmon, 'if they would not be falſe to the treaty they had ſworn to;' while others, vehement in the democratical cauſe, contended, 'that the interference of 'the Mantineians, in ſupport of the democratical party in Tegea, againſt 'the oppreſſion of Staſippus, had been right and juſt.'

The deficiency, or, at leaſt, the uncertainty of political principle, which the diſputation, thus reported, without a comment, by ſo able a cotemporary as Xenophon, ſhows to have been general in Greece [a], appears, at this day, wonderful. The argument of the friends of the democratical cauſe, if allowed, would have juſtified the interference of Lacedæmon, or of Thebes, in every conteſt of faction, in every republic of Greece, in Athens itſelf; and the argument of thoſe on the other ſide ſeems to have been directed, not to eſtabliſh the general principle, that no commonwealth had a right to interfere in the internal concerns of another, but only the particular caſe, that the interference with arms, which the Mantineians had exerciſed in Tegea, was forbidden by the terms of the late treaty. After much diſcuſſion, it was not an Athenian, but the Corinthian and the Phliaſian miniſters, who, by urging a particular fact, which intereſted the feelings of the Athenian multitude, decided the vote. 'Whether 'the Lacedæmonians or the Mantineians,' the Corinthian Cleiteles ſaid, 'in the inſtance in queſtion have been aggreſſors, may be a matter of diſ-'pute not eaſily ſettled. But that, ſince the general peace, the Corin-'thians have committed hoſtility againſt no ſtate, is ſufficiently known. 'Nevertheleſs the Thebans, in croſſing our territory, have plundered and 'waſted it, as if an enemy's; carrying off goods and cattle, burning 'houſes, and felling cultivated trees. Can you then, without perjury, 'refuſe us that aſſiſtance to which the treaty intitles the injured?' The aſſembly became agitated; murmur was vehement; but the general voice went, that the obſervation of Cleiteles was pertinent and juſt.

Xen. Hel. l. 6. c. 5. ſ. 37.

[a] That it was ſo, if Xenophon left any doubt about it, is confirmed by Iſocrates, in his Archidamus.

The

The Phliaſian miniſter proceeded to profit from the effect produced by the Corinthian's ſpeech. 'It was obvious,' he ſaid, 'that, if the Thebans 'could once incapacitate Lacedæmon, Athens would be their next object; 'becauſe Athens then alone, of all the Grecian republics, would remain 'powerful enough to attempt reſiſtance to their ambition, which evidently 'aſpired to the dominion of Greece.' This being urged amid much flattery, adapted to the popular temper, was deciſive. The multitude called impatiently for the queſtion, and would hear no other ſpeakers. By the vote which followed, the utmoſt ſtrength of the commonwealth was to be exerted in aſſiſtance of Lacedæmon, and Iphicrates was appointed to command. Xen. Hel. l. 6 c. 5. l. 33. ſ. 39.

The ſupport, powerful as it promiſed to be, which was thus preparing for Lacedæmon, might have been too late to be effectual, if diſregard of union, and neglect of diſcipline, growing with ſucceſs, had not rendered it impoſſible for the able leader of the confederate army to command the exertion of the allies, or even to calculate the force that he could command. The Arcadians, Argians, and Eleians, in numbers, went off with unaſked leave, to bear home the booty they had taken. Proviſions meanwhile became ſcarce for the troops remaining; the ſeaſon preſſed, and Epameinondas found it adviſeable to withdraw haſtily out of Laconia. ſ. 40.

Iphicrates was already in Arcadia, and opportunity was favorable for reducing the Theban army to great difficulty. But, through ſome party view, apparently, of which we have no information, he was not zealous in the command which he had undertaken. He had been much blamed for waſting time in Corinth, before he proceeded into Arcadia. Without attempting any annoyance to the Theban army, in its way through that difficult country, he withdrew again to Corinth. It was ſuppoſed that his purpoſe was to diſpute the paſſage of the iſthmus and of the mountains, which he might have made highly hazardous, or perhaps have completely prevented: but his meaſures rather indicated intention to allow that free way which Epameinondas found. Xenophon, on former occaſions the eulogiſt of Iphicrates, blames his conduct here in ſtrong terms.

This invaſion, waſteful but tranſient, ſuch as Attica had ſeveral times ſuffered from its Peloponneſian enemies, was fatal to the power of Lacedæmon.

Xen. Hel. l. 7. c. 2. s. 2.

Lacedæmon. When the foreign foe was gone, rebellion ſtill pervaded the country. A large part of thoſe Laconians, diſtinguiſhed by the name of Periœcians, and all the Helots, remained in revolt. The able leaders of Thebes took advantage of theſe circumſtances, to imitate and extend the policy of the Athenians, in the Peloponneſian war. They invited, from all parts, the relics of the Meſſenian race, to return to their former country, and take their place, once more, among the people of Greece. The chief body of them was that which, formerly, under Athenian protection, had held Naupactus in Ætolia, but, after the conqueſt of Athens, had been expelled by the Lacedæmonians. Some of theſe had found refuge among their kinſmen of Rhegium in Italy and Meſſina in Sicily; but the greater part had accepted an invitation from the Grecian colony of the Eveſperitans in Africa, then preſſed in war by the neighboring barbarians. This long unfortunate race now eagerly obeyed the call of the Thebans, to return to the country of their forefathers, the faireſt acquiſition of the Heracleids, the moſt deſirable territory in Peloponneſus, or perhaps in Greece. Epameinondas was patron of the new city of Meſſena, built at the foot of mount Ithomē, famous in the antient wars with Lacedæmon, on whoſe ſummit was raiſed the citadel; but it ſeems probable that the Argian general Epiteles was the commander upon the ſpot, who protected the works. The returned Meſſenians did not ſpurn at aſſociation with rebelling Helots, and other ſlaves, all, or moſtly, of Grecian origin, and many of Meſſenian blood.

Strab. l. 7. p. & Plut. Ageſ. p. 1124. t. 2.

Of the particulars, however, of this very intereſting reſtoration, we have little ſatisfactory; Xenophon, in delicacy, apparently, to his Lacedæmonian friends, having ſtudiouſly avoided even the mention of them, wanting toward the connection and elucidation of the reſt of his narrative. But he could not conceal that Meſſēnia was torn from Lacedæmon; and, for the reſt, his teſtimony, dropped in a word here and there, confirms the concurring accounts of later writers, that it was reſtored to the deſcendants, or thoſe reputed deſcendants of the antient Dorian Meſſenians, with ſome mixture of other adventurers, for all whom, united, the Meſſenian name prevailed. The Aſinæans and Nauplians, Dorians from Argolis, formerly eſtabliſhed, as we have ſeen, by the Lacedæmonians on the Meſſenian coaſt, having been among thoſe ſubjects of Sparta who revolted, or favored

favored the revolt, were allowed to retain their ſettlements, and admitted to political aſſociation with the reſtored people. Pauſanias, zealous to prove that the returning emigrants were really Meſſenians, remarks that even their ſpeech was not altered by their peregrination; for ſtill in his time, after more than five hundred years, the Doric dialect was ſpoken in Meſſenia, in greater purity than in any other part of Peloponneſus. Pauſan. l. 4. c. 26. c. 28.

Thus the province of Meſſenia, amounting to half their territory, was finally loſt to the Lacedæmonians; a poſſeſſion however, while they held it, of which their inſtitutions ſeem to have denied them any very profitable uſe, unleſs it may be reckoned ſuch to oppoſe a waſte againſt invaſion. But the retreat of the Theban army did not leave them maſters even of all Laconia. The diſtrict called Skiritis, in that tract of lofty and rugged mountains, among which the Eurotas and the Alpheius, the largeſt rivers of Peloponneſus, have their ſources, continued in rebellion. The important town of Sellaſia, at the upper end of the Spartan vale, on the great northern road, by which ſupport might beſt come from eaſtern Arcadia and Argos, was held by the revolters. Pallenē[12], in the weſtern fork of the vale, up which, by the courſe of the Eurotas, the other principal northern paſs led, through Skiritis to weſtern Arcadia and Elis, ſtill held for Lacedæmon. But ſoon after the retreat of the invading army, while perplexity occurred on all ſides for the Spartan government, the able general of the Arcadian forces, Lycomedes of Mantineia, returning unexpectedly, carried it by a ſudden aſſault, and put thoſe within to the ſword. Xen. He'. l. 7. c. 4. ſ. 21. Diod. l. 15. p. 492.

[12] This Laconian *town* muſt be diſtinguiſhed from the Achaian *city* of the ſame name, for which it has, by ſome modern writers, been miſtaken.

SECTION

SECTION IV.

Bad arrangement of military command by the popular aſſembly of Athens: Second invaſion of Peloponneſus by the Thebans under Epameinondas. Lycomedes of Mantineia: Alienation of Arcadia from the Theban intereſt: Military merit of the Arcadians. Quarrel of Arcadia with Elis. Congreſs at Delphi, aſſembled at the inſtance of a miniſter of the ſatrap of Bithynia. The Tearleſs Battle, won by Archidamus ſon of Ageſilaus. Expedition of the Thebans into Theſſaly, under Pelopidas. Embaſſies from the principal Grecian republics to the Perſian court. Able and ſucceſsful conduct of Pelopidas, ambaſſador from Thebes: Congreſs at Thebes: Attempt of Thebes to acquire the ſupremacy of Greece, through the ſupport of Perſia, defeated.

IN the exiſting preſſure upon Lacedæmon, and upon the ſtates whoſe intereſt yet bound them to the Lacedæmonian cauſe, it was of great importance for them to hold, and, if poſſible, improve their connection with Athens. Miniſters were therefore ſent thither, fully impowered to agree upon the ſyſtem of command, and the plan of operations, for the next campain. The former alone made any difficulty. The Athenian council, at this time ſwayed, apparently, by wiſe and moderate men, had agreed with the Peloponneſians, that it would be, all circumſtances conſidered, moſt for the intereſt of the confederacy, and moſt equitable, that the Athenians ſhould direct operations by ſea, and the Lacedæmonians by land. But a party in Athens, with Cephiſodotus for their orator, thought to earn popular favor, by oppoſing this arrangement. When the propoſal of the council was laid before the general aſſembly (for by that tumultuary meeting, in the degenerate ſtate of Solon's conſtitution, all the meaſures of executive government were to have their ratification) Cephiſodotus perſuaded the ill-judging multitude, that they were impoſed upon. In the Lacedæmonian ſquadron, he ſaid, the trierarcs would be Lacedæmonians, and perhaps a few heavy-armed, but the body of the crews would be Helots or mercenaries. Thus the Athenians would command ſcarcely any but

B. C. 368. Ol. 102. 4. February. Xen. Hel. l. 7. c. 1. ſ. 1.

but ſlaves, and the outcaſt of nations, in the Lacedæmonian navy, whereas, in the Athenian army, the Lacedæmonians would command the beſt men of Athens. If they would have a partition of military authority really equal, according to the fair interpretation of the terms of the confederacy, the command equally of the ſea and of the land forces muſt be divided. Popular vanity was caught by this futile argument, and the aſſembly voted, that the command, both by ſea and by land, ſhould be alternately five days with the Athenians and five with the Lacedæmonians. In this deciſion of the petulant crowd, ſingularly adapted to cripple exertion, both by ſea and land, the Lacedæmonians, preſſed by circumſtances, thought it prudent to acquieſce.

In ſpring an army was aſſembled at Corinth, to prevent the paſſage of the Thebans and their northern allies into Peloponneſus. But the ſuperior abilities of the Theban leaders prevailed. They ſurprized an outpoſt. Still they were at a loſs to force their way over the rough ground in deſcending the Oneian mountains. But they obtained, from the treachery or the weakneſs of the Lacedæmonian polemarc commanding, a truce, under favor of which they ſafely joined the forces of their Peloponneſian allies, the Arcadians, Argians, and Eleians. This junction being thus happily effected, they found themſelves far ſuperior to the army of the Lacedæmonian confederacy. Without oppoſition they puniſhed the attachment of the Epidaurians to the Lacedæmonian intereſt, by ravage of their lands. They attempted then one of the gates of Corinth; but, the Corinthians ſubmitting themſelves to the able direction of the Athenian general Chabrias, who was there with a body of mercenaries, they were repulſed with ſome ſlaughter. The abilities of Chabrias however were unequal, againſt ſo great a ſuperiority of force, to prevent the ravage of the Corinthian territory. All Peloponneſus ſeemed open to them; when the preſſure of the Theſſalian arms, under Alexander of Pheræ, upon the northern allies of Thebes, and threatening Bœotia itſelf, called the Thebans ſuddenly out of the peninſula, and then all the Peloponneſians of the confederacy parted to their ſeveral homes [13].

B. C. 368. Ol. 102. 4. Xen. Hel. l. 7. c. 1. ſ. 4. ſ. 5, 6.

ſ. 7, 8.

ſ. 9, 10, 11. Diod. l. 15.

[13] Xenophon, in relating the retreat of the Thebans, and the diſperſion of the reſt of the army, has not at all accounted for it. That the Theſſalian war was the principal cauſe, may however

This diſſolution of the army of the Theban confederacy gave a moſt fortunate relief to Lacedæmon. All the leiſure it afforded ſeems to have been wanted, for compoſing the troubles within Laconia. Offenſive operations were left to the auxiliaries from Dionyſius, tyrant of Syracuſe; a body remarkable enough, in itſelf and for its actions, to deſerve notice. The infantry were Gauls and Spaniards; the cavalry, apparently Sicilian Greek, ſo excellent, that, tho ſcarcely exceeding fifty horſemen, they had given more annoyance to the enemy, while waſting the Corinthian lands, than all the reſt of the army. After the other troops, on both ſides, were withdrawn, this tranſmarine force alone undertook the invaſion of Sicyonia; defeated the Sicyonians in battle, and took a fort in their territory by aſſault. Gratified then with glory and plunder, they imbarked, and, with twenty triremes, their convoy, returned to Syracuſe.

Xen. Hel. l. 7. c. 1. ſ. 12.

Thus far the able leaders of the Theban councils, profiting from the animoſity ſo extenſively prevailing againſt Lacedæmon, had kept their confederacy unanimous and zealous, under the ſupremacy of Thebes. But it was little likely that ſo many ſtates could, by any management, be long retained in patient ſubmiſſion to ſo new a ſuperiority. The long deference of the Grecian republics to Lacedæmonian command, amounting, in many inſtances, to a zealous, and ſometimes extending to a general, loyalty toward the ſuperior people, is a political phenomenon perhaps ſingular in the hiſtory of mankind. But that deference was paid to a ſuperiority, not ſuddenly obtained, but growing from the extraordinary inſtitutions under which the Lacedæmonians lived; which made them really a ſuperior people, obviouſly fitteſt, in the divided and tumultuary ſtate of the Greek nation, to command in war, and to arbitrate in peace: whence, even ſtill in theſe times, when the political power of Lacedæmon was ſo declining, the eſtimation of the Lacedæmonian people, we are told, was yet ſuch, that at the Olympian and other national meetings, a Lacedæmonian was an object of curioſity and admiration for ſtrangers, more even than the conquerors in the games. The ſuperiority of Athens alſo, perhaps in few

Iſocr. Archid.

ever be gathered from a compariſon of the accounts of Diodorus and Plutarch, with what Xenophon ſays in the former book of the Hellenics; (c. 4. ſ. 35.) and the incidental mention of that war by Polybius, (l. 8. p. 512.) affords valuable confirmation to this deduction from the other writers.

inſtances,

inſtances; or for a ſhort time only, ſupported by a loyalty like that which Lacedæmon experienced, accrued ſuddenly indeed at length, but in conſequence of long preparation: legiſlation more perfected, talents and manners more cultivated, and an extraordinary ſucceſſion of able men at the head of affairs, gave to the Athenians an effectual ſuperiority, which the people of other republics ſaw and felt. But Thebes, without any advantage of antient prejudice in favor of her pretenſions, without any public inſtitutions to be admired, juſt emerged from political ſubjection, poſſeſſing indeed a large and diſciplined population, which might infuſe ſome terror, was become ſo ſuddenly eminent only through the blaze of talents of a few, and principally of one extraordinary man, leading her councils and commanding her armies. If therefore, in any other ſtate of the confederacy, where military force was not very inferior, a ſimilar blaze of character ſhould occur, that ſtate would preſently feel itſelf equal to Thebes, and be prepared to break a connection involving an admiſſion of her ſuperiority.

Such a character had been, for ſome time, riſing among the Arcadians, in Lycomedes of Mantineia; a man inferior to none of his nation in birth, ſuperior to moſt in property, and who had already diſtinguiſhed himſelf, in council as a principal promoter of the Arcadian union, and in arms at the head of the Arcadian forces. Lycomedes apparently already ſaw, what afterward became abundantly notorious, that, if any view to the general good of Greece influenced the Theban councils, it was wholly ſubordinate to the ambition of making Thebes ſupreme over the Greek nation. This ambition he reſolved to oppoſe. In the general aſſembly therefore of the Arcadian ſtates, convened in the new city of Megalopolis, he repreſented, 'That Peloponneſus, among all its various preſent inhabitants, was the proper country of the Arcadians alone; the reſt were really ſtrangers. Nor were the Arcadians the moſt antient only, they were the moſt powerful of the Grecian tribes; they were the moſt numerous, and they excelled in ſtrength of body. It was notorious that the troops of no other Grecian people were in equal requeſt. The Lacedæmonians knew their value: they had never invaded Attica without Arcadian auxiliaries; nor would the Thebans now venture to invade Laconia without them. If therefore the Arcadians knew their own in-

Xen. Hel. l. 7. c 1. f. 12. Diod. l. 15. p. 492.

'tereſt, they would no longer obey the Thebans, but inſiſt upon equality 'in command. They had formerly raiſed Lacedæmon; they were now 'raiſing Thebes; and ſhortly they would find the Thebans but other Lace-'dæmonians.'

Xen. Hel. l. 7 c. 1. l. 13. Flattering thus alternately, and ſtimulating the Arcadian people, Lycomedes obtained the effective command of them; and the natural conſequence of the ſubmiſſion of the multitude's caprices to the controul of an able man, reſulted; the Arcadians were ſucceſsful, and their ſucceſſes were brilliant. The Argians invaded Epidauria. The able Athenian general Chabrias, at the head of the Athenian and Corinthian forces, intercepted their retreat. The Arcadians were in alarm for their allies. an aſſembly was held; the intereſt of Lycomedes decided the choice of commanders, and the Arcadian army, againſt great diſadvantage of ground, brought off

ſ. 14. the Argians without loſs. An expedition was then undertaken into Laconia; the territory of Aſinë was ravaged, and the Lacedæmonian polémarc Geranor, who commanded there, was defeated and killed. Many predatory incurſions, in the common way of Grecian warfare, followed; and when any object invited, neither night, ſays the cotemporary hiſtorian, nor weather, nor diſtance, nor difficulty of way, deterred; inſomuch that the Arcadians acquired the reputation of being the beſt ſoldiers of their time.

ſ. 15. In the diſpoſition of the Arcadians no longer to admit the ſuperiority of Thebes, their ſtrength, their diſcipline, and their ſucceſsful activity in arms, tho exerted in the cauſe of the confederacy, could ſcarcely fail to excite ſome jealouſy and apprehenſion. No direct breach inſued, but friendſhip cooled and became precarious. Meanwhile the new energy of the Arcadian government attracted the regard of the humble and oppreſſed; always an extenſive deſcription of men, and ſometimes of ſtates, among the Grecian republics. The people of Elis had long claimed, and generally maintained, a ſovereinty over the people of ſeveral towns of Elcia, and of the whole diſtrict called Triphylia, on the border againſt Meſſenia. In a ſtrong ſituation in Triphylia, called Laſion, to aſſiſt in

Diod. l. 15. curbing the inhabitants, they had allowed ſome Arcadian exiles to eſtabliſh themſelves. This, for a time, anſwered its purpoſe: but, as the Arcadians of Laſion were, like the Triphylians, only ſubjects of the Eleians and not fellowcitizens, and as the ſovereinty of people over people, ſeldom unoppreſſive,

oppreſſive, cannot fail to be humiliating, in courſe of time they made common cauſe with their neighboring fellow-ſubjects, particularly the Marganeans and Scilluntines, in oppoſition to the Elean government. For ſupport they turned their view to the new union of Arcadia: they claimed to be Arcadians; and, by a petition addreſſed to the new united government, they deſired to be taken under its protection. At the ſame time the Eleians were preſſing for aſſiſtance from their allies of Arcadia, to recover their former dominion over the towns which the Lacedæmonians had reſtored to independency. The Arcadians ſlighted this application, and declared, by a public reſolution, that the petition of the Triphylians was well founded, and that their kinſmen ſhould be free. Elis became in conſequence ſtill more alienated from Arcadia than Arcadia from Thebes.

Xen. Hel. l. 7. c. 1. ſ. 16.

This growing ſchiſm, in the oppoſing confederacy, promiſed great advantage to Lacedæmon. Meanwhile, tho, through vices in their civil conſtitution, and interior ill management, the Lacedæmonians had loſt the beſt half of their territory, their negotiations abroad ſtill carried weight, and were conducted ably and ſucceſsfully. It was at the critical time, when the circumſtances, juſt related, had begun to ſhake that political ſyſtem in Greece, to which the riſe of Thebes had given birth, and new troubles ſeemed ready to break out, that Philiſcus, a Greek of Abydus, arrived, as miniſter from the ſatrap of Bithynia, Ariobarzanes; profeſſedly charged to mediate, in the king of Perſia's name, a general peace among the Grecian republics. Following circumſtances proved, and the cotemporary hiſtorian, tho evidently averſe to the direct aſſertion, has nevertheleſs avowed, that Lacedæmonian intrigue produced this new interference of Perſia in Grecian affairs; which, however, ſeems not to have given any conſiderable umbrage to the Greek nation. Philiſcus propoſed a congreſs at Delphi; and deputies from Thebes, and the ſtates of the Theban confederacy, readily met deputies from Lacedæmon there. No fear of Perſia, as the hiſtorian, not their friend, teſtifies, influenced the Thebans: for, Philiſcus requiring, as an indiſpenſable article, that Meſſenia ſhould return under obedience to Lacedæmon, they poſitively refuſed peace, but upon condition that Meſſenia ſhould be free.

ſ. 17.

This

This reſolution being firmly demonſtrated, the negotiation quickly ended, and both ſides prepared for war. Philiſcus then gave ample proof of his diſpoſition to the Lacedæmonian cauſe, by employing a large ſum of money, intruſted to him by the ſatrap, in levying mercenaries for the Lacedæmonian ſervice. Meanwhile a body of auxiliaries from Dionyſius of Syracuſe, chiefly Gauls and Spaniards, as in the former year, had joined the Lacedæmonian army; and, while the Athenians were yet but preparing to march, a battle was fought, under the command of Archidamus ſon of Ageſilaus, in which the united forces of Argos, Arcadia, and Meſſenia were defeated, with ſlaughter, if Diodorus might be believed, of more than ten thouſand men, and, as all the hiſtorians report, without the loſs of a ſingle Spartan. After a ſeries of calamities, the intelligence of this extraordinary ſucceſs made ſuch impreſſion at Lacedæmon, that tears of joy, ſays the cotemporary hiſtorian, beginning with Ageſilaus himſelf, fell from the elders and ephors, and finally from the whole people [14]. Among the friends of the Lacedæmonians nevertheleſs, as no tear of ſorrow reſulted from it, this action became celebrated with the title of the Tearleſs battle.

Xen. Hel. l. 7 c. 1. ſ. 18.

ſ. 19—22.

Diod. l. 15. p. 495.

Plut vit. Ageſ.

The war with Theſſaly now preſſed upon Thebes. Nevertheleſs the amount of the power and influence to which that city had arrived, not through any merit of her conſtitution, as Polybius has obſerved, but wholly by the uncommon abilities of her leading men, and to which, beyond all expectation of her moſt promiſing days, ſhe had, from the moſt adverſe circumſtances, been ſo rapidly raiſed, is ſtrongly marked by the preſſure ſhe was not only able to bear, but to return with efficacy upon her enemies. Still urging Lacedæmon, by her confederates and dependants in Peloponneſus, ſhe could not only afford protection to her northern ſubjects and allies, againſt the ſucceſſor of the moſt formidable potentate of the age, but ſhe could aim at dominion, or influence, which would anſwer the purpoſe of dominion, among the populous and wealthy, but ill-conſtituted

Polyb. l. 2. p. 127. & l. 6. p. 487.

l. 8. p. 112. Diod. l. 15. p. 492.

[14] Diodorus, whether from his own invention, or the ſtore of ſome writer older, but not wiſer, apparently not more a politician or a ſoldier, than himſelf, has added much to Xenophon's account of this campain of Archidamus; dilating indeed more than is conſiſtent with the compreſſed ſcheme of his hiſtory. It is not likely that Xenophon's information upon the ſubject, or his inclination to relate whatever would do honor to the ſon of Ageſilaus, were deficient.

cities

cities of Theſſaly. While the rapacity and ambition of the tagus, Alexander of Pheræ, occaſioned a neceſſity for meaſures of protection and defence, the diſpoſition to revolt, which his tyranny had excited among thoſe over whom his authority extended, gave probability to views of aggrandizement. Pelopidas was ſent into Theſſaly with an army; under a commiſſion to act there at his diſcretion; for the advantage, not of the Theſſalians, who had ſolicited protection, but of the Bœotian people; who pretended to be common protectors; a kind of commiſſion which it has been uſual in all ages, for the barefaced ambition of democracies to avow, while the more decent manners of the moſt corrupt courts, from which ſuch commiſſions may have iſſued, have generally covered them with a veil. Pelopidas penetrated to Lariſſa; and, with the coöperation of its people, expelled the tyrant's garriſon. He extended negotiation then into Macedonia; formed alliance with Alexander, king of that country, whoſe government was diſturbed by the ambition of his baſtard brother, Ptolemy; and receiving from him, as a hoſtage, his legitimate younger brother, Philip, then a boy, afterward the great Philip, father of the greater Alexander, carried him to Thebes.

Diod. l. 15. p. 492. Plut. vit. Pelop.

It was, according to Diodorus, a ſecond expedition into Theſſaly, in which Pelopidas incurred that misfortune which Polybius has imputed to indiſcretion. With too little caution, certainly, yet perhaps with a magnanimity, and poſſibly with a humane deſire of ſtopping the evils of war, which ſhould do him honor, venturing, as voluntary negotiator for his country, within the power of the profligate tagus, he was ſeized, and impriſoned. The vengeance of Thebes, excited by this injurious treachery, was not immediately ſucceſsful. The Bœotarcs, who had ventured far into Theſſaly, not finding the ſupport expected from the people, were compelled to retreat, tho their own army is ſaid to have been eight thouſand foot and ſix hundred horſe, before the ſuperior force of the tagus; and in traverſing the Theſſalian plain, purſued by a ſuperior cavalry, they ſuffered ſeverely. It is attributed to the ability of Epameinondas, ſerving in an inferior ſtation, but called forth, by the voices of the ſoldiers, to ſupply the deficiencies of the generals, that the army was not intirely cut off. It ſeems to have been by negotiation, ſupported probably by

p. 494. Polyb. l. 8. p. 512.

Diod. ut ſup. Plut. vit. Pelopid. Pauſan. l. 9. c. 15.

by arms, yet not without ſome conceſſion, that the releaſe of Pelopidas was at length obtained [15].

Xen. Hel. l. 7 c. 1. ſ. 17.

The troubles in Theſſaly ingaged the attention of the Athenians, who had old and extenſive connections among its cities. Lacedæmon therefore being now greatly relieved by the victory of Archidamus, the diſſention growing in the Theban confederacy, and the diſtraction of the Theban arms by the northern war, it was propoſed to ſend, to the ſupport of their Theſſalian friends, thoſe forces which, of late, had gone yearly into Peloponneſus. The Lacedæmonian miniſter, however, repreſented ſo ſtrongly the preſſure of the rebellion in Laconia, ſtill ſupported by the moſt powerful

[15] We have preciſely three words only from Xenophon, about the war of Thebes with Theſſaly. Deeply intereſted in the tranſactions in Peloponneſus, where all paſſed almoſt under his eye, his attention ſeems to have been fixed there; and poſſibly ſatisfactory information of affairs in Theſſaly may not readily have occurred to him: We are thus reduced to depend upon later writers for the circumſtances of that war, which was materially connected with the thread of Grecian hiſtory. If Plutarch then ſhould be believed, the force of the Theban arms was exceeded only by the liberality and magnanimity of the Theban policy; the ſucceſs was ſo complete, that apparently nothing but the moſt exalted and uncommon diſintereſtedneſs prevented the Thebans from remaining maſters of Theſſaly; and Pelopidas ſhowed heroïſm and wiſdom equally and uniformly great, except that, rather than admit any inferiority in the Theban arms, the biographer has choſen to mark ſome raſhneſs, ſome extravagance of paſſion, in his hero, on the occaſion of his death. But the tale altogether has ſo much of the romantic, the bombaſt, and even the puerile, with ſome contradiction of well authenticated facts, and ſome ſtories bearing their own contradiction, that ſober judgement, diſguſted, might incline to reject all in a lump, and conclude that, as Xenophon has paſſed all by, there was really nothing worth hiſtorical notice. It will be the duty of the modern writer of hiſtory however to look farther; and we find teſtimony from an early and very reſpectable author, that will require notice. It has been incidentally only that Polybius has been led to mention Pelopidas. He gives no particulars, but he ſpeaks of it as a matter well known in his time, 'that the miſ-'management of Pelopidas in Theſſaly produced 'ſerious ill conſequences to Thebes, and, eſpe-'cially, great loſs of reputation:' Ἐβλαψε μὲν Θηβαίους μεγάλα, κατέλυσε δὲ τὴν ἀυτῶν προγεγενημένην δόξαν. Polyb. l. 8. p. 512. Xenophon's three words, tho leſs ſtrong, are perfectly conſonant to this. They occur in his account of Alexander of Pheræ, who, he ſays, was χαλεπος Θηβαίοις πολέμιος (Hel. l. 6. c. 4. ſ. 35.) 'an 'enemy who altogether preſſed hard upon 'Thebes.' Fortunately then, for this part of the hiſtory, where Xenophon ſo fails us, and Plutarch, ſtraining at panegyric for his fellowcountrymen the Bœotians, is ſo extravagant, we find Diodorus rational. Pauſanias alſo has given ſome circumſtances of the tranſactions of the Thebans in Theſſaly; but the account of Diodorus is the only one in which connection has been attempted; and, tho inclining to partiality for the Theban heroes, yet, under correction of Xenophon and Polybius, apparently it may be truſted.

Diodorus attributes the firſt expedition of Pelopidas into Theſſaly to the third year of the hundred and ſecond olympiad, preſently after the invaſion of Laconia; the impriſonment of Pelopidas to the firſt year of the hundred and third olympiad; the unfortunate expedition, in which Epameinondas ſaved the army, to the ſame year; and the liberation of Pelopidas to the year following. The firſt date agrees with Xenophon, the laſt not.

ſtates

ſtates of the peninſula, and ſo urgently ſolicited the continuance of coöperation from the Athenian army, that the requeſt at length was granted [16].

The cordial ſupport of Athens, the force of mercenaries to be added by Philiſcus, the growing averſion, among the Arcadians, to the Theban cauſe, and the troubles in the northern provinces, with the preſſure of the Theſſalian arms upon the Theban confederacy, together ſeemed likely to reſtore a deciſive ſuperiority to Lacedæmon, at leaſt within her peninſula; and then, judging from experience, it was not likely to be confined there. But the able directors of the Theban councils obſerved, that the firſt, and perhaps the moſt powerful efficient of this change in circumſtances, had been negotiation with Perſia; and they reſolved to direct their attention alſo to Perſia, and try if they could not foil the Lacedæmonians by negotiation, ſtill more effectually than by arms. A miniſter from Lacedæmon, Euthycles, was actually reſident at the Perſian court. Upon this ground a congreſs of the confederacy was ſummoned, and, in purſuance of a common reſolution, Pelopidas was ſent to Suſa on the part of Thebes, accompanied by miniſters from Argos, Elis, and Arcadia. The Athenians, jealous of the meaſure, ſent their miniſters alſo, Timagoras and Leon.

Xen. Hel. l. 7. c. 1. ſ. 23.

The choice of the Thebans on this occaſion was fortunate; that of the Athenians not ſo. A man at the head of a party, like Pelopidas, will of courſe be zealous in the intereſt of that party; it is his own intereſt. With a man not a leader, a private intereſt may have more weight than the ſhare he conſiders as his own in the party-intereſt. But, among the Grecian commonwealths, the variety of public intereſts, and the variety of party intereſts, was ſuch that, without the interference of individual intereſts, which nevertheleſs always might occur in political negotiation, circumſtances the ſtrangeſt, and apparently moſt unaccountable, were continually liable to ariſe. Pelopidas ſlighted the Arcadian miniſter, Antio-

[16] According to Diodorus the Athenians ſent a thouſand foot and thirty triremes, under the command of Autocles, to the aſſiſtance of the tagus of Theſſaly againſt the Thebans. Tho not uſually giving Diodorus credit for great exactneſs, I nevertheleſs do not conſider this as inconſiſtent, either with the general aſſertion of Xenophon, that Alexander was a troubleſome enemy to the Athenians, or with his more particular account of the intention, not purſued, to ſend their principal land force into Theſſaly.

Xen. Hel. l. 7. c. 1. ſ. 24, 25.

chus [17]; perhaps the more readily to gain the Athenian Timagoras; with whoſe coöperation, he ſucceeded completely in the great object of his miſſion. He was treated by the Perſian court with diſtinguiſhing honor. The ſlight, even to contempt, which he ſhowed toward the Arcadian miniſter, ſufficed to bring the marked contempt of the court upon that miniſter and his country. A Perſian of rank was appointed to accompany Pelopidas back to Greece, bearing a reſcript from the king, in which the terms of his friendſhip were declared. It required 'that the 'Lacedæmonians ſhould allow the independency of Meſſenia; that the 'Athenians ſhould lay up their fleet; that war ſhould be made upon them 'if they refuſed; and that, if any Grecian city denied its contingent for 'ſuch war, the firſt hoſtilities ſhould be directed againſt that city: that 'thoſe who accepted theſe terms would be conſidered as friends of the king, 'thoſe who refuſed them as enemies.'

If we compare the ſtyle and ſpirit of this reſcript, and the manner in which it was offered to united Greece, with the terms and circumſtances of the peace of Antalcidas, we ſhall hardly diſcover what has been the ground of diſtinction between them; why one has been ſo much reprobated, while the other, little indeed applauded, has in a manner been thrown out of obſervation, by the impoſing abundance of panegyric, which the conſent of antient and modern writers has beſtowed on the magnanimous patriotiſm of Pelopidas, and of his great aſſociate, in politics as in arms, Epameinondas. But we may perhaps be led to think, that political principle has been out of view, both in the panegyric and in the reproach; that the merit of individuals has had conſiderable ſway with the general mind; yet that the great diſtinction has originated in party-ſpirit. If, however, leaving the political principles of Pelopidas in that obſcurity, which we ſeem without means to illuminate, we look to his political abilities, we ſhall ſee them exhibited in their faireſt light, in real ſplendor, not by his profeſſed panegyriſts, but by the candid cotemporary hiſtorian, not his friend. They are evident in the ſucceſs of his Perſian negotiation, to which that hiſtorian has borne full teſtimony; and

17 Antiochus had been victor in the pancratium (Xen. Hel. l. 7. c. 1. ſ. 23.) ſo that it ſhould ſeem men of rank and education even at this day ingaged in that rough conteſt for honor; unleſs we ſhould conſider the contempt ſhown him, by Pelopidas, as in part founded on his low rank and manners.

that

that negotiation muſt unqueſtionably have been a buſineſs abounding with difficulties, and requiring much diſcernment, to conduct, and bring to ſo advantageous a concluſion.

But the Thebans ſeem to have been too much elated by their ſucceſs, in this extraordinary and very important affair, for perfect prudence to hold through their political conduct; whether their able chiefs now erred, or popular preſumption, in the badneſs of their conſtitution, to which Polybius bears teſtimony, was not to be reſtrained. They aſſumed immediately to be arbiters of Greece. Their ſummons, for a congreſs of deputies from the ſeveral republics to meet in Thebes, were generally obeyed. The Perſian, who had accompanied the return of Pelopidas, attended, with the king's reſcript in his hand; which was red and interpreted to the congreſs, while the king's ſeal, appendant, was oſtentatiouſly diſplayed. The Thebans propoſed, as the condition of friendſhip with the king and with Thebes, that the deputies ſhould immediately ſwear to the acceptance of the terms, in the names of their reſpective cities. Readily however as the congreſs had met in Thebes, the deputies did not come ſo prepared to take the law from Thebes. A majority of them joined in the reply, 'that they were ſent to hear propoſitions, not to ſwear to whatever might 'be propoſed. If oaths were expected, the Thebans muſt inform their 'ſeveral governments of the purport.'

Polyb. l. 6. p. 487.

Xen. Hel. l. 7. c. 1. ſ. 27.

The conduct of Pelopidas toward Arcadia and its miniſter at the Perſian court, unaccounted for by Xenophon, has ſcarcely been the reſult of meer caprice or reſentment, but probably of ſome political view; to gain more completely the Athenian miniſter, or to obviate ſome ſuſpicions or prejudices of the Perſians. It was however certainly productive of political inconveniencies. Antiochus, at his departure, had refuſed the cuſtomary preſents from the Perſian court; and when, on his return, he gave an account of his embaſſy, in that aſſembly of the Arcadian nation in Megalopolis, whoſe very title, the Ten-thouſand, or the Numberleſs, marks its tumultuary compoſition, he made light of the Perſian empire and all that it contained. 'Bakers, cooks, cup-bearers, and 'porters,' he ſaid, 'abounded there; but men, fit to fight with the 'Greeks, tho looking diligently, he could ſee none. Nor did he believe 'even in the boaſted riches of the empire; for,' concluding with a joke adapted to impreſs the multitude he was addreſſing, 'the ſo much cele-

'brated golden plane-tree, he was ſure, would not give ſhelter to a graſs-'hopper.'

This being added to former ſtimulation, the Arcadian deputies were choſen under an impreſſion not favorable to the Theban cauſe. The powerful and popular Lycomedes, the firſt who had ſtood forward in avowed oppoſition to the Theban pretenſions, was the Mantineian repreſentative. Not ſimply objecting to the propoſed oath, Lycomedes inſiſted, 'that 'Thebes was not the place in which the congreſs ſhould have been aſſem-'bled.' The Thebans exclaiming, with marks of reſentment, that he was promoting diſcord in the confederacy, he declared his reſolution to hold his ſeat in the congreſs no longer; and, the other Arcadian deputies concurring with him, they all went home together. The reſult ſeems to have been, that the congreſs broke up without coming to any reſolution.

Xen. Hel. l. 7. c. 1. ſ. 28.

Diſappointed and thwarted thus, the Thebans could not yet reſolve to give up their project of arrogating that ſupremacy over the Greek nation, which Lacedæmon had ſo long held; long indeed by the voluntary conceſſion of a large majority of it. They ſent requiſitions ſeparately to every city to accede to the terms propoſed; expecting that the fear of incurring the united enmity of Thebes and of the king, ſays the cotemporary hiſtorian, would bring all ſeverally to compliance. The Corinthians however ſetting the example of a firm refuſal, with the added obſervation, 'that they wanted no alliance, no interchange of oaths with the king,' it was followed by moſt of the cities. And thus, continues Xenophon, this attempt of Pelopidas and the Thebans, to acquire the empire of Greece, finally failed[18].

[18] Plutarch, in relating the Perſian embaſſy, has labored, with ſome ingenuity, to draw attention aſide from whatever, in his hero's conduct, was moſt repugnant to the claim for him of being a Grecian, and not meerly a Theban, patriot. He has however been either honeſt or idle enough not ſpecifically to contradict any of the particulars reported by Xenophon, which ſhow that the object of Pelopidas was to make Thebes miſtreſs of Greece. He has omitted all mention of the congreſs of Thebes, and the general oppoſition to Pelopidas there; an oppoſition evidently ariſing from the cauſe ſtated by Polybius for the failure of all attempts to unite the Grecian republics: διὰ τὸ μὴ τῆς κοινῆς ἐλευθερίας ἕνεκεν, ἀλλὰ τῆς ἰδίας δυναστείας χάριν ἕκαστον ποιεῖσθαι τὴν σπουδήν.—*becauſe the views and exertions of each were directed to promote, not the common freedom, but its own power.* Polyb. l. 2. p. 125. Concerning ſo remarkable a tranſaction, we ſhould have been glad even of ſuch reports as Diodorus might have preſerved, to compare with the account of Xenophon: but he has barely mentioned it; and that not in the regular courſe of his narrative, but only in a ſummary eulogy of Pelopidas.

CHAPTER

CHAPTER XXVIII.

Affairs of Greece, from the Failure of the Attempt to eſtabliſh the Supremacy of Thebes over the Grecian Republics, through the Support of Persia, till the Depreſſion together of the Aristocratical and Democratical Intereſts, and the Diſſolution of the antient Syſtem of Grecian Confederacy, through the Event of the Battle of Mantineia.

SECTION I.

Difficult circumſtances of the Theban adminiſtration. Affairs of Achaia: Advantageous conſtitution of Achaia, and advantageous character of its people: Interference of Thebes: Generous policy of Epameinondas: Impolitic illiberality of the Theban Confederacy. Miſeries, virtues, and injoyments of the people of the ſmaller republics, exemplified in the hiſtory of Phlius.

IF we refuſe to Thebes the credit of a glory genuine and pure, for her firſt ſucceſsful ſtruggle againſt the tyranny of Lacedæmon, we have Epameinondas himſelf with us, who would take no part in the revolution, till the buſineſs of conſpiracy, treachery, and aſſaſſination were over, and the affair came into the hands of the people at large, ready for leaders, and wanting them. We may have more difficulty to decide upon the merit or demerit of that obſtinacy, with which the Thebans afterward perſiſted in aſſerting dominion over the cities of Bœotia, and thus denying peace to Greece, when propoſed upon a condition which might ſeem, on firſt view, all that true Grecian patriotiſm could deſire, univerſal independency. For where was to be found the ſanction of that peace? Unfortunately the efficacy of any great intereſt, pervading the country, was overborne

overborne and loſt in the multitude of narrow, yet preſſing intereſts, of parties and of individuals, dividing every little community. No ſooner would the independency of the Bœotian towns have been eſtabliſhed, than a revolution would have been made, or attempted, in every one of them. The friends of Thebes once overpowered, and the friends of Lacedæmon prevailing among thoſe towns, how long might Thebes itſelf have been ſecure againſt a ſecond ſubjection to Lacedæmon, more grievous than the former? As far then as theſe conſiderations may apologize for the refuſal of acceſſion to the treaty of Athens, ſo far it may alſo juſtify the Perſian embaſſy; tho ſcarcely the haughtineſs, which ſucceſs in that negotiation ſeems to have inſpired. But what ſhould have been the farther conduct of Thebes, to ſecure her own quiet, without interfering in the affairs of ſurrounding ſtates, or how to inſure quiet among thoſe ſtates, without the poſſeſſion and the uſe of power to controul them, is not ſo eaſy to determine. For the buſineſs of the honeſt ſtateſman, amid the ſeldom failing contention of factions within, and the ambition of intereſted neighbours without, is not ſo eaſy and obvious, as preſumptuous ignorance is commonly ready to ſuppoſe, and informed knavery often, with intereſted purpoſes, to affirm. How ill Greece was at this time prepared for internal quiet, what follows will but concur, with all that has preceded of its hiſtory, to ſhow.

ACHAIA was more divided, and perhaps more equally divided, into little village-republics, without a preponderating town, than any other province of Peloponneſus. Hence, if its people were not among themſelves quieter and happier, yet their diſturbances, leſs expanding among their neighbours, leſs attracted the notice of hiſtorians. While the Lacedæmonian influence prevailed in Peloponneſus, the little Achaian ſtates were moſtly ariſtocratical republics. In the preponderance acquired by Athens, under the ſucceſſive able and liberal adminiſtrations of Themiſtocles, Ariſteides, Cimon, and Pericles, ſupport from that imperial democracy made the democratical the ruling party in Achaia, and brought Achaia into dependence upon Athens. By the conditions, afterward, of the Thirty-years-truce, to which the combination of enemies and defection of ſubjects compelled the Athenians to ſubmit, all interference of Athens being forbidden, ariſtocracy and the Lacedæmonian intereſt revived together. They

Ch 22. ſ. 3. & 4. of this Hiſt.

were

were however not ſo completely reſtored, but that, when the Peloponneſian war broke out, Pellenë alone, joining the general confederacy of the Peloponneſian ſtates againſt Athens, the reſt of the Achaian towns maintained a neutrality, till the deſtructive defeat of the Athenians in Sicily gave a decided preponderance to Lacedæmon.

Ch. 14. ſ. 1. of this Hiſt.

From that time Achaia ſeems to have remained moderately quiet, under ariſtocratical or perhaps a mixed government: for there ſeems ground for ſuppoſing that a better connection between the higher and lower ranks of citizens, a truer ariſtocracy, with leſs of oligarchy, whether from advantage of law or of cuſtom and circumſtances, was eſtabliſhed among the little towns of Achaia, than in moſt other parts of Greece[1]. The general character of the Achaians, for probity, at the ſame time ſtood ſingularly high among the Greeks, while their power was invidious to none; inſomuch that, after the battle of Leuctra, the Lacedæmonian and Theban governments, we are told, agreed to refer a matter in diſpute, not however ſpecified, to their arbitration. In the war between Thebes and Lacedæmon, as far as we have yet traced it, they ſeem to have maintained an exact neutrality; except that, in the extreme danger of Sparta itſelf, in the invaſion of Laconia under Epameinondas, the Pellenians, always more attached than the reſt to the Lacedæmonian intereſt, ſent their mite of aſſiſtance to their diſtreſſed friends. But the elevation of a new patron for democracy, preponderant among the powers of Greece, not by ſea, as Athens formerly, but by land, and which, as experience had ſhown, could extend its arm with effect into Peloponneſus, ſeems to have excited new ambition in the democratical leaders; for even among the Achaians parties

Polyb. l. 2. p. 127.

Xen. Hel. l. 6. c. 5. ſ. 29. Thucyd. l. 1. c. 9.

[1] Polybius ſays that the merit of the Achaian laws, as they ſtood in his age, was derived from times of great antiquity; (Polyb. Hiſt. l. 2.) which might be believed on leſs authority than that of Polybius, becauſe it is not common for a ſyſtem totally new to acquire ſtability and flouriſh at once, like the Achaian, in the time of its confederacy. He calls the Achaian governments democratical; meaning probably no more than that they had a mixture of democracy, ſufficient to inſure iſonomy, equal law, to the Many: for Xenophon clearly informs us that, by the old conſtitutions of the Achaian towns, preſerved to his time, (Hel. l. 7. c. 1. ſ. 32.) the wealthier and higher people held the principal ſhare in the government. But it appears evident that Polybius, with certainly the beſt opportunities of information, could learn little of the hiſtory of Achaia, and that what we gain from Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon, may be conſidered as everything moſt material in its hiſtory, till that bright period, which none of theſe writers lived to ſee, but which fell directly under the view of Polybius, and of which his detail is of the higheſt value.

exiſted.

exiſted. The democratical party in Achaia communicated with Thebes; and the Theban leaders, in the dilemma in which their failure in the late congreſs had left them, received the communication with eager attention. Diſappointed and in ſome degree diſgraced in the eyes of all Greece, here appeared a point to which the exertion of the confederacy might be directed, with the plauſible pretence of ſupporting the democratical cauſe, and the cauſe of Grecian independency, by delivering Achaia from ſubjection to Lacedæmon. In the want of ſuch an object, or in the neglect of it, their influence over the confederacy would riſk a rapid decay. The eſtabliſhment, beſides, of their influence in Achaia, would form a check, which they greatly deſired, upon the new refractorineſs of ſome of their Peloponneſian allies, eſpecially the Arcadians. It was therefore reſolved, at Thebes, that the army of the confederacy ſhould march into Achaia, and Epameinondas was appointed to the command.

Xen. Hel. l. 7. c. 1. ſ. 29. Diod. l. 15. p. 496.

B. C. 366 [a]. Ol. 103. 2/3. Dodw.

On the other ſide, to prevent this expected invaſion of Peloponneſus, the paſſes of mount Oneion, on the iſthmus, were occupied by two bodies of troops; one under a Lacedæmonian, the other under an Athenian officer; but the alliances of Thebes, within the peninſula, afforded opportunities for rendering ſuch precaution vain. In conſequence of negligence, at leaſt attributed to both the commanders, the Argian general, Peiſias, found means to eſtabliſh two thouſand men on a commanding height, which inabled Epameinondas to enter Peloponneſus without material moleſtation. He was quickly joined by the Peloponneſian allies, and all together directed their march toward Achaia.

Xen. Hel. l. 7. c. 1. ſ. 30.

Meanwhile the principal men of that country, after deliberation on their critical circumſtances, reſolved, inſtead of either attempting a vain reſiſtance, or betaking themſelves to the wretched reſource of flight, to truſt the liberal character of Epameinondas, and meet him with a declaration of their readineſs to commit their fortune into his hands. He did not deceive their opinion of him. Exerting his influence, and perhaps ſtretching his power, he not only prevented any baniſhment, but he preſerved the conſtitution of every city inviolate; and only requiring pledges that they would be faith-

[a] Dodwell gives the Achaian buſineſs to the year 366, and the Phliaſian to the preceding year, 367. They ſeem to have been going forward about the ſame time, occupying part of both years.

ful

ful to the Theban confederacy, and follow in arms whereſoever the Thebans ſhould lead, he conducted his army home [3].

Pelopidas, we are told, ſo held his intereſt with the Theban people, that, from the expulſion of the Lacedæmonians till his death, he was conſtantly in the office of Bœotarc, by yearly election. The magnanimity and ſteddy virtue of Epameinondas could not ſo condeſcend to popular folly and depravity, as to hold popular favor, or even to avoid ſometimes being in diſgrace, at leaſt with that occaſional majority of the multitude, which wielded, in the moment, the abſolute ſovereinty of Thebes. His indulgence toward the principal families of Achaia, highly diſappointing to their opponents, who had depended upon ſucceeding to the honors, and profiting from the eſtates, of fugitives, was unſatisfactory to the high democratical party, throughout the confederacy. The Arcadians eſpecially, prediſpoſed to blame the meaſures of Theban councils, joined with the Achaian malcontents in complaining aloud, 'that the intereſt of Lacedæmon, rather than of their own confederacy, was conſidered 'in the ſettlement of Achaia.' Clamor from without ſo aſſiſting party within Thebes, the intereſt of Epameinondas did not ſuffice for the ſupport of his own meaſure. The Theban people, calling themſelves champions of the liberty of Greece, decreed, that regulators ſhould be ſent to the Achaian cities. Under the ſuperintendance of the regulators, the Many drove the principal men of every Achaian town into baniſhment, and changed the governments to pure democracy.

Diod. l. 15. Plut. vit. Pelopid.

Diod. l. 15. Plut. vit. Pelop.

Xen Hel. l. 7. c. 1. ſ. 31.

It ſoon appeared that the meaſure of Epameinondas had been a meaſure of true policy, not leſs than of juſtice and humanity, and that the popular meaſure ſuperſeding it was as unprofitable as tyrannical; diſadvantageous to Thebes, to the confederacy at large, and, in the end, ſtill more to the Many in the Achaian towns, whoſe benefit was more particularly its pretended object. The exiles were numerous, and held ſtill ſome influence in

3 The ſtory is told in the original in theſe few words: Προσπεσόντων δ' ἀνδρῶν τῶν βελτίστων ἐκ τῆς Ἀχαΐας, ἐδυνάστευε ὁ Ἐπαμεινώνδας, ὥστε μὴ φυγαδεῦσαι τοὺς κρατίστους, μήτε πολιτείαν μεταστῆσαι· ἀλλὰ πίστα λαβεῖν παρὰ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν, ἢ μὴν συμμάχους ἔσεσθαι, καὶ ἀκολουθήσειν ὅπῃ ἂν Θηβαῖοι ἡγῶνται· καὶ οὕτως ἀπῆλθον οἴκαδε. I have endeavoured to give a faithful interpretation of this paſſage in the text: a meer verſion, without dilating in ſome parts, could ſcarcely be made at the ſame time faithful and intelligible.

every town. Uniting, and directing their whole force againſt each ſeparately, they recovered all. No longer then moderate, as before, in their politics, they ingaged warmly in the Lacedæmonian intereſt. What their domeſtic adverſaries ſuffered, the hiſtorian has not informed us; but he ſays that conſiderable inconvenience followed to the Arcadians; annoyed now, on their northern border by the active and zealous enmity of Achaia, while on the ſouthern they were preſſed, or conſtantly threatened, by the force of Lacedæmon [4].

Under theſe circumſtances the Achaians owed their ſecurity principally to the troubles in neighboring ſtates, ingaging the attention of Thebes, and employing the arms of her Peloponneſian allies. The ſituation of PHLIUS, bordering on Arcadia and Argolis, and in the road from the iſthmus to Lacedæmon, made the acquiſition of that little city much an object for the confederacy; and not the leſs on account of the remarkable fidelity with which, ſince the laſt revolution and the expulſion of Delphion, its people had adhered, under all fortunes, to their ingagements with Lacedæmon, and the ſpirit and ſucceſs with which, on many trying occaſions, they had exerted themſelves, as well in ſupport of their allies, as in defence of themſelves. Their zealous activity, in the extreme danger of Sparta, when invaded by Epameinondas, was warmly acknowleged by the Lacedæmonians. In revenge, on the other hand, for this, the Argians, in returning from that expedition, directed the uſual ravage of Grecian armies particularly againſt Phliaſia. The Phliaſians, utterly unequal to meet them in the field, nevertheleſs, with only ſixty horſe, purſuing them, ſo completely routed the rear-guard as to raiſe their trophy, in ſight of the Argian army.

Xen. Hel. l. 7. c 2. ſ. 3.

ſ. 4.

It was the common misfortune of Phlius, as we have heretofore ſeen, with almoſt all Grecian republics, and the unavoidable conſequence of ſedition and revolution, to have emigrant citizens more vehemently inimical than any ſtrangers. The miſerable inſecurity of thoſe little republics is ſtrongly marked in what the cotemporary hiſtorian proceeds to relate. While the

[4] I have been the more deſirous that the learned reader ſhould have ready opportunity to judge of the faithfulneſs of my interpretation of the paſſage of Xenophon, given in the preceding note, becauſe, I think, that paſſage, with its ſequel, does altogether ſingular credit both to Xenophon and to Epameinondas; inſomuch that I will own I doubt if the labored panegyric of Plutarch, were his life of Epameinondas extant, would ſo ſtrongly paint the real merit of his hero, to the penetrating and judicious, as this ſimple and compreſſed narrative from a political enemy.

Thebans

Thebans were the ſecond time invading Peloponneſus, the Eleians and Arcadians, marching through Nemea to join them, were perſuaded by the Phliaſian exiles, that the appearance only of ſupport from the army would inable them to recover their city. The exiles and others, accordingly, to the number of ſix hundred, prepared with ſcaling ladders, arrived, by night, under the very walls of Phlius, undiſcovered, and waited there. The march of the ſupporting army, however, was obſerved from an outpoſt at Tricranum, and indicated to thoſe in the city by ſignals. But in the city were ſome who held intelligence with the exiles. Theſe haſtened to give the concerted token for ſcaling; and the citadel, ill guarded, was taken almoſt without reſiſtance. Alarm rapidly pervaded the town, and the people ran to arms. The exiles, hoping to profit from the firſt confuſion, ſallied from the citadel into the town. They were however repulſed, and, as they retreated again into the citadel, the purſuers entered with them. But the Eleian, Arcadian, and Argian forces had by this time ſurrounded the town, and proceeded immediately to ſcale the walls. The threatening horrors of a ſtorm ſeemed now beyond the ſtrength of thoſe within to avert; but, by a ſeries of exertions, the moſt ſpirited, perſevering, and well-directed, they at length repulſed the aſſailants in all quarters. Without remiſſion then, they applied their whole ſtrength to the recovery of their citadel, and they effected it. This was no ſooner done, than their cavalry boldly ſallied. The enemy, baffled in all points, and probably weak in cavalry, were ſo fearful of the threatened annoyance to their retreat, that, in their haſte, they left their ladders, their ſlain, and even ſome wounded; moſtly thoſe lamed by leaping from the walls. Extreme danger thus fortunately, quickly, and for the moment completely ſurmounted, produced emotions, among the Phliaſians, ſtronger than perhaps any known in the more generous warfare of modern ages; unleſs where, in theſe times, France has gone beyond all antient example in illiberality and ferocity. The ſpectacle, it appears, was ſtriking, even in thoſe days; the men ſhaking hands while they circulated congratulations; the women, buſy with cups, miniſtering to their refreſhment, and ſhedding tears of joy; and at length (if it may be allowed ſo litterally to tranſlate the ſtrong expreſſion) all preſent actually ſeized with a weeping laughter [5].

Xen. Hel. l. 7. c. 2. ſ. 4—9.

[5] Πάντας δὲ τοὺς παρόντας τότε γε τῇ ὄντι κλαυσίγελως εἶχεν. Xen. Hel. l. 7. c. 2. ſ. 9.

Xen. Hel. l. 7. c. 2. ſ. 10

In the following year the united forces of Arcadia and Argos invaded Phliaſia, to revenge their defeat by ravage of the country, and not without hope of ſo diſtreſſing the town as to reduce it to capitulate. The long and ſevere preſſure of a ſtrong democratical party ſeems to have urged the ariſtocratical Phliaſians to cultivate the cavalry ſervice; ſo that, among the Peloponneſians, they appear to have excelled in it. A ſmall body of Athenian horſe had joined the Phliaſian; and together, ſupported by a ſmall choſen body of foot, they attacked the Argians and Arcadians, broken in croſſing a river, and with ſuch ſucceſs as conſiderably to check the intended waſte of their fields.

But the unfortunate Phliaſians, after the Thebans became maſters of Achaia, were ſo ſurrounded by enemies, that all their energy and all their ſucceſs could not inable them to procure ſubſiſtence from their fields. ſ. 11—15. Yet they ſtill perſevered, and ſtill were ſucceſsful. The Theban commander in Achaia entered their country at the head of his own troops, with the force of Sicyon and Pellenë, ſtrengthened with two thouſand mercenaries. The Phliaſians, finding opportunity to attack the Sicyonians and Pellenians ſeparately, defeated them with ſuch ſlaughter, that the expedition was purſued no farther. Xenophon has thought it a matter ſ. 16. for particular notice and warm eulogy, that a Pellenian, connected by public hoſpitality with Phlius, being made priſoner, was releaſed without ranſom; tho the wants and poverty of the Phliaſians were at that time ſ. 17. preſſing. Deprived of the produce of their own lands, they found means to obtain occaſional ſupplies; ſometimes by rapine from their enemies, ſometimes by purchaſe from Corinth; but both through many difficulties and dangers: with difficulty raiſing the price for their purchaſes; ſometimes by collection among themſelves, ſometimes by borrowing; and then, on account of the peril of the convoy, with difficulty finding pledges, even for the neceſſary beaſts of burthen.

ſ. 18. In extreme diſtreſs, at length, they were ſo fortunate as to obtain the aſſiſtance of the able Athenian general Chares, commanding a body of mercenaries at Corinth [6]. Beyond the direct line of his commiſſion, he joined them in protecting a convoy. With ſuch an auxiliary force, they arrived at

[6] Ξένους, ſ. 20. & μισθοφόροι, ſ. 21.

Phlius

Phlius unoppoſed; and then they requeſted Chares to give them his farther protection in carrying their uſeleſs mouths to Pellenë: for already the revolution in Achaia had taken place, which reſtored the government of that little city to the party with which the Phliaſians had old and intimate connection. He conſented, and they arrived there alſo unmoleſted. The market of a place ſo friendly, and with which they had not, for a long time, been able to communicate, ingaged their attention. They knew that, if they incumbered themſelves with a convoy, they ſhould certainly be attacked in their return. Nevertheleſs they provided themſelves to the utmoſt that their credit and the Pellenian ſtores would inable them; and, Chares ſtill giving his willing aſſiſtance, they fought their way home ſucceſsfully, and carried in their convoy undiminiſhed.

The ſmall population of Phlius, or the ſmall number of thoſe whom the ruling party could truſt with arms, little allowed reliefs in theſe arduous duties. But their activity ſupplied the want of number. They had ſcarcely taken a few hours reſt by daylight, after a night of great fatigue, when they propoſed to Chares a new enterprize. To check their convoys in future, equally from Corinth and Pellenë, and to extend waſte over their territory with more ſafety, more certainty, and more conſtancy, the enemy were fortifying a poſt at Thyamia, on their border againſt Sicyonia. Chares conſenting, they moved ſo as, by a rapid march, to reach the place a little before ſunſet, and they found equally the workmen and the protecting force, in the cotemporary hiſtorian's deſcription, ſome cooking, ſome baking, ſome preparing their beds. All completely ſurprized, all inſtantly fled. The Phliaſians and their allies then profited from the preparation made. Having ſtationed their guards, they ſupped, made libations, as thanks-offerings for their ſucceſs, ſang the pæan of victory, and went to reſt. Immediately, however, as their ſucceſs was aſcertained, they ſent a meſſenger to Corinth with the news; and the Corinthian adminiſtration, not waiting for daylight, haſtened, with the moſt friendly zeal, to preſs carriages and diſpatch them, laden with proviſions, to Phlius. Meanwhile the indefatigable Phliaſians applied themſelves diligently to the completion of the fortification of Thyamia; and thus made that intended for their annoyance and deſtruction, a poſt for protecting their

Xen. Hel. l. 7. c. 2. ſ. 19.

ſ. 20.

ſ. 22.

ſ. 23.

their territory, and ſecuring the communication with Corinth. Convoys paſſed then daily, and Phlius was abundantly ſupplied.

The teſtimony of Xenophon, which he has had evident pleaſure in giving, to the merits of the Phliaſians, will deſerve our credit, tho he was their political partizan; yet the ſincerity of hiſtory will require our recollection, that a very ſtrong intereſt, ſupported by very ſtrong prejudices, and the remembrance of paſt ſufferings, bound the Phliaſians to the line of conduct by which they earned ſo much honor, inſtigated their activity, and in a manner compelled them to firmneſs. About ſeven and twenty years had paſſed ſince the party, now ruling Phlius, then ſuffering in exile, vainly petitioned Lacedæmon for aſſiſtance toward their reſtoration. Not till near ten years after, finding a more favorable opportunity, they ſucceeded ſo far as to obtain, through the influence of Lacedæmon, readmiſſion to a reſidence in the city, and a promiſe of reſtoration of their property. But that promiſe was not fulfilled: juſtice was denied them, by their fellowcitizens; their reſidence was highly uneaſy and precarious; ſome were compelled to a ſecond flight; and it coſt Lacedæmon a troubleſome war to give them a complete reëſtabliſhment. When this was effected, the moſt active of the democratical party, or thoſe who, with the watchful Delphion, eſcaped death, took their turn in flight. Under ſuch circumſtances, with the Theban confederacy triumphant, there could be no hope of peace, for thoſe who held the city, without the condition, that the democratical exiles ſhould be reſtored: the predominance of the democratical party would follow of courſe, under the patronage of a democratical confederacy; and then what would be the ſituation of their political opponents is obvious to conjecture. But Xenophon, in the courſe of his long obſervation of the troubles of Greece, would have had frequent occaſion to ſee that all men, ſingle or in body, are not capable of that firm perſeverance and active exertion, which their own intereſt, in difficult and dangerous circumſtances, may require; and that thoſe who faint in purſuit of their own good, may appear unfaithful to their friends, without intending infidelity; and thus, while they incur our blame, may alſo claim our pity: and hence he would juſtly conclude, that men who, amid the greateſt difficulties, and moſt threatening dangers, are true at the ſame time

Ch. 25 ſ. 4. of this Hiſt.

Ch. 26. ſ. 1.

ſ. 4.

time to themſelves and to their friends, failing in nothing that their own intereſt, jointly with their ingagements to others, and with a ſenſe of what juſtice, generoſity, and honor demands; who, in ſhort, in honeſty actively purſue the beſt policy, deſerve admiration and applauſe; and thus the Phliaſians ſeem to have earned that eulogy, which has perpetuated the renown of their little commonwealth.

SECTION II.

Affairs of Sicyon: Euphron tyrant of Sicyon: Liberal deſpotiſm of Æneas, general of Arcadia: Principles of Grecian Law of Nations and of Theban Civil Juriſprudence, illuſtrated: Public honors to the memory of Euphron.

DURING theſe tranſactions of the Phliaſians, the affairs of Sicyon ingaging, in a ſtill greater degree, the attention of the Theban confederacy, contributed ſtill more to the quiet of Achaia. Sicyon, a Dorian city, frequently at war with the more powerful Dorian ſtate of Corinth, on its eaſtern border, contracted connections with the Achaian towns, its weſtern neighbours, ſuch as to produce a transfuſion of the Achaian inſtitutions into the Sicyonian government. At the time of the battle of Leuctra, the Sicyonian conſtitution, after the Achaian model, was a balanced ariſtocracy. While the Lacedæmonians yet held their full influence in Peloponneſus, Euphron, an able but unprincipled man, acting as their agent for the management of their intereſt in Sicyon, was firſt in power there: but, in their inability afterward ſo to extend their views and exertions, Sicyon, yielding to the preſſure of circumſtances, became connected with the Theban confederacy, and Euphron loſt his preëminence. Anxious, beyond all things, to regain it, and careleſs about the honeſty of his means, he repreſented to the leading men of Argos and Arcadia, that, if the families of property were allowed to hold their rank and influence, Sicyon would, on the firſt opportunity, become again the ally of Lacedæmon; but, were democracy eſtabliſhed, it would be ſecured in its preſent

Xen. Hell. l. 7. c. 1. ſ. 32.

ſent connection; and, with due ſupport from them, he would ingage that a ſimple vote of the people ſhould effect the change. The propoſal, profligate as it was from Euphron, involving the ruin of thoſe with whom he had been moſt connected, nevertheleſs ſuiting the views of the Argian and Arcadian leaders, they ſent the ſupport deſired. Euphron then convened the Sicyonian people; and, in preſence of the Argian and Arcadian auxiliaries, he propoſed, and it was at once voted, 'that the government 'ſhould be changed to a democracy, with perfect equality for all citizens.' Election, under awe of the ſame forein force, placed Euphron, with four others, at the head of the native military, and raiſed Adeas, ſon of Euphron, to the command of a body of mercenaries in the republic's ſervice.

Xen. Hel. l. 7. c. 1. ſ. 34.

Theſe leading points being carried, Euphron proceeded preſently to ſhow how much more glaring is the temptation, and how much readier the means, to become a complete tyrant in a democracy, or under democratical patronage, than in any other political circumſtances. His mercenary army was to be his principal inſtrument. He directed his attention, therefore, firſt to ſecure its attachment, then to increaſe its numbers. For both purpoſes, the indiſpenſable efficient was money. To acquire money therefore he ſcrupled nothing. With command of money, he truſted, that he could find ſupport in any meaſure. The public treaſury and ordinary revenue of the ſtate being very unequal to his need, he made no difficulty of riſking, what generally excited violent popular indignation, to take the ſacred treaſures from the temples, and convert to his uſe the revenues appropriated to ſacred purpoſes. Theſe being ſtill inſufficient, he had recourſe to oppreſſion of individuals. He incouraged accuſations of Laconiſm, as the crime of attachment to the Lacedæmonian party was termed, that party of which himſelf had been chief. Thus the property of many of the wealthieſt families, through confiſcation, came into his diſpoſal. When, after a ſhort but rapid courſe of violences, by the attachment of dependents and the removal of adverſaries, he thought himſelf ſtrong enough, he proceeded to direct his meaſures againſt thoſe who might become rivals. Procuring the death of ſome of his collegues, and the exile of others, he got all power into his own hands, and became truly tyrant of Sicyon. During theſe meaſures within his own little ſtate, he

he directed his attention ably, upon ſimilar principles, to the republics with which it had political connection; and he obviated interference of the confederacy, partly by money, and partly by the ready and effective ſervice of his troops, whenever and wherever required [7].

Where a people had not, for a long time, experienced any ſevere preſſure, or very alarming danger, from a forein enemy, democratical jealouſy would ſometimes pervade the military ſyſtem, and make all democratical; as among the Syracuſans at the time of the Athenian invaſion of Sicily; but wherever frequent wars have occurred, democratical jealouſy itſelf has ſoon felt the neceſſity of remitting its ſeverity, ſo far as to allow, for military matters, ſome degree of monarchal authority. The Arcadians, therefore, whoſe experience of war, while a divided people, was large, and whoſe union was effected during a war involving nearly all Greece, in forming their united government, committed the military eſtabliſhment of their democratical townſhips, under the controul of their Numberleſs aſſembly, to the authority of one commander-in-chief for the nation. Æneas of Stymphalus, being raiſed to that great office, ſaw, at length, with a juſt indignation, the tyranny of Euphron; and, nothing forbidding an arbitrary uſe of the ill-defined power with which he was veſted, he reſolved to exert it for a generous purpoſe. Leading the Arcadian army to Sicyon, where none reſiſted an ally in his high ſituation, he marched directly into the citadel. Imitating then the liberal policy of Epameinondas, he called together the principal men in the town, and ſent for all who, without a regular ſentence, had been forced or frightened into baniſhment. Apparently the inconveniencies reſulting from the reverſal of the meaſures of Epameinondas in Achaia, had brought the narrow policy of his opponents into difrepute, and inabled the Arcadian general, with the concurrence probably of Epameinondas, to follow a more generous ſyſtem. Euphron, therefore, ſhrinking before him, had however reſources in his abilities, and in his daring profligacy. Withdrawing from the city, he communicated with the Corinthian government, and managed to introduce a Lacedæmonian

Xen. Hel. l. 7. c. 3. ſ. 1.

[7] It were endleſs to point out all the circumſtances of reſemblance in the French, and in the worſt times of ſome of the Greek republics; but this hiſtory of Euphron might ſeem as if, inſtead of having been written 2300 years ago, it was an account of tranſactions within theſe three years.

Xen. Hel. l. 7. c. 3. ſ. 2, 3.

garriſon into the port of Sicyon. On the merit of this ſervice he then founded an endeavour to apologize to the Lacedæmonian government for his paſt conduct, and to regain its confidence. But the Lacedæmonians, tho ready to profit from his ſervices, were ſlow to give him the credit he deſired; and, in the mean time, new opportunity aroſe to invite the attention of his active and verſatile mind, bound by no ſcruples.

The Arcadian general, apparently little a politician, ſatisfied with having expelled the tyrant, left the Sicyonians to ſettle their own affairs; not however in perfect independency; for, to ſecure their fidelity to the con-

ſ. 4.

federacy, the command of their citadel (ſo the Theban authority prevailed in Peloponneſus) was committed to a Theban harmoſt. But a cordial and laſting coalition, between the ariſtocratical and democratical parties, was ſeldom effected in a Grecian republic, and did not take place in Sicyon. Their differences prevented meaſures for the recovery of the port. Meanwhile Euphron, verſed in the ways of ingaging mercenary troops, procured ſome from Athens, and then offered his aſſiſtance to the democratical faction in Sicyon. That faction, denied, by the liberality of Æneas and the leading men of the confederacy, that partial ſupport to which they thought their democratical merit intitled them, did not ſcruple to ſubmit themſelves again to ſo unprincipled a leader. Euphron was received into the city, and the force he brought with him ſufficed to give his democratical friends, for the moment, a clear ſuperiority over their opponents. But thus, making the Lacedæmonians again his decided enemies, he riſked to incur the vengeance alſo of the Theban confederacy. Intrigue and corruption were his reſources. Equally daring and ingenious in his profligacy, with the greateſt force of money he could collect, he went himſelf to Thebes.

ſ. 5.

Thoſe Sicyonians, who had been recalled from baniſhment by the generous deſpotiſm of the Arcadian general, informed of Euphron's journey, and of the preparation he had made for it, were in high alarm. To obviate the conſequences they apprehended, ſome of them went directly to Thebes. But their alarm was greatly increaſed when they ſaw how well Euphron was received, and to what intimate communication admitted, by ſome of the Thebans in power. In the vehemence of their fear then,

of

of being again ſubjected to his tyranny, they were ready to dare anything. In the citadel, while the council was ſitting there, and, apparently, without a proſpect of making their eſcape, they aſſaſſinated him. They were immediately apprehended, and carried before the council, which was the principal criminal tribunal of Thebes.

It cannot but be matter of juſt curioſity to know what were the principles and practice of criminal law in Thebes, in the age of Epameinondas, when Thebes, after Athens and Lacedæmon, was aſpiring at the ſupremacy of Greece; and the picture preſerved to us, by the maſterly hand of the cotemporary hiſtorian, is highly curious. A principal magiſtrate delivered the charge againſt the aſſaſſins, thus:

'Citizens, we inſtitute a capital accuſation againſt theſe men, for the 'murder of Euphron. Unjuſt and impious deeds, which good men avoid 'and abhor, even the wicked perpetrate, commonly, in ſome anxiety for 'concealment. But the audaciouſneſs and profligacy of theſe men has 'been ſuch, that, almoſt in preſence of us the chief magiſtrates, and of 'you, to whom it belongs to abſolve or condemn, they have aſſumed to 'themſelves to put a man to death. If they then eſcape capital puniſh-'ment, what ſtranger will hereafter with any confidence enter your city? 'Where is the juriſdiction of your ſtate, if any ſtranger is allowed, at 'his pleaſure, to kill another, before it is declared what has been the 'object of either, in coming hither? We therefore proſecute theſe men as 'offenders, in the higheſt degree, againſt divine and human laws, and 'ſingularly guilty of contempt of the juriſdiction of this ſtate. It depends 'upon you, after hearing them, to pronounce their doom.'

The Sicyonians apprehended, denied the charge, except one, who, in taking the whole blame, boldly claimed merit for the deed: 'To con-'temn your juriſdiction, Thebans,' he ſaid, 'for one who knows he is 'at your mercy, is impoſſible. In what confidence, then, I killed this 'man, I will declare to you: It was, firſt, that I thought it juſt; and 'then, that I truſted you would judge of it juſtly. For I knew that your-'ſelves, when you arreſted Archias and Hypates, for crimes ſimilar to 'thoſe of Euphron, did not wait for the formality of a trial, but uſed 'the means in your power, for inflicting inſtant puniſhment; hold-'ing, that men eminently wicked, notoriouſly traitors, and uſurpers of

'ſovereign authority, are condemned to death by the common ſentence of 'mankind.'

He proceeded then to ſtate the crimes of Euphron againſt gods and men: ſtripping the temples of Sicyon, rich in dedicated gold and ſilver[8]: betraying the Lacedæmonians, betraying the confederacy, tyrannizing over his fellowcitizens, raiſing ſlaves to honorable ſituations, and, as his intereſt inſtigated, putting to death, baniſhing, or ruining by confiſcation, the worthieſt of the people: 'after this,' continued the accuſed, 'introducing the Athenians, 'the moſt determined of your enemies; with their coöperation oppoſing 'your harmoſt in arms, and, unable ſo to carry his purpoſe, finally coming 'here prepared with money.—Had he come in arms and I had killed him, 'you would have thanked me. How then, coming with money, to pro-'cure by corruption your favor[9], that he might again be maſter of our 'city, for ſtriking the blow of juſtice againſt him, how can you juſtly 'condemn me? The violence of an open enemy, injurious indeed, is 'not neceſſarily unjuſt; but bribery is intrinſically unjuſt, injurious, and 'diſgracing.

'If nevertheleſs, being my enemy, Euphron had been your friend, I 'would not pretend to juſtify killing him in your city: but ſo groſſly a 'traitor as he was to you, how could he be more my enemy than yours? 'He came hither, it may be ſaid, freely. But if, before he entered your 'territory, putting him to death would have been meritorious, how, when 'he came with the purpoſe of adding to his former crimes, can it be 'maintained that he has not ſuffered juſtly? Where, among the Greeks, 'are not traitors, deſerters, and tyrants, held as outlaws; rejected from 'divine protection, and out of all compact with men[10]?'

'You have yourſelves decided, by a decree, that fugitives may be ap-'prehended, throughout the confederacy, and carried to their proper city. 'Can it then be contended, that the exile who returns, unauthorized by 'a common decree of the confederate ſtates, may not juſtly be put to

[8] Ἀναθήματα.

[9] This may ſeem a ſtrong expreſſion, for one in the priſoner's ſituation to uſe, but it certainly does not go beyond the original, Ὃς δὲ χρήματα ἦλθε παρασκευασάμενος, ὡς τούτοις ὑμᾶς διαφθερῶν. κ. τ. ἑ.

[10] Ποῦ ἴχνη Ἕλλησι σπονδὰς ἀποδῦξαι ἢ πρόδοταις, ἢ πάλιν ἀυλομόλοις, ἢ τυράννοις; For fuller explanation of the phraſe σπονδὰς ἀποδείξαι, the reader, deſirous of it, may ſee the fourth ſection of the fifteenth chapter of this Hiſtory, toward the concluſion; and for confirmation of that explanation, the fifth ſection of the twenty-third chapter, toward the middle.

'death?

'death? I affirm that, if you condemn me, you will avenge the moſt 'injurious of all your enemies; and, on the contrary, if you determine 'that I have done well, you will clearly participate in juſtice, done to your-'ſelves, and to all your allies.'

We have already had too many occaſions to obſerve the familiarity of the Greeks with aſſaſſination: a crime which the better policy, ſcarcely leſs than the better religion and morality, of modern times, had taught utterly to abhor, till a ſingularly profligate faction in France, with the impudently arrogated title of philoſophers, lately attempted to give new vogue to the atrocious baſeneſs. If palliation can be for ſuch a crime (for excuſe cannot) it muſt ariſe from political circumſtances as unfortunate as thoſe of Greece; among whoſe diminutive ſtates, eternally ſtruggling for an ill-underſtood civil freedom, and an impoſſible political independency, political difficulties would be always exiſting, political neceſſities often ariſing, which a ſtate of extenſive dominion, with large population, cannot know. To thoſe difficulties and neceſſities, apparently, ſhould be attributed, in a great degree, the ſtriking imperfections of the Grecian adminiſtration of juſtice. Political dangers were forever too cloſely preſſing around, to allow a ſtrict adherence to fixed law and regular proceeding. The little republic was continually in circumſtances, in which the ſenate of more powerful Rome would commit abſolute authority to the conſuls, by charging them to guard againſt detriment to the commonwealth. It is obvious how political intereſts would be likely to interfere with the judgement on the death of Euphron. Epameinondas himſelf, to ſupport his ſyſtem of liberal policy toward the ſtates ingaged, or which might ingage, in the Theban confederacy, might find it neceſſary to concur, if not in declaring approbation of the murder of Euphron, yet in ſcreening the aſſaſſin. Nevertheleſs we cannot without ſome wonder obſerve the extreme deficiency of principle, and confuſion of principle, both what could with any advantage be applied to the regulation of the conduct of independent ſtates toward each other, and what might direct the diſpenſation of juſtice, within any ſtate, to its own people, which are ſtriking in theſe ſpeeches reported by Xenophon: ſpeeches intended by him, if not for an exact repreſentation of what was actually ſaid by the perſons to whom they are attributed, yet certainly for what was proper, or at leaſt probable

probable, to have been ſaid. Avoiding however, as uſual, to give any opinion of his own upon the ſubject, he proceeds to ſtate the reſult, 'that the Theban council declared Euphron to have ſuffered juſtly.'

Xen. Hel. l. 7, c. 3, ſ. 8.

That there ſhould remain men in Sicyon, diſpoſed to do the memory of Euphron honor, thoſe who have been accuſtomed to obſerve the ways in which political party intereſt is put forward, will not be ſurprized. It was the buſineſs of thoſe, with whom he had been principally connected, to obviate the probable acquiſition of aſcendancy by the party which oppoſed him, and it was with this view that they held out Euphron to the people as the martyr of the popular cauſe. They ſent to Thebes, requeſting his body, which was not denied to them; they buried it with public pomp, in the agora; which was among the higheſt marks of reſpect for deceaſed worth; the general cuſtom of the Greeks, as of the Romans, forbidding burial within the walls of a town; and they procured a decree for laſting honors to his memory. What has paſſed in France, in our own time, will aſſiſt to make ſuch tranſactions more readily and extenſively intelligible, and to give means for a juſt eſtimate of the value of ſuch public honors. The cotemporary hiſtorian, commonly confining himſelf ſtrictly to ſtatement of fact, makes this reflection here: 'Thus,' he ſays, 'apparently moſt men appreciate political merit, by their private advantages or ſufferings, reſulting from political meaſures.'

SECTION

SECTION III.

Affairs of Athens: Athenian exiles: Progreſs of change in Grecian politics adverſe to Theban ſupremacy: Alliance of Arcadia with Athens: Inſecurity of perſon in Greece: Alienation of Corinth from Athens: New preſſure upon Lacedæmon: Magnanimity of Lacedæmon: Uprightneſs of Corinth: Partial Peace: Injuſtice of Argos.

THE affairs of Athens, from the reſtoration of the democracy, now ſeven and thirty years [11], appear to have been adminiſtered with general prudence. The rarity of the mention of them, in the cotemporary Athenian hiſtorian's general account of Grecian affairs, implies that, compared at leaſt with other Grecian ſtates, regularity and quiet prevailed there. The ſteddy ſupport which the Athenian government gave to the falling power of Lacedæmon, and the ſteddy yet moderate oppoſition to the new ambition of Thebes, are poſitive indications that the popular will was wiſely guided, againſt antient prejudice, to the true intereſt of the commonwealth; and the preſervation of peace to the Attic territory, while an enemy on its border threatened the moſt diſtant parts of Greece, and the acquiſition of new glory to the Athenian arms by ſupporting the allies of the commonwealth in Peloponneſus againſt ſuch an enemy, evince ability and energy in the adminiſtration. Nevertheleſs, under the Athenian conſtitution, with the Athenian ſyſtem of juriſprudence, the Athenian law of treaſon, and ſycophancy flouriſhing, civil quiet could be but imperfect and precarious. Many Athenians accordingly were at this time ſuffering in exile; and ſo familiar, among the Greek republics, was the flight or baniſhment of numerous bodies of citizens, that, when unattended with extreme violence, they ſeem to have been thought ſcarcely matter for hiſtorical notice. Xenophon has mentioned the exiles but incidentally, leaving us wholly uninformed of the time, the cauſe, and every circumſtance of this new ſchiſm of the Athenian people. For the modern reader ſome infor- Xen. Hel. l. 7. c. 4. ſ. 1.

[11] From B. C. 403 to 366.

mation

mation on the ſubject ſeems wanting, toward a clear underſtanding of this part of Grecian hiſtory; and a collation of the antient writers, from whom we have memorials of the times, will furniſh what may be uſeful.

In the embaſſy from the principal Grecian ſtates to the Perſian court, we have ſeen the Athenian miniſter, Timocrates, lending himſelf to Pelopidas, to put forward the Theban intereſt. Timocrates, as we may gather from the ſtories reported of him by Plutarch, was a vain weak man, dazzled by the ſplendor of the Perſian court, delighted with Aſiatic pomp and luxury, and fond of diſplaying preſents, ſuch as it remains yet the cuſtom of Aſiatic courts to make, tho at the riſk of exciting among his fellowcountrymen, according to their different tempers and degrees of information, ſuſpicion, envy, or contempt. Formed, however, as he ſeems to have been, to become the tool of the able Theban, yet it is not likely that, with his collegue proteſting againſt his conduct, he could have been led ſo to act with the man whom he was particularly commiſſioned to oppoſe, if ſome old party-views had not prepared him, and if the expectation of ſupport from a party did not incourage him. He might however, very poſſibly, both wander from the views and miſcalculate the ſtrength of his party; whence, on his return, Leon accuſing him of neglecting and betraying the intereſts of the commonwealth, he was brought to trial, condemned and executed.

Plut. vit. Pelop.

Xen. Hel. l. 7. c. 1. f. 26.

There remained yet in Athens, as various paſſages of Lyſias and Iſocrates teſtify, a relic of the old ariſtocratical party of the Four-hundred. In the actual confuſion then of intereſts among the Grecian republics, while the Athenian democracy was allied with the ariſtocratical confederacy of Lacedæmon, againſt the democratical confederacy of Thebes, if the ariſtocratical oppoſition in Athens had communication with the Theban leaders, the complication was not ſtranger than we have ſeen, in the courſe of the Peloponneſian war, during the peace between Athens and Lacedæmon. But that the inherent tyranny of the Athenian democracy preſſed ſeverely upon men of property in general at Athens, is ſhown by the moſt unequivocal teſtimony of the ſame great orators, the ableſt advocates of the democratical cauſe. A few leading men, as Iſocrates complains,

Ch. 21 & 22 of this Hiſt. Iſocr. de Pace, p. 254. v. 2.

grew

grew rich from the public ſpoil; while, in the impoſſibility for any to live in eaſe and ſecurity, the city was filled with lamentation and complaint. The indigent multitude, living by the aſſemblies and the courts of juſtice, delighted in accuſations, proſecutions, and the whole buſineſs of ſycophancy; incouraged by the men in power, who held their power from that multitude; while men of property were ſo oppreſſed with arbitrary orders, ſometimes for military ſervice, ſometimes for civil office, frequently for contributions to the treaſury, and, on any complaint of ſeverity, vexed with demands for exchange of property, that their condition was altogether more uneaſy than that of men who never poſſeſſed anything.

This ſketch of the ſtate of Athens, given to the public in an oration addreſſed to the Athenian people, between twenty and thirty years after the period of which we are treating, but by one then fifty years of age, as it ſpeaks of no new ſtate of things, but rather of inveterate evils, may account for the circumſtance, that many Athenian citizens were in exile. Theſe unfortunate men then combining, made themſelves maſters of the town and port of Oropus, in Attica, on the border of Bœotia. Thoſe who directed the adminiſtration of the commonwealth were greatly alarmed. Fearful probably of diſaffection, they did not think it ſufficient to aſſemble the whole force within Attica, to make war upon the refugees, but they ſent for Chares, with the troops he commanded in Peloponneſus. This afforded an opportunity for the Sicyonians, which they did not neglect. The force under Chares, and the abilities and activity of the commander, had been the principal ſupport of the Lacedæmonian cauſe in the north of Peloponneſus. As ſoon as theſe were withdrawn, the Arcadians, no longer fearing for their own country, readily gave aſſiſtance requeſted by the Sicyonians, who thus preſently recovered their port. Meanwhile the Athenians, unable to obtain any aſſiſtance from their allies, little confident in their own means for attacking a fortified place, within ready reach of ſupport from Thebes, and perhaps yet more fearful of a party within, than of an enemy without, came to terms, which are remarkable; it was agreed, that Oropus ſhould be held by the Thebans, in truſt, till the matters in diſpute between

Xen. Hel. l. 7. c. 4. ſ. 1. B. C. 366. Ol. 103. $\frac{3}{4}$.

the Athenians of the city and the exiles ſhould be decided by a fair arbitration [12].

While the ſupremacy of Greece was, with general conſent, yielded to Lacedæmon, or diſputed only by Athens, it was ſcarcely poſſible for a citizen of any other ſtate to acquire any conſiderable eminence in the nation. But the depreſſion, ſucceſſively of Athens and Lacedæmon, made an opening, which Thebes had not ſo completely filled as to preclude competition. On the contrary, the ſudden and totally unexpected elevation of a new candidate for empire among the republics, ſeems to have excited emulation. Lycomedes of Mantineia, a man, from the account even of Xenophon, his political adverſary, of large and liberal views, attentive to the circumſtances of the ſurrounding ſtates, was informed that diſſatisfaction was growing among the Athenians, in conſequence of their not finding that ready return of aſſiſtance, to which they thought their exertions for their allies intitled them. Tho Athens was ſtill the confederate, and Arcadia the enemy, of Lacedæmon, he conceived it poſſible that a connection might be formed between Arcadia and Athens, advantageous to both, and perhaps extenſively advantageous to Greece. The circumſtances were not without example: he obtained a decree from the aſſembly of the Ten-thouſand, or the Numberleſs, authorizing negotiation for the purpoſe, and he reſolved to be himſelf the negotiator. The propoſal was received at Athens, not without ſurprize; and warmly exclaimed againſt by many, as contrary to the exiſting ingagements with Lacedæmon: but, when it was repreſented how greatly the connection of Arcadia with Athens would tend to obviate the interference of Thebes in Peloponneſus, inſomuch that it appeared to promiſe no leſs advantage to the Lacedæmonians than to the Athenians themſelves, the objections moſtly ceaſed, and a treaty of alliance was concluded. It was ſtipulated that, if Arcadia ſhould be attacked, Athens ſhould ſend a body of cavalry to

Xen. Hel. l. 7. c. 4. ſ. 6.

[12] Τοῖς δ'Αθηναίοις, ὐυδεὶς τῶν συμμάχων ἐβοήθησεν, ἀλλ' ἀνεχώρησαν, Θηβαίους παρακαταθέμενοι τὸν Ωρωπὸν, μέχρι δίκης. This paſſage ſeems to me to want ſomething. All the tranſlators have agreed to turn it nearly alike, none very intelligibly, and none noticing any difficulty. I have not much doubt of the explanation I have ventured to give; but I want the information, a want I have before had occaſion to mention, what the δίκη could be, which might be reaſonably truſted for an equitable deciſion of a matter in diſpute between, either two independent ſtates, or between two factions of the ſame ſtate.

its

its affiſtance, but that this auxiliary force ſhould not be bound to march with the Arcadians into Laconia.

Lycomedes, in returning from Athens, unfortunately landed at a port of Peloponneſus, which happened to be, at that time, full of Arcadian refugees. His death is mentioned, by the cotemporary hiſtorian, as what, in ſuch circumſtances, followed of courſe. Tho we ceaſe to wonder at this, after obſerving the circumſtances of the death of Euphron, yet it is a remarkable inſtance, to add to ſo many before occurring, of the exceſſive deficiency of proviſion for perſonal ſecurity in Greece. The treaty with Athens ſurvived; but the views of the able negotiator, how far of a noble patriotiſm, how far of ſelfiſh ambition, his premature death has left uncertain, moſtly ſeem to have periſhed with him. To judge however from the ſcanty mention of him, by the hiſtorian, his political adverſary, Lycomedes with the beſt ability and the beſt inclination, unleſs exception ſhould be made for Epameinondas, ſeems to have been by far in the moſt favorable circumſtances for extending peace and good policy in Greece, of any man of his time. Xen. Hel. l. 7. c. 4. ſ. 3.

After the death of Lycomedes, Grecian politics continued, for ſome time, to hold the bent which he had principally given them; but the intuitive eye, watching all points in all the republics, and the ably guiding hand were wanting. Soon after the accommodation, ſo unexpectedly effected between Athens and Arcadia, an indiſcreet ſpeech in the Athenian aſſembly alienated Corinth. The ſituation of Corinth, moſt advantageous in peace, was moſt unfortunate whenever war was general in Greece. Its territory, the thorofare between the northern and ſouthern provinces, could not fail to ſuffer frequently, and to be in danger always. As the Grecian confederacies now ſtood, Corinth, cut off from Lacedæmon by the intervention of Arcadia, Eleia, and Argolis, could receive ready and effectual ſupport only from Athens; and thence had been accuſtomed ſo to rely upon Athenian auxiliaries, as to have incurred, unawares, the danger of becoming dependent upon Athens. One of thoſe imprudent orators, by whom, in the Grecian democracies, the policy of wiſer ſtateſmen would be conſtantly liable to be fruſtrated, ſpeaking to the Athenian people, extolled the wiſdom of the Arcadian alliance; and then proceeded to adviſe the ſoverein aſſembly, that its generals ſhould be in-

ſtructed to hold Corinth alſo ſafe for the Athenian people [13]. This expreſſion, reported at Corinth, alarmed the Corinthians. Immediately exerting themſelves to furniſh ſufficient garriſons of their own people, they relieved the Athenian troops in all the ſtations within their territory. Careful then to obviate juſt complaint, they aſſembled them in the city, and proclaimed by the public heralds, that if any Athenian was aggrieved, he ſhould give his name to the proper magiſtrate, and juſtice ſhould be done him. In this conjuncture Chares arrived at Cenchreæ with the Athenian fleet; and Xenophon's cautious account may give to ſuſpect, that the Corinthians were not without reaſon jealous of the purpoſe. They thanked Chares for his readineſs to aſſiſt them, but refuſed to admit his fleet into their port. Settling then with careful punctuality all accounts with the Athenian troops, they diſmiſſed them. Thus the commanding influence, which Athens had for ſome time held in Corinth, ceaſed.

Xen. Hel. l. 7. c. 4. ſ. 5.

ſ. 6. In thus guarding however againſt treachery from an ally, the Corinthians were aware that they were expoſing themſelves to the common enemy, to whom, on account of the paſs it commanded, their country was ſo great an object. Their firſt reſource was to ſtrengthen their military with a force of mercenaries, horſe and foot; and this ſufficed, in the moment, not only to ſecure their own, but to inable them to extend annoyance into the hoſtile territories adjoining. Still they were aware that, if the force of the Theban confederacy ſhould be collected againſt them, without ſupport from Athens, upon which they could no longer rely, they muſt be overpowered. They managed therefore, by private communication, to ſound the Theban government, and they had the ſatisfaction to receive, in direct terms, incouragement to ſend miniſters to Thebes. They requeſted to be allowed firſt to communicate with their allies; that thoſe who were deſirous of peace might be parties; and to this alſo the Thebans conſented.

ſ. 8. Then they ſent miniſters to Lacedæmon. 'They were bound,' they ſaid, 'by intereſt, by inclination, by old and hereditary friendſhip, as well as 'by oaths, to the Lacedæmonian alliance; to which they ſhould anxiouſly 'deſire to adhere, if the Lacedæmonians themſelves could ſhow how

[13] Ὅπως καὶ ἡ Κόρινθος σωᾶ ἦ τῷ δήμῳ τῶν Αθηναίων.

'they

'they might finally reſiſt the confederacy, which had been ſo long and 'ſo ſeverely preſſing upon them. But if ruin threatened, not Corinth 'only, but Lacedæmon, then their firſt wiſh muſt be, that Lacedæmon 'would join them in making peace, upon the beſt terms that could be 'obtained; their ſecond, that they might be releaſed from their obliga-'tions, ſo far as to be allowed, without offence to gods or men, to make 'peace for themſelves; and this they deſired, not for their own ſakes only, 'but with the conſideration that their deſtruction would bring no benefit 'to their allies, whereas, if preſerved, they might ſtill, on ſome future 'occaſion, be uſeful to Lacedæmon.' The determination of the Lacedæmonians, if not prudent was generous. They not only allowed, but adviſed the Corinthians to make peace; and they declared, 'that thoſe of 'their other allies, who were unwilling to continue the war, ſhould be 'releaſed from their ingagements to them: but, for themſelves, leaving 'the event to God, they would perſevere in arms, and never ſubmit 'to be deprived of Meſſenia, their inheritance received from their 'fathers.' Xen. Hel. l. 7. c. 4. ſ. 9.

The Corinthian miniſters returning, with this anſwer, negotiation was immediately opened with Thebes. Alliance defenſive and offenſive was propoſed by the Thebans; but this the Corinthians refuſed: it would be, they ſaid, but a change of war; their object was a juſt and permanent peace. Admiring their reſolution, ſays Xenophon, under the dangers which preſſed them, to refuſe taking a part againſt their friends and benefactors, the Thebans granted their deſire. Peace was made with them, in the name of the confederacy, upon condition that both parties ſhould hold their antient territories, as before the war. Theſe terms were extended to the Phliaſians and Epidaurians; and all parties ſwore to the treaty, with the uſual ſolemnities. The Phliaſians then immediately evacuated Thyamia in Sicyonia, expecting that Tricranum [14], in their own territory, then held by Phliaſian exiles, under the protection of Argos, ſhould be given up to them. But the Argians, having ineffectually ſolicited the conſent of the Phliaſian government for the exiles to retain the place, claimed it as a part of Argolis, and placed a garriſon of their own troops in it. The Phliaſians in vain called for that ſ. 10.

[14] The name is alſo found written Tricranium and Tricaranum.

legal

legal diſcuſſion, and judicial deciſion, of which we often hear between ſtate and ſtate in Greece, without any ſatisfactory information what it was; but the Argians perſevered in uſing the power they poſſeſſed, to maintain the deciſion they had themſelves already made.

SECTION IV.

Conſiderations on which the conduct of Lacedæmon was founded: Diſpoſition of Athens: narrow views of the Grecian politicians: Advantage of the meaſures of Ageſilaus: Progreſs of diſſention among the Peloponneſian confederates of Thebes: War of Arcadia and Elis. Danger of Thebes from ſedition; cruelty of the Thebans. War of Thebes in Theſſaly; death of Pelopidas. Project of Epameinondas to make Thebes a maritime power.

IN thus freely allowing the Peloponneſian allies to ſeek their own ſecurity by a ſeparate treaty, and at the ſame time perſevering themſelves in refuſal to ſurrender Meſſenia, which was the condition of peace, required by the Theban confederacy, the Lacedæmonians were guided by a policy, certainly magnanimous, but perhaps not leſs wiſe and truly prudent. In the inability of Lacedæmon to aſſiſt her allies, the obligations of ſacrifices and oaths would probably not have ſtood long againſt the preſſure of the Theban arms; and, in the mean time, a forced ſervice, tho it may promote a proſperous, would not be likely to give any very efficacious ſupport to a falling, cauſe. But for themſelves, had the Lacedæmonians yielded to the requiſition of Thebes, had they purchaſed peace by the ſurrender of half their territory, the relief would have been utterly precarious. The argument, tho we are ſhocked with it, which Iſocrates has attributed to Archidamus, we muſt allow to be forcible; that the eſtabliſhment of the Meſſenians and Helots in freedom, in the neighbourhood of Lacedæmon, would be the more dangerous and the more intolerable, as their former treatment had exceeded in ſeverity that of other ſlaves. But threatened and diſtreſſed as Lacedæmon was, her ſituation was leſs deſperate than it had been. Peloponneſus had now ſome experience of the Theban connection. Infinite civil diſturbances had ariſen; civil order, that

Iſocr. Archid. p. 76. v. 2.

p. 54—60.

that might inſure domeſtic quiet, had followed nowhere; and there was evidently nowhere any general ſatisfaction in any change which it had produced. In Arcadia an avowed jealouſy of Thebes prevailed, and ſymptoms of ſchiſm in the confederacy appeared in more than one part. Of all the advantages, likely to reſult from theſe circumſtances, Lacedæmon would deprive herſelf, without any fair hope that ſubmiſſion would procure laſting quiet.

Lacedæmon, moreover, was not yet without powerful allies. The younger Dionyſius, who had ſucceeded to his deceaſed father's power in Syracuſe, was diſpoſed to maintain his father's ingagements. In Athens, according to the cotemporary Athenian orator, there was no general diſpoſition truly friendly to Lacedæmon, but there was, what might anſwer the purpoſe for the Lacedæmonians, a diſpoſition, in juſt attention to the intereſt of Athens, to oppoſe the advancement of Thebes. The zealous advocate for univerſal peace among the Greeks, Iſocrates, was one of the many Athenians who ſaw, with anxiety, the avowed ambition of Thebes, ſupported by growing power, and conducted by conſummate talents. His extant oration, in the form of a ſpeech made in the Lacedæmonian aſſembly, by the prince Archidamus, ſon of Ageſilaus, has been really a political pamphlet, admirably adapted to its purpoſe; which was, at the ſame time, to incourage the Lacedæmonians in reſiſtance to Thebes, to confirm the Athenians in the Lacedæmonian connection, and to reconcile the Greeks, in general, to the claim of Lacedæmon ſtill to hold the territory of Meſſenia. One deficiency in that compoſition, which has earned the particular commendation of an elegant and judicious critic of the Auguſtan age, tho frequently obvious among the Greek political writers, is nevertheleſs here ſtriking, and worthy of notice: no principle of common welfare, fairly extended over Greece, is put forward; but, on the contrary, the Lacedæmonians are incouraged in that narrow patriotiſm, whoſe great object was the excluſive power and happineſs of their own commonwealth; recommended however by the obſervation, that, under the acknowleged ſupremacy of Lacedæmon, civil order and general happineſs had been conſpicuous in Peloponneſus, and almoſt peculiar to it; whereas anarchy and diſcord, public evils and private, many and extreme, had followed the change for the patronage of Thebes.

Iſocr. Archid. p. 54.

de Pace et ad Philipp. & al.

Dionyſ. Hal.

Iſocr. Archid. p. 76, & 82.

p. 56.

The

The caution of Xenophon, inforced by his particular circumſtances, has left us very ſcanty information of the ſtate of parties in Lacedæmon, during all that diſaſtrous period which followed the return of Ageſilaus from Aſia. We gather, however, that Ageſilaus could not always direct meaſures; and ſome expreſſions of Iſocrates imply that for ſome time he had not held a leading influence. The Theban invaſion ſeems to have reſtored it to him. His ability then defended Sparta, his liberality aſſiſted to feed the auxiliaries, for which the public treaſury was unequal; while the misfortunes of the country were attributed to the miſmanagement of others, who had held the miniſtry; and the victory, obtained afterward under the command of his ſon Archidamus, over the Peloponneſian allies of Thebes, would tend powerfully to confirm the renovated power of his party.

Iſocr. Archid. ſub fine.

Xen Ageſil. c. 2. ſ. 24, 25. Plut. vit. Ageſil.

Events, ſoon following, ſhowed the juſtneſs of the views, which decided Ageſilaus and his friends to adviſe perſeverance in war, rather than ſubmiſſion to humiliating and oppreſſive terms, for a precarious peace. By the ſeparate treaty, the nominal ſtrength of Lacedæmon was indeed reduced; but the allies, whoſe coöperation was loſt, were ſo expoſed by ſituation, and ſo unequal to their own defence, that it might be queſtioned if their ſecurity in neutrality was not more advantageous to Lacedæmon than their coöperation, under the perpetual want of protection. The diſſention growing between the moſt powerful allies of Thebes, moſt preſſing by ſituation upon Lacedæmon, at the ſame time fortunately afforded a relief, that very much leſſened the want of their coöperation. When the ſeaſon for action came on, the uſual ſuccours arrived from the tyrant of Syracuſe; the Lacedæmonians aſſembled their forces, and, no interruption occurring from the Theban confederacy, they recovered the important town of Sellaſia, which ſince the Theban invaſion had been held by the revolters.

B.C. 365 [15]. Ol. 103. 4. Xen. Hel. l 7. c. 4. ſ. 12.

The firſt movements of the Peloponneſian allies of Thebes, were againſt one another. In Elis, at this time governed by the ariſtocratical party, a democratical oppoſition was patronized by the Arcadians. Irritated anew by this, while anger at the loſs of their dependencies in Triphylia, through

ſ. 15.

[15] I cannot underſtand Dodwell's reaſon for aſſigning this event, againſt the order of Xenophon's narrative, to the beginning of the former campain, B. C. 366.

the

the violent interference of the Arcadians, was yet freſh, they reſolved to recur to arms; and, attacking Laſion in Triphylia, formerly theirs, but now a tributary dependence of Arcadia, they made themſelves maſters of it. When paſſion urged the Eleian ariſtocracy to a meaſure of violence, which appears to have been highly imprudent, we ſhall leſs wonder if the Arcadian Numberleſs aſſembly, no longer directed by the wiſdom of Lycomedes, gave way alſo to paſſion; if, under the exiſting provocation, all conſideration of the great intereſts, not of Greece only but of the confederacy, were loſt in reſentment, and it was thought enough for prudence to reflect that the ſtrength of Arcadia ſufficed for revenge. The ſtrength of Arcadia, accordingly without delay collected, invaded Eleia. The Eleians met it, with inferior numbers; and, ill-adviſedly coming to action, with diſadvantage alſo of ground, were defeated with conſiderable ſlaughter. The towns of the Eleian highlands then, excepting only Thrauſtus, yielded to the ſummons of the Arcadian generals, while they directed their march toward Olympia. No reſiſtance was found there. A garriſon was placed in the precinct of the temple of Saturn, which, with an intrenchment thrown around, commanded the Olympian mountain: the neighboring town of Marganeæ was gained by the voluntary act of the prevailing party among the inhabitants. The Arcadian army proceeded then to Elis, and its advanced guard entered that unfortified town, and penetrated as far as the agora. Being however there charged by the collected Eleian cavalry, ſupported by infantry, it was driven out again with ſome ſlaughter.

Xen. Hel. l. 7. c. 4. ſ. 12.

B. C. 365. Ol. 103 ¾.

ſ. 13.

ſ. 14.

The diſtreſs of their country, in the uſual way of faction, gave joy to the democratical leaders in Elis, who looked to it as the means of power and party-triumph to themſelves. Under the incouragement it afforded, they opened a traitorous correſpondence with the enemy, and obtaining the terms they deſired, with a promiſe of ſupport, they ſeized the citadel. The ariſtocratical party, however, exerting themſelves inſtantly and vigorouſly, recovered the fortreſs; and then the leaders of the democratical party, with about four hundred of their followers, fled. Received as friends by the Arcadians, and incouraged by them, they ſeized Pylus, a town of Eleia under mount Pholoë, leſs than ten miles from

ſ. 15, 16.

Elis [16]. A ſettlement thus acquired, and the patronage of a conquering army, gave ſuch credit to their cauſe, that numbers quitted the threatened city to join them.

Under theſe circumſtances, the Eleians in poſſeſſion would probably not have been able long, with their ſingle ſtrength, to ſupport themſelves. But the prudent governments of the bordering province of Achaia ſaw their own danger in the fall of Elis, and the preponderance which Arcadia was acquiring in Peloponneſus. The diſtraction of the confederacy, and eſpecially the violence of the Arcadians againſt their allies, operated in favor of the Lacedæmonian intereſt, and already the little commonwealth of Pellenë, being under ariſtocratical government, had ventured to renew its antient connection with Lacedæmon [17]. The other Achaian cities, profeſſing a deſire to avoid hoſtility againſt Arcadia, declared however their purpoſe to protect Elis, and immediately ſent troops to give efficacy to their reſolution. The Arcadians, their firſt vengeance againſt the Eleians being ſatisfied, yielded to an argument ſo well inforced. Deſiſting from farther attempts againſt the city, they however ravaged the country, and leaving the democratical Eleians eſtabliſhed in Pylus, the Achaians not interfering with theſe matters, they withdrew home. The return of Elis to its antient connection with Lacedæmon, then became matter of courſe.

Xen. Hel. l. 7. c. 4. ſ. 29.

While the able leaders of the Theban councils were perplexed, with regard to their intereſts in Peloponneſus, by the violence of the diſſentions among their confederates, their attention was called to the circumſtances of Theſſaly; and, ſtill more urgently, to matters ariſing in Bœotia, and in Thebes itſelf. Orchomenus, the ſecond city of Bœotia, in importance, had been the laſt to acknowlege the ſovereinty of Thebes; and the ariſtocratical, the moſt powerful party there, bore that ſovereinty with extreme

16 There were three principal places of the name of Pylus in Peloponneſus; the Eleian, here ſpoken of, the Triphylian, which, according to Strabo, was Neſtor's reſidence, and the Meſſenian, which became remarkable in the Peloponneſian war.

17 Ἦδη γὰρ πάλιν προσνενεχθήκεισαν οἱ Πελληνεῖς εἰς τὴν τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων συμμαχίαν. Xen. Hel. l. 7. c. 5. ſ. 17. Xenophon has, I think, not explained whether the return to the Lacedæmonian confederacy, here ſpoken of, was after the change occaſioned by the march of Epameinondas into Achaia, or after the partial peace, made by the treaty of Thebes, to which the Pellenians may have been parties.

reluctance

reluctance and diſſatisfaction. In Thebes itſelf, where ariſtocracy had ſo long predominated, an ariſtocratical party was ſtill numerous, but the chiefs were in exile. Theſe founded their hope of reſtoration on the political ſentiments prevailing in Orchomenus, and ſpreading, in a ſmaller degree, among thoſe of higher rank in other Bœotian towns. Communication was had among them, and a plot was formed for a revolution. Diod. l. 15. p. 498.

It was the practice of the Theban government occaſionally to order reviews of the whole cavalry of Bœotia. The conſpirators were moſtly of thoſe ſerving in the cavalry, who in Orchomenus alone were three hundred. The time appointed for a review was choſen for the execution of the plot; but, in the difficulty of due caution, where numbers are to be ingaged, ſome, faithleſs or diſaffected, were let into the ſecret, and they diſcloſed it to the Bœotarcs. Who directed the Theban councils on the occaſion we are not informed; but, amid the abominable cruelty of the vengeance taken, that able policy appears, which commonly diſtinguiſhed the meaſures of the Theban government under Pelopidas and Epameinondas. The conſpirators of the ſmaller towns were pardoned; the Orchomenian cavalry were brought in chains before the aſſembled Theban people. An inveterate hatred, traced even to the heroïc ages, is ſaid to have ſubſiſted between the Thebans and Orchomenians. The death of the guilty cavalry therefore did not ſatisfy popular animoſity. At the ſame time that capital condemnation was pronounced againſt theſe, it was decreed that the town of Orchomenus ſhould be levelled, and the whole people ſold to ſlavery. Force only could carry into execution ſuch a decree. The Thebans marched in arms to Orchomenus, already deprived of its leaders and its cavalry, and, becoming maſters of the town, put to death all the men, and ſold the women and children [18].

[18] According to Pauſanias (l. 9. c. 15. p. 740.) this tranſaction took place while Pelopidas and Epameinondas were abſent; the former priſoner in Theſſaly, the other marching to his relief. According to Diodorus, it was three years after the releaſe of Pelopidas. Miſtakes indeed abound in the chronology of Diodorus; but Diodorus was a chronologer, and meant to be exact. Pauſanias was an antiquarian; generally, as Dodwell has well obſerved, much more accurate than Diodorus, but unverſed in politics, ill-verſed in hiſtory, and inattentive to the courſe of political events.

Xenophon, intent upon tranſactions in Peloponneſus, in which he was deeply intereſted, and where everything paſſed, in a manner, under his eye, has omitted notice of theſe tranſactions in Bœotia and in Theſſaly.

The danger, which had threatened the exiſting government of Thebes, being, by this dreadful execution, averted, the leading men had leiſure to direct their views around; and, while the diſtractions among their Peloponneſian allies repelled, circumſtances in other quarters invited their interference. The averſion among the Theſſalian cities to the tyrant tagus, Alexander of Pheræ, notwithſtanding the general ill ſucceſs of the Thebans in that country, kept alive a Theban party there. New oppreſſion from Alexander had excited new reſiſtance to his authority; but his abilities and activity inabled him to overbear his opponents, who, in their diſtreſs, applied to Thebes for ſupport; and for commander they requeſted Pelopidas, whoſe military talents and popular manners, when formerly commanding in their country, had procured him general favor and eſteem. The ſupreme aſſembly of Bœotia was ſummoned; it was decreed that the Theſſalian cities ſhould be ſupported; and Pelopidas led an army of ſeven thouſand men through the ſtraits of Thermopylæ. Alexander, with ſuperior forces, on advantageous ground, waited his attack, which Pelopidas, perhaps too much truſting in the ſuperiority of the Bœotian heavy-armed, raſhly made. Pelopidas himſelf fell. If Diodorus, Nepos, and Plutarch might be believed, his army nevertheleſs obtained a complete victory; but the conciſe account of Alexander by Xenophon, and the incidental mention of the tranſactions of Pelopidas in Theſſaly by Polybius, imply ſomething ſo different, that allowance, apparently, muſt be made for exaggeration, in the panegyric of the biographers, and the report of the later hiſtorian. A dubious victory, however, a drawn battle, with a large Bœotian force remaining in the country, may have afforded great relief to the party which had taken arms againſt the tagus; and then wherever that party predominated, thoſe honors to the memory of the ſlain general, ſtatues, and golden crowns, with grants of land to his family, which Nepos has reported, would follow in the common courſe of party meaſures.

Diod. l. 15. Plut. & Corn. Nep. vit. Pelop.

Pelopidas appears to have been a man of an active, enterprizing, bold, and generous ſpirit, very popular manners, and good, but not great, abilities. Scarcely equal to the lead of councils, or perhaps of armies, in the great and arduous circumſtances in which his exertion had contributed much

to

to place his country [19], he was, nevertheleſs, by his talents and his virtues, a moſt valuable aſſiſtant to Epameinondas; with whom he ſeems to have lived in perfect friendſhip, above envy and jealouſy. His death was therefore a great loſs, to his friends, to his country, and to thoſe allies who depended upon his country for ſupport.

According to Diodorus, after the death of Pelopidas, the Thebans gained a ſecond great victory in Theſſaly, and Plutarch relates that Alexander was completely ſubdued. Xenophon and Polybius forbid intire credit to this; yet there ſeems reaſon for ſuppoſing that the affairs of Thebes in Theſſaly continued to be ably conducted. The reſult, as we learn from Xenophon, was a treaty of peace and alliance with the tagus, and an accommodation, under the mediation of Thebes, between the tagus and the Theſſalian cities, which appear to have been altogether creditable and advantageous. Xen. Hel. l. 7. c. 5. ſ. 4.

It is remarkable that, in this war, in which Athens and Thebes were ingaged on oppoſite ſides, we hear of no ravage of the Attic fields by the powerful armies of Bœotia, nor of any attempt againſt Bœotia by the Attic forces. Both ſtates ſent troops to act againſt each other, at a diſtance from the territories of both, in Peloponneſus; remaining quiet at home, as if by compact: perhaps compact, if not formally expreſſed, yet really underſtood, and upheld by a mutual ſenſe of its convenience. But the genius of Epameinondas, intent upon raiſing his country, tho he would not ingage it in ruinous hoſtilities with Athens by land, formed the bold project of making Thebes a maritime power, and conteſting with Athens Diod. l. 15. p. 498.

[19] We may, apparently, truſt the poſitive aſſertion of Nepos and Plutarch, ſupported by the leſs explicit teſtimony of Diodorus, that Pelopidas was one of the leaders, and he would of courſe be among the moſt active of them, in the conſpiracy by which Thebes was recovered from the Lacedæmonians; tho in the detailed account of that remarkable tranſaction by the cotemporary hiſtorian, and even in the account given at ſome length by Diodorus, the name of Pelopidas never occurs. It is in ſumming up his praiſes only, where he relates his death, that Diodorus mentions the univerſal acceptance of the report, which gave the firſt merit in that buſineſs to Pelopidas, without at all ſtating what particular part Pelopidas took in the buſineſs, but rather implying that he had no certain information of it. Ἐν γὰρ τῇ τῶν φυγάδων καταλήψει, καθ' ἣν ἀνεκτήσαντο τὴν Καδμείαν, ὁμολογημένως ἄπαιξε τοῦτον (τῷ Πελοπίδᾳ) τὸ πρωτεῖον τοῦ κατορθώματος ἀποφέρουσι. This is the whole of what he has undertaken to ſay on the ſubject. Yet Plutarch, near two centuries after him, and near five after Xenophon, has not ſcrupled to deſcribe the ſingle combat, and the complex conteſts, of Pelopidas, in the courſe of a ſeries of nocturnal aſſaſſinations, as if he had been preſent as a quiet ſpectator, in a theater, where they were repreſented before him.

the

the empire of the ſea. The circumſtances of the rich ilands of Rhodes and Chios, and of the important town of Byzantium, ſeem principally to have invited his attention to that point. Perhaps thoſe places had been ſuffering from Athenian tyranny, or were diſguſted by Athenian arrogance; for Athens, during the war in Peloponneſus, had been ſilently riſing to empire again, among the ilands and on the coaſts of the Ægean; and we learn enough, from Xenophon and from Iſocrates, that they again exerciſed that power tyrannically. Thus a pretence would not be wanting for the Theban confederacy to interfere, in vindication of Grecian freedom. Epameinondas collected ſuch a naval force, and conducted it ſo ably, that he ſupported Rhodes, Chios, and Byzantium againſt the Athenian fleet, commanded by Laches, and ingaged all thoſe ſtates in alliance with Thebes. But tho he was thus ſucceſsful in one expedition, probably well timed and rapidly executed, yet it is abundantly evident that he was never able really to conteſt, with the Athenians, the command of the ſea. Within the ſame year, according even to Diodorus, his eulogiſt, from whom alone we have any account of theſe naval tranſactions, Timotheus, commander-in-chief of the ſea and land forces of Athens, relieved Cyzicus in the Propontis, when beſieged, if not by Epameinondas in perſon, yet by the armament which had been acting under him, and took the important towns of Toronë and Potidæa on the Thracian coaſt; nor do we hear of any farther naval enterprize of the Thebans [20].

[20] The year to which Diodorus has referred theſe tranſactions is the ſecond of the hundred and fourth Olympiad. They are unconnected with any other matter reported to us, that can either confirm or diſprove this date. Coming only on the authority of Diodorus, they appeared however to require notice; and, as they might be introduced here, without injury to the connection of the narrative, it has been done, to avoid inconvenient interruption hereafter.

SECTION

SECTION V.

Invaſion of Eleia by the Arcadians, of Arcadia by the Lacedæmonians: Arcadian Eparites, or ſelect Militia: Liberality in Grecian law of war. Interference of the Arcadians in the preſidency of the Olympian feſtival; battle of Olympia.

LACEDÆMON, and the Lacedæmonian cauſe in Greece, ſeemed now reviving from threatened diſſolution. But leiſure was ſtill wanted, to repreſs or compoſe revolt, and reſtore civil order, over the antient territory of Sparta, when a new invaſion of Eleia by the Arcadians, and a new defeat, which the Eleians, venturing a battle, had ſuffered, compelled attention, from the Lacedæmonian government, to the diſtreſs and danger of its firſt returning ally. Archidamus was therefore placed at the head of an army, with which he invaded Arcadia. He took the town of Cromnus, and putting three lochi in garriſon there, led the reſt of his army home. B. C. 364. Ol. 104. 1.

Xen. Hel. l. 7. c. 4. ſ. 19.

As far as immediate relief to the Eleians only was in view, this meaſure appears to have been well conceived; but the foreſight, not of the ſtateſman only, but of the general alſo, ſhould have extended farther. The Arcadians, feeling all the expected uneaſineſs at the eſtabliſhment of a hoſtile poſt within their country, withdrew their troops from Eleia; and, collecting their whole force at Cromnus, haſtily ſurrounded it with a contravallation and circumvallation. The Lacedæmonians, not till their garriſon was already blockaded, in much alarm for it, reäſſembled their army, and committed the command again to Archidamus. The ſame deficiency of weapons and art of attack, which compelled the Arcadians to the ſlow method of blockade, againſt a weakly fortified place with a ſmall garriſon, deterred Archidamus from aſſault upon the Arcadian lines. His object was to allure or provoke the beſiegers to quit them, and with this view he carried ravage through the rebellious Lacedæmonian province of Skiritis, and, as far

far as he could, into Arcadia. But the able generals of the Arcadians were not to be ſo diverted from their purpoſe. Within their lines they kept their army ſecure, and the blockade cloſe.

Xen. Hel. l. 7. c. 4. §. 22. Archidamus now ſaw that, to relieve Cromnus, he muſt force the lines. The circumvallation, incloſing part of a hill, was commanded by the ſummit. If he could poſſeſs himſelf of the ſummit, he thought the Arcadians could not long hold their ſituation beneath. With this view, he was winding his march round the hill, when his advanced guard, compoſed of targeteers and cavalry, ſeeing the choſen body of Arcadians, called the Eparites, without their lines, attacked them. The Eparites ſeem to have been an eſtabliſhment made by thoſe able men who formed the union of Arcadia. They were a ſelect militia, compoſed of citizens from every republic of the union, who were to be always ready for the general ſervice. The deſultory aſſault of the Lacedæmonians was received, by this well-trained body, without moving. It was renewed upon them, and then they advanced againſt the aſſailants. Archidamus turned to ſupport his targeteers, leading his heavy-armed along the carriage-road, in a narrow column of march. In this weak order he was attacked by the Arcadians formed in phalanx. The Lacedæmonians, apparently, ſhould not have ſwerved from their firſt object to make the attack: they were now unable to withſtand the firmer order of the Arcadians: Archidamus himſelf was ſeverely wounded in the thigh: Chilon, his ſiſter's huſband, and not leſs than thirty other Spartans, moſtly of the higheſt rank, were killed. Quickly however the Lacedæmonians gained ground, on which, notwithſtanding the preſſure upon them, their ready diſcipline inabled them to form; and then the Arcadians halted. But it appeared that the tranſgreſſion of thoſe precepts of their great lawgiver, which forbad laſting war, and frequent wars with the ſame enemy, had already been carried too far. Not the Thebans only, but the Arcadians alſo, began to vie with them in diſcipline; and that perſuaſion of their ſuperiority to all mankind, which had aſſiſted formerly to render the Lacedæmonians invincible, was gone by. They were now, in number, ſuperior; but diſheartened by their prince's wound, and the death of thoſe around him, while the Arcadians were incouraged by the conſideration, always important, that they had been ſucceſsful aſſailants upon a retreating enemy.

§. 23.

§. 24.

The

The action was however on the point of being renewed, when one of the Lacedæmonian elders, perhaps aware of deficiency in the commanders, exclaimed, 'To what purpoſe are we going to fight? Why ſhould not a 'truce rather here end the conteſt?' The propoſal of a truce, under ſuch circumſtances, always implied an acknowlegement of defeat; yet it was approved by the other Lacedæmonians. The Arcadians readily conſented: withdrawing to the ground where they had made their firſt aſſault, they erected their trophy there, and left the Lacedæmonians to perform, at leiſure, the funeral obſequies of their ſlain. Xen. Hel. l. 7. c. 4. ſ. 25.

Where battle begun might ſo be ſtopped (and it is not from a cloſet-ſpeculator of ſome centuries after that we have theſe curious particulars, but a cotemporary, verſed in the din of war and the craſh of armies) it might be not unreaſonably ſuppoſed that opportunity for any negotiation, and a diſpoſition to any juſt accommodation, would be ready. Why then was not negotiation inſtantly begun; firſt for the ſurrender of Cromnus, with ſafety for the garriſon; and then for a ſolid peace? Nothing like either, as far as appears, was thought of. Civilization and reflection, amid much practice in war, had led the Greeks, tho not to the generoſity of modern European warfare, yet to cuſtoms adapted to humanize hoſtility, in ſome degree, and leſſen its horrors; but the circumſtances, altogether, of their political ſyſtem, and the habits which it ſuperinduced, impreſſed much the idea that warfare was the natural ſtate of man, to be regulated, not obviated, by policy and humanity[a]. The Lacedæmonians, after due rites to their dead, withdrew in quiet, under cover of the truce; but, ſoon after, returning by night, attacked the Arcadian lines, and, in one point, forced them. In numbers, however, adapted to ſurprize, too ſmall to contend with the collected ſtrength of the beſieging army, haſty retreat was neceſſary to them; and thoſe only of the garriſon were relieved, who could inſtantly ruſh out and join them: the eſcape of ſomewhat more than a hundred was prevented by the beſiegers. ſ. 27.

Then appeared, in all its extent, the impolicy of a meaſure ſo alarming and irritating to the Arcadians, as the eſtabliſhment of a Lacedæmo-

[a] This appears in all the projects, for improving government, of Plato, Ariſtotle, and others; and in the ſchemes of Iſocrates for obviating the eternal quarrels of the Greeks among themſelves, by directing hoſtility againſt forein nations.

nian garriſon in their country. Their ill diſpoſition toward Thebes, and eſpecially their jealouſy of Theban interference in Peloponneſus, which had contributed, perhaps, beyond anything, to the relief of Lacedæmon from paſſed dangers, and afforded the beſt ground of hope for its future ſecurity and proſperity, now gave way to their anxiety for riddance from ſo annoying and threatening an inconvenience. The deficiency of the art of attack of the age, when a garriſon of a hundred men might defy an army, made all auxiliaries acceptable. For, to proſecute with certain effect the tedious buſineſs of a blockade, the force was to be proportioned, not to that within the place attacked, but to that which, from without, might, at any time during the long operation, attack the beſiegers. The aſſiſtance of all allies was therefore called for, and the guard of the lines was divided between Arcadian, Argian, Theban, and Meſſenian forces. Farther attempts to relieve the place were thus deterred, and the little garriſon was at length ſtarved into a ſurrender.

Xen. Hel. l. 7. c. 4. ſ. 26.

The detention of the Arcadian forces at Cromnus afforded opportunity for the Eleians to direct their whole ſtrength againſt their apoſtate fellow-citizens in Pylus; who, venturing a battle, were defeated, and about two hundred were made priſoners. The Eleian citizens, among theſe, were all put to death; the reſt were ſold for ſlaves. Siege being then laid to Pylus and Margancæ, both were taken.

ſ. 28.

The ſeaſon of the feſtival of the hundred and fourth Olympiad now approached, while an Arcadian garriſon commanded Olympia, and the neighboring country, adhering to the Arcadian intereſt, remained in what the Eleians eſteemed rebellion againſt them. The Arcadians, having freed themſelves from the annoyance of a Lacedæmonian garriſon, within their country, did not immediately propoſe any new aggreſſion againſt the Eleians, but they reſolved not to ſurrender Olympia to them for the purpoſes of the feſtival. A ſhock was thus hazarded to the prejudices, and an interruption to the injoyments of the Greek nation, which might have excited extenſive enmity; but means for obviating this, to a conſiderable degree, were found in the diſputed title of the Eleians to the preſidency, which they had been uninterruptedly exerciſing ſo many years. The Arcadians would not aſſume that preſidency, in their own name; they affected to reſtore the ſacred right to the Piſæans, who had never ceaſed

ceaſed to claim it, againſt what they termed the Eleian uſurpation; and thus was obtained the ſupport of ſome of the moſt powerful ſtates of Greece; perhaps diſſatisfied, as we have ſeen Lacedæmon formerly, with the manner in which the Eleians may, on ſome occaſions, have exerciſed the power conceded to them at the Olympian meeting. The Argians ſent two thouſand heavy-armed to aſſiſt in maintaining the preſidency of the Piſæans; and even the Athenians, in favor of their new allies of Arcadia, againſt Elis, the confederate of Lacedæmon, while Lacedæmon was the confederate of Athens (ſo the intereſts of the Grecian republics became complicated) ſent five hundred horſe, which, among the Peloponneſian armies, would be a very conſiderable body.

On the other hand, the Eleians, eſteeming their right of preſidency at the Olympian feſtival a moſt valuable inheritance derived from their foreſathers, reſolved to ſpare no exertion in aſſerting it. They ingaged the Achaians in their intereſt; and, waiting then till the time when the concourſe would be formed (for ſuch was the public confidence in the ſacred eſtimation of the place and ſeaſon, that perſons led by curioſity or buſineſs had flocked, nearly as uſual, from every ſettlement of the Greek nation) they marched to Olympia.

The Eleians, tho ingaged in frequent wars, were held in the loweſt eſtimation, among the Greeks. as a military people; looked upon with a degree of contempt, not only by the Arcadians, Argians, and Athenians, but by their own allies the Achaians. The Arcadians therefore, the more confident in their preſent ſtrength, on account of their late ſucceſs againſt Elis, took no meaſures for preventing, or even obſerving the approach of an enemy. They were attending the exhibition of the games, in all leiſure; the horſerace was over; the pentathlon, or conteſt of five exerciſes, was going forward; the athletes, who had already run, were proceeding to wreſtle; no longer in the courſe, ſays Xenophon, who is likely to have been preſent, but between the courſe and the altar; when the alarm was given, that the Eleians were already on the verge of the Altis, the incloſure conſecrated to the purpoſes of the celebrity. The Arcadians then hurried into order of battle, on the bank of the brook Cladaüs, which, waſhing one ſide of the Altis, preſently joins the Alpheius. The Eleians, advancing in good order, on each ſide of the Cladaüs, broke the Arca-

Xen. Hel. l. 7. c. 4. ſ. 30.

ſ. 29.

dian phalanx with the firſt ſhock, and then were equally ſucceſsful againſt the Argians, haſtening to ſupport it. The diſordered troops retreated, and the Eleians purſued among the public and ſacred buildings, to the ſpace between the council-hall, the temple of Veſta, and the adjoining theater. There the advantage afforded for defence, and for the uſe of miſſile weapons, by thoſe ſolid and lofty edifices, inabled the defeated to ſtand, and the victors ſuffered ſome loſs before they withdrew to their camp.

Xen. Hel. l. 7. c. 4. ſ. 32.

The Arcadians and their allies, however, it appeared, felt themſelves very effectually defeated. No longer thinking of oppoſing the Eleians in the field, they were all night employed in forming defences; the ſcaffolding and ſheds, raiſed for the accommodation of perſons attending the celebrity, furniſhing materials for a paliſade [19]. By morning, they had ſo fortified the avenues, and ſo diſpoſed troops on the temple-tops, that the Eleians, on a view of the oppoſition prepared for them, prudently abſtained from farther aſſault. Xenophon has declared his aſtoniſhment at what they had already done. After mentioning the previous diſrepute of their military character, he expreſſes himſelf thus: 'On this occaſion the 'Eleians ſhowed themſelves ſoldiers, ſuch as the deity, giving courage by 'inſpiration, might make in a day; but the art of men, employed on 'thoſe not naturally brave, could not in a long time form.'

But the poverty of the Grecian ſtates, the diſproportion of their public revenue to their military force (except when Athens or Lacedæmon received tribute from many ſubject republics) generally prevented any regular plan of a campain, and often denied what ſhould have been the immediate fruit of victory. The Eleians, not ſtrong enough to carry Olympia by aſſault, not rich enough to ſubſiſt long from home, at a loſs in any way to puſh the advantage gained, returned to Elis.

[19] It appears from this circumſtance that the ſpectators and men of buſineſs, at the Olympian meeting, did not view this extraordinary conteſt quite ſo much at their eaſe as Diodorus has repreſented.

SECTION

SECTION VI.

Sacrilegious robbery of the Olympian treaſury, by the democratical adminiſtration of Arcadia: Oppoſition of Mantineia to the ſacrilege: Support ſolicited from Thebes by the perpetrators: Remonſtrance againſt interference from Thebes by the Arcadian ſoverein aſſembly: Congreſs at Tegea: Violence of the Theban commiſſioner; ſupported by Epameinondas: Reünion of Arcadia, Achaia, and Elis, in alliance with Lacedæmon.

BY the retreat of the victorious Eleians, the Arcadians were left at liberty to chuſe their meaſures. The force of Arcadia might perhaps have ſufficed for revenge, but that Arcadia, like Elis, wanted pecuniary reſources. The Eparites, none probably ſo poor as not to poſſeſs a ſlave, could generally ſubſiſt from their private means, while the defence of their own country, or a haſty expedition only, into a neighboring province, was required of them. But already they began to be preſſed by their detention at Olympia; far from their homes, and yet ſurrounded by a friendly territory, which put plunder at a diſtance; uneaſy, at the ſame time, under their late defeat, which would not diſpoſe them to bear, with increaſed patience, the inconveniencies of want. If, to relieve them, Olympia was left without an Arcadian force, the conſiderable acquiſitions made, through the firſt ſucceſſes in the war, would be at once loſt; and the Piſæans, Triphylians, all thoſe, on pretence of protecting whom the war had been undertaken, muſt be expoſed to the vengeance of the Eleians. Theſe conſiderations preſſed upon the democratical chiefs, now at the head of the Arcadian affairs, while a ſtrong ariſtocratical oppoſition ſtill exiſted in their country. Shame, anger, revenge, intereſt, ambition, fear, the fear of all thoſe evils, uſually, in the Grecian republics, following the loſs of popularity and its attendant power, inſtigated, and the Olympian treaſury was before them. The temptation altogether was greater than they could reſiſt. Careleſs, perhaps, about the puniſhments which, in vulgar opinion, would certainly follow from the vengeance of the

the gods, they reſolved to brave thoſe, moſt ſeverely denounced, for the crime of ſacrilege, throughout Greece, by the laws of men; truſting to the means, which the crime itſelf would furniſh, for their ſecurity. They expected aſſuredly to gain the Eparites; whoſe ſupport would inable them to overbear oppoſition within their own country; and they had great confidence in the efficacy of the riches, which they ſhould make their own, for negotiation without.

The amount altogether of the plunder, which, under this reſolution, may have been committed upon the ſacred treaſury of Olympia, perhaps was never publicly known; but the ſource of a pay, eſtabliſhed, and regularly iſſued for the Eparites, under authority of the adminiſtration of a confederacy of democracies, not to be concealed, appears indeed to have been boldly avowed. Powerful however as the means were, which the democratical chiefs had laid their hands upon, for obviating oppoſition and complaint, they could not prevent the uſe of the opportunity, which their meaſure afforded to the ariſtocratical party, for exciting honeſt indignation, and alarming popular ſuperſtition. In Mantineia the ariſtocratical appears to have been the prevailing party. There a decided oppoſition to the meaſure was preſently reſolved upon, by thoſe at the head of affairs; and it was conducted with a temperate firmneſs, which made it formidable. A deputation was ſent, in the name of the municipal government of Mantineia, to thoſe who directed the adminiſtration of the union, declaring, 'that the Mantineians, deſirous to ſupport, with their beſt 'means, the intereſt of the united Arcadian people, would however avoid 'implication in the guilt of ſacrilege: that they had therefore remitted a 'ſum of money, collected among themſelves, equal to their ſhare of the 'pay at preſent wanted for the Eparites; and againſt all ſacrilegious uſe of 'the Olympian treaſure, they utterly proteſted.'

Xen. Hel. l. 7. c. 4. ſ. 33.

But the democratical chiefs, who, in conſidering the different dangers before them, had perhaps thought it ſafer to commit the crime, than either to abandon the direction of public affairs, or ſtruggle, in the management of them, againſt the difficulties of public penury, were not now diſpoſed to retreat. Suppoſing their party ſure in the Numberleſs aſſembly, they cited the leading men of Mantineia [23] before that body, to anſwer for their

[23] Τοὺς πρωτάτας ἀνδρῶν.

conduct,

conduct, as a treaſonable oppoſition to the authority of the united Arcadian government. This citation, the Mantineians, doubting the independency or the impartiality of a majority in the aſſembly, avoided to obey. It is indeed a curious complication of tyranny and weakneſs, of public corruption and private inſecurity, that is diſplayed in the cotemporary hiſtorian's account of the meaſures of that new united government, which had been propoſed to the Arcadians as the perfection of democracy. The aſſembly proceeded to paſs a decree of condemnation againſt the contumacious Mantineians, as if they had been tried and regularly convicted. This indeed was familiar in the Greek juriſprudence. A body of Eparites was ſent to apprehend them; but the Mantineians, who had reſolved to diſobey a legal ſummonce, were prepared alſo to reſiſt force: they ſhut the gates of their town, and refuſed admittance to thoſe who came with the authority, or at leaſt in the name, of the ſoverein aſſembly of Arcadia.

Civil war thus was, in effect, declared. The oppoſition of the Mantineians could in truth be juſtified only by what might juſtify reſiſtance to any eſtabliſhed government. Sound political principle, as we have had frequent occaſion to obſerve, was little found in Greece; but ſuperſtition, commonly powerful, operated, perhaps on this occaſion, in concurrence with the beſt political principle, in favor of the Mantineian chiefs. The ariſtocratical party, throughout Arcadia, would of courſe be with them. At the ſame time doubt, ſhame, fear, began to ſpread among thoſe inclined to the democratical cauſe; fear of the divine vengeance, and fear of the reproaches and enmity of all Greece; inſomuch that many of them alſo declared againſt the obnoxious meaſure. The dreadful idea of involving themſelves and their families, to lateſt poſterity, in guilt with gods and men, had a growing effect, which the bold authors of the crime could not repreſs; and ſhortly a majority of the Numberleſs, or the Ten-thouſand, repented, ſo far as to come to a reſolution, 'that no farther treſpaſs 'upon the ſacred treaſury ſhould be allowed.' Xen. Hel. l. 7. c. 4. ſ. 34.

This reſolution, moderate as it might ſeem, reduced the authors of the ſacrilege, hitherto leaders of the Arcadian politics, at once to a ſituation of extreme peril, by depriving them of that ſource of power to which they had looked for ſafety. They could no longer hold their influence over the Eparites; many of whom were unable, and many others

little

little willing, to ſerve, out of their own country, on their private means. The ſtoppage of a pay, which was become a public condition of their ſervice, affording a pretence, many went home. By the laws of the union, apparently, the towns for which they had ſerved were to ſupply their places. Men of principal property had hitherto avoided inrolment among the Eparites. But they had now ſeen the danger of truſting to thoſe who had little or nothing, what would inable them to take all; and to avoid, ſays the cotemporary hiſtorian, being ſubjected by the Eparites, they reſolved to be Eparites. This was another blow to the democratical leaders. No proſecution was yet inſtituted, or, as far as appears, threatened againſt them; but, loſing thus their influence in the army, after having loſt their majority in the ſoverein aſſembly, everything was to be apprehended for thoſe implicated in a crime which, by the laws of all Greece, was capital, and the puniſhment generally to be inflicted without trial. One reſource remained to them. Thebes, or at leaſt thoſe who now ruled the Theban councils, had a great intereſt in ſupporting them; as their downfal would be, in courſe, followed by a renewal of the antient connection of Arcadia with Lacedæmon. That proud independency, which the Arcadians had made their glory, and that jealouſy of Theban interference, which they had been taught to eſteem their eſſential policy, were no longer conſiderations for the democratical leaders: they applied urgently and expreſſly for a Theban army to march into Peloponneſus: 'If it was delayed,' they ſaid, 'Lacedæmonian influence would quickly 'again rule Arcadia.'

How far this meaſure was neceſſary to their ſafety, we can only conjecture; forming our judgement by what we find to have been common in Grecian political conteſts. That their power was gone, that their views of ambition were fruſtrated, unleſs they could obtain ſupport from Thebes, the cotemporary hiſtorian has clearly ſhown. The ariſtocratical party had ſo gained ground, that a majority in the multitudinous ſoverein aſſembly of Arcadia went with it; not in oppoſition to the ſacrilege only, but generally; a circumſtance in itſelf ſpeaking not a little in favor of the ariſtocratical leaders. The application of the democratical chiefs to Thebes, and its favorable reception there, becoming known, was taken into conſideration. The democratical party ſeems to have been ſtill too powerful,

in

in the yet but half-formed union of the republics, to be effectually reſtrained by the ſoverein aſſembly; but, under authority of that aſſembly, miniſters were ſent to remonſtrate, at Thebes, againſt the propoſed march of Theban forces into Arcadia, uncalled for by the Arcadian government. This meaſure being taken, the Eleian war and the circumſtances of Olympia became the next ſubjects for debate. In the diſcuſſion of theſe it was obſerved, 'That the charge and preſidency of the temple neither of 'right belonged to the Arcadians, nor were to be coveted by them; that 'the reſtoration of both to the Eleians would be moſt conſonant to juſtice 'and religion, and moſt acceptable to the god; that, in truth, no cauſe 'for continuing the war with Elis exiſted;' and thus it was decreed by the aſſembly. The Eleians gladly conſented to a negotiation for peace upon ſuch grounds; a truce was inſtantly concluded; and miniſters from all the Arcadian cities aſſembling in Tegea, there received miniſters from Elis. Xen. Hel. l. 7. c. 4. ſ. 35.

In this critical moment, when the fate of Greece, for all futurity, was on the balance, the wiſdom, the magnanimity, the inlarged patriotiſm of a Lycomedes, ſingularly wanted among the Arcadians, unfortunately were not found; or, if exiſting anywhere, without his active exertion and commanding influence they were inefficacious. The efforts of the ariſtocratical leaders could not prevent the inſulting appearance of a Theban at the congreſs, attended by a body of three hundred Bœotian heavy-armed. Swearing, with ſacrifice and ſolemn ceremony, to the obſervance of the truce, was the firſt buſineſs of the meeting. In this the Theban readily concurred, and objection was made on no part. Banquets were then prepared, the pæan of peace reſounded, a thoughtleſs joy pervaded all; thoſe leading men excepted, who had been principals in the ſacrilege at Olympia. They could not withdraw their conſideration from the diſappointment of their ambition, by the very meaſure which gave occaſion for the general joy, or from the proſecution, to which they had made themſelves legally liable, and the perſecuting manner in which, too commonly in the Greek republics, meaſures were carried againſt a defeated party. The Theban came commiſſioned to give them ſuch ſupport as circumſtances might allow. Communicating with him, they found him full of that patriotiſm, which could throw a veil over honor, revile juſtice, and contemn oaths, when the ſ. 36.

intereſt of his country, or of the party to which he was attached in his country, required. Some of the Eparites were yet devoted to them. Supported by theſe, and by the Bœotians, they ſhut the town-gates, and ſent parties around, to ſeize, in the midſt of the general feſtivity, the leading men of every Arcadian city. The number thus apprehended was ſuch, that, the public priſon not holding all, the townhouſe was alſo filled with them. Many, nevertheleſs, eſcaped; ſome over the town-walls; ſome by favor of thoſe who guarded the gates: for, in this buſineſs, ſays the cotemporary hiſtorian, the animoſity, uſual in Grecian ſedition, actuated none but thoſe who feared capital proſecution; and among thoſe who fled were moſt of the principal Mantineians, whom it had been particularly the object of the conſpirators to ſecure.

Intelligence of this tranſaction quickly reaching Mantineia, diſtant only twelve miles, was thence haſtened over Arcadia, with admonition added for all the towns to be upon their guard againſt what might follow. Heralds were then ſent to Tegea, bearing a requiſition for the liberty of the Mantineians detained there, accompanied by a remonſtrance, inſiſting that no Arcadian ſhould be executed, or even impriſoned, without trial, in due courſe of law; and offering, if any were accuſed of treaſon againſt the union, ſecurity from the Mantinean ſtate for their appearance before the great aſſembly of the nation. It might ſeem as if ſomething of the ſpirit of Lycomedes, ſome idea of juſt government and true civil freedom, and of the proper manner of aſſerting them, exiſted ſtill in Mantineia, and only there.

Xen. Hel. l. 7. c. 4. ſ. 39.

The Theban, to whoſe authority, it appears, the Arcadian conſpirators deferred, ſeems to have been diſconcerted by the ſpirited prudence of the Mantineians. Fearful of the conſequences of the violence to which he had been perſuaded, he ſet all his priſoners at liberty; and, next day, aſſembling as many Arcadians of the different towns as were at hand and would come at his invitation, he apologized for what he had done; miſled, as he pretended, by falſe intelligence of a plot for delivering Tegea to the Lacedæmonians, and of a Lacedæmonian army approaching. The excuſe found little credit, but the apology was accepted, ſo far that he was allowed to depart quietly. The matter however was then taken into ſerious conſideration, by thoſe who directed the Arcadian councils; and the

the reſult ſeems to have been not preciſely what prudence would have dictated to thoſe, whoſe object was to preſerve the peace and independency of Arcadia, which had been ſo indangered, without being yet materially injured: they ſent miniſters to Thebes, to accuſe the author of the late violence, and to inſiſt that his crime ſhould be puniſhed with death.

Epameinondas was then in the high office of general, commander-in-chief; which, in the Theban as in Athenian democracy, ſeems to have conferred, for its period, a kingly power; far leſs regularly controuled, by any conſtitutional checks, than the authority of the Lacedæmonian kings; and, when an overbearing party in the tumultuary ſoverein aſſembly favored, it was, like the power of an Aſiatic vizier, the favorite of his deſpot, uncontrouled. To the general the Arcadians were to addreſs themſelves. We do not find Xenophon often vouching for words, ſpoken by his cotemporaries, with that unqualified aſſurance, with which ſome, who wrote four or five hundred years after him, have undertaken to give them. On this occaſion, the only one on which we find any cenſure upon his political enemy, Epameinondas, even implied, he relates what that great man ſaid; but his caution in ſo doing deſerves notice: affirming nothing from himſelf, he ſtates the report, which the Arcadian miniſters, on their return, made to their government: 'Epameinondas told them,' they ſaid, 'that the Theban commiſſioner in Tegea had done far better when he 'ſeized the principal Arcadians, than when he releaſed them: for, the 'Thebans having ingaged in the war only to ſerve Arcadia, any negotia-'tion for peace, without communication with Thebes, was treaſon againſt 'the confederacy. Be aſſured therefore,' he added, 'we will march into 'Arcadia; and, with our numerous friends there, who have been faithful 'to the common cauſe, we will proſecute the war [24].

Xen. Hel. l. 7. c. 4. ſ. 40.

[24] Diodorus has given a ſtrange inconſiſtent account of the affairs of Arcadia and Elis, which led to the fourth expedition of Epameinondas into Peloponneſus. Not the leading men of the united adminiſtration of Arcadia, according to him, but the Mantineian chiefs alone purloined the ſacred treaſure of Olympia; for no public purpoſe, but for private lucre; and it was they who, to prevent leiſure for inquiry into their conduct, fomented the Eleian war. That the chiefs of the united adminiſtration had the Olympian treaſury in their power, appears from his own narrative; but how the Mantineians ſeparately could command it, he neither informs us, nor ſeems to have ſtopped to conſider; and he appears totally to have forgotten, what he had juſt before related, that it was through the previous exiſtence of war with Elis that any of them could lay their

The communication of this report put Peloponneſus in a ferment. All the independent intereſt, if an appoſite modern phraſe may be allowed, were indignant, yet at the ſame time alarmed, at the preſumption of Thebes, to command war for them, within their own peninſula, when they deſired peace; and to march an army into their country, to inforce ſuch commands. The governments of Arcadia, Elis, and Achaia united in theſe ſentiments. They ſent, in common, to Athens, ſtill connected in that alliance with Arcadia which was the laſt political work of Lycomedes, in ſome confidence that the Athenians would feel themſelves bound by intereſt, not leſs than by treaty, to prevent the Thebans from becoming maſters of Peloponneſus; and they were not diſappointed. They ſent with not leſs confidence to Lacedæmon, tho hitherto the enemy of Arcadia, but already ingaged anew in friendly connection with Achaia and Elis. The humiliation of Lacedæmon is ſtrongly marked by what followed. A propoſal which, in the early days of Ageſilaus, would have been ſcorned and reſented, was now, tho far from adapted to promote the common object, readily accepted. It was agreed that the combined troops, when within the territory of any ſtate of this new confederacy, ſhould be commanded in chief by the general of that ſtate, under direction of its government.

their hands upon the Olympian treaſury. Poſſibly he had not ready opportunity to conſult Xenophon's clear detail, when he inriched his book with this ſtring of abſurdities; which ſeems too groſs to have had vogue when the facts were recent, but may have been recommended afterward, by the vehemence of party diſpute, to ſome author (perhaps Dionyſiodorus or Anaxis, Bœotian writers of Grecian hiſtory, mentioned at the cloſe of his fifteenth book) whoſe work may have fallen too temptingly in his way.

SECTION

SECTION VII.

Principles of Grecian politics. Fourth expedition of the Thebans, under Epaminondas, into Peloponneſus; ſecond invaſion of Laconia; battle of Mantineia.

WE may, perhaps, on firſt view, rather wonder at the former ſubmiſſion of the Grecian republics to the Lacedæmonian ſupremacy, than at the aſſertion now of the right of equality. But it will readily occur that this right of equality, however juſtly claimed, could not be exerciſed, when a powerful enemy preſſed, without riſking great inconvenience to the common cauſe. Republics, therefore, like individuals, when fear, revenge, or ambition inſtigated, often conceded their equality for the advantage of military ſubordination. Hence aroſe temptation and opportunities for leading and ambitious men, which prevented the poſſibility of laſting peace in Greece, and muſt prevent it wherever a democracy may exiſt, ſtrong enough to contend with neighboring powers. Where gradation of rank is eſtabliſhed, and means of riſing are open, ambition which, undoubtedly, for wiſe purpoſes, hath been implanted in the mind of man, has ſome opportunity for gratification, even in a ſettled government in peace; but a democracy, in peace, is, for the ambitious man, a blank: war or civil diſturbance are neceſſary to him; and when war or ſedition are once afloat, no government ſo teems with opportunities, none offers ſo wide a field for ambition as democracy. Hence the moſt ambitious men are commonly zealous for democracy: by far the largeſt portion of ſucceſsful uſurpers have begun their career as favorites of the multitude: and hence the perpetual wars of Greece, and the perpetual ſeditions. We have ſeen what inſecurity public and private, what continual apprehenſion, what almoſt continual evils reſulted. In a country ſo conſtituted, ſhould any commonwealth, acquiring ſtrength to controul others, exerciſe it ſo as to check miſchievous ambition, and inforce any tolerable civil order, popularity would of courſe accrue to it, as far as ſuch benefits were extended. Thus, at the time of the Perſian invaſions, the attachment of

the

the greater part of Greece to Lacedæmon was like that of a clan to an individual chief, or a nation to its hereditary king, to the admitted right of ſucceſſion in whoſe family it had owed ages of internal peace. At the ſame time the reſt of Greece, as all the older writers teſtify, looked to ſubjection even under the Perſian monarch, as likely to avert more evils than it would bring. When the ſuperintending power then of Lacedæmon, through abuſe, became intolerable, ſtill the other republics felt the neceſſity of a head. Thus Athens roſe; and when the power abuſed by Athens became alſo intolerable, it only reverted to Lacedæmon to be again abuſed. Nevertheleſs ſuch was felt to be the neceſſity of a ſuperintending authority among the jarring republics, that, when a few extraordinary men had raiſed Thebes, from bondage under Lacedæmon, to dominion over Bœotia, no ſooner was her new power of giving protection obſerved, than it drew the regard of neighboring ſtates; and Thebes appears to have been in no ſmall degree invited to aſpire to the empire of Greece. The ſmaller republics, in general, ſaw ſuch a riſing power with more hope than jealouſy: the larger, which themſelves aſpired at ſupremacy, viewed it through a different medium. Since the battle of Cnidus and the return of Conon, Athens had been alternately advancing and loſing ground, but altogether gradually advancing, in ſtrength and in dominion. No ariſtocracy, oligarchy, or monarchy would ſo in all points meet and thwart her intereſt as an imperial democracy. It was thus the ſame principle which formerly animated Syracuſe againſt Athens, that now determined the Athenians to perſevere, in alliance with Lacedæmon, for the purpoſe of oppoſing the ambition and the growing power of Thebes.

Antiquity has ſo conſented in unqualified eulogy of Epameinondas, that it might be hazardous, for a modern, to queſtion the integrity of his views and the propriety of his conduct, if the paſſions which, evidently and confeſſedly, in ſome degree inſtigated him, ambition and the love of glory, were not themſelves ſomewhat differently eſtimated in the antient and in the modern moral balance, and if political right and wrong were not alſo, in antient and in modern times, diſtinguiſhed by different criteria. The violence of his interference in the affairs of Arcadia, againſt the eſtabliſhed government of the country, in ſupport of a faction diſgraced by a profligate act, ſeems not to be juſtified upon any principle that

that will be now admitted. Motives however of conſiderable weight for his reſolution to march into Peloponneſus evidently exiſted. It appears clearly enough, tho not directly ſaid by Xenophon, that Lacedæmonian intrigue had contributed to the revolution in Arcadia; beginning with Mantineia, and finally pervading the united government. Neverthelefs this, apparently, ſhould have been oppoſed by negotiation, and would hardly juſtify hoſtile invaſion. Thebes was not attacked, nor any regular ally of Thebes; but the Meſſenians, whom the Thebans had undertaken to protect in their recovered country, were, through the reviving influence of Lacedæmon in Peloponneſus, certainly in great danger. If then Epameinondas can be vindicated from the appearance of ſome wantonneſs of ambition, the right, if ſuch it was, and the duty, which he had created for himſelf, of protecting the Meſſenians, are what may moſt obviouſly be alledged for him. But another at leaſt probable motive to his famous and fatal expedition may deſerve notice. That inherent reſtleſſneſs in the Grecian political ſyſtem, which made it incapable of laſting peace, is acknowleged by all the ableſt writers of the republican times. Thebes was the head of a great military confederacy; and the ſituation of Epameinondas, at the head of the affairs of Thebes, would not be an eaſy one. Very probably he was reduced to make a virtue, as he could, of neceſſity, by undertaking the direction of the effervescence which he could not ſtill [25].

The force that he was able to aſſemble, zealous to ſerve under him, might alone have inflamed the ambition of an ordinary man. The Eubœan towns were now united in that confederacy with Thebes, which bound their men of military age to march at the order of the imperial people. Numerous Theſſalian auxiliaries came, from the tagus, Alexander of Pheræ, and from

Xen Hel. l. 7. c. 5. ſ. 4.

[25] Barthelemi has done little, and even attempted little, toward any illuſtration of the politics, or political hiſtory, of Greece. In his abundant reading he has given his attention much to the panegyriſts of Epameinondas, and it has been a favorite purpoſe of his own to panegyrize Epameinondas. Neverthelefs he deſcribes him as a meer Theban patriot; not even attempting to ſhow that his views extended to the general freedom and well-being of Greece. He uſes the licence, which the plan of his work affords, for omitting all notice of the very remarkable circumſtances which led to the laſt Theban invaſion of Peloponneſus; and taking up his hero already with his army in the heart of Arcadia, he avows, without reſerve or apology, that the purpoſe of the expedition was to decide 'ſi c'etoit au Thebains ou aux Lacedemoniens *de donner des loix aux autres peuples.*' Anacharſis, ch. 13. p. 264. t. 2. ed. oct.

the

the cities which had oppoſed the tagus; for they were now at peace with one another, and equally in alliance with Thebes. Locris was completely ſubject to Thebes [26]. Phocis, boldly aſſerting independency, refuſed obedience to the requiſition for its troops: 'The terms of our 'alliance,' ſaid the Phocians, 'require us to aſſiſt the Thebans if attacked, 'but not to march with them to attack others.'

Xen. Hel. l. 7. c. 5. l. 6.

Leaving this contumacy for future conſideration, Epameinondas, to prevent opportunity for checking his way to his great object, haſtened to paſs the iſthmus. At Nemea he halted; hoping thence to intercept the force expected from Athens, to join the army of the Lacedæmonian confederacy; but, after ſome ſtay, finding himſelf diſappointed by the foreſight of the Athenian government, who ſent their troops by ſea to the Laconian coaſt, he proceeded to Tegea. Here his Peloponneſian allies met him. Argos, commonly zealous in oppoſition to Lacedæmon, was at this time free enough from ſedition to ſend forth its ſtrength. The revived ſtate of Meſſenia was of courſe warm in the Theban intereſt; and ſcarcely leſs ſo thoſe Arcadian ſtates which, by what appears to have been rebellion againſt the united government of their nation, had embraced it. Theſe were principally Tegea, Megalopolis, Aſea, and Palantium, with ſome interſperſed village-republics, through weakneſs and ſituation, neceſſarily dependent on theſe. The army, altogether, according to Diodorus, conſiſted of more than thirty thouſand infantry, and about three thouſand horſe. The army of the Lacedæmonian confederacy, conſiderably inferior, aſſembled about the ſame time in Mantinea. The troops of Arcadia, Achaia, and Elis, formed its principal force. The Lacedæmonians ſent their cavalry and a body of mercenaries to join it, with a ſmall body only of their native infantry, keeping the greateſt part at home.

l. 1. & 9.

Epameinondas remained for ſome time with his whole army inactive within the walls of Tegea [27]; a meaſure of which Xenophon declares his

[26] Of this we are informed by Xenophon on a former occaſion, and therefore perhaps he has omitted to name Locris here.

[27] Τὸ στρατόπεδον ἐν τῷ τειχει τῶν Τεγεατῶν ἐποιήσατο. The word στρατόπεδον, commonly tranſlated, and indeed commonly meaning, *a camp*, was however not confined to that ſenſe, but was uſed ſometimes for what we call *quarters*; as appears from an expreſſion of Xenophon ſoon following: καλὸς στρατοπεδευτάμενος ἔξω τοὺς τείχους, ἐν ταῖς οἰκίαις. Xen. Hel. l. 7. c. 5. ſ. 15.

approbation,

approbation, in terms which ſeem to mark that, in its day, it had not eſcaped cenſure. In the want indeed of a cotemporary hiſtorian the friend of the Theban general, tho with later writers he has been a favorite object of panegyric, yet we find his candid enemy, Xenophon, really his beſt eulogiſt. 'That this expedition was fortunate,' ſays Xenophon, 'I would 'not affirm; but, for what human prudence and courage might accom- 'pliſh, in my opinion Epameinondas failed in nothing. I commend him 'for keeping his army within the walls of Tegea. He deprived the enemy 'thus, not only of opportunity to attack him, but of opportunity to ob- 'ſerve what might indicate his purpoſes: means of preparation nevertheleſs 'for himſelf were readier; and the enemy's motions were equally open to 'his obſervation as if he were incamped without. I commend him alſo, 'becauſe, tho commanding the ſtronger army, he refrained from attack, 'while the enemy held advantage of ground.' The inactivity however, which Xenophon thus approves, could be advantageous only for a limited time. The influence ariſing from the general confidence in the ability and ſpirit of Epameinondas, would indeed inable him to perſevere in it longer than a commander of inferior name; but, in reſt and confinement, diſcontent would grow, even among his troops, collected from various ſtates; his reputation would ſuffer, and then his command would become precarious. Meanwhile of ſome advantages, which he had been expecting, he found himſelf diſappointed: none of the hoſtile or neutral ſtates would be induced, through any terror of his ſuperiority, or any hope of advantage from the change, to join the Theban cauſe.

Xen. Hel. l. 7. c. 5. ſ. 8.

ſ. 9.

Apparently the wiſeſt conduct, for the Lacedæmonian confederacy, would have been to perſevere in preciſely that diſpoſition of their force, which had principally occaſioned the Theban general's inactivity. The Lacedæmonian heavy-armed remaining at home, for the ſecurity of their own country, the army aſſembled at Mantineia had taken a poſition near that town, ſo ſtrong as to deter attack, and ſo advantageous, for covering the Mantineian territory, that Epameinondas, with the very ſuperior force he commanded, had thought it prudent to avoid the uſual work of ravage. But, in ſuch circumſtances, reſt itſelf begets uneaſineſs. The allies feared only the more deſtructive exploſion from the unexpected quieſcence of ſo great a force, under ſo renowned a com-

mander. They could not be ſatisfied to have the Lacedæmonians remain at home, for the protection of their own country, leſs immediately threatened, while they, with unequal numbers, ſhould bear the brunt of a war ſo much more than commonly formidable. They were in conſequence ſo urgent in petition and remonſtrance, that the Lacedæmonian government thought it neceſſary to concede, and all the beſt remaining ſtrength of the ſtate marched under the orders of Ageſilaus.

This meaſure relieved Epamcinondas. Intelligence no ſooner reached him, that Ageſilaus had left Sparta and was already at Pellenë, than he formed his plan and proceeded inſtantly to the execution. Orders were iſſued for the troops to take their evening meal and march. The better road to Sparta, by Sellaſia, and perhaps nearer from Tegea, was open; and ſo deficient was the lookout of the Lacedæmonians, that, but for the providential intelligence, ſo Xenophon calls it[28], brought to Ageſilaus by a Cretan, Sparta would have been taken, he ſays, like a birdſneſt, deſtitute of defenders. Ageſilaus haſtened his return, ſo that he arrived before Epamcinondas. His force, the whole Lacedæmonian cavalry and part of the infantry being at Mantineia, was very ſcanty for the defence of a looſely-built unfortified town, againſt the approaching army. But, for the antient art of war, every houſe was a fortification; every eminence gave great advantage for the antient miſſile weapons. From a houſetop the bowman, ſlinger, and dartman, himſelf ſecure, could aim his ſtrokes at thoſe below, with ſuperior effect.

Xen. Hel. l. 7. c. 5. ſ. 10.

Epameinondas, upon his arrival, diſappointed of his hope of ſurprizing the place, obſerved the able diſpoſition for defence made by Ageſilaus, and determined his plan of attack accordingly. Making no attempt againſt the more open parts, where immediate aſſault was expected, by a circuitous march he ſeized a height commanding the town. 'It may be 'ſaid,' ſays Xenophon, 'that the deïty interfered: it may be ſaid that no-'thing can withſtand the deſperate: certainly,' he proceeds, 'it appears 'extraordinary, that, when Archidamus, with leſs than a hundred men, 'advancing over very difficult ground, attacked that height, the Thebans, 'thoſe men breathing fire, thoſe conquerors of the Lacedæmonians, with

ſ. 11. Diod. l. 15. p. 499. Corn. Nep. vit. Epam. & Ageſ. Plut vit. Ageſ.

Xen. Hel. l. 7. c. 5. ſ. 12.

[28] Κρὴς θείᾳ τινὶ μοίρᾳ προσελθὼν.

'advantage

'advantage of numbers, and with every advantage, did not even wait the 'aſſault, but turned; and ſome of the prime of their army were ſlain.' The Lacedæmonians, elated with ſuch ſucceſs, purſued intemperately, and loſt ſome men; but Archidamus kept poſſeſſion of the important poſt he had carried, raiſed his trophy, and received the enemy's ſolicitation for the bodies of the dead of which he remained maſter; which, on account of the uſual impreſſion on the ſoldiers, on both ſides, was, in the circumſtances in which the Lacedæmonians ſtood, a very important advantage.

Xen. Hel. l. 7. c. 5. ſ. 13.

Plutarch has reported an anecdote of this attack upon Sparta, which, tho ſomewhat apparently extravagant, has been too much noticed to be paſſed unmentioned. Iſadas, ſon of Phœbidas, a youth of a ſingularly fine perſon, juſt anointed, in the way of the Greeks, after bathing, on alarm ſounded, ſnatching a ſpear in one hand, a ſword in the other, ran out naked, preſſed to the foremoſt rank of the Lacedæmonian troops, and did extraordinary execution among the enemy, without receiving a wound: whether, ſays the writer, ſome god preſerved him, or the idea that he was more than human appalled the enemy. For the merit of his deed he was rewarded with the honor of being publicly crowned by the ephors: for the irregularity of it, he was fined a thouſand drachmas, about forty pounds ſterling. Plutarch ſeems to attribute this adventure to the ingagement in which the trophy was won by Archidamus; with which it ſeems utterly inconſiſtent. With more appearance of probability it might be referred to the aſſault, unmentioned indeed by Xenophon, but in which, according to Polybius, the beſieging army penetrated as far as the agora of Sparta [29].

Polyb. l. 9. p. 547.

[29] Iſadas, according to the well imagined conjecture of Mr. James Byres, has been intended in that admirable ſtatue in the villa Borgheſe at Rome, commonly, but enough without reaſonable foundation, called the fighting gladiator; the only work extant, of the firſt-rate Greek ſculpture, in which the human form is repreſented in ſtrong action; unleſs the Laocoon in the Vatican ſhould be arranged in the ſame claſs of deſign, or the Wreſtlers, in the tribune of the gallery at Florence, may be admitted into the ſame claſs of merit. The character of the countenance of the figure in the villa Borgheſe is Grecian and heroic: the difference of the features of the dying gladiator, rightly ſo called, in the Capitol, is ſtriking: the expreſſion is very fine; the work is altogether admirable, and the more ſo becauſe it marks preciſely the character it has been intended to repreſent; not a Greek, for the face is not Grecian; not a hero, for the expreſſion, tho

It appears however to have been the ſucceſs of Archidamus, in carrying the commanding poſt, that deprived Epameinondas of the hope of rapid progreſs againſt the city; and, unprovided as he was, in a hoſtile country, hemmed in by mountains, he deemed it inexpedient to wait till the army from Mantineia, already marching to the relief of Lacedæmon, ſhould arrive. Fertile in reſources, he founded, on the failure of one ſtroke, a plan for another. It was the ſeaſon of harveſt; and the Mantineians, who had confined their ſlaves and cattle within their walls, while he lay in Tegea, would endeavour to profit from his abſence for getting in their crop. Haſtening therefore his return, in expectation to find the produce ready for carrying, with the ſlaves and cattle in the fields, he propoſed to make all his own.

After a march of thirty miles, over a loſty mountain barrier, he allowed his infantry ſome reſt in Tegea; but he ſent his horſe immediately forward, into the Mantineian territory. As he foreſaw, all the laboring ſlaves, all the cattle, and many of the Mantineian people, within and beyond the military age, were in the fields. The approach of the Theban cavalry being obſerved and announced, all was alarm in Mantineia and throughout its narrow territory. Fortunately a body of Athenian horſe was juſt arrived, but fatigued with a forced march of two days, of extraordinary length, along a mountainous road. They had left Eleuſis only the preceding day, reſted for the night at the iſthmus, and, on the morrow, in fear, apparently, of being intercepted, preſſed their way on, by Cleonæ to Mantineia, without halting. They had juſt taken their quarters, and men and horſes were yet without refreſhment, when the Mantineians came to them with the moſt earneſt ſolicitations for aſſiſtance and protection, on which they repreſented their exiſtence as depending. The Athenians, aſhamed, ſays the hiſtorian, weary as they were, being preſent in ſuch circumſtances to be uſeleſs, and anxious to maintain their country's glory, inſtantly remounted, to ingage a very ſuperior force of the cavalry of Thebes and Theſſaly, the moſt renowned of Greece. They came quickly to action, and brave men, he proceeds, fell on both ſides; but the advantage was wholly with the

Xen. Hel. l. 7. c. 5. ſ. 15.

tho ſhowing ſternneſs and fortitude, ſhows the fortitude of a mind depreſſed by ſlavery, and without elevation of thought. Such at leaſt is the impreſſion which it readily conveys to thoſe to whom the forms of Grecian ſculpture are familiar.

Athenians:

Athenians: they carried off all their own ſlain; they reſtored ſome of the enemy's, which was always the boaſted criterion of victory, under a ſolicited truce; and, what was a more eſſential, and indeed a moſt important advantage, they gave complete protection to the Mantineians, and inabled them to ſave all their property [30].

Difficulties now preſſed upon Epameinondas. The confederacy of little military republics, which had put ſo great a force, the beſt part of their population, under his command, had no public revenues equal to the maintenance of thoſe numbers in the field, far from home. The term of expeditions, which they might undertake, was limited by neceſſity of circumſtances. Magazines, ſuch as attend the motions of modern armies, were not even thought of. Already the troops under Epameinondas had ſuffered want, and that want muſt go on increaſing. But the term of his expedition was not left to his diſcretion, or to be decided by contingencies; it was abſolutely limited by the controuling authority, whether of the Theban government, or of a congreſs of the confederacy, we are uninformed. It was now near expiring, and the troops of the northern ſtates muſt be led home [31]. Defeated in his attempt upon Sparta, and in that which followed it, upon the Mantineian territory, his reputation could not fail to ſuffer, notwithſtanding the abilities really diſplayed, if, with an army ſo ſuperior to the enemy, and ſo much greater than was commonly ſeen in Greece, his campain were marked only by diſappointments. He had moreover to conſider, that his expedition was the immediate occaſion of the union of Athens, Elis, Achaia, and the beſt part of Arcadia, in oppoſition to Thebes, or at leaſt of the actual energy of that union. Were he then to withdraw without victory, thoſe Arcadians, whoſe cauſe had been the pretence for the Thebans to interfere in arms in Peloponneſus, muſt be immediately overwhelmed; and the revived

Xen. Hel. l. 7. c. 5. ſ. 19.

ſ. 18.

[30] Xenophon has not named the Athenian commander: Diodorus calls him Hegelochus; a man, he ſays, before of high reputation among the Athenian military.

[31] —— Ὀλίγων μὲν ἡμερῶν ἀνάγκη ἴσως ἦν ἀπιέναι, διὰ τὸ ἐξήκειν τῇ στρατείᾳ τὸν χρόνον. This is among the paſſages of Xenophon for which we want aſſiſtance, which, it ſhould ſeem, we might not unreaſonably expect from the later antient writers who have treated of the actions of Epameinondas; but, among many tales, and much panegyric, we find little that deſerves the name of hiſtory, or that affords any illuſtration of hiſtory. As far as I have ventured explanation, I think I am warranted by what may be gathered from Xenophon himſelf.

ſtate

ſtate of Meſſenia, for whoſe protection the Thebans, and eſpecially Epameinondas, were particularly pledged, would be at the enemy's mercy. A victory was perhaps neceſſary, not only to avert ruin from thoſe whom he had bound himſelf to protect, but perhaps to make his own return to his country, not creditable only but even ſafe. A battle therefore was indiſpenſable; and if he fell, ſays Xenophon, it was a ſatisfactory reflection for him that his fall would be glorious, in the endeavour to give Thebes the empire of Greece.

Xen. Hel. l. 7. c. 5. ſ. 19. 'That theſe ſhould be his ſentiments,' proceeds the hiſtorian, continuing his eulogy of his enemy, 'I think not very wonderful; they are com-'mon to men ſmitten with the love of glory: but, to have ſo prepared 'his troops, collected from various ſtates, that they would decline no 'fatigue, yield to no danger, in want be patient, and in all circumſtances 'orderly and zealous in duty; this I think truly worthy of admiration.'

ſ. 20. Having taken the reſolution for battle, he declared it in public orders; and then the utmoſt alacrity in the ſervice was manifeſted. The cavalry diligently brightened their helmets; the infantry were ſeen buſy, ſharpening their ſpears and ſwords, and burniſhing their ſhields; ſome of the Arcadian heavy-armed deſired to be inrolled in the Theban band of clubmen; a circumſtance which ſeems ſingularly to mark the popularity of the Theban name, when Epameinondas commanded. What the band of clubmen was we are not informed: poſſibly an inſtitution of leſs utility for the weapon, from which it was denominated, than for the enthuſiaſm it inſpired, in emulation of Hercules, whom the Thebans proudly called at the ſame time their god and their fellowcountryman.

ſ. 21. General zeal thus quickly making preparation complete, Epameinondas, at an early hour of the morning, formed his order of battle, and marched, by his left; not directly to Mantineia, but to the neareſt root of mount Mænalus; the weſtern boundary of the vale, in which both Mantineia and Tegea ſtood.

ſ. 22. There, on ſtrong ground, within ſight of the enemy, he extended his phalanx, and grounded arms [32], as if going to incamp.

According

[32] Ἔθετο τὰ ὅπλα. It is not always poſſible to find terms in modern language for expreſſing exactly the circumſtances of antient warfare. In the Grecian ſervice, what principally loaded the footſoldier of the phalanx was his large ſhield. To relieve him from the preſſure of its weight was of

According to thoſe terms, to which the preſſure of adverſity had reduced the Lacedæmonians to ſubmit, the army of their confederacy, being in the Mantineian territory, was to be commanded, in chief, by Mantineian generals, under direction of the Mantineian adminiſtration. In the want of the abilities of a Lycomedes, which might have made ſome amends for the inherent inconveniencies of ſuch a regulation, the preſence of Ageſilaus, tho not poſſeſſing the nominal command-in-chief, might have been advantageous: ſome deference might have been paid to his rank and long experience, at leaſt when danger preſſed. But Epameinondas ſeems to have derived that advantage from his expedition againſt Sparta, that Ageſilaus, and a large part of the troops, before deſtined to reïnforce the army in Arcadia, were retained to protect Laconia againſt any new attack. Who commanded now in Arcadia, we are not informed: their deficiencies only are reported to us. Apparently the circumſtances which impoſed upon Epameinondas the neceſſity of ſeeking a battle, ſhould have decided them by all means to avoid it. Nevertheleſs they were prepared, with a very inferior force, two thirds only of his numbers, according to Diodorus, to contend with his ſuperior talents. His meaſures, indicating intention to incamp, completely deceived them. After having formed their order of battle, with the view to meet him, concluding that his purpoſe was not to fight that day, they allowed that order to be in a great degree diſſolved, and the preparation of the ſoldier's mind for action, highly important in Xenophon's idea, to be relaxed and diſſipated.

Epameinondas obſerved the effect his feint had produced, and proceeded to profit from it: he iſſued orders to reſume arms and march. We have ſeen it the practice of the Thebans to form their phalanx of extraordinary depth, even to fifty in file; truſting to the effect of breaking the enemy's front, at the riſk of ſuffering themſelves in flank. By this method they had formerly gained the battle of Delium againſt the Athenians, and by this method Epameinondas himſelf had ſucceeded, in the glorious day of Leuctra, againſt the Lacedæmonians. His ſuperiority in numbers

of courſe expedient, whenever it might be ſafely done. The ſpear alſo was weighty, but it might be planted on the ground, and ſtill ready for inſtant uſe. To ground the ſhield required more caution, and ſeems to have been more particularly implied in the phraſe θέσθαι τὰ ὅπλα.

inabled

inabled him now, in taking the advantage, to obviate the hazard of that method. Reſolving to direct his principal effort againſt the enemy's right, he formed his line in the ordinary manner of the Greeks. His Theban column of attack was a ſeparate body, which he placed in front of his left wing. Following the ſame principle in the diſpoſition of his cavalry, he divided it on the flanks of his infantry; but meaning that the cavalry of his left ſhould be the charging body, he gave it a ſtrength that might inſure its ſuperiority, leaving the horſe on his right comparatively weak. Theſe therefore he directed to ſome advantageous ground, with orders not to move from it, unleſs opportunity of evident advantage ſhould offer; and he provided ſupport for them, in caſe of need, from a body of infantry.

While, in this advantageous order, Epameinondas led directly toward the enemy, their generals, who had allowed order nearly to ceaſe among them, had made no proviſion for holding it in their choice to avoid a battle. Hurry and alarm of courſe pervaded the army. Some, ſays the cotemporary hiſtorian, were forming, ſome running to the ground where they ſhould form, ſome bridling their horſes, ſome putting on their breaſtplates, and all ſeeming more like men expecting to ſuffer than preparing to act. Order however was reſtored before attack could begin upon them: the Arcadians held the right, as the poſt of honor, which, by treaty, they claimed within their own country; the Lacedæmonians were poſted next to them; the cavalry were divided on the flanks.

Diod. l. 15.

The battle began with the cavalry. That of the Lacedæmonian ſide was without thoſe light-armed foot, practiſed to act with horſe, whoſe weapons, galling from a diſtance, prepared for the effect of a charge. The Theban abounded with theſe; and being moreover very ſuperior in number, they preſently overthrew their opponents. The Theban column of infantry then joined action; but, tho carefully compoſed of the beſt troops, with Epameinondas leading, it found ſtrong reſiſtance from the Lacedæmonian and Arcadian foot. Its perſevering force, however, at length broke the oppoſing ranks, and then the effect was what the able projector expected. That which had the reputation of being the firmeſt part of the enemy's line being put to flight, the contagion ſpred among the inferior troops, and all the infantry gave way.

Xen. Hel. l. 7. c 5. ſ. 23.

It

It ſeemed now as if victory muſt be, on the Theban ſide, as complete as ſuperior force, directed by ſuperior judgement, could make it. But quickly was ſeen how much of the fate of multitudes may depend on one man. Leading the charge of his column, juſt as ſucceſs appeared decided, tho the Lacedæmonians, broken, were ſtill reſiſting, Epameinondas received a wound in his breaſt and fell. The diſaſter ingaged the attention of thoſe around; and, with the information of it, rapidly ſpreading, confuſion and diſmay pervaded the army. Succeſſion of command ſeems not to have been duly provided for. The various multitude having no equal confidence in any other officer, authority, extending over the whole, in a great degree ceaſed; or, if any proper regulation had been made, it was overborne by the impulſe of heſitation and conſternation; which ſo prevailed, that ſcarcely an attempt was made to profit from the victory actually gained. The heavy-armed ſtood on the ground on which they had fought, vindicating the poſſeſſion of the dead and wounded, but not moving a ſtep in purſuit. The cavalry turned from thoſe they had put to flight, and, without a blow againſt the enemy's retreating infantry, ſlipped by them, to rejoin their own phalanx, as if themſelves defeated. The light-armed and targeteers, alone preſuming on victory, croſſed the field toward the left, without expecting attack or looking for ſupport. The Athenian horſe, no longer kept in check by the able diſpoſition made for the purpoſe, charged and moſtly put them to the ſword. Epameinondas lived to be informed that his army was victorious, but fainted, it is ſaid, on the extraction of the broken end of the weapon, left in the wound, and died ſoon after [33].

B. C 362. Ol. 104. 3/4.

Xen. Hel. l. 7. c. 5. ſ. 25.

Under theſe circumſtances of the battle, both ſides claimed the victory; each army raiſed its trophy, undiſturbed by the other; each remained in

ſ. 27. Diod. l. 15. p. 503.

[33] Xenophon ſimply mentions that Epameinondas fell in the battle. Diodorus, after a puerile detail of his feats, like thoſe of Achilles in the Iliad, or rather of Virgil's heroin the Æneid, is more circumſtantial than any other writer about his death. He mentions no authority for thoſe things ſaid and done between three and four centuries before him, which Nepos, in his own age, and Plutarch and Pauſanias, after him, evidently did not quite believe; yet his ſtory has been generally given as authentic by modern writers. Plutarch, in his Life of Ageſilaus, has quoted earlier authors; a circumſtance which may, more than any other, excite regret for the loſs of his Life of Epameinondas. For thoſe circumſtances, reported by Diodorus, which, being probable in themſelves, are in any degree confirmed by Nepos and Plutarch, neither of whom has copied him, or which afford probable illuſtration of the cotemporary hiſtorian's conciſe narrative, reaſonable credit will be allowed.

poſſeſſion of ſome of the enemy's dead; and neither would immediately ſolicit the bodies. But the ſlain of the Lacedæmonian ſide ſeem to have been not only more numerous, but of higher rank, cavalry and heavy-armed; whereas thoſe of the Theban ſide, remaining in the enemy's power, were only, or almoſt only, light-armed, or targeteers. Shortly therefore the Lacedæmonians, yielding to what was eſteemed a moſt ſerious duty, ſent their herald, with the uſual ſolicitation; and, after this acknowlegement, the Thebans alſo ſent their herald to make the ſame requeſt.

Xen. Hel. l. 7. c. 2. ſ. 26, 27.

'Univerſal expectation,' ſays the cotemporary hiſtorian, 'was ſtrangely 'deceived by this event of ſo great a battle. Almoſt all Greece being 'met in arms, there was nobody who did not ſuppoſe that the victors 'would in future command, and the defeated muſt obey. But God,' he continues, 'decided otherwiſe. Each party claimed the victory, and nei-'ther gained any advantage: territory, town, or dominion was acquired by 'neither; but indeciſion, and trouble, and confuſion, more than even before 'that battle, pervaded Greece.' Tired then with the ſad tale of his country's woes, which, in the vain hope of better times, he had now, from early youth to advanced age, been ſolicitouſly obſerving, he concludes his hiſtorical narrative: 'Thus far,' he ſays, 'ſuffice it for me to have related: 'following events, perhaps, will intereſt ſome other writer.'

SECTION

SECTION VIII.

General Pacification; Lacedæmon excluded: Troubles in Arcadia; Interference of Athens: Views of Ageſilaus. Affairs of the Eaſt: War of Evagoras with Perſia: Rebellion of the Perſian maritime provinces. Expedition of Ageſilaus to Egypt: Death of Ageſilaus: Diſtraction together of the Ariſtocratical and Democratical intereſts in Greece, and Diſſolution of the antient ſyſtem of Grecian Confederacy,

IT is a moſt critical moment at which we loſe the invaluable guidance of Xenophon, in the maze of Grecian affairs. According to Diodorus and Plutarch, the confuſion, in which the indeciſive battle of Mantineia left things, was preſently ſtilled by a general peace; to the terms of which Lacedæmon alone refuſed acceſſion. How the adverſe republics were brought to a temper for pacification, thoſe writers, little curious about ſuch matters, leave untold; but a collation of the memorials of the times will afford, in a great degree, the information to be deſired. We have already learnt from Xenophon, that the term limited for the ſervice of the Theban and other northern forces was near expiring, when the battle was fought; and we have had numerous occaſions to ſee how uſual it was for the armies of the Greek confederacies, without a peace, without even a truce, to ſeparate after a battle. It ſeems then certain that, when the credit and abilities of Epameinondas were gone, the Theban influence inſtantly ſunk, and the bonds which held the Theban confederacy together were ſo ſlackened, that it verged rapidly toward diſſolution. That fear, therefore, of the preponderance of Thebes, which had united the oppoſing republics, ſoon diſſipated: and, ſome of them, eſpecially Athens, driven, by the dread of a rival democracy, to connect itſelf with the opponents of that intereſt of which it had been formerly the head, became now rather apprehenſive of the ſuperiority which might return to Lacedæmon and the ariſtocratical cauſe. Under theſe circumſtances opportunity for negotiation would be obvious. The ſtates of the Theban confederacy perſevered in inſiſting upon the independency of Meſſenia. Thoſe of the Lacedæmonian, Lacedæmon itſelf only excepted, holding themſelves no longer intereſted, as

Diod. l. 15. c. 89. p. 504. Plut. vit. Ageſil.

before, to oppoſe this, ſome perhaps gladly, and the reſt after no long controverſy, conſented. Thus peace appears to have been concluded; Lacedæmon alone remaining at war, nominally, with all the republics of the Theban confederacy.

This relic of war, however, was of no very threatening aſpect; if, by the terms of the treaty, as Diodorus affirms, between the other ſtates of the two confederacies, the armies on both ſides were to be diſſolved, and the troops to return to their ſeveral homes. Nevertheleſs the fear of exciting united energy anew among the inimical ſtates, appears to have prevented any immediate effort of the Lacedæmonians againſt Meſſenia. The firſt inſuing tranſactions in Greece, noticed by the compiler whom we muſt now follow, which he attributes to the year after that of the battle of Mantineia, ſtrongly mark, at the ſame time, the change in the politics of Athens, the weakneſs of Lacedæmon, and the ceſſation of the energy and influence of Thebes, with the conſequent inefficiency of the Theban confederacy. On the union of Arcadia, the inhabitants of ſeveral villages had been compelled to quit their reſidences, and migrate to the new capital, Megalopolis. Diſſatisfied with the change, they now claimed, under that article of the treaty of peace, which required the return of all the troops, on both ſides, to their reſpective homes, to go themſelves and reöccupy their antient country reſidences. The leading men in Megalopolis vehemently oppoſed this. We might be at a loſs for the motives of each party, had we not ſeen a ſolution of the difficulty in Xenophon's account of the diſperſion and reäſſembling of the Mantineians. Thoſe, of the inhabitants of Megalopolis, on whom the violence had been put, or the chief of them, were landed men, accuſtomed to live independently upon their eſtates, nearly as the ſmaller barons in the feudal times of weſtern Europe [34]; of courſe attached to the ariſtocratical intereſt. The uneaſineſs of ſuch men on being ſeparated from their property, to become members of the multitude in a town, and there obſerved with jealouſy by that multitude, inſtigated by leaders their political enemies, may be eaſily conceived. They addreſſed ſolicitations

Diod. l. 15. c. 94. p. 507.

B. C. 362. Ol. 104. 3.

Diod. l. 15. c. 94. p. 507.

Ch. 26. ſ. 1, & ch. 27. ſ. 2. of this Hiſt.

34 Something of the ſame kind is ſaid to ſubſiſt, with many relics of heroïc manners, among the Mainotes, in the Peloponneſian mountains, at this day; whoſe chiefs, living in caſtle-faſhioned houſes, lodge the ſtranger, hoſpitably received, as in Homer's time, under the ſounding portal, ὑπ' ἀιθούσῃ ἰριδούπῳ. Odyſſ. l. 3. v. 399.

to

to Mantineia, Elis, and all the ariſtocratical republics, to ſupport them in their conſtruction of the late treaty. Upon this the democratical chiefs applied to Athens. There their own ſpirit of democratical tyranny prevailed, not only in the adminiſtration, but in the law: the wealthy and people of higher rank were not at liberty to quit the city, or, however, to quit Attica, at their pleaſure. The Athenian government therefore, propoſing to reſume the patronage of the democratical intereſt, throughout Greece, for which Thebes had no longer energy, ſent Pammenes, with three thouſand heavy-armed, to ſupport the democratical Megalopolitans. The unfortunate country-gentlemen, as we ſhould call them, in England, were thus compelled to ſubmit to the commands impoſed upon them; and the more effectually to obviate a renewal of their attempt to ſecede from the city, their country reſidences were deſtroyed.

Xen. Sympoſ. c. 9. ſ. 30.

Diod. ut ant.

In this ſtate of things, the ſituation of the aged king of Lacedæmon, Ageſilaus, who had begun to reign when Lacedæmon was arbitreſs of Greece, and had himſelf gone far to make her arbitreſs of Aſia, could not but be highly uneaſy. Plutarch has ineptly enough cenſured him for not reſting on his humiliated throne. Reſt, in any ſecurity, is little likely to have been in his choice; and Plutarch's apology for him, ſubjoined to the cenſure, appears far better founded than the cenſure itſelf: 'He thought 'it,' ſays the biographer, 'unworthy of him, even at his age, to ſit down 'in Sparta, waiting for death, and doing nothing for the public.' In truth a Spartan king could do little for the public, at home, in peace, unleſs the public good might require his interference in political intrigue, to controul the ephors. But it appears that, at this time, the party of Ageſilaus was prevalent in Lacedæmon. Tho approaching his eightieth year, his conſtitution of body was ſtill vigorous, and his mind ſtill enterprizing. Still therefore himſelf the life and ſoul of the Lacedæmonian adminiſtration, he directed his views to reſiſt any new preſſure, which might come upon his country, from the change in the politics of Athens; and eſpecially it ſeems to have been his anxious purpoſe to recover Meſſenia. Military ſtrength was not yet ſo much wanting to Lacedæmon, as revenue to give energy to that ſtrength. Every method, therefore, that the circumſtances of the times would allow, was taken for raiſing money. According to Plutarch, loans from individuals ſeem to have been the prin-

Xen. Ageſil. c. 2. ſ. 28.

Xen. Ageſil. Plut. vit. Ageſil.

cipal-

cipal reſource, and the private intereſt and reſponſibility of Ageſilaus what chiefly gave this any efficacy. To ſoothe and reconcile the Periœcians, thoſe Laconians of the provincial towns, whom the tyrannical oligarchy of the Spartans had alienated, would of courſe be an important object; and it was probably a meaſure of policy, with this point in view, and not of baſe reſentment, as Plutarch would have it, to grant hereditary honors and privileges to Anticrates, a Laconian, who had the credit of having given Epameinondas his mortal wound. Poſſibly it may not have been very clearly aſcertained by whom, or how, in the tumult of cloſe action, with confuſion already begun in the Lacedæmonian line, that wound was given; but, among the different reports tranſmitted to us, what Plutarch has preſerved deſerves notice: 'The hiſtorian Dioſ-'corides,' he ſays, 'relates, that the Laconian Anticrates ſtruck Epa-'meinondas with a ſpear; but the deſcendants of Anticrates bear ſtill, 'among the Lacedæmonians, the ſurname of Machairion, from the ma-'chaira (a ſmall ſword) with which, as they affirm, he gave the fatal blow; 'and the hereditary exemption from taxes, granted on the occaſion, is at 'this day injoyed by Callicrates, the head of the family.'

Matters were thus preparing, in Lacedæmon, for the Meſſenian war, and the great mind of Ageſilaus was bent upon wearing out its laſt energy in that narrow field, to which the preſſure of adverſe circumſtances had reduced and ſtill urged his attention, when events occurred in the Eaſt, ſeeming to offer proſpect of a nobler kind. Egypt had been ſo long in revolt, ſo far ſucceſsful againſt the Perſian empire, that the largeſt part of that rich country, or perhaps the whole, was nearly ſettled into an independent monarchy. Rebels however ſtill, in the contemplation of the Perſian court, the Egyptian kings (for ſo they are called by all the Grecian writers) were watchful of opportunities for advantageous forein connections, and for means of providing diverſion for the Perſian arms. This ſucceſs, in one province, afforded incouragement for thoſe who held command in others, toward the extremities of the empire, to aſſert independency. Of theſe none was more invited, by ſituation and circumſtances, than the friend of the Athenian people, Evagoras tyrant of Salamis in Cyprus; whom we have ſeen acquiring his dominion as a hero,

and

and adminiſtering it as a patriot, but ſtill holding it in tributary vaſſalage under the Perſian monarch. The great object of Evagoras was to unite the extenſive iland of Cyprus under his authority. The people of three principal towns, Amathus, Citium, and Soli, or at leaſt a powerful party in each, oppoſed this. If they injoyed liberty in any ſecurity, in their municipal governments under Perſian protection, their oppoſition may have been not unreaſonable; for, tho the adminiſtration of Evagoras was juſt and liberal, and anxiouſly directed to the cultivation of popularity, yet it was, even according to the cotemporary Athenian rhetorician, his panegyriſt, completely deſpotic; the prince not only choſe his counſellors, and appointed all magiſtrates, but made laws, and exerciſed judicial powers; ſo that he was maſter of the lives and fortunes of his ſubjects. Iſocrates indeed has not ſcrupled, in writing for the ſucceſſor of Evagoras, to ſay that his was not only a better government than oligarchy or democracy, but the beſt of governments. The adminiſtration may indeed eaſily have been preferable to that of many of the Grecian republics; and thus men of property were induced to migrate from various parts, to live under the benign adminiſtration of Evagoras. But the Solians, Citians, and Amathuſians nevertheleſs conſidering, that the character of ſuch a government depended upon the life of one man, and the chance of what his ſucceſſor might be, were unwilling to change exiſting advantages, under a deſpotic ſcepter ſeldom interfering with them, for the precarious benefits to be derived from the merit of an abſolute prince within their iland. Evagoras nevertheleſs perſiſted in meaſures, whether by his own arms, or by ſupporting a party favorable to his views, for bringing thoſe people under his dominion; and upon this the adverſe party, otherwiſe unable to reſiſt, ſolicited protection from Perſia.

Diod. l. 14. p. 447

Iſocrat. ad Nicoclem. p. 66 & 68. t. 1.

p. 110 & 112. t. 1.

The danger of loſing the command of Cyprus, ſo critically ſituated for intercepting the moſt important maritime communication of the empire, alarmed the Perſian court; and it was reſolved to repreſs the growing power of the Salaminian prince by force, if he refuſed obedience to commands. Evagoras however had prepared himſelf, by other means than the ſcanty reſources of Cyprus afforded, for ſupporting his meaſures, and proſecuting his views. He had formed a cloſe connection with the wealthy king of Egypt, Acoris; he had great intereſt among the Aſiatic Grecian towns,

and

and he had carried ſucceſsful intrigue among the Perſian provinces bordering on the Mediterranean. Hecatomnus, who is ſtiled, not ſatrap, but prince or lord of Caria, a powerful vaſſal of the empire, apparently of Grecian lineage, wiſhing for opportunity to follow his example, ſecretly aſſiſted him with money: Cilicia, and great part of Phenicia, were ripe for revolt. Knowing then the uſual ſlowneſs of the Perſian councils, he reſolved not to wait till the force of the empire ſhould be collected to attack him in Cyprus, but to endeavour to raiſe buſineſs for its arms that might prevent ſuch attack. His ſucceſſes at firſt ſeemed to juſtify the boldneſs of his plan. Cilicia joining him, he carried the war immediately into Phenicia; ravaged and plundered the adverſe part of that rich province, and took Tyre by ſtorm.

B. C. about 381 or 382. Ol. 100 [35].

Whether theſe actions were really more brilliant than the plan altogether was judicious, whether they did not compel the ſlothful government of Perſia to an exertion of its preponderant force, which by quieter meaſures might have been avoided, our information is too deficient to inable us fairly to decide. At length, however, an army to the amount, according to Diodorus, of three hundred thouſand horſe and foot, and a fleet of three hundred triremes, were collected for the Cyprian war. Evagoras's fleet, only ninety triremes, of which twenty were Phenician, venturing a battle, was defeated. Driven then to the defence of his iland, his land-force was little able to withſtand the numbers that, with the ſea open, could be poured in upon him. After reſiſtance ably protracted beyond expectation, beſieged in Salamis, diſappointed in the amount of aſſiſtance received from the king of Egypt, on the verge of ruin, he was relieved by intrigue among the Perſian officers. Teribazus, the commander-in-chief, accuſed by Orontas, the general next under him, of miſconduct and diſaffection, was removed. Political neceſſity then urged Orontas, advanced to the chief command, to put an early end to a war, which had already coſt the Perſian court, according to Iſocrates, more than ten millions ſterling [36]. Thus Evagoras, compelled to ſurrender all his acquiſitions, preſerved, however, by treaty, the dominion of Salamis, holding

Iſocr. Evag. p. 310. t. 2. Diod. l. 15. p. 460.

[35] This date is thus nearly aſcertained by two paſſages in the panegyrical oration of Iſocrates, p. 250 & 274. t. 2.

[36] Πλέον ἢ πενταϰισμύριοι τάλαντα. Iſocr. Evag. p. 308. t. 2.

it

it indeed as a dependence of the empire, and paying a ſpecified yearly tribute, but reſerving, by compact, the proud privilege to communicate with his ſoverein as a king with a king [37]. This dominion and dignity he held till his death, and tranſmitted as an inheritance to his family. His eldeſt ſon, ſays the cotemporary Athenian orator, was ſtiled king, and the titles of prince and princeſs diſtinguiſhed his younger ſons and his daughters [38]. It is by three extant tracts of that reſpectable writer, addreſſed to Nicocles, eldeſt ſon and ſucceſſor of Evagoras, who ſeems to have maintained his father's connection of alliance and citizenſhip with the Athenian people, that we derive our principal information concerning Evagoras, and the important tranſactions in which he had ſo great a ſhare [39].

Thus Cyprus was preſerved to the Perſian empire. But, in reducing one rebellion, another, far more extenſive and dangerous, was prepared. Gaos, who commanded the fleet, was ſon-in-law of Teribazus. Apprehenſive that he ſhould be involved in his father's ruin, he revolted, and joined Acoris in Egypt. In the deficiency of the Perſian government at this time, in proportion as the fidelity of its officers was liable to be ill rewarded, treaſon and rebellion were little ſcrupled among them: its frequent weakneſs in pardoning incouraged offence, while its miſdirected ſeverity took away the juſt confidence of integrity; and war allowed, or even incouraged, between the governors of its provinces, was ever ready to be turned againſt the throne itſelf. Some years after the reduction of Cyprus, according to Diodorus, about the time of the battle of Mantineia, a rebellion broke out, of all the weſtern maritime provinces at once, in which Orontas himſelf engaged, with ſeveral other great officers of the empire. Among the lea-

Ch. 23. ſ. 1 & 2. & Ch. 24. ſ. 3. of this Hiſt.

Diod. l. 15. c. 90. p. 504.

B. C. 362.

[37] We have obſerved, in Xenophon's accounts, ſomething very like feudal vaſſalage, in the tenure of principalities and lordſhips under the Perſian empire. Diodorus's words expreſs the ſame thing, as nearly perhaps as it could eaſily be expreſſed in the words and according to the ideas of a people, among whom the thing had not obtained. The terms required of Evagoras by Teribazus were, that, reigning in Salamis only, τιλῇ τῷ Περσῶν βασιλεῖ καὶ ἐναυσὸν φόρον ὡρισμένον, καὶ ποιῇ τὰ προσταττόμενον, ὡς δοῦλος δεσπότῃ. The terms granted by Orontas, βασιλεύειν τῆς Σαλαμῖνος, καὶ τὸν ὡρισμένον διδόναι φόρον, καθ' ἑκαστὸν, καὶ ὑπακούειν βασιλεὺς βασιλεῖ προστάττοντι.

[38] Τῶν ἐξ ἀυτοῦ γενομένων ἐνίοις καλλίστην ἐπιθεμένοις ὀνόμασι προσαγορευόμενον, ἀλλὰ τὸν μὲν βασιλέα καλούμενον, τοὺς δ' ἀναξίας, τὰς δ' ἀνάσσας. Iſocr. Evag. p. 318. t. 2.

[39] Diodorus, according to our copies of him, affirms that Evagoras was aſſaſſinated by a eunuch, named Nicocles, who obtained poſſeſſion of his kingdom: but the annotators have ſuppoſed error in the tranſcription of that paſſage, tho they would ſupport it, as far as regards the aſſaſſination of Evagoras, from a paſſage in Ariſtotle's Politics, (b. 5. c. 10.) which poſſibly ſome readers may think as doubtful as the paſſage which it is propoſed to correct by it.

ders, beſide Orontas, who was ſatrap of Myſia, were Ariobarzanes, ſatrap of Phrygia, Autophradates, of Lydia, and Mauſolus, who had ſucceeded his father Hecatomnus in the principality of Caria; and the hiſtorian names, as people joining in it, the Lycians, Peiſidians, Pamphylians, Cilicians, Syrians, Phenicians, and all the Aſian Greeks. Matters had been concerted with Tachos, now king of Egypt, who was to give his utmoſt aſſiſtance. But through the faithleſſneſs of the chiefs toward one-another, all that was moſt formidable in this rebellion quickly ſubſided. Orontas, elected general of the confederacy, immediately betrayed it, and, in conſequence, all Leſſer Aſia again yielded obedience to the Perſian king. Reomithres, appointed to command fifty ſhips, and intruſted with a large ſum of money to coöperate with Tachos, purchaſed his own pardon with a part of the money, all the ſhips, and the heads of many of his aſſociates. In conſequence of this treachery the king's officers quickly recovered Syria [40].

Strab. l. 14. p. 656.

Then Tachos became apprehenſive that the concentered ſtrength of the Perſian empire would be exerted againſt himſelf. Long before the time of the younger Cyrus, we have ſeen Grecian mercenary troops in extenſive requeſt in the eaſtern countries; and the retreat of the Cyreian Greeks, and the ſucceſſes afterward of Ageſilaus in Aſia, would tend to increaſe the opinion of their value. The Athenian general Chabrias, among the firſt in reputation of this active age, had been at one time ingaged in the ſervice of Acoris, predeceſſor of Tachos. With Lacedæmon Tachos himſelf had alliance, not without ſome claim of gratitude for aſſiſtance afforded. In the general pacification which had followed an extenſive and laſting war in Greece, troops of ſuperior value, and commanders of experience, might probably be readily obtained. Tachos applied to Lacedæmon for a general, making large offers to Ageſilaus, if he would himſelf undertake the command-in-chief of all his numerous forces; and he ingaged Chabrias

Diod. l. 15. p. 471.

Xen. Ageſ. c. 2. ſ. 29.

[40] That theſe were not improbable circumſtances, tho we have them only from Diodorus, may be gathered from what Xenophon relates of Perſian affairs, in his account of the expedition of Cyrus. Nevertheleſs the omiſſion of all mention of them, in his Panegyric of Ageſilaus, might excite a doubt if the revolt was quite ſo extenſive, or at leaſt ſo complete, as the account of Diodorus has repreſented it. He mentions however the flight of the king of Egypt to Sidon, which marks revolt there; and Iſocrates ſhows that a diſpoſition to revolt was extenſive among the maritime provinces, ſo that, together, they go far to ſupport Diodorus.

to

to command his fleet, conſiſting, according to Diodorus, of two hundred triremes. Among the numbers whom the ceſſation of war in Greece had left without employment and without income, a large body of troops was eaſily raiſed. Xen. Ageſ. c. 2. ſ. 28. Diod. l. 15. p. 506.

It may ſeem, on firſt view, an extravagant reſolution, for a prince of the age of Ageſilaus to go to ſuch a diſtance from his country, to command the forces of a forein ſoverein: but if we conſider the ſituation of a king of Lacedæmon, in peace, at home, it will not appear ſo wonderful that, with ſtrength and activity for the undertaking, it ſhould be his choice. His views indeed, as they are reported by Xenophon, were extenſive, and ſeem to carry ſome indication of an intention not to return to Greece; where his part of the divided royalty of Lacedæmon, little inviting for him, might well be adminiſtered by his ſon, Archidamus. Ageſilaus, ſays the philoſopher, his friend, was pleaſed with the propoſal from Tachos, becauſe he thought, by the ſame expedition, he might requite the Egyptian for benefits conferred on Lacedæmon; he might once more reſcue the Aſian Greeks from the Perſian dominion; and he ſhould have the ſatisfaction of revenge againſt the Perſian king, whoſe ſupport to the enemies, while he called himſelf ſtill the ally of Lacedæmon, was the cauſe of the loſs of Meſſenia. The Lacedæmonian government approved the meaſure; induced apparently by the proſpect, that means to be furniſhed by the friendſhip of the king of Egypt, and perhaps increaſed by the ſpoil of Perſian provinces, might lead to the recovery of Meſſenia; an inducement poſſibly ſtill aſſiſted by the hope afforded to powerful families of partaking in the ſpoil; for according to the practice on former occaſions, thirty Spartans were either appointed by the government, or choſen by Ageſilaus, for his counſellors and attendants on the expedition, not, probably, without expectation of ſharing its rewards. Xen. Ageſ. c. 2. ſ. 29. Plut. vit. Ageſ.

Whether the age and infirmities of the king Artaxerxes, or what elſe impeded the exertions of the Perſian government, the meaſures againſt Egypt were ſlow, and little vigorous. Tachos therefore reſolved, inſtead of waiting for invaſion, ſtill to proſecute, as far as circumſtances would allow, the plan concerted with the diſcontented in the maritime provinces, and carry the war into Phenicia and Syria. But, with the relief of his fears, a change took place in his diſpoſition toward his ſupporters. Inſtead of the command-

in-chief of all his forces, by the promise of which he had ingaged Agesilaus in his service, he allowed that prince only the subordinate command of the Grecian mercenaries: and, committing the fleet to Chabrias, he assumed the nominal command-in-chief himself. What followed, barely touched upon by Xenophon, is variously, and very imperfectly and confusedly reported by later writers [41]. According to Plutarch, Agesilaus submitted to attend the Egyptian prince into Syria, and, together with Chabrias, bore long, tho impatiently, his ignorance, petulance, and neglect. Notwithstanding however the charges of Grecian writers against him, we may conceive it very possible that some good and even necessary policy may in part at least have directed the conduct of Tachos. Nevertheless what very shortly followed marks some great deficiency. While he was meditating conquest in Syria, two competitors for his throne arose in Egypt; and presently he was so deserted by his people, that he took refuge in Sidon. Agesilaus and Chabrias then, courted on all sides, made no difficulty of abandoning Tachos. Between the other two claimants, even Xenophon's expression implies that they were decided by the more advantageous offer [42]. Nectanabis, a near kinsman of Tachos, had been the first to revolt. But his opponent, if we may judge from the support he received from the Egyptian people, had the fairer pretensions. A hundred thousand men presently attended his standard. Perhaps that very support was his ruin. It led him to hold himself high, and to neglect the Greeks, or treat them with haughtiness. Agesilaus and Chabrias were thus decided to join Nectanabis; a man possessing apparently neither ability nor courage, tho otherwise not without virtue. Little able either to estimate the value of Grecian troops, or to face danger with them, he superinduced great danger by impeding their exertions. The pressure of his opponent's superiority however at length compelled him to yield himself wholly to the guidance of Agesilaus and Chabrias. Grecian valor and discipline and science then prevailed against the irregular

[41] For the circumstances of the Egyptian war, very slightly touched upon by Xenophon, and evidently ill related by Diodorus, apparently we may best trust Plutarch. His account, the most particular remaining to us, is the most coherent, and most consistent with Xenophon's.

[42] One was, according to Xenophon's phrase, Μισέλλην, literally *a Greekhater*; the other φιλέλλην, *a Greeklover*.

multitude

multitude of the enemy, and Nectanabis was ſeated on the Egyptian throne. The reward to the Lacedæmonian king and the Athenian admiral, from a prince who, by the teſtimony of the Greek hiſtorians, ſhowed himſelf not wanting in probity or generoſity, might perhaps beſt be eſtimated by what has been obtained, in modern times, by merit, on parallel occaſions, with the princes of Hindoſtan. Cotemporary and later writers agree that it was large [43].

Xen. Ageſ. c. 2. ſ. 30. Plut. vit. Ageſ. p. 1130. t. 2.

Tho Ageſilaus was thus finally ſucceſsful in Egypt, yet all the alluring proſpects in Aſia, which ſeem principally to have led him to ingage in that diſtant expedition, were completely cloſed by the unforeſeen turn which things had taken. To return to Greece was neceſſary; and it became again the great object of his indefatigable mind, to recover yet, before he died, that better half of what had been, for two centuries, the territory of Lacedæmon, and had been raviſhed from it while he had been Lacedæmon's king. Tho midwinter, therefore, he ſailed for Greece, anxious, ſays Xenophon, that no part of the following ſummer ſhould be unemployed againſt the enemies of his country: but he ſickened on the voyage, and putting into a port of the Cyrenaïc territory, he died there [44]. His body, imbalmed in wax, it is ſaid, becauſe honey, according to the eſtabliſhed ceremonial for the Lacedæmonian kings, could not be immediately procured, was carried to Sparta, and, with the uſual regal honors, there intombed.

Xen. Ageſ. c. 11. ſ. 16. Plut. vit. Ageſ.

Archidamus, ſon of Ageſilaus, whom we have already ſeen often commanding the armies of his country, ſucceeded to his father's ſhare of the divided throne of Lacedæmon. That prince had, on many trying occaſions, earned the glory of perſonal valor; but he ſeems to have poſſeſſed with it rather the quiet prudence of Archidamus, his grandfather, than

[43] It appears difficult to account for the numerous inſtances in which we find Diodorus differing from Xenophon about the names, as well as the actions of Xenophon's cotemporaries. According to him, it was Tachos himſelf that Ageſilaus and Chabrias reſtored to the Egyptian throne, inſtead of placing his competitor Nectanabis upon it. If we could ſuppoſe, for a moment, that it was poſſible Xenophon could be ſo groſsly miſinformed, yet Plutarch's account, more detailed than that of Diodorus, would ſuffice to reſtore his credit. Books, when Diodorus wrote, were dear, cumberſome, and troubleſome to conſult; and hence, perhaps, compilers, who conſulted many, might ſometimes be tempted to truſt too much to memory, in giving form to their materials.

[44] According to Plutarch Ageſilaus lived eighty-four years, of which he reigned forty-one. Xenophon, tho perſonally acquainted with him, does not undertake to be ſo preciſe: he ſays Ageſilaus was *about* eighty, ἀμφὶ τὰ ὀγδήκοντα, when he went to Egypt.

the

the enterprizing abilities of Ageſilaus. Nor was this alone what checked the proſecution of the purpoſes of the late king. The defection of the Periœcian Laconians, and the incouragement offered for the flight of the numerous ſlaves, on whoſe labor Lacedæmon depended for ſubſiſtence, had induced the neceſſity of employing mercenary forces. The connections which Ageſilaus had formed in his Aſiatic command, furniſhed him with means to aſſiſt the deficient treaſury of the ſtate, in ſupporting theſe. We learn incidentally from Xenophon, that the powerful prince of Caria, Mauſolus, ſecretly an enemy, tho vaſſal of the Perſian king, was among the wealthy friends who relieved the neceſſities of Ageſilaus. With Ageſilaus theſe means would probably ceaſe. How then the treaſure which that prince had amaſſed in Egypt, was diſpoſed of, we are not informed. But the change which had taken place in the politics of Athens, the refuſal of that powerful ally to ſupport any longer the claim of Lacedæmon to Meſſenia, and its diſpoſition, on the contrary, to reſume itſelf the lead of the democratical intereſt in Greece, of which Meſſenia was now eſteemed an eſtabliſhed member, made an alteration in the balance of parties, that would require ſerious conſideration, before meaſures were taken, which might provoke a new exertion of the united ſtrength of the democratical republics. On the other hand, all the ariſtocratical republics, Elis, Phlius, the Achaian cities, and ſome of the Arcadian, were deeply intereſted in the ſupport of Lacedæmon; to which probably they might be equal, in any caſe but that of ſuch a union of the democratical intereſt, as nothing but aggreſſion from Lacedæmon was likely to produce. Under theſe circumſtances apparently it behoved the Lacedæmonian government to direct its utmoſt endeavours toward the preſervation of its own peace, and of the general political quiet of Greece; and, in peace, to direct its views toward the conciliation of the Periœcian Laconians, and the preſervation and increaſe of its diminiſhed ſtock of ſlaves, by whom the agriculture was carried on, through which Lacedæmon exiſted. Thus the Meſſenian country was finally loſt to the Lacedæmonians; and the Meſſenian ſtate, tho not even now acknowleged by Lacedæmon, became effectually eſtabliſhed as an independent member of the Greek nation.

Xen. Ageſ. c. 2. ſ. 27.

The

The preëminence, the empire, as it was often called, which Lacedæmon ſo long held in Greece, had been, ſome time ſince, aboliſhed by thoſe treaties, to which Lacedæmon was a party, conceding equality with her, in military command, to all the ſtates of her confederacy. It was now, by the loſs of the beſt half of her territory, and the eſtabliſhment of a democratical commonwealth there, effectually deſtroyed. A great change was thus made in the ſyſtem of Grecian politics. A leading ſtate no longer exiſted in Peloponneſus; a head of the ariſtocratical intereſt no longer exiſted in Greece. With the fall of Thebes, at the ſame time, whoſe extraordinary ſudden elevation had checked the progreſs of Athens toward a recovery of empire through a leading influence among the democratical ſtates, the democratical intereſt remained alſo divided and without a head. The conſtitution of Greece at large, before bad, by theſe changes became worſe: the antient ſyſtem of confederacy was diſſolved, and no new ſyſtem aroſe: a jealouſy, juſt as far as it was directed to obviate an overbearing ſuperiority, but, in its extreme, adverſe to all ſyſtem, order, and peace, became the prevailing political paſſion: hoſtilities, indeed, upon any conſiderable ſcale, were, through general laſſitude and weakneſs, ſuſpended: Lacedæmon had thus opportunity to breathe, and recover herſelf within her remaining narrow territory; yet the aſſertion of Xenophon, already noticed, appears to have been nevertheleſs juſt, that 'indeciſion, and trouble, and confuſion, pervaded the nation.'

SECTION

SECTION IX.

Illuſtration of the ſtate of Greece: Seditions, in Argos, Phialeia, Corinth, Megara, Sicyon, Phlius, Theſſaly: Proſperity, of Megara, Cos, Sicyon, Rhodes, the Aſiatic cities: Circumſtances promoting the cultivation of Science, Arts, and Commerce: Proſperity of Athens: Memorials of Xenophon.

IN purſuing hiſtory through the moſt intereſting age of the Grecian republics, that age in which their political importance among the affairs of nations was greateſt, while, among themſelves, the diſplay of great abilities and great characters innobled often the conteſt, with ſmall forces, for ſmall objects, and the perfection of ſcience, art, and fine taſte, unknown before elſewhere, made them, for all poſterity, objects of attention, reſpect, and admiration, we have the advantage of the guidance of two cotemporary writers, of very ſuperior abilities, and very ſuperior opportunities of information. Nevertheleſs, thoſe writers both compoſing their hiſtories in baniſhment, ſuffered from democratical policy, we might fear to be miſled by ſome bias thence ariſing, if the concurrent voice of antiquity did not ſpeak to the extraordinary impartiality of one of them, and if, beſide the high character of the other, ſupported by the internal evidence of his narrative, teſtimony ſtrongly confirming what, in that narrative, moſt preſſes upon his political opponents, did not remain to us from cotemporaries, ſome adverſe to his politics, and ſome perſonally adverſe to him. Occaſion has already occurred to obſerve, that Xenophon, deeply intereſted, certainly, in the political events of his age, and directing his attention to thoſe principally, which particularly affected either Athens or Lacedæmon, has omitted notice of tranſactions among the inferior republics, of ſome importance toward the modern reader's knowlege of the ſtate of the country at large. Where Xenophon fails us, the account of Diodorus will ſcarcely be completely ſatisfactory; yet ſome details, which he has preſerved, will deſerve notice, for confirmation of what Xenophon has reported, moſt adverſe to republican principles and practice, whether democratical or oligarchal,

as

as well as for what they add toward a completion of the general picture of the country.

In the conteſt for the ſovereinty of Greece, when Lacedæmon, by the overbearing confederacy of the democratical intereſt againſt her, was humbled, when Thebes, from oppreſſion and ſervitude, roſe at once to a degree of imperial preëminence, a preëminence allowed even among the Peloponneſian ſtates of the democratical party, when, afterward, Arcadia would firſt conteſt that preëminence with Thebes, and then aſſert equality with Lacedæmon, we may wonder where was the antient pride of Argos, and why her power, formerly ſo conſiderable, and her energy in oppoſition to Lacedæmon, commonly ſo ready, ſcarcely occurred to hiſtorical notice. In the ſilence of Xenophon on this ſubject, the information which we find from Diodorus is valuable.

That hiſtorian refers to the ſecond year of the hundred and ſecond olympiad, a ſedition, with executions inſuing, ſuch as, he ſays, were never elſewhere known among the Greeks. The manner, he proceeds, was thus. The form of the Argian government being democratical, ſome ambitious men propoſed to raiſe themſelves to power, by exciting the multitude againſt thoſe of principal authority, influence, and eſtimation in the commonwealth. Theſe, who had ruled through popular favor, were thus forced into oppoſite politics; and, at length, finding their ſituation uneaſy and alarming in extreme, to avert the threatening evils, they reſolved upon the hazardous expedient of attempting a revolution, and eſtabliſhing oligarchy. Before, however, they could prepare their plot for execution, ſuſpicion of it aroſe among the popular party, and the moſt ſuſpected were ſeized and put to the torture. The chiefs of the conſpiracy then, aware of the haſty, unſcrupulous and unmerciful temper of popular ſovereinty, to avoid greater miſery, inſtantly deſtroyed themſelves.

B. C. $\frac{371}{370}$. Diod. l. 15. c. 57. p. 487.

The death of theſe men however, and the inſuing confiſcation of their property, rather excited then ſatisfied the cruel jealouſy and avarice of the multitude. One of thoſe under the rack having named thirty others, as privy to the conſpiracy, the popular aſſembly, ſoverein, judge, and party, without form of trial, ſent all to the executioner, and ordered their property to the public treaſury. The popular leaders then reſolved not to loſe any of the advantages which this temper in the people ſeemed to offer them. That a conſpiracy for ſubverting the democracy had

exiſted, being now notorious, it followed, at leaſt as a probability, that numbers were more or leſs implicated in the guilt. To excite ſuſpicion among the people, againſt almoſt any, was thus eaſy; ſuſpicion ſufficed to procure condemnation; and accuſations were extended, till more than twelve hundred of the principal Argian citizens were executed. At length the accuſers became alarmed at their own ſucceſs. The people called for more accuſations and more confiſcation. The demagogues knew no longer either how to feed or how to ſtill the popular fury. In the prevailing diſpoſition to ſuſpect, their heſitation appeared ſuſpicious. The turn among the multitude was obſerved by thoſe who ſtill feared the progreſs of accuſation, and they were diligent in improving the opportunity. The people, habituated to blood, nevertheleſs the farther they went in fury, became the more fearful of revenge. In this temper they were eaſily perſuaded that the accuſers were betraying them; and with the ſame haſte and informality, with which ſuch numbers, at their inſtigation, had ſuffered, the demagogues were themſelves all condemned and executed. Then, proceeds the hiſtorian, little commonly ſedulous to account for what he relates moſt extraordinary, the people became calm, and the former quiet and harmony in the city were reſtored. A circumſtance, however, which he has reported, appears authentically to mark, not only the manner of the popular juſtice, on this occaſion, but alſo the exceſs of the popular vengeance. Among the numerous ſeditions of Argos, this, for its enormity, obtained the diſtinction of a name; it was called the Scytaliſm, ſtaff-work or bludgeoning.

Whatever then may have been the harmony which, according to the hiſtorian, was ſo inſtantly reſtored upon the execution of the demagogues, yet a government only liable to ſuch exceſs of diſorder, would be little capable of taking the lead of the affairs of a great confederacy. Still more then, in the weakneſs ſuperinduced by its deſtructive political diſſentions, it would be likely to yield itſelf to the guidance of the able directors of the Theban councils, and ſubmit its forces, in common with thoſe of the other commonwealths of the alliance, to be commanded in chief by the great general of the Theban people.

It is a truly curious account, free from inconſiſtency and the marvellous, that remains to us from Diodorus, of the conſequences of that peace, by which independency, under the patronage of Thebes ſupported by Perſia,

was

was aſſured to all Grecian cities. The moſt important particulars, unmentioned by Xenophon, ſufficiently accord with the tenor of Xenophon's narrative; and the whole deſerves notice the more, becauſe, contrary to Xenophon, all Diodorus's partiality was for the cauſe of Thebes and democracy.

The eſtabliſhment of independent ſovereinty in the people of every city [43], ſays the hiſtorian, produced great diſturbances and numerous ſeditions; eſpecially in Peloponneſus. For the people there having been moſtly accuſtomed to oligarchal government, their new democratical authority was exerciſed with eager but unſkilful zeal [44]. Many of the moſt reſpectable men, in various cities, were driven into baniſhment; many, through calumnious and intereſted accuſations, were executed; confiſcated property, divided among the people, was as a reward held out to incite haſty and unjuſt condemnation: to obviate theſe evils, ſedition ſoon grew buſy; and, to avoid them, emigration abounded [45]. The preſſure fell much upon thoſe who had held the adminiſtration of their reſpective towns under Lacedæmonian patronage. For as theſe had generally carried their authority with ſome haughtineſs, the multitude no ſooner acquired power than they exerciſed it under the inſtigation of reſentment. This paſſion of courſe became mutual; and if thoſe, who had been injured and oppreſſed, recovered power, little contented with juſtice, they would uſe it for revenge. Diod. l. 15. c. 40. p. 477.

Of this diſpoſition, the firſt, and a very remarkable inſtance, occurred in the ſedition of the little Arcadian city of Phialeia. A number of its principal people, driven away by ſentence of baniſhment, or by fear, either of a worſe condemnation, or perhaps of maſſacre, ſeized a ſtrong poſt within the Phialeian territory. Before any effectual meaſure was taken to diſlodge them, the ſeaſon of the Dionyſia, the feſtival of Bacchus, occurred. We have already had occaſion to obſerve inſtances of the attachment of the

43 Μετὰ τὴν συγχωρηθεῖσαν τοῖς δήμοις αὐτονομίαν ——

44 Ἀτειραγάθως.

45 This tranſlation of a paſſage written eighteen hundred years ago, and applying to times four hundred years before, ſo exactly deſcribes what has juſt been occurring in France, that it may almoſt be neceſſary to deſire the reader to look at the original, for proof that it is not a forgery. What follows wants only the change of a name or two to make it apply equally to the French as to the Grecian revolution.

Greeks, paſſionate at the ſame time and ſcrupulous, to theſe feſtive ceremonies of what they called religion. The Phialeian people, newly become ſoverein, would not be debarred of their ſacred joys, or reſtrained in them. They were collected in the theater, intent upon its amuſements, when the exiles entered the town, and carried maſſacre among them almoſt unreſiſted. According to the hiſtorian's account, their purpoſe would appear meerly revenge; but probably they had a view alſo to plunder. To hold the place, however, when they had maſtered it, was totally out of their thought: againſt the powerful confederacy of which Thebes was the triumphant head, and the democracy of Phialeia was a member, it was too much beyond hope. Little beneficial therefore to themſelves, this bloody deed brought great inconvenience upon many of their friends, who had been allowed hitherto a reſidence in the city. Fearing that revenge, unable to reach the juſter objects, might fall upon them if they remained, all fled, with the exiles, to Lacedæmon.

Nearly about the ſame time, among the Corinthians, the democratical was the fugitive party. The new prevalence of the democratical cauſe, under Theban ſupremacy, incouraged theſe to hope, that they might not only revenge themſelves on their opponents, but eſtabliſh themſelves in their ſtead. A number of them, who had taken refuge in the Argolic territory, communicated with ſome ſtill reſiding in Corinth, and a plot was concerted for a revolution. To put this forward, many of the exiles returned into the city, hoping to remain unobſerved. but, ſuſpicion ariſing among thoſe who held the government, meaſures were taken, ſo effectually preventing their eſcape, that, in deſpair, they killed one-another. Then thoſe evils, which the friends of the Phialeian exiles avoided, by flying with their conquering comrades, fell upon the friends of the Corinthians, who failed in their plot. Accuſations were numerous; many were in conſequence executed; and many, happy to find opportunity for flight, ſaved themſelves only by a miſerable emigration.

In the democratical government of Megara, an oligarchal party attempted a revolution. Numerous executions followed the failure, and many more were avoided only by flight. In Phlius again it was the democratical party that was compelled to fly. The democratical Phliaſians, like the oligarchal Phialeians, ſeized a ſtrong poſt within the territory

tory of their city; but finding no ſuch opportunity againſt the vigilant ariſtocracy of Phlius, as the wildneſs of democratical ſovereinty in Phialeia had afforded, they ingaged a body of thoſe mercenary troops, which ſeem now to have been always ready in Greece to accept pay, or to earn plunder, which might anſwer the purpoſe of pay, in any ſervice. Thus ſtrengthened, they annoyed their adverſaries in the city greatly: in one action they killed more than three hundred. But ere long they experienced the danger of truſting troops unconnected with them by any certain and permanent intereſt. Opportunity was found to corrupt their mercenaries. In a following battle they were deſerted by them, and in conſequence were defeated, with ſuch ſlaughter that the miſerable remnant, unable any longer to hold the poſt in Phliaſia (probably Tricaranum, mentioned by Xenophon to have been occupied by Phliaſian exiles) withdrew to Argos.

In a few general words only Diodorus notices the ſedition in Sicyon, of which an account has already been given in ſome detail from Xenophon; and then, concluding his review, 'ſuch,' he ſays, 'was the calami-'tous ſtate of Peloponneſus.'

From this account of the conſequences of the general peace, which followed the battle of Leuctra, and the embaſſy of Pelopidas into Perſia, we may form ſome conjecture what the indeciſion and trouble and confuſion were, which, notwithſtanding the pacification, followed the battle of Mantineia. After then comparing the pictures remaining to us from the cotemporary hiſtorian, deeply intereſted in the ariſtocratical cauſe, with thoſe of the compiler who, between three and four centuries after, adopted the prejudices of the oppoſite party, and obſerving how they ſupport one-another, the ſketch of a cotemporary orator, tho intended to ſerve a political purpoſe, may appear no unfair ſumming-up of the ſtate of things in Peloponneſus. 'The multitude in Peloponneſus,' ſays Iſocrates, ſpeaking in the name of Archidamus prince of Lacedæmon, 'and 'all thoſe whom we diſtinguiſh by the name of common people, tho 'they heedleſſly enough ingaged in the Theban cauſe, will I think, in 'future, be more cautious. For nothing, of what they expected, has 'followed from the revolution which they have been ſo eager to promote. 'Inſtead of greater freedom, they have acquired only a worſe ſervitude; 'for

Iſocr. Archid.

'for, inſtead of the beſt of their fellowcitizens, they are now ſubjected 'to the worſt: inſtead of independency, they have eſtabliſhed a dreadful 'lawleſſneſs: accuſtomed formerly to march with the Lacedæmonians 'againſt others, they now ſee others marching againſt them: ſeditions, 'which formerly they only heard of, in diſtant parts, they now experience 'almoſt daily at home. Calamities are ſo various and extenſive, that to 'decide who ſuffer moſt is impoſſible. Not a city remains unin-'jured by its neighbours: lands are ravaged, towns plundered, pri-'vate houſes deſolated, and thoſe governments are overthrown, and thoſe 'laws aboliſhed, under which they were formerly the happieſt of the 'Greeks. Miſtruſt and hatred, hence, are ſo become popular paſſions, 'that no enmity can exceed what exiſts between fellowcitizens. Where 'formerly was general plenty, and a concord promoting general injoy-'ment, now the rich would rather throw their wealth into the ſea, than 'give to the numerous poor; while theſe would be much leſs delighted 'in finding a treaſure, than in ſtripping the rich of their property. Holy 'ſacrifice is no longer regarded, but murders are committed even on the 'altars: and there are more exiles now from ſingle cities than formerly 'from all Peloponneſus.'

While ſuch was the ſtate of the ſouthern peninſula, which, when united under the ſupremacy of Lacedæmon, had taken the lead among the political concerns of the nation, ſo that Peloponneſian was a name of eminence among the Greeks, that northern province, which poſſeſſed in the greateſt degree the natural advantages adapted to give political importance, and which lately, under the guidance of one extraordinary man, had actually acquired a threatening ſuperiority, was fallen again into no enviable ſituation. The tyrant tagus of Theſſaly, Alexander of Pheræ, after a reign of eleven years, was aſſaſſinated, through a plot in which his wife was ingaged; and her eldeſt brother, Tiſiphonus, a principal in the conſpiracy, ſucceeded to the ſupreme executive power, and held it ſtill, when Xenophon put the finiſhing hand to his Grecian Annals [46].

Xen. Hel. l. 6. c. 4. ſ. 36, 37.

The

[46] Plutarch ſays that Thebë, wife of Alexander, was daughter of Jaſon (Plut. vit. Pelopid. p. 534. t. 1.) Xenophon and Diodorus both mention the wife of Alexander, ſiſter of Tiſiphonus, as a principal in the conſpiracy; Xenophon with very particular circumſtances, and Diodorus by

The delivery of his country from the tyranny of Alexander, tho by a baſe midnight murder, gave Tiſiphonus a gleam of popularity among his fellowcountrymen: for the advantage of the deed they overlooked its foulneſs. But a country where all conception of what can give ſtability to law and juſt government is ſo wanting, that aſſaſſination may find public applauſe, in the ſuppoſition that aſſaſſination only can obviate tyranny, will never long be free. Tiſiphonus, raiſed to the dignity of tagus, was allowed to rule, like Alexander and Jaſon, by an army of mercenaries; becauſe, with its defective conſtitution, only, ſo probably, authority could be carried through Theſſaly. In ſuch circumſtances, not the virtue only, but the ability of Jaſon would be requiſite to exerciſe ſovereinty, ſo as either to conciliate or to deſerve popularity. Tiſiphonus wanted either the ability, or the virtue, or both. Oppoſition to him, repreſſed by military power, was puniſhed by numerous executions and baniſhments; and ſtill oppoſition was ready, wherever it might dare to ſhow itſelf. Some of the towns obeyed the tagus; ſome reſiſted him. Indeciſion and trouble and confuſion ſeem to have pervaded Theſſaly, tho it had a conſtitutional chief, not leſs than Peloponneſus, left without a leading or connecting power; and thus, thoſe whoſe territorial advantages, as an able cotemporary writer obſerves, ſhould have made them the moſt powerful of the Greeks, became abroad inſignificant and at home wretched.

Xen. ibid.

Diod. l. 16 p. 517.

Iſocr. de Pace, p. 248. t. 2.

It may afford ſome conſolation, in contemplating human affairs, that the preſſure of evils, in one part of the world, not uncommonly produces a flow of proſperity in others. If, amid extenſive confuſion, ſecurity, in civilized ſociety, can be found anywhere, the favored ſpot will eſpecially attract thoſe, whoſe ability to be uſeful, giving them value, will make them welcome; and thus ſometimes, in the wreck of nations, all that is moſt valuable among men becomes concentrated. The ſpots where, in ſuch circumſtances, ſecurity will moſt be found, will generally be among thoſe leaſt favored by nature, for the ordinary purpoſes of life. Thus, in the middle ages, the marſhes of Venice, the mountains of Genoa, and the

by the name of Thebē; (Diod. l. 15. p. 517.) both equally mention Tiſiphonus, brother of Thebē, as ſucceſſor to Alexander in the dignity of tagus, and neither ſpeaks of them as children of Jaſon. This omiſſion, by the earlier writers, affords ſtrong preſumption that Plutarch wrote, as was too frequently his way, careleſſly.

ſcarcely

ſcarcely acceſſible cliffs of Amalfi, attracted whatever remained of moſt worth from the wreck of the Roman empire [47]; and in thoſe earlier times of which we have been treating, amid the complicated troubles of Greece, Megara, ſituated, like Genoa, on a mountainous coaſt of the continent, and Cos, a ſmall diſtant iland, flouriſhed ſingularly. The Megarians, as Iſocrates ſays of them, poſſeſſing really neither land nor port, and whoſe mountains are deſtitute even of mines, nevertheleſs through the laborious cultivation of their rocks, and by a diligence in manufacture and commerce which overbore diſadvantages of ſituation, profiting on the contrary from that ſituation, to preſerve the peace of their narrow territory, tho ſurrounded by warring neighbours, had among them the wealthieſt families of Greece [48]. It was in like manner, among the general troubles, and apparently in conſequence of them, that the new town of Cos was founded, in the iland of the ſame name, and rapidly became very conſiderable. The iland, ſcarcely twenty miles long and five wide, fortunate in ſoil and climate, had the advantage of being united in one republic, but not without experiencing the common bane of the Greek republics, ſedition. It was diſtracted by parties, when an earthquake overthrew great part of the principal town. Able men at the head of the party then holding the adminiſtration took advantage of this event for a bold undertaking. Inſtead

Iſocr. de Pace, p. 248. t. 2. Xen. Mem. Socr. l. 2. c. 7. § 6.

Diod. l. 15. c. 76 p. 496. Strab. l. 14. p. 656.

B. C. $\frac{366}{365}$. Ol. 103. 3. Diod.

[47] Venice and Genoa, with their local inconveniences, have local advantages, beyond that of meer ſecurity, which have aſſiſted to extend their proſperity through civilized ages: but the local inconveniencies of Amalfi are ſuch that they repelled, as ſoon as the ſecurity, derived from inacceſſibility, was no longer wanted: 'Oppreſſed,' in Gibbon's phraſe, 'by the arms of the Nor'mans, and ſacked by the jealouſy of Piſa,' (Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, ch. 56.) Amalfi never recovered from the blow. Deſcribing, with his uſual livelineſs of manner, the extraordinary proſperity of Amalfi, Gibbon has omitted notice of its local peculiarities, to which it was ſo much indebted for its proſperity. Only thirty miles from Naples, and ſeven from Salerno, there is ſcarcely any intercourſe with Amalfi but by ſea. In ſummer the road over the mountains, which ſeparate the bay of Naples from the bay of Salerno, whoſe ſnows ſupply the markets of the capital, is barely practicable for a mule; and in winter it is ſaid to be generally impracticable, or to be attempted only by an able walker. In the town itſelf winter is ſcarcely known: no north or eaſt wind can blow upon it; but the reverberated heat of the ſummer-ſun is ſuch, that a particular conſtruction of the dwellings, adapted to exclude the beam and produce a draft of air, is neceſſary to inable even the natives to breathe. Since the ruins of Pæſtum have been pointed out to public notice, the pictureſk beauties of the coaſt, forming the northern boundary of the bay of Salerno, a coaſt which Salvator ſtudied, have ingaged the attention of travellers and ſtudents in landſcape-painting; and hence Amalfi has become more known, among Engliſh travellers, than it was formerly, or perhaps is now, to moſt Neapolitans.

[48] Xenophon informs us that the great ſource of the wealth of Megara was a mannfacture of coarſe cloth, Ἐξωμιδοποιΐα. The Megarian citizens were maſter-manufacturers; the journeymen were ſlaves, bought barbarians. Mem. Socr. l. 2. c. 7. § 6.

of

of reſtoring the old town, called Aſtypalaia, they removed, with all their adherents, to a new one, which they founded on a more advantageous part of their coaſt, and to which they would give no other name than that of the iland [48]. They provided for its ſecurity by ſtrong fortifications, raiſed at great expence, and they improved the advantages which nature had afforded, for a commodious port. By the opportunities thus furniſhed for commerce, and by the benefits of a wiſe adminiſtration, a large population was collected, private fortunes grew, public means became conſiderable, and the new city of Cos, not indeed among the largeſt, became however one of the moſt flouriſhing and was eſteemed the beſt built and handſomeſt of Greece [49].

Megara and Cos, ſeemingly the moſt remarkable, were however by no means the only inſtances of flouriſhing communities, among the troubles by which the Greek nation was convulſed, in the courſe of the half century following the Peloponneſian war. In Peloponneſus itſelf, Sicyon, notwithſtanding its paſſing diſturbances, was a ſchool of the fine arts; and, among the ilands, Rhodes appears to have ſet the advantageous example whence Cos profited. Three principal towns there, Ialyſus, Lindus, and Cameira, had, from before Homer's time, held their ſeparate political eſtabliſhments. Toward the concluſion of the Peloponneſian war, they coäleſced into one government; for the ſeat of which a new city was founded, in a very advantageous ſituation, upon a fine natural harbour. An Athenian architect, who had gained reputation by his works at Peiræus, was ingaged to form the plan, deſign the walls, gates, and other public buildings, and ſuperintend the execution. To obviate invidious diſtinctions, no other name was given to the new capital than

Strab. l. 14. p. 652—654. Diod. l. 13. B. C. 408. Ol. 93. 1.

[48] It appears however dubious whether Aſtypalaia, ſynonymous with the Engliſh Alton, Aldborough, old town, was in uſe before the founding of the new town.

[49] The Count de Choiſeuil Gouffier, in his Voyage Pittoreſque de la Grèce, deſcribes Cos, in the year 1776, thus: 'The town of Cos is 'on the ſhore; its port is commodious; the whole 'coaſt is covered with orange and citron trees, 'which give it a moſt delightful appearance: 'the public place is ſingularly pleaſant: a pro- 'digious plane-tree, in the center, with its 'branches overſpreads the whole. Bending 'under their own weight, theſe might ſuffer, 'without the attention of the inhabitants, who 'regard the tree with a kind of religious reve- 'rence. In theſe countries everything offers traces 'of antient grandeur; and ſo the props, which 'ſupport the decrepid limbs of this reſpected 'tree, are magnificent columns of marble and 'granite. An abundant fountain adds to the 'charms of this place, always frequented by the 'inhabitants, who reſort to it to tranſact their 'affairs, and to injoy its ſhelter againſt the heat of 'the climate.'

that of the iland itſelf; a meaſure, among others, the example of which was followed by the Coäns. The diſtraction of the oligarchal and democratical intereſts in Greece, and the depreſſion of the leading republics, adverſe to the common power of the nation and its means of oppoſition to a common enemy, adverſe, as we have ſeen, even to the internal quiet of Greece itſelf, ſeems however to have been favorable to the peace and proſperity of ſome of the diſtant colonies. When neither the higher people could any longer hope for ſupport from Lacedæmon in the exerciſe of an oppreſſive oligarchy, nor the lower were ſtimulated by Athenian politics to diſturb all government not ſubſervient to Athens, the Rhodian conſtitution ſettled into a liberal ariſtocracy. This probably was not inſtantaneouſly eſtabliſhed in the full perfection which Strabo aſcribes to it, nor was it undiſturbed in its growth; but, in the end, the men of higher rank and fortune learnt ſo to govern, that the lower people, through a conſtant employment of their induſtry, a careful attention to their wants, a ſtrict and impartial adminiſtration of juſtice, were happy, quiet, and zealouſly attached to their country and laws. An extraordinary proſperity followed, and laſted for ages.

Strab. ut ant.

For a complete picture of Greece, in this age, if memorials remained to direct the pencil, a conſiderable extenſion of bright colors and fair forms, no doubt, ſhould find place among the gloomy tints and horrid ſhapes, that have been tranſmitted as the principal conſtituents. But, as in landſcape, rugged mountains, and pathleſs rocks, and waſteful torrents, every work of nature rude, and every work of man in ruin, moſt ingage the notice of the painter, and offer the readieſt hold for the touches of his art, ſo in the political world, war, and ſedition, and revolution, deſtruction of armies, maſſacre of citizens, and wreck of governments, force themſelves upon the attention of the annaliſt, and are carefully reported to poſterity; while the growth of commerce, and arts, and ſcience, all that gives ſplendor to empire, elegance to ſociety, and livelihood to millions, like the extended capital and the boundleſs champain, illumined by the ſun's midday glare, pleaſes, dazzles, bewilders; offers a maze of delightful objects, charms rather than fixes the attention, and giving no prominences, no contraſt, no ſtrongly charactered parts, leaves the writer, like the painter, unable to chooſe out of an expanſe and a variety, whoſe magnificent

magnificent whole is far too great for the limited ſtretch of litterary or pictureſk deſign.

Neverthelefs among the playful ſketches and incidental remarks of antient writers, we find teſtimony to the proſperity of ſome of the extenſive ſettlements of the Grecian people. The weſtern colonies are objects for ſeparate conſideration. Confining our attention here to the eaſtern, we may obſerve that Cnidus, on the Carian coaſt, appears to have ſhared in the proſperity of the neighbouring iland of Cos. The Cnidian Venus, by Praxiteles, which deſcription remaining ſeems to mark as the model of more than one antient ſtatue preſerved to us, tho that known by the name of the Medicean, firſt in merit, is ſingular in fame, was through all antiquity eſteemed among the moſt admirable efforts of the art of ſculpture [30]. It ſeems to follow, were other teſtimony wanting, that the community was flouriſhing, which could adorn its temples with the moſt finiſhed works of artiſts the moſt eminent known to fame. In quiet, under Perſian ſovereinty, proſperity ſeems to have been extenſive among the Grecian towns on the Aſiatic ſhore. Halicarnaſſus, the ſeat of the Carian princes, for its flouriſhing ſtate, might deſerve to be better known to us; and the Ionian and Æolic cities, allowed the management of their own affairs in peace, while they paid the ſettled tribute to the Perſian government, and only forbidden war and diſturbance, produced philoſophers, and artiſts, and wealthy merchants, tho they offered no ſtateſmen or generals for the notice of hiſtory.

Plin. l. 36. c. 5. Lucian. Amor.

Diod. l. 15. p. 404, 405.

The political circumſtances of Greece, even to the minute diviſion of territory, among all the troubles they produced, had a tendency to promote the cultivation of ſcience and the fine arts. Eloquence was ſo important, in every ſtate, that no ſtudy, by which it might be improved, could be indifferent. In democratical governments it was all-powerful; and even in the oligarchal, not only for debate among the Few who ruled, but for perſuaſion alſo among the Many, whoſe obedience was to be inſured, and whoſe willing ſervice often to be ingaged, it was of great moment.

[30] A ſtatue of ſimilar deſign is preſerved in the muſeum in the Capitol, at Rome; larger than the Medicean, and of leſs winning delicacy, but altogether of very conſiderable merit.

Hence perhaps principally aroſe the habit of ſtudy among the Greeks, and the paſſion for philoſophy. The cuſtoms then, and the circumſtances of the country, made, for every town, at leaſt three public buildings indiſpenſable; a temple, for religious ceremonies; a theater, for public amuſement, ſometimes uſed alſo for public buſineſs, and even the amuſement dignified, in vulgar opinion, by an ideäl connection with religion; and a gymnaſium, or place of public exerciſe, where, in ſhelter againſt ſummer heat and winter ſtorms, the youth, within the confinement of a fortified town, might keep themſelves in conſtant preparation for military ſervice, for which, with the weapons of antient warfare, ſtrength, activity, and perſonal ſkill were ſo important. In the larger towns theſe buildings, eſpecially the temples, were multiplied; and baths, and the ſtoä, portico, or ſhelter for walking and public converſation, were added. The common property of the people, and accommodated to their favorite injoyments, it was the pride of every little community to have theſe buildings of a ſolidity to withſtand time, and of a beauty to ingage admiration. When they were to be raiſed or repaired, no purſe was to be ſhut. The celebrated temple of Diana at Epheſus, one of the moſt magnificent among the Greek ſettlements, being deſtroyed by fire, little after the time of which we have been treating, every fortune was to be preſſed, whether by voluntary contribution, or a tax inforced by authority, that it might be reſtored with ſuperior ſplendor: even the jewels and golden ornaments of the womens' dreſs were required, or given, to aſſiſt the expence.

Strab. l. 14. p. 640.

Hence principally the incouragement to the architect, and to the painter and ſculptor, who were to adorn the architecture. The progreſs, thus, of ſcience, arts, and fine taſte, among the troubles of the republican times, of which we have large information, is far leſs wonderful than the riſe of them in ages of obſcurity; how a Homer was inabled to acquire that judgement for the correction of his fancy, whence Ariſtotle has pronounced him the model of all eloquence; how the ſimple form of the Doric temple, cleared from Egyptian and Aſiatic ſophiſtication, became the ſource of pure taſte for all the architecture of the nation, chaſtening ſtill the artiſt's fancy, when in aftertimes he was required to vary forms for the various purpoſes of civilized and luxurious life, and to add the richeſt ornaments; and how that chaſtity and greatneſs

neſs of deſign became endemial, which are ſtriking in ſome of the medals, of times beyond the oldeſt hiſtorians, ſcarcely leſs than in the ſtatues remaining from the ages in which arts and philoſophy met in higheſt cultivation.

But on the continent of Europeän Greece, in the height of its troubles, arts, commerce, and ſcience were not confined to the narrow limits of two inferior towns, Megara and Sicyon. A wider field was yet open to them, in which, not only they might expatiate in ſome ſecurity, but find even peculiar advantages. Megara, and Sicyon, and Cos, and Cnidus bore the characteriſtics more of civil communities than of political powers. Leaving to others the care of the great intereſts of the Greek nation, which they could little influence, their adminiſtrations gave their attention wholly to preſerve the peace of their own little ſtates, as they could, and, in that peace, to cultivate commerce and the arts. Wiſe, and perhaps neceſſary, in their political impotence, ſuch dependence upon events would have been, for Athens, a weak policy. The obvious danger of loſing more through acquieſcence than would be hazarded by exertion, impelled her to take an active part in the common affairs of Greece. Liable thus, unavoidably, to ſome degree of political turbulence, nevertheleſs the adminiſtration, generally directed by able yet moderate men, preſerved peace, as we have ſeen, within Attica, while the Athenian arms were ſeldom unemployed abroad; and, notwithſtanding the vices of the Athenian civil conſtitution, yet, in compariſon with many other parts of Greece, perſon and property in Attica might be eſteemed ſecure. To theſe then being added the advantages of an extent of territory, narrow indeed, yet far ſuperior to that of moſt Grecian republics, of a powerful navy, and of that very political importance which forbad perfect quiet, Athens became the great reſort of ſcience, arts, and commerce. Peiræus, as Iſocrates informs us, was the center of the trade of the age: he calls it the center of Greece; and, for maritime communication, it might be not improperly ſo called. Commodities, he ſays, ſcarcely to be obtained elſewhere of one kind in each place, were found in abundance, of every kind, in Peiræus. Eloquence, then, from the nature of the government, and from the manner of adminiſtering the law, was cultivated, as a qualification almoſt neceſſary to civilized life; and philoſophy ingaged earneſt attention as a conductor to eloquence. Athens was the place in Greece where means moſt occurred for

Iſocr. Paneg. p. 186. t. 2.

for the acquiſition of wealth, where commerce had moſt expanſe, where the government offered moſt opportunities, where even learning was a road to riches; and, tho great fortune could hardly be held there in quiet and ſecurity, yet it might be ſpent with ſplendor. Wealth and ſcience were attended of courſe by the arts, to which ſcience aſſiſted to give the embelliſhment of fine taſte. Thus architecture, ſculpture, and painting continued to receive improvements, during all the turbulence which followed the Peloponneſian war; and it was during that period that Plato wrote and taught, Lyſias and Iſocrates pleaded, and Ariſtotle and Demoſthenes were ſtudying, in Athens.

It is impoſſible for the compiler of Grecian hiſtory not to feel a particular intereſt in the fortunes of another Athenian of that age, the ſoldier-philoſopher-author, who has been his conductor, now through a period of nearly half a century, among thoſe tranſactions in which he was himſelf an actor; and the ſuppoſition will naturally follow, that the reader will not be wholly unimpreſſed with a ſimilar ſentiment. Fortunately the memorials remaining to us, tho very inadequate to the gratification of a juſt curioſity, will however, as far as they go, perfectly coïncide with the purpoſe of Grecian hiſtory, affording no unimportant addition to our propoſed illuſtration of the actual ſtate of Greece.

Whether an illuſtrious man was born in a high or a low ſituation in ſociety, however otherwiſe indifferent, cannot be intirely ſo toward a knowlege of the character, either of the man, or of the times in which he lived; and eſpecially in Greece, where the oppoſition between the higher and lower orders formed the prominent point in the character of the national politics, from times before connected hiſtory, till thoſe when the country ceaſes to be an object for hiſtory. But, concerning the anceſtry of Xenophon, antient writers have left us no farther information, than that he was ſon of Gryllus, an Athenian, of that diviſion of the Attic people, which compoſed the Erchian or Echrian borough, of the Ægeid ward. Various indications however concur in tendency to denote that his family was of ſome conſideration, and that he was born rather to affluence than poverty. The ſcholars of Socrates were moſtly of the principal families of Athens; ſo much Xenophon himſelf informs us;

Diog. Laert. vit. Xen.

us; and he was a ſcholar of Socrates, bred apparently without a profeſſion. His early intimacy with Proxenus, who appears to have been of a family of eminence in Thebes, implies a probability at leaſt that he was of connections not greatly inferior in his country [50]. The ſame circumſtance, together with his earneſtneſs to leave Athens, juſt after the reſtoration of the democracy, as his friend had left Thebes apparently becauſe his proſpects were not pleaſant under the prevalence of the democratical party there, marks that his connection with the ariſtocratical intereſt, probably inherited, was at leaſt very early formed. The confidence then with which Proxenus promiſed him introduction to Cyrus, and the attention paid him by that prince; his election, after the loſs of both thoſe patrons, to a great military command, from no previous military rank, by thoſe who poſſeſſed the beſt claims of previous rank to that very ſituation; the reſpect with which, unprotected by his country, he was treated by Spartan officers in the higheſt forein commands, by the king, Ageſilaus, and finally by the Lacedæmonian ariſtocracy; all theſe circumſtances, tho perhaps each ſingly might be referred to another cauſe, ſeem collectively to afford ſtrong preſumptive evidence that he was not originally diſtinguiſhed for his merit alone, but that his birth and connections had aſſiſted to introduce him and give him conſideration.

Xen. Anab. l. 1. c. 1. ſ. 11 l. 2. c. 6. ſ 9. & l. 3. c. 1. ſ. 4.

Xenophon, we are told, was eminently favored by nature with elegance of countenance and perſon. He was bleſt, as we learn from himſelf, with active ſtrength, and a conſtitution of a firmneſs fitting him for a ſoldier's life in any climate. The ſuperior qualifications of his mind had apparently been already obſerved by Socrates, when, meeting him in a narrow way (if we may credit Laertius for the ſtory) the philoſopher ſtopped him by putting his ſtick acroſs, and abruptly aſked 'Whence 'comes every good to man?' Anſwer being made to his ſatisfaction, he aſked again, 'How then are men made honeſt and good?' This producing heſitation, Socrates added, 'Follow me then and learn.' When Xenophon was invited by Proxenus to the court of Sardis, then about his ſix or ſeven and twentieth year, it is evident, from his own account, that

Diog. Laert. vit. Xen. Xen. Anab. l. 4.

Diog. Laert. vit. Xen.

B. C. 402. Ol. 94. 3.

[50] Proxenus, generally marked by Xenophon only as a Bœotian, is diſtinguiſhed in one paſſage of the Anabaſis as a Theban. (Anab. l. 2. c. 1. ſ. 8.) He alone of the Grecian generals in the ſervice of Cyrus is ſtiled a friend of the prince, φίλος, (Anab. l. 1. c. 1. ſ. 11.) one admitted to familiar communication; the others are called ξένοι, gueſts received at his table.

he

he conſidered Socrates as his beſt friend and moſt valuable adviſer. He did not fail therefore to conſult him upon that occaſion. Both were aware that to ingage in the ſervice of Cyrus, the ally of Lacedæmon, and eſteemed the enemy of Athens, or at leaſt of the democracy, would afford opportunity, not unlikely to be uſed, for exciting popular reſentment againſt him. Socrates therefore adviſed, as in a caſe of both difficulty and importance, to conſult the Delphian oracle. What confidence the philoſopher really had in oracles, as we have formerly obſerved, ſeems difficult to judge: but, as a forbidding reſponſe would probably divert his young friend from a hazardous purpoſe, and an incouraging one would give to that purpoſe a ſanction, which the public religion acknowleged and the law reſpected, the advice appears to have been unqueſtionably wiſe. Both the doubt, however, and the advice given upon it ſeem ſtrongly to confirm the ſuppoſition, before ſtated, that Xenophon was rich and of conſiderable connections. For reſtrictions upon forein travel attached only upon thoſe of ſome eminence; popular jealouſy was little to be apprehended by the needy and obſcure; and the Delphian oracle ſeems to have been acceſſible only to the rich, and favorable almoſt only to the profuſe. Xenophon went to Delphi; but, bent, with all the ardor of youth, upon new and great proſpects, and urged, apparently, by uneaſineſs under the exiſting adminiſtration of his country, inſtead of aſking the oracle Whether he ſhould go to Sardis? he aſked To which of the gods he ſhould ſacrifice and pray for ſucceſs in his projected journey? The anſwer, favoring him with direct information, he reported to Socrates; who, he ſays, diſſatisfied with the evaſion of his advice, but nevertheleſs conſidering the reſponſe as amounting to a command to go, adviſed him 'to do as the god directed.'

Xen. Anab. l. 3. c. 1. ſ. 4, 5, 6.

Xen. Sympoſ. c. 4. ſ 30.

The expence of the journey to Sardis, of the reſidence at a court of much more than the Lydian ſatrap's uſual ſplendor, and of accompanying the army afterward on its long march into Upper Aſia, Xenophon ſeems to have borne from his private fortune, unaſſiſted by emolument from any appointment. Nevertheleſs that he lived upon a high footing, and made even more than common figure, ſeems indicated. That, without the pretenſions of military rank or civil office, he was in a ſituation to communicate perſonally with the Perſian prince, is marked, before he left Sardis,

Sardis, and more particularly again on the day of the battle of Cunaxa; and, when, after the circumvention of the generals, a body of cavalry was to be formed, his horſes are mentioned in a manner appearing to imply that he had more than any officer of the Grecian forces, Clearchus only perhaps excepted. Theſe conſiderations then may aſſiſt to account for his elevation, at his early age, at once to the rank of general, over all the officers holding commands in the body under Proxenus, and by their election.

Ch. 23. ſ. 2. of this Hiſt.

It was while Xenophon was in Aſia, or about the time of his return, that Socrates, whoſe loſs he has ſo affectionately lamented, and whoſe worth he has ſo ably recorded, was condemned and executed. The adminiſtration, we may be aſſured, was not friendly to Xenophon, under which ſuch an event could have place. A decree of baniſhment was propoſed againſt him, and carried; at what point of time is not aſcertained, but it ſeems to have been within two years after the death of Socrates. In reporting the arrival of the troops under his command in ſight of European ground, he takes occaſion to mention his own earneſtneſs to return immediately to Athens. We have ſeen how, firſt, the requeſt, and afterward the adverſe conduct, of the Lacedæmonian commander on the Helleſpontine ſtation, Anaxibius, interpoſed delays; and, how at length, attachment to his ill-uſed little army, concurring perhaps with ſome view of private advantage, induced him to forego his purpoſe for a time, and, in midwinter, ingage in the ſervice of the Thracian prince Seuthes. In the following ſpring the opportunity ſo fortunately occurred for the troops to be taken into Lacedæmonian pay, for the war then reſolved againſt Perſia. On this occaſion he again declares his purpoſe of returning directly to Athens; adding, that the decree of baniſhment was not yet paſſed againſt him. The earneſt requeſt however, he ſays, of ſome among his officers whom he moſt eſteemed, that he would retain the command till he had in perſon delivered them over to the Lacedæmonian commander-in-chief, Thimbron, induced him again to delay his voyage.

B. C. 401 or 400. Ol. 94, 4. or 95, 1.

Anab. l. 7. c. 1. ſ. 3.

Ch. 23. ſ. 6. of this Hiſt.

B C. 399. Ol. 95. 1.

Anab. l. 7. c. 7. ſ. 35.

It has been evidently among Xenophon's purpoſes, in his account of the return of the Greeks, to obviate the imputation of having improperly amaſſed private wealth: an imputation ſeldom failing to be urged, with or without foundation, in accuſations of offences againſt the commonwealth, at Athens. In relating the entertainment given by Seuthes,

on firſt ingaging the ſervice of the Greeks, he has taken occaſion to mention his poverty. It was uſual, it ſeems, for thoſe received at the table of Thracian princes, to carry preſents with them. Timaſion of Dardanum, from his ſtore of Aſiatic ſpoil, offered a ſilver cup and a Perſian carpet [52], the latter valued at forty pounds ſterling. Xenophon, who had brought from Aſia only one ſlave-ſervant, and the meer neceſſary for his return to Athens, made a gratifying ſpeech, which ſeems to have been favorably received inſtead of a preſent. His ſtipulated pay, then, of about four guineas monthly, for his ſhort ſervice with Seuthes, would certainly not make him rich. When the Grecian troops paſſed into the Lacedæmonian ſervice, while it was ſtill his purpoſe to return to Athens, the Thracian prince offered to fulfil his firſt promiſe to him, of his daughter in marriage, with the port of Biſanthë, and a territory around, and ſtock for its cultivation, if he would remain with only a thouſand men; preſſing the propoſal with the obſervation, that he would be ſafer ſo than in returning to his country. This might appear the more inviting, as, under the late empire of Athens, the thing had been familiar in Thrace; many Athenians having poſſeſſed caſtles and eſtates there [53], and ſome having formed connection by marriage with Thracian princes. The connections and poſſeſſions of Miltiades and Alcibiades in the Cherſoneſe, and of Thucydides and Agnon on the Strymon, have been objects for hiſtorical notice. Xenophon declares his poſitive refuſal of the propoſals of Seuthes, without aſſigning his reaſons; which perhaps it might have been difficult to ſtate, ſo as to avoid riſking offence either to the Lacedæmonian or to the Athenian government.

Anab. l. 7. c. 7. ſ. 29. c. 2. ſ. 20.

In relating his arrival with the army at Lampſacus, on the Aſiatic ſide of the Helleſpont, he ſpeaks again of his poverty, and then he repeats, for the laſt time, the mention of his purpoſe to return home; whence it ſeems probable that intelligence of the decree of baniſhment reached him not long after. His account of theſe matters is ſtrongly marked with caution againſt offence to the two really deſpotic governments of Athens and Lacedæmon; on one of which he muſt be neceſſarily dependent, and the controul of neither he could intirely avoid. It is never-

l. 7. c. 8. ſ. 8.

[52] Ταπίδας βαρβαρικὰς. Spelman has made an apology for his tranſlation, *Perſian* carpets, which it ſeems hardly to have wanted.

[53] Καὶ ἐν τῇδε τῇ χώρᾳ ἴσως ἀξιώσεις καὶ τείχη λαμβάνειν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἄλλοι τῶν ὑμετέρων ἔλαβον, καὶ χώραν. Anab. l. 7. c. 3. ſ. 9.

theleſs

theleſs ſtrongly marked with candor. Evidently, in the outſet of his expedition, he was fond of expence and ſhow: and, after he was elected general, careleſs of ſaving, generous rather to profuſion, and ambitious of popularity, he conſidered preſent expence as opening future means. But the decree barring his return to his country, probably depriving him of property, certainly cutting off many hopes, made an alteration, neceſſarily almoſt total, in his views for his future life. Then it became a matter of urgency to conſider, leſs how he might be great, than how he might ſubſiſt. With an alteration of his economy, if he retained his military ſituation, opportunity was apparently before him. His preparation then to account for the acquiſition of wealth, by means without moral reproach, in the common eſtimation of the times, and, not only allowed by the religion, but ſpecially warranted, as he aſſerts, by the declared favor of the gods of his country, yet for which he ſeems nevertheleſs with ſome anxiety to apologize, will deſerve notice.

At Lampſacus he met a friend whom he had known in Attica, Eucleides, a Phliaſian by birth, and by profeſſion a prophet, whoſe father, Cleagoras, had earned renown as a painter, by his work called the Dreams, in the Lyceium at Athens[54]. Eucleides could not believe Xenophon's declaration, tho affirmed with an oath, that one who had been in ſo great a command, where others, with inferior advantages, as Timaſion of Dardanum and the ſoothſayer Silanus, had acquired conſiderable wealth, could be under any neceſſity to ſell his horſe for an immediate ſupply. The preſent of hoſpitality however from the Lampſakene public, uſually made to thoſe in high public ſituations, inabled Xenophon to offer ſacrifice. Eucleides attended the ceremony, and, after inſpecting the entrails of the victims, declared that he had no longer any doubt of the offerer's poverty. 'And I ſee it probable,' he ſaid, 'that this will continue; for, if opportunities of gain occur, ſome obſtacle will intervene; and, if no other, 'you will be yourſelf the obſtacle.' Xenophon allowed that this was likely. 'But moreover,' continued Eucleides, 'Jupiter Meilichius is 'adverſe to you. Have you ſacrificed to him, as I was accuſtomed to do

Anab. l. 7. c. 8. ſ. 1.

ſ. 2.

[54] Spelman has obſerved that no mention is found, in any other antient writer, of this painter, or his works here mentioned; tho Pauſanias has left a deſcription of the Lyceium, and from Pliny we have accounts of earlier paintings.

'with you at Athens?' He replied that he had not ſacrificed to that god ſince he had left home. 'Then,' ſaid Eucleides, 'do it, and benefit will 'follow [55].'

Anab. l. 7. c. 8. ſ. 3.

On the morrow Xenophon proceeded with the army to Ophrynium, and there, according to the antient Attic rites, he ſacrificed, ſcorching hogs whole, and the ſymptoms were propitious [56]. On the ſame day Biton and Eucleides came thither, commiſſioned to pay the troops. They entertained Xenophon at their table; and, learning that the horſe he had ſold had been a favorite, they redeemed it for him and would take no compenſation.

Ch. 23. ſ. 6. of this Hiſt.

After this the army proceeded, as already has been related in its place, acroſs the Trojan plain, and over mount Ida, to Antandrus; along the coaſt of the gulph then to the plain of Thebë, and by Atramyttium, Certonium, and Atarneus, to Pergamus on the river Caïcus. Pergamus, afterward the ſeat of a kingdom, was at this time the reſidence of thoſe Grecian families, deſcended from Demaratus king of Lacedæmon, and Gongylus of Eretria in Eubœa, which have been already noticed as holding hereditary lordſhips in this country, derived from the bounty of the Perſian monarchs [57]. Both had ingaged with Cyrus in rebellion againſt the reigning king, and therefore both would ſee with joy the proſpect of Lacedæmonian protection. Xenophon was entertained in the houſe of Hellas, mother of Gorgion and Gongylus, then chiefs of the Eretrian family. From her he had information that Aſidates, a wealthy Perſian, lord of the higher part of the rich vale of the Caïcus, was at this time, with his family, in his caſtle there: three hundred men, ſhe told him, might ſuffice to make all priſoners, whoſe ranſoms, together with the effects to be found, would form a very large booty; and, if he would undertake it, a

Ch. 24. ſ. 1.

Anab. l. 7. c. 8. ſ. 4. & 5.

[55] We want information of the import of many of the titles of the Greek deities. Meilichius ſeems to have meant the character of the ſupreme god as the kind father of men, in oppoſition to that of the avenger of ſin.

[56] Spelman has obſerved that, according to Thucydides, l. 1. c. 126. as explained by his ſcholiaſt, theſe were probably cakes, formed in the ſhape of hogs.

[57] In the Hellenics (b. 3. c. 1. ſ. 4.) Pergamus, as well as Teuthrania and Aliſarnia, otherwiſe called Eliſarne, is mentioned as the lordſhip of the family of Demaratus, tho, in the Anabaſis, it appears that it was, perhaps as the moſt conſiderable town in that part of the country, the reſidence of the family of Gongylus, whoſe fief, if it may be ſo expreſſed, was compoſed of the townſhips of Gambrium, Palaigambrium, Myrina, and Grynium.

near

near kinſman, with others of her friends, ſhould be his guides. This adventure, curſorily heretofore mentioned, as belonging leſs to the general hiſtory than to the memorials of Xenophon, may deſerve more detail here.

Ch. 23. ſ. 6. of this Hiſt.

The propoſed meaſure then appearing to human reaſon practicable, and promiſing great advantage, how far the gods would favor it was to be inquired through ſacrifice. An Eleian prophet, Agaſias, officiated, and the kinſman of Hellas, and another of her moſt confidential friends, Daphnagoras, attended with Xenophon. The appearances of the victims were highly favorable, and the prieſt declared in direct terms, according to Xenophon's expreſſion, 'that the man might be taken.' Xenophon ſelected, from his own army, only the lochages whom he moſt deſired to favor, to accompany him on the expedition, the reſt of the party being apparently compoſed of the Pergamenian lady's people. But, due ſecreſy not having been obſerved, when the party ſet forward, full ſix hundred obtruded themſelves to go with it; apparently of the Cyreian troops, among whom, when booty was in proſpect, diſcipline might poſſibly be deficient. The lochages however, ſuppoſing the prey certain, and unwilling to have ſo many ſharers, puſhed on with the guides, and, in the darkneſs of ſupervening night, left the greater part of the interlopers at a loſs to find their way.

Anab. l. 7. c. 8. ſ. 6.

About midnight the party arrived at the caſtle; and, depending upon the capture of Aſidates himſelf, with the riches within, they negligently ſuffered the ſlaves, with much valuable booty without, to eſcape. But the caſtle was ſtronger than had been ſuppoſed, the circuit large, the walls eight bricks thick and loſty, with projecting towers, and the defenders numerous and able. By daybreak however a breach was made, but the perforation, not damaging the ſolid wall above, no ſooner appeared, than the foremoſt of the aſſailants was wounded through the thigh with a large ſpit; and preſently the well-directed arrows from above made it dangerous even to approach the wall. Meanwhile fireſignals and cries had communicated alarm around, and numerous ſuccours approached; ſome Perſian cavalry, ſome middle-armed, and ſome even Grecian heavy-armed in the Perſian king's pay [58].

ſ. 7.

ſ. 8.

[58] Thus I think the ὁπλῖται φρουροὶ muſt be underſtood.

In

In this, leſs a military expedition than a private adventure, eſtabliſhed order ſeems to have been very deficient, till, the multitude of the
Anab. l. 7. c. 8. ſ. 9. enemy gathering, and danger preſſing, fear inforced ſubordination, and able command became acceptable. It was now leſs an object to carry off booty than to retire in ſafety; but the leaders were apprehenſive of the incouragement to the enemy, and diſcouragement to their own people, which might inſue from abandoning the booty, and ſo giving their retreat the appearance of flight. They formed therefore a hollow ſquare, with the oxen, ſheep, and ſlaves in the middle, and in that order directed their march homeward. Nevertheleſs they were ſo purſued with bowſhots and
ſ. 10, 11. ſlings, that it was with great difficulty they croſſed the Caïcus, and, before the annoyance ceaſed, near half their number was wounded. Probably indeed all might have been cut off, but for the ſupport ſpiritedly brought from Pergamus by young Gongylus; who, againſt his mother's inclination, led a force to their relief, while Procles alſo ſhowed himſelf with his troops from Aliſarnia and Teuthrania. Thus they brought in about two hundred ſlaves, and cattle, according to Xenophon's expreſſion, juſt enough for ſacrificing.

With the manner of this privateering or pirating expedition, Xenophon appears to have been utterly unſatisfied, but he expreſſes no diſapprobation of the object. On the contrary, he reſolved upon a ſecond attempt, which ſhould be under his own conduct. On the very next day
ſ. 12. he was careful to have the preparatory rites of ſacrifice duly performed; and then, moving at night with his whole army, he made a long ſtretch into Lydia, meaning to deceive the Perſian into the ſuppoſition that, the hoſtile force which alone was formidable to him being far off, his caution might be remitted. But Aſidates, receiving information that Xenophon had conſulted the pleaſure of his gods about a ſecond expedition, to be made with his whole ſtrength, haſtened to leave his caſtle, apparently before intelligence could reach him of the Grecian army's march; and, directing his way up the country, he incamped in ſome villages near Parthenium. The reſult is related by Xenophon in very few words. Perhaps he made his forced march not more to deceive Aſidates, than to avoid a repetition of inconvenient interference from his own troops; probably

probably he provided for intelligence of all the Perſian's motions, and, with a ſelect party only, ſurprized him in his camp. The unfortunate Aſidates, however, was taken, with his wife, children, horſes, and all his effects; 'and thus,' ſays Xenophon, 'the indications in the firſt 'ſacrifice were accompliſhed.' The army then returned to Pergamus, and great credit appears to have been given to Xenophon for his conduct. According to his own expreſſion, 'he had no longer occaſion to com-'plain of the god,' apparently meaning Jupiter Meilichius, 'for the whole 'army, generals, lochages, and ſoldiers, and even the Lacedæmonians 'preſent, vied in ſelecting horſes, cattle, and the beſt of everything for 'his ſhare of the booty; ſo that, inſtead of wanting aſſiſtance, he was 'thenceforward in circumſtances to confer benefits.'

Anab. l. 7. c. 8. l. 13.

With this account of his own acquiſition of fortune, Xenophon concludes his narrative of the expedition of Cyrus and its conſequences; the arrival of Thimbron, preſently after, to take the command in chief, putting an end to all ſeparate and independent operations of the Cyreians. In his Grecian Annals, in which their ſervice afterward, under the ſeveral Lacedæmonian commanders in Leſſer Aſia, is reported, he makes no mention of himſelf. But in five or ſix campains, moſtly ſucceſsful, in the richeſt provinces of that rich country, tho under the controul, not of the commander-in-chief only, but of a Lacedæmonian officer ſpecially appointed to the Cyreians, who would of courſe ſhare in all legal plunder before him, yet, even in ſubordinate command, at the head of that body, the opportunities of adding, and, in the common eſtimation of the times, creditably adding, to his private wealth, would be large. Had the ſucceſſes of Ageſilaus produced any ſettlement of affairs in Leſſer Aſia, promiſing any permanency, perhaps Xenophon might have choſen to ſettle there, even were the return to Athens open to him. But the recall of that prince, with the requiſition for the Cyreian troops to march into Greece, made a great and anxious change for him. He was rich; but, without a country, he was incumbered with his riches, both thoſe his private property, and thoſe committed to him in truſt by the troops he had commanded. It is from the account, which he has been ſolicitous to give to the public, of the execution of that truſt, that we have

B. C. 394. Ol. 96. 3.

have our chief information concerning his following fortunes, and with it ſome pictures of the times of ſingular value.

Ch. 23. ſ. 5. of this Hiſt.

We have ſeen that when the prizemoney, acquired by the Cyreian Greeks in Upper Aſia, was, in their return, divided at Ceraſus, a tenth was ſet aſide for the gods, and committed to the generals for dedication. The deities, ſelected to be honored on the occaſion, were the Delphian Apollo and the Epheſian Artemis, or, in her Latin name, Diana. Tho it has been evidently a principal purpoſe of Xenophon's narrative of the expedition of Cyrus, to apologize for himſelf to his country, yet there we find his free confeſſion, that, being baniſhed, he reſolved to follow Ageſilaus when he returned to Greece, and riſk the dangers of the war againſt that confederacy, of which Athens was a member. The dedication remained then ſtill to be made; and, in the deficiency of means for remitting large ſums, and the hazard of keeping them, eſpecially for one in the employment of a ſoldier and the condition of an exile, his difficulties we may eaſily conceive to have been conſiderable.

Anab. l. 5. c. 3. ſ. 7.

But the commiſſion for the dedication put him in poſſeſſion of what was, in the circumſtances of the times and in his circumſtances, an ineſtimable advantage: it opened a favorable introduction to the prieſthood of the two principal temples of the Greek nation, in Europe and in Aſia: none were ſo rich, and, unleſs that of Jupiter at Olympia ſhould be excepted, none ſo extenſively venerated, as thoſe of Apollo at Delphi and Diana at Epheſus. On his departure therefore he divided his wealth. Part, as the ſum to be conſecrated to Apollo, he carried with him; and, apparently when, after the victory of Coroneia, Ageſilaus made the magnificent dedication of the tenth of his Aſiatic ſpoil at Delphi, Xenophon depoſited his humbler offering in the treaſury of the Athenian people there, inſcribing it, as he tells us, with his own name and that of his deceaſed friend Proxenus. The other part, probably equal, or perhaps larger, as the portion of the Epheſian Diana, he committed to the integrity of Megabyzus, ſacriſtan or treaſurer of the temple of that goddeſs at Epheſus. The worſhip of Artemis or Diana, with the title of the Epheſian, was, it ſeems, not confined to Epheſus, nor was the dedication to her neceſſarily to be made there. He therefore injoined Megabyzus to remit the depoſit to him in Greece, ſhould he ſurvive the dangers of the expedition he was going

Ch. 25. ſ. 1. of this Hiſt.

Anab. l. 5. c. 3. ſ. 6.

going upon, but otherwiſe to dedicate it himſelf, in whatever way he might judge moſt acceptable to the goddeſs.

After the campain in Bœotia, Xenophon is ſaid to have accompanied Ageſilaus to Lacedæmon. Tho victory attended that prince in Greece; yet, as we have ſeen, his recall from Aſia was followed by the almoſt immediate and intire overthrow of the Lacedæmonian empire there and in the intermediate ſea. Thus was loſt that revenue, by which alone Lacedæmon had been inabled to maintain a large force of mercenaries, and to wage diſtant war; and hence, with the campain in Bœotia, Xenophon's military life ſeems to have ended.

Diog. Laert. vit. Xen.

Ch. 25. ſ. 1. of this Hiſt.

But Lacedæmon could hardly be made a pleaſant reſidence for a ſtranger, even by the friendſhip of a king, and that king Ageſilaus. Jealouſy of ſtrangers was peculiarly a principle of the conſtitution; and the kings, liable themſelves, even in private life, to ſevere controul always, could never calculate the amount or the kind of new embarraſſment to ariſe for them with every yearly change of the ephors. Protection and patronage, however, which the ſpirit of the Lacedæmonian government, denying to ſtrangers within Laconia, preſcribed for them everywhere elſe, were liberally given to Xenophon. Opportunity aroſe from the circumſtances of the province of Triphylia, between the river Alpheius and the border of Meſſenia, whoſe people, claimed as ſubjects by the Eleians, had been reſtored to, at leaſt, a nominal independency by the arms of Lacedæmon. Scillus, one of its towns, ruined by the Eleians for rebellion, was rebuilt and repeopled under Lacedæmonian auſpices, and, according to Pauſanias, given to Xenophon as a kind of lordſhip, to hold under Lacedæmonian ſovereinty. There however he ſettled, under Lacedæmonian patronage, having already a family: his ſons are mentioned by himſelf: of his wife we learn from his biographer no more than her name, Phileſia.

Ch. 24 ſ. 2. of this Hiſt.

Xen. Anab. l. 5. c. 3. ſ. 11. Pauſan. l. 5. c. 6.

Diog. Laert. vit. Xen.

Soon after he was eſtabliſhed at Scillus, the faithful ſacriſtan of the Epheſian Diana, taking the ſeaſon of the Olympian feſtival to make him a viſit there, reſtored the ſum committed to his charge. Then Xenophon made an extenſive purchaſe of land in the neighbourhood of Scillus, in the name of an eſtate for the goddeſs; having firſt taken the very remarkable precaution to procure an oracular reſponſe from Delphi, pointing

Anab. l. 5. c. 3. ſ. 8.

out, with the authority of Apollo, the very land that ſhould be purchaſed for Diana [59]. Of this eſtate, and his management of it, he has left us the following account.

Xen. Anab. l. 5. c. 3. ſ. 9.

'A brook flows through the eſtate, of the ſame name with that which 'runs near the temple of the Epheſian Diana at Epheſus: both are called 'Selenus [60]; both abound with fiſhes, and both have ſhellfiſh [61]. But the 'eſtate of the goddeſs near Scillus abounds alſo with beaſts of chace of vari-'ous kinds. From the ſacred ſtock then Xenophon built a temple and

ſ. 10.

'an altar; and he conſtantly ſet apart a tenth of the produce of the land 'for a ſacrifice to the goddeſs, and a feſtival, in which all the townſ-'people, and the men and women of the neighbouring villages partake. 'The goddeſs entertains with meal, bread, wine, confectionary, the meat 'of victims from the ſacred paſtures, and the produce of the chace [62]. For

ſ. 11.

'the ſons of Xenophon, and the youth of the town, with any of the 'older men who chuſe it, make a general hunting for the feſtival; not

Strab. l. 8. p. 357. Pauſan. l. 8. c. 24. Xen. ut ant. ſ. 12.

'only upon the ſacred grounds, but extending the chace acroſs the 'Alpheius over the neighbouring mountain Pholoë, on the border of 'Arcadia; and they take wild boars, roes, and deer.

'The place [63] lies in the way from Olympia to Lacedæmon, about 'twenty furlongs from the temple of Jupiter in Olympia. The ſacred 'land [64] has variety of hill, dale, and woods, with plentiful paſture for 'ſwine, goats, ſheep, and horſes; ſo that the ſaddle and draft cattle of 'thoſe who come to the feſtival, ſhare, in their way, amply in the cheer. 'The temple is ſurrounded by a grove of cultivated trees, furniſhing the 'fruits of every ſeaſon. Its form, comparing ſmall things with great, is 'the ſame with that at Epheſus; and the image of the goddeſs alſo re-'ſembles the Epheſian, as a ſtatue of cypreſs-wood may reſemble a ſtatue

[59] Χωρίον ᾠκίσται τῇ Θεῷ, ὅπου ἀνεῖλεν ὁ Θεός. Xen. Anab. l. 5. c. 3. ſ. 8.

[60] According to our copies, Xenophon wrote this name Σελληνοῦς, Strabo Σελινοῦς, Pauſanias Σιλινοῦς.

[61] Perhaps Crawfiſh.

[62] Xenophon adds ἀργύρια, a word to which I am unable to aſſign a probable meaning, and the tranſlators have omitted all notice of it.

[63] Ὁ τόπος.

[64] Ἔνι δ' ἐν τῷ ἱερῷ τόπῳ. Neither Xenophon nor Pauſanias has marked the diſtance of the ſacred-place from the town of Scillus, which, in all our maps, is, apparently, too near the coaſt, and too far from Olympia.

of

"of gold. Near the temple is a pillar, inſcribed thus: 'This is the "ſacred land of Diana. Whoever holds it and gathers from it, let him "ſacrifice the tenth yearly, and, from the remainder, maintain the temple. "Who fails thus to do will incur the deity's animadverſion."

In this very curious detail, evidently, with much ſaid, the direct mention of much implied has been prudentially avoided. We have already had frequent occaſion to notice the reſpect which we find, in Xenophon's writings, uniformly and zealouſly expreſſed for the religion of his age; and we have obſerved ground for ſuppoſing, that much of his eſteem for it aroſe from obſervation of the means it afforded, to the officer and to the ſtateſman, in the want of other ſanction, for inforcing duties, military, civil, and moral: at the ſame time we have ſeen inſtances of both his humanity and his ſkill in directing that ſuperſtition to purpoſes the moſt charitable, and with effect very extenſively beneficial. How much ſome reſource was wanting, in the deficiency of civil eſtabliſhments, for giving ſecurity to private property, among the Grecian republics, has alſo, in no ſmall degree fallen within our obſervation. In Greece, as Xenophon informs us, land was not, as with us, eſteemed the ſureſt foundation of private income, but rather any moveable effects that might have protection from the walls of a town. Within the walls of Athens then property would be ſafer than perhaps anywhere elſe in Greece, unleſs in Lacedæmon. But how precarious it was in Athens may be gathered from the high rate of uſury, in the moſt flouriſhing times there. Twelve for the hundred yearly was the loweſt uſual intereſt for money, and the cautious lender commonly required monthly payment. Thirty for the hundred was ordinarily given by thoſe who borrowed for commercial adventure; and on account of the inſecurity of contracts, the lender frequently imbarked himſelf, with his money, or the goods bought with it, to be ready to take his principal again with the intereſt, in the firſt moment that the borrower ſhould have means of payment. Among the commonwealths more ſubject to forein oppreſſion, or to ſedition breaking out into action, to calculate a rate of intereſt at all commenſurate with the lender's inſecurity evidently muſt have been impoſſible.

Ch. 21. ſ. 1. of this Hiſt.

In this ſtate of things then, rendered ſtill more unfavorable for Xenophon by his condition of an exile, his firſt reſource, opened to him by

his commiſſion for dedication, appears to have been to uſe the treaſuries of Diana at Epheſus and Apollo at Delphi as banks; and poſſibly this practice, unnoticed by writers who have had public matters only in view, may not have been ſingular or very uncommon. The advantage of having ſuch means ready, equally in Greece and in Ionia, was ſo peculiarly adapted to Xenophon's circumſtances, that it may countenance the ſuppoſition of his having ſuggeſted the double dedication which the army voted. For as dedication to Diana was not reſtricted to Epheſus or Aſia, ſo neither would that to Apollo be limited to Delphi or Europe; and had Xenophon's meditated colony on the Euxine ſhore been eſtabliſhed, or had the ſucceſſes of Lacedæmon againſt Perſia been leſs tranſient, poſſibly inſtead of carrying the worſhip of the Epheſian Diana into Peloponneſus, he might have extended that of the Delphian Apollo on the eaſtern ſide of the Ægean. When Ageſilaus left Aſia, his hopes of conqueſt, and perhaps Xenophon's views to ſettlement there, were not immediately abandoned. It was Conon's naval victory off Cnidus that confined the arms of the one, and decided the reſidence of the other, within the limits of Greece.

Then it became of courſe neceſſary for Xenophon to collect his property, or at leaſt to bring it within ready reach; and, if it might be poſſible, in his unfortunate condition of an exile, and, in times threatening more than common turbulence in that turbulent country, to provide with it an income of ſome ſecurity, for himſelf and his family, ſo that, if he muſt depend upon a foreign government for protection, ſtill he need not depend upon it for ſubſiſtence. To aſſure then to himſelf and to his poſterity a permanence of landed property, ſuch as, under the civil law alone, was perhaps ſcarcely anywhere in Greece to be hoped for, he recurred to religion for aſſiſtance. Uſing the opportunity afforded by the commiſſion from the troops he had commanded in Aſia, he procured the eſtimation of ſacredneſs for any extent of land, by making himſelf and his heirs nominally truſtees for the goddeſs, of what was very effectually their own eſtate, burdened only with a certain quit-rent and certain ſervices. For, by the conditions expreſſed in his inſcription, they were bound to employ a tenth only of the produce in ſacrifice and public feſtival: and whatever,

of

of the other nineteenths, was more than requiſite to maintain the temple and its appendages, would be at their diſpoſal. If then he paid largely to obtain the ſacred ſecurity, he might probably well afford to do ſo; for, in the proportion that landed property was otherwiſe inſecure, it would of courſe be cheap. The oracular reſponſe from Apollo, directing the circumſtances of the purchaſe, a very ſtrong matter in itſelf, tho dropping in a manner incidentally in the report of the tranſaction, was probably deſired for two purpoſes: it would amount to a declaration of the god's ſatisfaction with the management of the ſum which had been lodged in his treaſury, how afterward diſpoſed of we are uninformed, while it gave the moſt unqueſtionable authority for the purchaſe of lands on the weſtern ſide of Peloponneſus for the Epheſian Diana, the exact propriety of which might otherwiſe perhaps have been open to diſpute. It furniſhes moreover, for our information, the cleareſt indication that Xenophon was upon good terms with the Delphian, as well as with the Epheſian prieſthood.

The ſuperſtition of the middle ages, as much as it has been a ſubject of indiſcriminate invective, nevertheleſs had its evils not untempered with beneficial effects. When law was unequal to perſonal protection, the aſylum of a monaſtery, generally open, and in almoſt all circumſtances inviolable, was of high value. But the religious tenets of thoſe days, calculated for the appropriation of temporal advantages excluſively to the clergy, were no way applicable to the ſecurity of family-property. Even the baron's chapel, to be ſafe, muſt be within his caſtle-wall. In this point the ſuperſtition of Greece was more beneficial: Xenophon's chapel diffuſed a myſtical protection over his caſtle and his whole eſtate.

The advantages then of the ſituation of Scillus, for Xenophon, ſeem to have been many, and ſome of them very important. He was there under the immediate protection of the Lacedæmonian government, and yet he was beyond the ſphere of its Lycurgian rule, its cenſorial inſpection, and its more importunate jealouſy. Separated by lofty mountains from the countries moſt likely to be the ſeats of war, and far out of any expected line of march of contending armies, he was yet, by his neighbourhood to Olympia, in the way of communication with all parts, with every diſtant member of the Greek nation. Every fourth year Greece

was

was in a manner aſſembled in his immediate neighbourhood; and in caſe of preſſing danger, ariſing from any unforeſeen turn in Grecian affairs, the ſanctity of the Olympian altars, at hand, might be a valuable refuge. Dependent then as he was upon Lacedæmon, yet far removed from the great ſeats of contention of oligarchy and democracy, perhaps no man of his time in Greece injoyed great fortune with ſo many of the advantages of independency. The circumſtances of the country itſelf, moreover, ſeem to have been, for a man of his turn, ſingularly pleaſant. According to antient accounts, (modern are yet wanting) all the various beauties of landſcape appear to have met in the neighbourhood of Scillus. Immediately about the town and the adjacent temple, with their little river Selenus, incloſed between the hilly woodlands, Diana's property, and the barren crags of Typæum, whence, according to the Olympian law, it is ſaid, women intruding at the games were to be precipitated, we may conceive the fineſt claſſical compoſitions of the Pouſſins. Up the courſe of the Alpheius and its tributary ſtreams, toward Erymanthus and the other loftier Arcadian mountains, the ſublimeſt wildneſs of Titian and Salvator could not fail to abound; while the Olympian hill, with its ſplendid buildings among its ſacred groves, the courſe of the Alpheius downward, the ſandy plain, ſtretching toward Pylus, Neſtor's antient ſeat, diverſified with its pinaſters [65], the ſea in diſtance one way, and all the Arcadian mountains the other, would offer the various beauty, the rich grandeur, and the mind-filling expanſe of Claud [66].

Xen. Anab. l. 5. c. 12. Pauſan. l. 5 c. 6.

Strab. l. 8. p. 345, 351. Pauſan. l. 5. c. 6.

In this delightful retreat Xenophon is ſaid to have written moſt of his works, of which all of principal note remain to us. Here, while he meditated on the paſt, or viewed, in ſecure diſtance, the preſent ſtorms, which gave occaſion for moſt of the graver, the immediate circumſtances of his

Plut. de Exil. p. 1070. & 1074. t. 2. ed. H. Steph. Diog. Laert. vit. Xen.

[65] Πίτυς ἀγρίας. Pauſan. l. 5. c 6. The tree commonly called *Pinaſter* (for its quick growth and pictureſk beauty deſerving the attention of our planters, tho, like the oriental plane, on account of ſome unaccommodating qualities for their purpoſe, diſliked by our nurſerymen) is diſtinguiſhed by our botaniſts by the name of *Pinus ſylveſtris*.

[66] Chandler viſited Olympia in the unhealthy ſeaſon, in haſte and in fear. Like ſome of the moſt beautiful and intereſting parts of Italy, the hilly environs of the lake of Bolſena, and the rocky coaſt of Baia, of which otherwiſe it may be ſtill truly ſaid, in the words of Horace,

Nullus in orbe locus Baiis prælucet amænis,

it ſeems the weſtern coaſt of Peloponneſus is, at this day, in the autumnal ſeaſon, proverbiall unhealthy. Chandl. Trav. in Greece.

own

own happy ſituation would at intervals lead to the lighter; thoſe on his amuſements, field-ſports, the management of horſes, and agriculture; agriculture only incidentally treated, tho evidently a favorite ſubject. For, while, in moſt parts of Greece, ſoil and climate did much for the cultivator, among the ravages of war and ſedition, frequently occurring, ever threatening, the exertions of art would be neceſſarily haſty and little ſyſtematic. The fair lot of the countryman, the loved ſubject of faithful eulogy for the fortunate poet, under the wide ſhelter of the Roman empire, was hardly a matter even for imagination amid the inſecurity of the Greeian republics [67]. It may be worth while to compare, with his inchanting deſcription of plenty poured from the earth, arms remote, and juſtice reigning, the portraiture which Xenophon has left us of the huſbandman's life, not indeed at Scillus, but in two ſeparate diſtricts of the largeſt and moſt fruitful province of Greece. It occurs in the deſcription of an entertainment given by the officers of the Cyreian army, while incamped near Cotyora, to the miniſters of Corylas, prince of Paphlagonia. Among both Greeks and barbarians, as among the eaſtern nations at this day, the meal was commonly ſucceeded by dances and pantomimes. After a pantomimical dance, performed to the muſic of the flute, by two Thracians, armed, in the manner of their country, as targeteers, ſome Ænians and Magnetes, people of the ſouthern and northern borders of Theſſaly, ſtepped forward, and, in the full armour of the phalanx [68], exhibited the dance called the Carpæan. 'The manner of it,' ſays Xenophon, 'was thus: Flutes playing, and 'time being obſerved in all motions, one advances, as a huſbandman. 'Grounding his arms, he ſows, and drives his oxen, often looking around, 'as if in fear. Another approaches as a robber. The huſbandman ſeeing 'him, runs to his arms, and a combat inſues. The robber prevails, 'binds the huſbandman, and drives off the cattle. Then the dance is 'varied; the huſbandman is victorious, binds the robber's hands behind 'him, yokes him with the oxen, and drives all off together.'

Anab. l. 6. init.

[67] O fortunatos nimium, ſua ſi bona norint,
Agricolas! quibus ipſa, procul diſcordibus armis,
Fundit humo facilem victum juſtiſſima tellus.
&c. Virg. Georg.

[68] Ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις.

The

Strab. l. 7. p. 330. & l. 8. p. 429.

The Magnetes inhabited the dales of Pelion, along the Ægean ſhore, and the northern bank of the Peneius, under the heights of Olympus, againſt Macedonia. The Ænians held the upper part of the valley of

l. 8. p. 427.

the Sperchcius, and the northern roots of Oeta, to the border of Ætolia. They boaſted the pureſt blood of Grecian race; but neither this proud claim, nor their title to ſupport from the Theſſalian confederacy, nor the valor and ſkill in arms of every huſbandman among them, exerciſed in the daily care even of his draft-cattle and his ſeed-corn, nor the ſtrength of their highland faſtneſſes, in the end availed them. Among the wars of their more powerful weſtern neighbours, the Ætolians, Acarnanians, and Epirots, according to the geographer, perhaps within the age of Xenophon,

ibid.

the Ænians were extirpated. Of their neighbours, on the ſouthern ſide of the ridge of Oeta, the Dorians, a remnant juſt ſufficed to keep the name from periſhing.

In Laconia, Elcia, Attica, and ſome other parts of Greece, the ſituation of the huſbandman certainly was leſs unfortunate. To plow in arms was not commonly neceſſary; the plowman and his cattle were at leaſt not liable to attack from the ſolitary robber. Yet, if we conſider the ſtate of the country altogether, we ſhall hardly wonder if what remains from the Greeks of the republican times upon agriculture, is not among the moſt valuable of their writings, and if it affords little inſtruction for the cultivator under any mild government, long eſtabliſhed, only moderately well adminiſtered, and able, by its own ſtrength, or its political connections, to keep forein enemies at a diſtance.

More than twenty years Xenophon ſeems to have reſided at Scillus, perſonally undiſturbed, tho obſerving often, doubtleſs with much anxiety, the various turns of the contention between the democratical and ariſtocratical intereſts in Greece, excited anew by the injurious haughtineſs of Lacedæmon, ſo ſoon after her complete triumph over the democratical oppoſition. But the battle of Leuctra made a great and unfortunate change

B.C. 371.

for him. Then the Eleians, hitherto repreſſed by an overbearing power, allowed their indignation and their ambition vent; and, when a general

Ch. 27. ſ. 2. of this Hiſt.

peace was propoſed by the Athenians, upon the terms that all Grecian people ſhould be independent, they alone diſſented, with a declaration of their reſolution to aſſert their ſovereinty over the Triphylians. Mindful

of

of the groſs evils which can ſcarcely fail in the ſubjection of people to people, the Triphylians reſiſted. For that protection, which Lacedæmon could no longer with the former certainty give, Arcadia was ſolicited. War followed between Arcadia and Elis; violence and confuſion ſuperſeded law and order, more or leſs during ſeven or eight years, in that before peaceful and happy part of Greece; and at length, as we have ſeen, the ſacred precinct itſelf of Olympia became a field of battle. B. C. 386. Ch. 27. ſ. 4. of this Hiſt. B. C. 365. B. C. 364. Ch. 28. ſ. 5.

Diſturbance to Xenophon's quiet could not fail among theſe troubles; in which, however, he ſeems to have avoided taking a part. According to the biographer, but at what time is not ſaid, he ſent his family to Leprcum, he went himſelf to Elis, apparently to ſolicit, plead, or negotiate, and, finally, with his family, he removed to Corinth. It was doubtleſs a very advantageous circumſtance for him, that, after a violent ſtruggle, the ariſtocratical party in Elis remained complete maſters there; and this would be greatly improved by, what preſently followed, the renewal of alliance between Elis and Lacedæmon. Theſe facts, authenticated by himſelf, give probability to the report of his journey to Elis; and both together have a confirming conſonance to what is related by Pauſanias, that the Eleians recovered Scillus; that, a proſecution being inſtituted againſt Xenophon, before the Olympian council, for interference with their dominion, under claim of authority from a forein power, he was either acquitted or pardoned; and that, under protection of the Eleian government, as before of the Lacedæmonian, he was allowed to continue his reſidence at Scillus, and to preſerve his property [69]. Diog. Laert. vit. Xen. Ch. 28. ſ. 4. Pauſan. l. 5. c. 6.

When, about two years after the battle of Leuctra, the Athenians, abandoning the Theban alliance, took a decided part with Lacedæmon, there remained apparently no political motive to prevent his reſtoration to his country. Then therefore probably it was that, according to the account preſerved by Laertius, the ſame orator, Eubulus, who, in the vehemence, perhaps, of youthful politics, had propoſed the decree for his baniſhment, with the maturer judgement and ſoftened temper of thirty added years, moved in the Athenian aſſembly, with equal ſucceſs, for its B. C. 369. Ol. 102. 1/4. Diog. Laert. vit. Xen.

[69] This ſeems fully implied in the expreſſions — τυχόντα δὲ παρὰ Ἠλείων συγγνώμης, ἀδεῶς ἐν Σκιλλοῦντι ὠκησας.

reversal. Such a residence however, as Xenophon himself has described Athens, for eminent and wealthy men, we shall not wonder if, after an absence of more than thirty years, at the age of near sixty, he was not very eager to return to it. Corinth was a more commodious situation for communication with his property at Scillus, or negotiation concerning it.

But tho he avoided needlessly to expose his own elderhood, and the property that was to support his family, to the unbridled intemperance of a misruling multitude [70], yet he desired that his sons should not omit those duties of Athenian citizens, which, of their age, the Attic law required. Both are said to have fought, in the Athenian cavalry, on the great day of Mantineia, where the elder, Gryllus, earned a glorious death: the younger, Diodorus, survived.

For himself, in his declining age, Corinth probably might be a residence preferable to Scillus. That his connection with that city, and at least his occasional residence there, were of some duration, is implied in an epigram, preserved by Laertius, apparently selected from many relating to him. It runs thus: 'Tho, Xenophon, the Athenians banished you, 'for the friendship with which you were distinguished by Cyrus, yet 'hospitable Corinth received you. There you were kindly treated; there 'you found satisfaction; and there finally you resolved to reside [71].' Occasionally perhaps visiting his estate in Triphylia, but mostly under the liberal aristocracy of Corinth, he seems to have passed, in a dignified case, the remainder of a life, by all accounts long, and according to the report of Lucian, protracted beyond his ninetieth year [72].

Lucian de Macrob.

The estimation in which, living as well as afterward, Xenophon was extensively held, is marked by some pleasing testimonies. The death of

[70] Civium ardor prava jubentium. Hor. Od. 3. l. 3.

[71] Εἰ καὶ σὲ Ξενοφῶν, Κρανεῖ Κεκροπός τε πολῖται
Φεύγειν παίγνιον τοῦ φίλου χάριν Κύρου,
Ἀλλ' ἀ Κόρινθος ἔδεκτο φιλόξενος, ἣ σὺ φιληδῶν
Ὅπως ἀρίσκῃ, κεῖθι καὶ μένειν ἔγνως.

[72] I will own myself not inclined to give any credit to the date assigned, in our copies of Diogenes Laertius, as the term of Xenophon's life, namely the first year of the hundred and fifth olympiad, about two years only after the battle of Mantineia. Barthelemi, in a note to his fifty-ninth chapter of the Travels of Anacharsis, observing that the battle of Mantineia was fought in the year before Christ 362, about which I believe there is no difference, adds that Xenophon's history goes five years farther, to the year before Christ 357. Barthelemi is generally very accurate in discussion, tho the form of a novel, which he has unfortunately chosen to give to his work, has allured him to some occasional licentiousness in narration and remark; but on what authority or under what mistake he asserts this, I have not discovered.

Xenophon's

of Gryllus gave occaſion to many. Epitaphs and panegyrics upon that young man, as Laertius reports from Ariſtotle, principally intended as compliments to his father, were numerous. The Mantinean ſtate rewarded his merit with more coſtly honors: an equeſtrian ſtatue of him, placed near the theater in Mantineia, remained in the time of Pauſanias, who travelled through Greece between four and five hundred years after. Even to that time the fame of Gryllus was cheriſhed among the Mantineian people. They attributed to him the firſt merit in the great battle in which he fell; the ſecond to Cephiſodorus, who commanded the Athenian cavalry; and the third only to their own highly reſpected fellowcitizen Podares. Among the Athenians, already in Xenophon's age, the practice was growing, in paying compliments, and in everything, to run into extravagance. The Attic cavalry, having been the only victorious part of the army of their confederacy at the battle of Mantineia, had a fair claim to public honor. A picture of the battle was therefore placed in the Cerameicus, which Pauſanias mentions as remaining perfect when he viſited Athens. In this picture it was reſolved to honor the memory of Gryllus; and, whether with fair picturesk licence may perhaps be diſputed, but againſt all authority in hiſtory, Gryllus was repreſented giving the mortal wound to Epameinondas [72]. Pauſanias alſo found the memory of Xenophon's reſidence preſerved by tradition among the Triphylians, and cheriſhed among the moſt informed of the Eleians. Scillus was then again in ruin; but the temple of Diana remained; and, near it, a monument of marble, which Pauſanias knew to be from the quarries of mount Pentelicus in Attica, with a figure, which the neighbouring inhabitants aſſerted to be of Xenophon.

Diog. Laert. vit. Xen.

Pauſan. l. 8. c. 9 & 11.

l. 5. c. 6.

Xenophon's Grecian Annals end with the battle of Mantineia. His panegyric of Ageſilaus includes the death of that prince, the time of which is not preciſely aſcertained, tho it is generally ſet (perhaps a year or more too early) within two years of the battle of Mantineia. The very circumſtance, however, that Xenophon has recorded the death of Ageſilaus, with the teſtimonies extant to his reſidence Corinth, ſeem ſufficient to invalidate the date of his death, as it ſtands in our copies of Laertius.

[72] ——— Pictoribus atque poetis
Quidlibet audendi ſemper fuit æqua poteſtas.
HOR. de art. poet. v. 10.

According to all accounts of Gryllus he fought in the Athenian cavalry. Xenophon, in his narrative of the battle, makes no mention of his ſon; but he marks clearly that the Athenian cavalry was not ingaged till after Epameinondas was killed.

END OF THE THIRD VOLUME.

Lately published,

BY CADELL AND DAVIES,

A NEW EDITION

OF THE

FIRST FOUR VOLUMES, IN OCTAVO,

OF

THE HISTORY OF GREECE.

By WILLIAM MITFORD, Esq.

Price One Pound Four Shillings in Boards.

BRITISH
10 JA 1926
MUSEUM